The Samurai preparing for the Dragon´s Attack? Normative Drivers and Strategic Foundations of Japan´s Security Cooperation with Australia and the United States

Academic Paper 2013 90 Pages

Politics - International Politics - Topic: Miscellaneous


Table of Contents




List of Figures

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Chapter 2 – Analytical Framework
1.1 Methodology
1.2 National Identity
1.3 Collective Identity
1.4 Security Communities
1.4.1 Tier One
1.4.2 Tier Two Structure Process
1.4.3 Tier Three

Chapter 3 – Case Study
Part 1 – Collective Identity Formation 11/2001- 03/2006
2.1 Bilateral Cooperation
2.1.1 United States-Australia Relations The Howard Administration Australia´s 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper The Iraq War
2.1.2 Japan-United States Relations 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan The Iraq Invasion 2003 and the “War on Terror” Two SCC Meetings in 2005 The February Meeting The October Meeting
2.1.3 Japan-Australia Relations John Howard´s Visit to Japan in 2003 Cooperation in Iraq 2006 Developments
2.2 Trilateral Cooperation
2.3 South Korea´s Exclusion
2.3.1 ROK-Australia Relations
2.3.2 ROK-United States Relations
2.3.3 ROK-Japan Relations

Part 2 – Japan´s Evolving Security Framework 05/2006 – 03/2010
3.1 The “Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century”
3.2 The Security Treaty with Australia 2007
3.3 A Quadrilateral Relationship with India?
3.4 BMD Cooperation with the United States
3.5 ACSA with Australia 2010
3.6 Convergence with the Obama Administration?

Part 3 – The Greater Strategy
4.1 The Strategy: Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific
4.2 The Foundation
4.3 The Bush Administration
4.4 Australia´s Participation
4.5 Japan´s Participation and the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”

Chapter 4 - Conclusion



This book is thankfully dedicated to my parents.

Special thanks go to Brian Melican for proofreading. I am grateful for Kai Schulze´s valuable critique and insightful discussions on constructivism.

I thank Prof. Dr. Heberer for frequent support and inspiration.


This study is an exploration and analysis of the ideational drivers of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) that was concluded in March 2006, between Japan, Australia and the United States.

Turning away from materialist explanations of security cooperation, the questions of this study are: can the conclusion of the TSD and its subsequent evolution be accounted for by a perceived collective identity between the three countries? And what is the Japanese Government´s motivation to expand its alliances architecture?

The last decade provides the timeframe for a qualitative analysis. The findings of this study show that the agreement and its following deepening is the result of a strong collective identity constituted by shared norms and democratic values. Moreover, Japan targets with the United States and Australia the establishment of a multilateral community of democratic states in the Asia-Pacific. The results also indicate, however, that collective identity promises peace between liberal states but is hostile towards non-liberal ones.


illustration not visible in this excerpt

List of Figures

Figure 1: The Development of Security Communities

Figure 2: Outline of the “Arc of Freedom and Democracy”.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

“Wenn irgendwo zwischen zwei Mächten ein noch so harmlos aussehender Pakt geschlossen wird, muss man sich sofort fragen, wer hier umgebracht werden soll.”[1]

– Otto von Bismarck

This quote by Germany´s first Chancellor gives an indication of the way security cooperation has been analyzed in 19th century European concert of monarchic powers. Even though Von Bismarck´s days are almost 150 years behind us now, research on security ties or alliances still typically subscribes to a perspective that focuses on material terms and the international balance of power.

In the East Asia of the 21st century an important change to the local balance of power, the so-called “San Francisco System” of alliances between the American “hub” and it’s allied “spokes” has happened.[2] This system and the bilateral character of the relationships dominated security policy in the Asia Pacific region since its inception in 1951-52. The change is displayed in the conclusion of a trilateral security relationship, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, between the liberal democracies of Australia, the United States and Japan. As explaining security relations between states on materialist grounds is the general trend in international relations (IR) scholarship, the TSD was quickly perceived as an act of “neo-containment” to confront a economically and militarily rising China. Consequently, Post-World War II IR theory has paid little attention to non-material factors such as national identity and culture. Theory has become increasingly structuralist and has drifted toward largely unvarying systemic properties of the international anarchic system, deducing from which is assumed to be national interests of state actors. Kenneth Waltz´ Theory of International Politics is the vanguard of this tradition, which assumes states to be rational unitary actors, pursuing accumulation of power, and whose actions are governed by the structure of international anarchy. In this sense, weak states band together against a common foe[3]. As a consequence, realism, with its focus on power, national interest, and the systemic environment, has reigned as the orthodoxy in explanations of Japanese foreign policy. And Sino-Japanese rivalry; contentious territorial and resource disputes; the North Korean nuclear threat; the seemingly eternal presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait; the wrangling over U.S. military bases; the expansion of security arrangements between Japan, Australia, and India - all seem to validate the appropriateness and strength of the realist explanation of interstate relations in East Asia. Realism does not produce a uniform picture of Japan, however. Diverse variations of realism can be identified, including realism that Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels call “dual hedging” mercantile, Jennifer Lind’s militarily strong “buck-passing,” Michael Green’s “reluctant,” Michael Blaker’s diplomatically “coping,” Kent Calder’s economically reactive, Christopher Hughes’s on-the-verge-of-normality, Daniel Kliman’s born-again, and Kenneth Pyle’s never-died classical realism.[4]

While realism doubtlessly delivers cutting-edge analyses of security policies, the schools of thoughts´ tenets nevertheless fail to address most non-material factors that drive security relations between states. And Japan´s (evolving) security relations have been mostly left to be explained by the realist school of thought.

Constructivist IR scholarship fills the gap of addressing those non-material factors of security policies, and casually challenges the hegemony of rational structuralism in IR theory too. Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein popularized the main tenets of the school of thought in the 1990s. Moreover, the majority of current constructivist IR scholarship on Japan´s identity is mainly focused on Japan´s security policy and its sources. As such, constructivist research has been largely driven by the question as to why Japan has been reluctant to use military force since the end of the Pacific War.[5] Constructivists argued that post-war Japan had developed a uniquely antimilitarist identity of purely domestic origin, which constituted or constrained the national security agenda.[6] However, the Koizumi administration´s (2001-2006) security posture has not only seriously undermined assertions of deep-rooted cultural norms as the foundation for Japanese anti-militarism, the active shaping of security policy of the following administrations also rendered Japan´s reliance on the United States as the one and only security partner obsolete. The swift enactment of laws that enabled Japan´s participation in the “War on Terror”, the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the signing of landmark security treaties with Australia and India as well as the adoption of various national security-related legislation in the face of strong resistance from the opposition demonstrates that Japan´s reluctance to resort to force cannot be traced primarily to certain cultural or normative structures alone. Such an approach presupposes a relatively stable and static effect of those ideational factors[7] - and neglects foreign influences. Moreover, constructivist IR theory in Japan is still very historical and theories including identity are not very popular. Foreign-language works by researchers like Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger tend to be met with mild bewilderment because ideas on both the government and people´s level are much more complicated than simply pacifism or anti-militarism. This is an important question for Japan´s security identity which is left unanswered in the scholarship. Japan´s post-war “Peace Constitution” for example, which is seen as one of the main manifestations of Japan´s antimilitarism[8] was drafted by the Occupation authorities, an external actor. Therefore, drawing borders between the domestic and the international obscures the origins and structure of Japan´s foreign and security identity.

An examination of the relationship between Japan´s ideational structures and the “outside” is thus necessary and this study aims to fill this knowledge gap using the concept of collective identity. The questions that are to be answered in this case study thus are: can the conclusion of the TSD and its subsequent deepening be explained by a perceived collective identity between the three governments of Japan, Australia and the United States? And what was the Japanese government´s motivation to expand its security framework?

This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the topic. I briefly discuss contemporary International Relations (IR) studies regarding security cooperation between Realism and Constructivism. This is followed by chapter two which outlines collective identity, its defining dimensions and its implications for the development of a security community as outlined by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The case study, as the main part of the paper, is found in chapter three and is divided into three parts. In the first part, the collective identity formation between Japan, the United States and Australia until the establishment of the TSD in 2006 is analyzed. In order to gain further insight into the process, this analysis will be complemented by a contrasting case study of what normative factors exclude South Korea (like Japan and Australia a democracy and ally of the United States) from the framework. The second part illuminates Tokyo´s deepening of its security relations while focusing on collective identity as driver of the process. The third part sheds light onto Tokyo´s motivation to expand its security relations. Finally, chapter four offers a conclusion based on the theoretical analysis of the previous chapters. Arguments are limited and possible implications for the future of Japan´s security relations are drawn.

Chapter 2 – Analytical Framework

1.1 Methodology

Methodologically, this study belongs to the research field of International Relations and it develops a concept of collective identity by drawing on a constructivist approach based on Adler and Barnett´s framework of Security Communities. The method in approaching the questions outlined above is by utilizing discourse and content analysis that surrounded the development of the TSD over the past decade. In particular, it sheds light on the terms of inclusion and exclusion that reside within the texts of international politics.

1.2 National Identity

The concept of national identity negates the presumed uniformity of nation-states as posed by realists. The concept was present in the scholarship in the 1940s and 1960s, and was established by such academics as Hedley Bull or Karl Deutsch. Identity is not a static normative or ideational structure. Rather, it is an “ongoing boundary drawing process”[9] in which the cognitive borders of the Self are defined and redefined in opposition to difference embodied in a multiplicity of Others. The fact that identities are shaped in relationship to others is emphasized by Alexander Wendt who poses that egoistic identities are not intrinsic, exogenously given features of human agency but social terms of individuality that are constantly reproduced through practice. If Alter chooses to defect Ego in a social dilemma they are simultaneously choosing to reproduce the egoistic identities that constitute that dilemma. This also applies to prosocial behavior. If Alter chooses cooperation in a social dilemma, Ego implicitly takes a collective identity, acting as if he cares for Alter, expecting him to do the same in return (“altercasting”). Ego ´s new identity will be reinforced if Alter reciprocates. Over time, the reinforcement will lead to further cooperation and an internalization of collective identity of parties in the end.[10]

Identity is an open-ended process, a multi-leveled discursive construction in which the boundaries of the collective Self can expand to include its former constitutive Other (Germany´s post-war integration into Europe, for example). Identities are not only personal or psychological. They are also social, defined by the actor´s interaction with and relationship to others. Identities can also be constructed around certain, subjectively perceived characteristics and can thus be exclusive. Therefore, any normative identity category (such as democracy or liberalism, for example) presupposes an Opposite. As such, all political identities are contingent and depend on the actor´s interaction with others and place within an institutional context. National and state identities are thus formed in relationship to other nations and states. The identities of political actors are tied to their relationship to those outside the boundaries of the community and the territory.[11]

1.3 Collective Identity

But what constitutes a collective identity between states? For Thomas Risse-Kappen, “values and norms embedded in the political culture of liberal democracies constitute the collective identity of a security community among democracies”.[12] Because even the most ideologically and politically compatible allies will not be immune to some degree of suspicion and mistrust toward their partner´s motives the allies observe predictable patterns, norms, of behavior.[13] For Peter Katzenstein, norms involve “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity…norms have “regulative” effects that specify standards of appropriate behavior.”[14] A security community may exhibit formal norms (institutionalized rules, treaty regulations) or informal expectations or obligations. These together become a type of “regime” which mediates relations between the partners, forming a “codification of principles, rules and procedures to govern alliance behavior.”[15] Once these norms are established, they develop into symbolic “values” to be adhered to by the allies. Deviating from the established norms carries the risk of undermining the allied trust and might provoke reprisal from the other member states.[16]

Collective identities entail that people not only positively identify with other people´s fate but also identify themselves and those other people as a group in relation to other groups.[17] Alexander Wendt defines collective identity as a „positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than independent.”[18] In this sense, collective identity considers the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, being altruistic. While altruistic actors may still be rational, they nevertheless calculate their interests in terms of the group or “team”.[19] This implies a willingness to make sacrifices for the Other for his own sake, when necessary.

1.4 Security Communities

Karl Deutsch was one of the first to research the ideational factors that provided friendly security relations among a group of states. His concept of “Security Communities” was reinvigorated with the advent of the constructivist school of IR theory. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett were the ones to offer a reconstructed architecture of Deutsch´s concept.[20]

Adler and Barnett define a pluralistic security community as a “transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”[21] The distinctive feature of a security community is that a stable peace is tied to the existence of a transnational community. A community is defined by three characteristics: first, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. Secondly, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations in several setting. Thirdly, communities display a reciprocity that expresses long-term interest and possibly even altruism. Long-term interest develops from knowledge of those with whom one is cooperating. Altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility. Even though actors will come to identify with each other, they also will continue to harbor distinct interests. These create competitive behavior which can lead to conflict. However, while states of a security community possibly display rivalry, they no longer fear the use of violence as a means to settle their disagreements.

The three defining qualities of a community outlined above cannot only exist at the local or domestic but also on the international level. Communities develop around networks, interactions, and face-to-face encounters that do not rely on inhabiting the same geographic area. Security communities do not exclusively emerge between neighboring countries because individuals can define themselves based on markers that are not necessarily tied to a certain space.

The outcome that distinguishes a security community from other communities is that its members entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change. This outcome can be analyzed in its two companion elements. Dependable expectations can be explained by different theories of social interaction. Stable expectations can result from (a) actors with pre-given interests and preferences, such as rationalist theories (neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism) or (b) actors with shared identities, whose very identities and interests are shaped by their environment, i.e. interpretative theories such as those offered by constructivists. However, only constructivist theory allows for the possibility that interstate interactions can transform the identities and interests of states and induce dependable expectations of peaceful change. While peaceful change might be explained through the language of Realpolitik and/or the calculation of expected material benefits to be derived from a course of action, Adler and Barnett´s approach implemented here isolates knowledge, learning, and the existence of norms that emerge from interstate practices and transnational forces.

Adler and Barnett define peaceful change as “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.”[22] States do not undertake and do not consider security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening. Therefore, security communities can exist in the absence of well-developed strategic ties or a formal alliance. Because security communities can count for compliance on the acceptance of collectively-held norms, a security community that is dependent on enforcement mechanisms is not a security community. Some of these norms are not only regulative, designed to overcome the collective action problems associated with interdependent choice, but also constitutive as a direct reflection of the actor´s identity and self-understanding. Consequently, security communities will rely for their governance structures not only on an understanding of their member states´ behavior in the international sphere but they will also read their domestic behavior and arrangements. A security community´s governance structure thus depends on (a) the state´s external identity and associated behavior and (b) on its domestic characteristics and practices. As a consequence, it is crucial that states govern their domestic behavior in ways consistent with the community. States comprising a security community are still sovereign in a formal-legalistic sense. However, their sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy are contingent on the security community in two respects. First, a security community does not erode the state´s legitimacy but the more closely tied a security community is, the more the state´s role will be altered. Secondly, the conditions under which the state is viewed as part of the community and given certain rights, obligations, and duties, depend on its ability to abide by the region´s normative structure. States remain “free agents” as long as their own preferences are framed by the common understandings of the community.

Adler and Barnett organized their framework of a security community around three tiers. Tier one concerns the precipitating environment. Tier two examines the positive, dynamic, and reciprocal relationship between the structure of the region. This is defined by material power and knowledge, social processes, organizations, transactions and social learning. The third tier of mutual trust and collective identity formation is shaped by these dynamics.

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Figure 1: The development of Security Communities

1.4.1 Tier One

Technological developments, an external threat, the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, new interpretations of social reality and other developments can move states to turn to each other to coordinate their policies to mutual benefit. These early encounters and first efforts of cooperation create trust or mutual identification. Simply because they are based on the promise of more pleasant and more frequent exchanges, they provide the necessary environment for these very possibilities.

1.4.2 Tier Two

In the second tier, states and their peoples have become involved in a series of social interactions which begin to revise the environment in which they are embedded. This tier is divided into “structural” categories of power and knowledge and the “process” categories of transactions, international organizations (IO) and institutions, and social learning. Collective identity and mutual trust forms under these dynamic, positive, and reciprocal connections between these variables. Without these, there could be no dependable expectations of peaceful change. Structure

The structural binders for the development of a security community are power and knowledge. Power can be an important factor in the development of a security community by virtue of a core-state´s ability to push and drive others to maintain a collective stance. Power can be alternatively understood as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community. As such, power can be a magnet. While powerful states that belong to the core of strength do not create security per se, security communities grow around them because of the positive images of security that are linked with powerful and successful states. Knowledge also constitutes part of the international structure. Part of what constitutes and constrains state action is the knowledge that represents categories of practical action and legitimate activity. Scholars of international politics identified one set of political ideas and meanings that are related to a security community: liberalism and democracy.[23] Common ideas of the role of government, tolerance, and the rule of law enable a shared transnational civic culture. This shapes the transnational identity of individuals of the community. Secondly, liberal ideas promote strong civil societies through intense exchange of people, goods, and ideas. However, other ideas also account for the formation of security communities. A shared project, for example, which increases the number of interactions and the development of common institutions. This shared project promotes collective purpose around which a shared identity and, thereafter, dependable expectations of peaceful change emerge. Process

Social facts do not depend on material resources alone, but also on collective experience and human consensus. The categories of process involve transactions, international organizations and institutions and learning. IO and institutions contribute directly and indirectly to the development of mutual trust and a shared identity on four issues. First, organizations contribute to the development of trust through the establishment of behavioral norms, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those norms. Secondly, organizations are sites of socialization and learning. Political actors learn and perhaps even “teach” others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are. Identities are created and reproduced on the basis of knowledge that people have of themselves and others. Through institutions, lead actors develop positive reciprocal expectations and thus identify with each other. Thirdly, IOs are contributing to the development of mutual trust and collective identities because of their potential to provide conditions that support their development. They are able to foster around commonly held attributes, for example, democracy or human rights. They reinforce the belief in a common fate and enhance norms and practices of self-restraint, such as mediation.

Political elites create innovative institutions to promote new possibilities. Communication between peoples, learning processes, and the thickening of the social environment play a crucial role in the evolution of political communities. However, the most profound change is brought about by agents who transform them into political reality through institutional and political power. Such matters highlight the critical role of social learning, which represents the capacity and motivation of social actors to manage and transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities. This explains why norms and other cognitive and cultural categories that are tied to a collective identity, interests, and practices, are transmitted from individual to individual and state to state. They are internalized by individuals and are institutionalized in governments and society. Consequently, social learning plays a critical role in the emergence of security communities. It is facilitated by transactions that typically occur in organizational settings and core powers. During their transactions, people communicate their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and their normative expectations. As a result, there might occur possible changes in individual and collective understandings and values.

Transactions are an essential feature for the development of collective learning and collective identities. Learning often occurs within institutionalized settings. Social learning may not be sufficient for the development of a security community unless learning is connected to functional processes that are traceable to a general improvement of the state´s condition. This is why core powers are crucial to the process. States that possess superior material power, international legitimacy and have adopted norms and practices that are conducive to peaceful change confer increased material and moral authority to the norms and practices they diffuse. As such, social learning frequently occurs through a communicative exchange in the context of power asymmetries. Nevertheless, even asymmetrical relationships can involve a situation where partners negotiate a new regional collective identity around consensual norms and mutual understandings. Through the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action, social learning encourages political actors to see each other as trustworthy.

The structural and process conditions are necessary for the development of mutual trust and collective transnational identities. The emergence of collective identities may be prompted by learning processes that occur within institutionalized settings which subsequently lead to changes in cognitive structures. In any event, the processes that develop are critical for the development of a security community.

1.4.3 Tier Three

The dynamic and positive relationships among the variables described above are the source of mutual trust and collective identity. Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing. Because a minimal level of trust is necessary for a collective identity to develop, trust comes prior to identity. A collective identity however reinforces and increases the depth of trust and the more tightly connected security communities are, the shorter is the collective cognitive distance between its members.[24]

Chapter 3 – Case Study Part 1 – Collective Identity Formation 11/2001- 03/2006

2.1 Bilateral Cooperation

2.1.1 United States-Australia Relations

Australia and the United States look back on a long history of security cooperation. They were allies in every major military conflict of the 20th century (World War I+II, the Korean War, Vietnam, the Gulf War) and created the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) treaty in February 1951. The U.S. hence maintained and deepened its security relations with Australia[25] while the Reagan administration extricated New Zealand from ANZUS in 1985 due to New Zealand’s ban of nuclear weapons or nuclear powered vessels in its territorial waters.

Government representatives of both countries have enthusiastically incorporated references to culture, values, and traditions in more recent statements and communiqués relevant to security in the Asia-Pacific. Especially in the United States, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to an ideological upsurge of emphasis over American values and American national identity vis-à-vis a “savage”, “backward” and “inhumane” foe. Responding to the terrorist attacks with the invasion of Afghanistan, Dick Cheney justified military action because the United States has “always stood for human freedom”, and he constructed the nation as “freedom's home and defender” while terrorists on the contrary are “evil people, who dwell in the shadows, planning unimaginable violence and destruction.”[26] The Bush administration compared fundamentalist terror to Nazism, Militarism and Soviet Communism which allowed for the construction of a “just” and “righteous” American national identity. The threats of the 20th century were defeated by the “will of free peoples” and the “strength of great alliances” and even though this “asymmetric” threat was new, America´s “duty” was nevertheless “familiar.”[27] For the Bush administration Islamic terrorism posed “the greatest danger to our free society, to our values and I would say to our lives.”[28] As a consequence, the United States did not engage in defensive warfare of its territorial and political independence but fought “in defense of civilization and humane values”[29] thus giving moral justification for military action in countries that, from the U.S. government´s perspective, would not coerce with those attributes. President Bush stated in 2002 that the United States had no intention of imposing its culture onto other countries. “But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.”[30] The Howard Administration

The American values discourse found strong resonance in Australia´s government under John Howard of the Liberal Party of Australia. With his 1996 election, the Australian Prime Minister (PM) was intent on strengthening the relationship with the United States, a turn of policy from his predecessor Paul Keating of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). One of the first results of this policy shift was that Canberra reaffirmed the ANZUS alliance in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.

On the day of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Howard was visiting Washington, D.C. and the attacks had a significant impact on his thinking on foreign and defense policy. “I have to say that of all of the events that I have been in any way touched by in the 27 year that I’ve been in public life, none has had a more profound impact on me than has this.”[31] In his rhetoric, he adapted to the one of the Bush administration with its monochrome view of the world, striking it into “good” and “evil”:

“September 11 was a rare moment when evil emerged to challenge the human decency upon which our democratic societies are built. It was not a local challenge – it was global – and it called for a global response. (…) Passive indifference in the face of evil achieves nothing. (…) We would be foolish indeed, in the very first years of the twenty-first century, to forget the most hard learned lesson of the twentieth century – that evil cannot be appeased.”[32]

Thus the events of September 11 were an attack not only on the United States, but on “all civilized nations” and a world system built on “individual freedom, religious tolerance, democracy, and the international free flow of commerce” which Howard perceived as the “virtues of the modern world.”[33] From his perspective, the terrorist attack was not only designed to shatter the faith and the ability to live lives in a “free and open manner”, it was designed to “shake the world’s economic foundations.”[34] As such would the openness and tolerance of the Australian society be “lethal” for the international terrorist. “I am proud to be an Australian citizen for many reasons, but none seems more relevant in today’s troubled world than our extraordinary achievement of building a single nation drawn from so many cultures and religious traditions.”[35] John Howard boasted Australia´s “distinctive setting” of the “great bulwarks” of Australia´s liberal democracy: “a vigorous parliamentary system, a free market economy, the rule of law and impartial courts, a free press and a vibrant civil society.”[36]

While the concurrence in values discourse can be conceived as “mere talk”, first normative drivers in the relationship emerge. On September 14, 2001 John Howard invoked Article IV of the ANZUS treaty. Because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 happened on the East Coast of the U.S., the Australian government displayed the norm of pacta sunt servanda. Canberra stipulated that the threat of international terrorism had to be taken on by all Western liberal democracies. Howard emphasized Australia´s support for the United States:

“This was not simply an attack on America. We were all the targets. (…) If we left this contest only to America, we would be leaving it to them to defend our rights and those of all the other people of the world who have a commitment to freedom and liberty”.[37]

Thus, the Australian government justified its participation in the war in Afghanistan (and later Iraq) because Australia has a commitment to act “where appropriate in different parts of the world to defend the values that Britain and Australia and the United States and other countries hold in common, because in the end a nation's foreign policy must be values based”.[38]

Already after the war in Afghanistan, United States-Australia security arrangements and the political statements surrounding them had dwelt, as Tow and Albinski argue, on “similar values, shared histories, languages and outlooks within the so-called Western community of states.”[39] Australia´s 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper

This development was further intensified with Australia´s 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. The notion that the US-Australian alliance is founded upon “shared values” had already found an expression in the 2000 Australian Defence White Paper. Whilst acknowledging that the white papers emerge from different ministries which may use different vocabularies, there is a notable increase in the references to values between the 2000 and 2003 papers. This is unsurprising before the background of September 11 and the subsequent intensification of pro-liberal democratic discourses in the U.S. and Australia.

Advancing the National Interest, the 2003 Foreign and Trade policy White Paper under patronage of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, and the Minister for Trade Mark Vaile, placed a premium on the fight against international terrorism, the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles, making security policy the centerpiece of the document. In the paper it is apparent how closely Australian policy makers made values a primary driver of their defense and security policy. The authors identified that the international terrorism was not only a threat to Australian security but it would pose “a deliberate challenge to the values of the Western world”.[40] The document emphasized Australia´s liberal values as a driving force for the country´s policy making with democratic partners:

“Australia is a liberal democracy with a proud commitment to political and economic freedom. That freedom is a foundation of our security and prosperity. We have a long tradition of working with other liberal democracies around the world to defend and promote it.[41]

The government positioned Australia´s place in the world as part of the Western system of liberal democracies, pointing to the goal of strengthening the alliance with the United States:

“Australia and the United States share values and ideals that underpin our strong relationship. We both have deep democratic traditions and aspirations, elements of a common heritage and a lasting record of cooperation and shared sacrifice. Our security alliance is a practical manifestation of these shared values”.[42]

While security relations with Japan find no reference at all, the importance of liberal values moved to the forefront of the White Paper is striking. This is also addressed by Alan Gyngell who notes that although the word “interest” was in the title of the document, it was “overtly about values”. As such, the “vital” relationship with the United States (the only country on which “vital” is used) is underpinned by the fact that Australia and the United States “share values and ideals”[43]

Importantly, the strong emphasis on values as a driving force of Australia´s foreign and security policy underpinned the Howard government´s willingness to the utilization of military force in order to defend the country´s liberal values. Kelly concludes that John Howard´s approach to politics was driven by his “beliefs and style”, among them the belief in the traditional value of a close security relationship with the United States, a “penchant to project national power including military power to achieve political goals” and a “sanctioning of foreign policy positions by invoking Australian values”.[44] As such, the use of force was considered a legitimate tool to shape the regional and global security environment.[45] The Iraq War

This development found its practical manifestation in Australia´s participation in the wars in Afghanistan and, to a greater extent, in Iraq. While the invasion of Afghanistan was welcomed with little criticism, the 2003 invasion of Iraq received international repudiation and helpless cynicism over American military supremacy.

The contribution of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) to heavy combat operations in these war theaters was limited in comparison to U.S. or British forces. ADF contributions during the combat phase in Iraq totaled less than one percent of the coalition´s combat force.[46] As such, Australia´s contribution to the Iraq military operation was seen by many as another example of military-diplomatic “symbolism” in the country´s alliance relationship with the United States.[47] However, pacta sunt servanda is obvious. The Howard government was a firm supporter of the Bush administrations action against Iraq at a fairly early stage in the run-up to the war. One year before the invasion, Howard stated: “Most of all, we value loyalty given and loyalty gained - the concept of mateship runs deep within the Australian character. We cherish and where necessary will fight to preserve the liberties we both [Australia and the U.S.] hold so dear.”[48] As such Howard boasted that “Australia is a liberal democracy with (…) a proud history of defending freedom against its enemies.”[49] This was not mere rhetoric. Canberra dispatched troops to Iraq despite strong dissent from the Australian public. Moreover, Canberra participated with 1500 ADF troops in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and with 2000 troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This is a significant obligation for Australia considering the relatively small ADF. After the invasion, the Australian government stood firmly behind the Bush administration and boasted its support for the “War on Terror”:

“Australians will also take their place within that coalition as highly respected and highly prized comrades in arms. Through decades of close military co-operation, in peacetime and in war, America has grown to respect the quality of our soldiers, our sailors and our airmen.”[50]

Before this background it is evident that Australia´s participation in the military actions in Iraq was not mere symbolism but a firm example of pacta sunt servanda. The Howard administration kept its word even in the face of overwhelming public and international opposition. This is also highlighted by Michael Wesley. He points out that most crucial for the Canberra-Washington dyad´s positive development was Australia´s support for the United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and during the Iraq War: “Canberra´s solidarity in the face of opposition, especially as the enunciated pre-war case for invasion unraveled, was a gesture that resonated strongly in Washington.”[51] However, the relationship is not a zero-sum game for Australia. Reciprocity is also a strong driver because the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2005 was “widely viewed as a reward for Australian loyalty in the war on terrorism.”[52]

Further collective norms shaped the cooperation of both militaries in Iraq. Nevertheless the small Australian contribution, the U.S. military command was willing to take advice from the Australian force commander, Maurice McNarn, on operational issues. McNam served at the military headquarters in Qatar and vetoed U.S. military planners on a number of occasions and was thus able to influence the coalition´s operations. The U.S. representatives always respected Australia´s vetoing.[53] This would not have been possible if the norms of cooperation and consultation and information between the two allies who greatly differ in military strength and who do not oblige to constitutive norms of a legal treaty outside of ANZUS where non-existent.

Cooperation in war theaters has been alleviated by the fact that U.S. and Australian forces regularly conduct joint military exercises, rang­ing from full-scale joint maneuvers to unit-level operations. Joint training exercises sponsored by the Australian Defense Force Joint Operations Com­mand and the U.S. Pacific Command include sea, air, and land mock battle, a computer-simulated war, paratroop and amphibious inser­tions, live-fire exercises, and anti-sub­marine warfare.[54] In addition to bilateral exercises, the two countries work together on missile defense. Cooper­ation between the Australian Defense Science and Technology Office and the Pentagon Missile Defense Agency has gained significant momentum since July 07, 2004, when the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding outlin­ing future Australian participation in missile defense activities. The 25-year agreement commits Canberra to Washington’s missile defense program, including cooperative development of advanced radar technology capable of providing early detection of hostile bal­listic missiles.[55]

2.1.2 Japan-United States Relations

Japanese foreign and security policy preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks was characterized by reluctance towards change. It was only with the election of Koizumi Jun'ichirō as Prime Minister of Japan in 2000, that the Japanese Government became a proactive shaper of security and alliance politics. This was spurred by two external factors: most obviously the terrorist attacks in New York and to a lesser extent, the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the repellent neighbor for Japan.[56] In December 2001, the Japanese Coast Guard sank a spy ship from North Korea, marking the incident to be the first since World War II with Japanese hostile fire. For the newly elected Japanese administration, the terrorist attacks provided an opportunity to not only justify further institutional change of Japan´s security norms, but to expand Japan´s security posture. 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan

The Koizumi administration´s response to the 9/11 attacks displays norm obedience to pacta sunt servanda. On September 19, 2001 Koizumi explained his position in a press conference and his words resemble those of John Howard. He stated that the terrorist attacks in New York

“represent not only attacks on the United States, but attacks on freedom, peace and democracy of the whole of humankind. Recognizing this, I was resolved for Japan to take its own initiative towards the eradication of terrorism, in cooperation with the United States and other countries concerned (beikoku ni taisuru kougeki nominarazu, kore ha sekai jinrui ni taisuru jiyuu heiwa, minshushugi ni taisuru kougeki da. souiu ninshiki no shimoni, tero conzetsu ni muke, Nihon toshitemo Beikoku hajime kankei shokoku to kyouryoku shinagara, shutaitekina torikumi wo shitai to omoimashite).”[57]

He emphasized his strong support for any U.S. action four days later when he spoke at the funeral ceremony in the United States:

“These terrorist attacks are a serious challenge not only to the United States, but to the freedom, peace and democracy of the world. (…) as an ally, Japan strongly supports the United States and is resolved to do its utmost in offering assistance and cooperation (kono tero kougeki ha, Beikoku nominarazu, jiyuu, heiwa, soshite minshushugi ni taisuru juudaina chousen desu […] doumeikoku toshite Beikoku wo tsuyoku shijishi, saidaigen no shien to kyouryoku wo oshimanai ketsui desu).”[58]

Koizumi pledged to make sure that the Japan-US Security relationship functions even more effectively and stipulated to work with Washington “in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity” (kyouchou to rentai no seishin) as it was necessary for Japan to “defend peace and freedom for all humankind (sekai jinrui no heiwa to jiyuu wo mamoru).”[59]

Like Australia, Japan supported the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 because the terrorist attacks: “thrust before us basic issues of how to protect our values, our citizens and our civilized society (9.11 ha wareware no kachikan, shimin, shiminshakai wo ikani bouei suru no ka toiu kadai wo tsukitsuketeimasu).”[60] In a first move to achieve this, he tied the military operationally to the alliance with the United States. He pushed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (tero taisaku tokubetsu sochi hou, hereafter ATSML) through the Diet on October 29, 2001 which allowed for increased dialogues and intelligence exchanges between the Japanese and American armed forces and as a result, the depth of mission coordination intensified substantially.[61] The law was a “milestone” in Japan´s security evolution as it permitted the SDF to give rear-support to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and enabled the dispatch of SDF vessels on refueling missions to the Indian Ocean.[62] This development is noteworthy as the Japanese government circumvented the “peace norm” (heiwa kihan) of Japan´s foreign policy which had functioned under the slogan “strength based on peace” (chikara ni yoru heiwa). This peace norm found it´s informal constitution in the Japanese public that disapproved of anything related to military affairs. Formally the norm is constituted in Article IX of the National Constitution of Japan that prohibits acts of war by the state.[63]

When President Bush visited Japan in February 2002, Koizumi made it clear that Japan would firmly stand on the United States´ side in the “War on Terror”. Bush´s explanation why he had started his first visit to Asia in Japan exemplifies Washington´s gratitude for Tokyo´s pacta sunt servanda: “because Japan is one of America's greatest and truest friends. (…) The peace of the world is now threatened by global terror. And we have had no better friend, and nobody provides such steadfast support than the Japanese government.”[64] When Bush spoke to the Japanese Diet he stated that “The bonds of friendship and trust between our two people were never more evident than in the days and months after September the 11th.”[65] This met Koizumi´s assessment of Japan-U.S. ties who stated that he felt “a strong affinity and trust” (tsuyoi shitashimi to shinrai) with the President since he had first met him the year before: “I believe this friendship represents the larger relationship between our two countries. Japan-U.S. ties are now closer and deeper than ever in our history (watashi to daitouryou no yuujou ha nichibei nikokukan no kankei wo shouchou suru mono to shinjimasu).”[66]

The two countries consult and inform each other through several fora: The Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), the Security Subcommittee (SSC), the Security Consultative Group (SCG), and the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee.[67]

The high level of interaction is evident in dealings with the National Security Strategy of the Unites States of America (hereafter referred to as NSS or Bush doctrine) which was published on September 20, 2002. The Bush doctrine held significant implications for the Asian security order and especially Japan. In preparation for the Iraq War, the United States declared that it would transform America´s global defense posture focusing on the reduction of forward-deployed forces and the replacement of bases. In both cases Japan would have been affected. However, possible transformation without previous consultation of the Japanese government was impossible to think and the allies began consultations in December 2002 on a variety of issues. The reciprocity between the allies is evident with the result of the consultations that can be considered American gratitude for Japan´s support in Afghanistan. The Security Consultative Committee was enhanced at every level from tactical units to strategic consultations. Moreover, the allies agreed upon a profound transformation of the armed forces which resulted in the first integration of the forces since the existence of the alliance.[68] The joint statement of the just upgraded SCC thus displays the collective values between the governments of both countries and is the result of bilateral norm compliance. Both sides stressed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks “represented an assault on the basic values of freedom and democracy shared by their two nations” thus making “continued action and cooperation” of “highest importance”.[69] The Iraq Invasion 2003 and the “War on Terror”

The flourishing of bilateral relations was not only fostered by Koizumi´s pacta sunt servanda. At the outset, the Japanese government was opposed to military action against Iraq and wanted to restrain the Bush administration from engaging in such.[70] However, in October 2002, North Korea admitted that it had broken its pledge not to proceed with their nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang further declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), simultaneously evicting inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who were monitoring the Yongbyon nuclear facilities under the NPT inspections regime.[71] In their 2002 SCC meeting, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the United States and Japan had already agreed to closely cooperate in dealings with Pyongyang and developed approaches to defense and deterrence against WMD, including the strengthening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes. However, Richard Armitage, the United States Deputy Secretary of State reaffirmed the United States´ commitment to Japan´s most vital security issue. On February 26, 2003 he stated that “We consider an attack on Japan as an attack on the United States, and we will take action.”[72] U.S. ambassador Baker further emphasized the two countries common values in the Daily Yomiuri at the onset of the war: “Countries like Japan and the United States that believe in the rule of law have the responsibility to set standards of behavior and to address the challenges of dictators and tyrants who defy the will of the international community.”[73] Arguing that Iraq had not acted with “sufficient sincerity” (shuubunna seii), Koizumi expressed his “understanding and support” (rikai shi, shiji itashimasu) for the engagement in the military action of the U.S.-led invasion against Iraq on March 20, and emphasized that Japan stood firmly on the U.S. side in the war.[74] Moreover, Japan also hosted a postwar international conference on Iraq reconstruction in October 2003 and pledged US$ 5 billion, the largest amount of financial assistance after the United States and nearly 10% of the sum called for by the United States from donor states.

Koizumi´s support for the U.S. faced strong public criticism but marked a turning point in the alliance. The Japanese declaration was followed by direct logistical support for the U.S. military by the SDF whose role was further expanded. The “Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance” (iraku jindou fukkou shien tokusohou ni motodsuku taiou sochi, hereafter LCSMHRA) was pushed through the diet on July 26, 2004. Further constitutional prohibitions were circumvented by Koizumi who predicated the LCSMHRA on the basis of UN resolutions 1458 and 1511. The law allowed the dispatch of 600 Ground Self-defense Forces (GSDF) troops to Samara, Iraq and Air Self-defense Force (ASDF) to fly supplies and U.S. troops from Kuwait to Iraq. “The novelty was that the ground mission was neither requested by the host country nor was it UN-sanctioned (as required by the PKO Law).”[75] Even though the deployment of SDF personnel represents a precedent, 600 troops that only engage in humanitarian aid are of little importance to reconstructing a war-torn country, least of military value. The normative value for the Japan-United States alliance, however, was much higher because Japan´s support under the legal framework of both ATSML and LCSMHRA was entirely separate from the U.S.-Japan security treaty´s framework.[76] While Washington was supportive to Tokyo´s dealings with Pyongyang, the Japanese government increased its “defense burden” even in the face of strong domestic (public opinion) and international (China, France, Germany, Russia) opposition to the war against the Iraqi regime. The death or a serious injury of a Japanese soldier would have put domestic support for Japan´s foreign policy in peril. Before this background it is difficult to imagine Japan and the United States taking divergent approaches in their basic security policies in situations such as the conflict in Iraq.[77] This gives further evidence of the strong reciprocity in the relationship between the two countries.[78]

Namatame notes that Japan had “racked its head” (kuryo suru) over military participation in Iraq.[79] Yet, the government´s quick decision to join Japan´s participation in the Iraq War speaks another language. Japan´s participation marked a further shift in its constitutional limits and an incremental step in the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Again, Koizumi had complied with pacta sunt servanda after his support of American military action in Afghanistan. Moreover, the collaboration of their armed forces in operations in the Middle East taught the habits of multilateral interaction under U.S. instruction and among U.S. partners[80], most noticeably Australia.

The “War on Terror” allowed a new level of understanding between the governments in Washington and Tokyo. When American Vice President Dick Cheney visited Japan in April 2004, he emphasized what he considered the core of the Japan-U.S.-Alliance:

“We are drawn together not only by converging strategic and economic interests, but, above all, by our shared values. It is those values, our belief in constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of individual liberties that form the unshakable foundation of our alliance and provide the basis of our shared vision of the future.”[81]

Koizumi welcomed George W. Bush´s reelection in November 2004 and underlined what he considered to be both countries´ commonalities:

“Japan and the United States share fundamental values such as the respect for basic human rights, democracy and promotion of the market economy. (…) I intend to continue to cooperate with President Bush in striving for peace and prosperity of the world by jointly tackling the issues that the international community is faced with, as we further strengthen the Japan-US alliance in the global context (nichibei ryoukoku ha kihontekijinken no sonchou, jiminshugi ojobi shijoukeizai no suishin toitta kachikan wo kyouyuu shiteiru. […] watashi wa, kongotomo Busshu daitouryou to kyouryoku shi, ‘sekai no naka no nichibei doumei’ wo issou kyoukashi tsutsu, kokusai shakai ga chokumen suru samazamana kadai ni chikara wo awasete torikomi, sekai no heiwa to hanei no tame ni doryoku shite ikitai).”[82]

Security relations received further upgrading through an unprecedented move the same year. As agreed on in the 2002 SCC meeting, Japan finally announced that it would acquire a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system from the United States and that both countries would jointly develop BMD technology. This announcement is momentous because the joint development requires the alliance to cooperate on an unprecedented level of intimacy. The system requires extensive capabilities of integrated reconnaissance, surveillance as well as command and control systems, meaning mutual access to highest-level information and technology.[83] These technical requirements led to a significant integration of the Japanese and American defense systems and the move tied the United States closer to Japan.[84]


[1] Authors provisional translation: “When somewhere two powers conclude an even seemingly harmless pact one has to question who is supposed to be killed here.”

[2] The most important “spokes” are Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. See Kent Calder, "Securing Security Through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective,"The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004) p. 135-157

[3] See for example Glenn Snyder (1997), Alliance Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; and Stephen M. Walt (1997), “Why alliances endure or collapse”, Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, who represent the vanguards of these ideas.

[4] Eric Heginbotham, "Japan's Dual Hedge. Not Another Britain,"Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002), Jennifer Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,"International Security 29, no. 1 (2004). Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance," in Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,"World Politics 40, no. 4 (1988), Christopher Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence as A "Normal" Military Power (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), Daniel M. Kliman, Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik (Westport: Praeger, 2006), Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

[5] Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996). and Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). p. 193

[6] Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, Peter J. Katzenstein/Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University, East Asia Program, 1993).

[7] Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World. p. 98f and Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. p. 167

[8] Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security. p. 116

[9] Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the Eu's Mode of Differentiation,"Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2004). p. 31-33

[10] Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). p. 346

[11] Emanuel Adler/Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Security Communities, ed. Michael Barnett Emanuel Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). p. 47

[12] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). p. 370

[13] Charles Kegley, Gregory Raymond, „When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics” (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990)

[14] Ronald L. Jepperson/Alexander Wendt/Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). p. 54

[15] Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). p. 54

[16] Thomas S. Wilkins, "Towards a “Trilateral Alliance?” Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American–Japanese–Australian Relations,"Asian Security 3, no. 3 (2007). p. 259

[17] Adler/Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." p. 47

[18] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State,"The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994). p. 386

[19] Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. p. 229

[20] Emanuel Adler/Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

[21] Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." p. 30

[22] Ibid. p. 34

[23] This is the central claim of the argument of the “Democratic Peace”. See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993)

[24] Adler/Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." p. 37-48

[25] Hiroyuki Umetsu, "The Birth of Anzus: America's Attempt to Create a Defense Linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific,"International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4 (2004). p. 173

[26] The White House, Vice President Cheney Delivers Remarks at the 56th Annual Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner (2001 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011018.html.

[27] George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) (Miller Center of Public Affairs, [cited September 5 2010]); available from http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4541.

[28] The White House, The Vice President Participates in a Media Availability with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (2002 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020319.html.

[29] The White House, Remarks by the Vice President at Celebration for the Marine Corps Birthday (2001 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011110.html.

[30] George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002) (Miller Center of Public Affairs, [cited September 5 2010]); available from http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4540.

[31] John Howard, Pm's Address to the Australian Defence Association October 25, 2001 (2001 [cited July 1 2010]); available from http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/21243/20030411-0000/www.australianpolitics.com/news/2001/01-10-25.html.

[32] Ibid.([cited).

[33] Ibid.([cited).

[34] Ibid.([cited).

[35] Ibid.([cited).

[36] John Howard, The Lowy Lecture: Australia and the World (The Lowy Institute for International Affairs, 2005 [cited August 6 2010]); available from http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=396. p. 4

[37] Howard, Pm's Address to the Australian Defence Association October 25, 2001 ([cited).

[38] Parliament of Australia, Transcript of Joint Press Conference: The Prime Minister the Hon John Howard with British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw (2003 [cited September 9 2010]); available from http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Source%3A%22PRIME%20MINISTER%22%20Author_Phrase%3A%22straw,%20jack%22;rec=0.

[39] William Tow/Henry Albinski, "Anzus - Alive and Well after Fifty Years,"Australian Journal of Politics and History 48, no. 2 (2002). p. 171

[40] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 2003," (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). p. 16

[41] Ibid. p. 32

[42] Ibid. p. 86

[43] Allan Gyngell, There's Rhetoric and Dinner Talk, but Little Debate on Foreign Policy (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2003 [cited May 27 2010]); available from http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/24/1061663672744.html?from=storyrhs.

[44] Paul Kelly, "Howard's Decade," in Lowy Institute Paper 15 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006). p. 2f

[45] Benjamin Schreer, The Howard Legacy: Australian Military Strategy 1996-2007 (Frankfurt: Lang, 2008). p. 182

[46] Russell Parkin, "Coalition Operations: The Australian Special Forces Task Group Operations in Iraq,"Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia 55, no. 3 (2004).

[47] See, for example Mark Thompson, "Punching above Our Weight? Australia as a Middle Power,"Strategic Insights 18 (2005).

[48] John Howard, Address at the Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress (2002 [cited August 13 2010]); available from http://australianpolitics.com/news/2002/06/02-06-12.shtml.

[49] John Howard, Australia Day Address to the National Press Club January 25, 2006 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006 [cited July 18 2010]); available from http://australianpolitics.com/news/2006/01/06-01-25_howard.shtml.

[50] Howard, Pm's Address to the Australian Defence Association October 25, 2001 ([cited).

[51] Michael Wesley, "The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue's Institutional Politics," in Asia-Pacific Security. Us, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle, ed. Mark J. Thomson William T. Tow, Yoshinobu Yamamoto & Satu P. Limaye (London: Routledge, 2007). p. 40

[52] Joseph Siracusa, "John Howard, Australia, and the Coalition of the Willing,"Yale Journal of International Affairs 1, no. 2 (2006). p. 45

[53] Greg Sheridan, Secrets of the Alliance (The Australian, July 26, 2006 [cited May 27 2010]); available from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/secrets-of-the-alliance/story-e6frg6v6-1111112143535.

[54] Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Australian and U.S. Forces Strengthening Regional Security (United States Pacific Command, May 30, 2010 2006 [cited Fall/Winter 2005-2006]); available from http://forum.apan-info.net/2005-2006_fall-winter/australia/1.html.

[55] United States Department of Defense, United States and Australia Sign Missile Defense Agreement (2004 [cited July 12 2010]); available from http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=7529.

[56] Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan. Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). p. 148

[57] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Koizumi Naikaku Souritaijin Kishakaiken Roku [Transcript of Prime Minister Koizumi' Press Conference] (2001 [cited September 16 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0919sourikaiken.html.

[58] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Beikoku Tero Higaisha Zuitou Omimai No Kai Ni Okeru Naikaku Souridaijin Aisatsu [Remarks by the Prime Minister at the Memorial Ceremony for the Victims of Terrorist Attacks] (2001 [cited September 16 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0923aisatu.html.

[59] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Dai Hyaku Gojuu Sankai Kokkai Ni Okeru Koizumi Naikaku Souridaijin Shoshin Hyoumei Enzetsu [Policy Speech by Prime Minister Koizumi to the 153rd Session of the Diet] (2001 [cited September 16 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0927syosin.html.

[60] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 21 Seiki No Nichibei Doumei: Mitsu No Chousen [Japan-U.S. Alliance in the 21st Century: Three Challenges] (2002 [cited September 16 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2002/09/10nitibei.html.

[61] Kent E. Calder, Pacific Alliance (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2009). p. 139f

[62] Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan. Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2008). p. 182

[63] Naofumi Miyasaka, ""Senryakubunka" To Sengonihon No Terotaisaku [ Postwar-Japan's Terror Counter-Measures And "Strategic Culture"]," in Nihongaikou No Aidentity [Japan's Diplomatic Identity], ed. Yuichi Hasegawa (Tokyo: Nansousha, 2004). p. 167

[64] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Opening Statements by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the U.S. President George W. Bush at the Joint Press Conference (2002 [cited August 11 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/02/18kyodo_e.html.

[65] The White House, President Discusses Unity between the U.S. & Japan (2002 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020218-2.html.

[66] Cabinet, 21 Seiki No Nichibei Doumei: Mitsu No Chousen [Japan-U.S. Alliance in the 21st Century: Three Challenges] ([cited).

[67] Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security. p. 101

[68] Samuels, Securing Japan. Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. p. 178

[69] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2002 [cited July 28 2010]); available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html.

[70] Chijiwa Yasuaki, "Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations on the Eve of the Iraq War: Dilemmas Over "Showing the Flag","Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (2005). p. 855f

[71] Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Soft Power-Hard Power Balancing Act," in The Us-Japan Alliance. Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia, ed. David; Akaha Arase, Tsuneo (London: Routledge, 2010). p. 69

[72] "Nihon He No Kougeki Ha Beikougeki to Minasu, Kitachousen Mondai De Beikoku Mufukuchoukan [an Attack on Japan Is Considered an Attack on the United States, United States Deputy Secretary of State on the North Korea Problem],"Asahi Shimbun (Evening Edition) February 27, 2003.

[73] Howard H. Baker, "Iraq's Choice and U.S. Resolve,"The Daily Yomiuri March 4, 2003.

[74] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Koizumi Souridaijin Kisha Kaiken: Iraku Mondai Ni Kansuru Taiou Ni Tsuite [Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Iraqi Problem] (2003 [cited September 16 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken.html.

[75] David Arase, "Japanese Security Policy: From Soft to Hard Power," in The Us-Japan Alliance. Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia, ed. David; Akaha Arase, Tsuneo (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 42. p. 42

[76] Christopher Hughes, "Japan's Security Policy, the Us-Japan Alliance, and the 'War on Terror': Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?,"Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 4 (2004). p. 435f

[77] Hitoshi Tanaka, "Toward Active Diplomacy for the Japan-Us Alliance and International Coordination,"Gaiko Forum 4, no. 1 (2004). p. 6

[78] Yukiko Miyagi, "Foreign Policy Making under Koizumi: Norms and Japan's Role in the 2003 Iraq War,"Foreign Policy Analysis 5 (2009). p. 351

[79] Norifumi Namatame, "Sengonihon Ni Okeru Anzenhoshou Taisaku to Aidentiti [Identity and Postwar-Japan's Security Measures]," in Nihongaikou No Aidentiti, ed. Yuichi Hasegawa (Tokyo: Nansousha, 2004). p. 273

[80] Hughes, "Japan's Security Policy, the Us-Japan Alliance, and the 'War on Terror': Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?." p. 440

[81] The White House, Remarks by the Vice President at the Washington Post-Yomiuri Shimbun Symposium (2004 [cited August 20 2010]); available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040413.html.

[82] Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Busshu Daitouryou No Daitouryou Saisen Ni Taisuru Souri Komento [Comment of the Prime Minister on the Re-Election of President Bush as President] (2004 [cited September 16 2010]); available from http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2004/11/04comment.html.

[83] Pyle, Japan Rising. p. 367

[84] Christian Wirth, "China, Japan, and East Asian Regional Cooperation: The Views of 'Self' and 'Other' from Beijing and Tokyo,"Int Relat Asia Pac 9, no. 3 (2009). p. 488


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Title: The Samurai preparing for the Dragon´s Attack? Normative Drivers and Strategic Foundations of Japan´s Security Cooperation with Australia and the United States