Creating Enemies

Mattingly, David

Creating Enemies

Stabilization Operations in Iraq

by David Mattingly (Author)

Politics - International Politics - Region: Near East, Near Orient

Summary

The Bush administration planned the invasion of Iraq to be a quick “in and out” operation without dedicating a large force for the invasion and the aftermath. The “honeymoon period” immediately after the invasion closed and the insurgency movement emerged and grew when the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the army and banned the Ba’ath Party and most of its members from participating in the new government. The results of the orders created an insurgency war that the U.S. and Coalition forces had not planned to fight. The war created numerous domestic and foreign insurgency groups and militias as well as a largely under-governed area in Western Iraq on the Syrian border. The Syrian Civil War drew a number of groups into the country to fight along the pro-Shi`a and pro-Sunni factions. The insurgency war born in the aftermath of the invasion has created regional instability and conflict. The war has also crippled the U.S. in reacting to other global conflicts at a time when Russia is increasing its involvement in world affairs.

Excerpt

Western Iraq on the Syrian border. The Syrian Civil War drew a number of groups into

the country to fight along the pro-Shi`a and pro-Sunni factions. The insurgency war born

in the aftermath of the invasion has created regional instability and conflict. The war has

also crippled the U.S. in reacting to other global conflicts at a time when Russia is

increasing its involvement in world affairs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... iv

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS ... v

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES... ix

INTRODUCTION ... 1

LITERATURE REVIEW ... 11

METHODOLOGY and RESEARCH DESIGN ... 21

FINDINGS and ANALYSIS ... 27

THE ADMINISTRATION ... 28

WAR PLANNING ... 36

PHASE IV ASSUMPTIONS ... 41

INTELLIGENCE ... 44

PHASE IV PLANNING... 47

OFFICE OF HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

(OHRA) ... 49

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) ... 51

THE ORDERS ... 57

vii

THE MISSING VOICE ... 61

DE-BA'ATHIFICATION ... 62

THE INSURGENCY ... 67

ARAB REVOLUTION ... 70

CONCLUSION ... 74

FIGURES and TABLES ... 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 88

viii

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Explanatory Perspectives on the Iraq Invasion ... 85

Table 2: Ba`ath Party Membership Levels ... 86

Table 3: Security Indicators in Iraq April October 2003 ... 87

INTRODUCTION

"No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first

being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he

intended to conduct it."

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

If you are going to put people's lives at risk you better have a darn good reason,

you better know what that reason is, know why you are doing it..."

Secretary of Defense Donald F. Rumsfeld

President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq will arguably be the

watershed mark defining his administration and its response to the attacks on the U.S. by

al-Qaida on September 11, 2001. This paper will not debate the reasons for going to war

or whether it was a just war beyond stating the Bush administration vacillated as the

operation unfolded from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), countering the next attack

on the U.S. by reducing the terrorist threat, and finally to spread democracy in the Middle

East.

Its failure to establish a concrete goal contributed to the failures in 2003.

This paper focuses on the decisions made by the Bush administration's principal

decision makers--President Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State

Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor

Condoleezza Rice--which led to Coalition Provisional Authority Orders Number 1

(Disbanding the Ba'ath Party) and 2 (Dis-establishing the Iraq Army and Security

Forces).

This paper argues that the resulting orders were principal factors in the

emergence of the Sunni insurgency; created an environment of sectarian violence--

Sunni, Shi'i, and Kurd fighting--hampered the formation of a new government that

delayed Iraqi sovereignty, cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, and ultimately

established the conditions for other Arab revolutions to launch.

"We will demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the United States

wants to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq or control Iraqis or their economic

resources."

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman

The decision to invade Iraq in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11was seen

through often-distorted lenses; Americans first had the images of the attacks on 9/11, then

the administration created Iraq as the enemy with an impending threat just over the

horizon. Additionally, they remembered the quick and largely "casualty free" Operation

Desert Storm in 1991 and the successful small-scale invasion of Afghanistan that toppled

the Taliban.

Secretary Rumsfeld and the policymakers in the Department of Defense saw

Saddam's regime as a threat based on the regime's alleged links to terrorism and

possession of WMD, as a test bed for bringing democracy to the Middle East, and lastly

as a laboratory to further test the transformed military--one that had performed well in

Afghanistan. Secretary Powell supported the war; however, the majority in the

Department of State saw Iraq as a threat that could be contained with smart power using

diplomacy and the international community. Figure 1, Summary of Explanatory

Perspectives on the Iraq Invasion.

Exiled Iraqis saw an opportunity to return to their homeland, presented a best-case

scenario of Iraqis welcoming the Coalition, and lobbied for a position of power in the

new Iraq.

However, to Arabs it was an American attempt to insert themselves into

Middle East affairs and to support Israel. Arabs would quickly see the Americans as

occupiers.

Most European allies that supported the war in 1991 saw the invasion as a "war of

choice" and a misadventure of the U.S. into the Middle East. Only the United Kingdom

would provide troops for the invasion with other countries joining later to become the

"coalition of the willing." Critics of Rumsfeld labeled him as the "non-diplomat" after

several press statements that appeared to insult the nation's oldest allies referring to them

as "old Europe"--later clarified by the Pentagon though Rumsfeld did not apologize for

the statement.

Many European allies, including France that had voiced pre-invasion

opposition, who considered working in the reconstruction of Iraq, opted out after the

summer of 2003. The short-term window for the Coalition closed as security decreased

in Baghdad; the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy (August 7, 2003), a truck bomb

destroyed the United Nation headquarters in the Canal Hotel killing the lead diplomat

Sergio Vieira de Mello (August 20, 2003), and the assassination of Shite leader Ayatollah

Mohammad Baqir al- Hakim (August 29, 2003).

Press reports quoted former U.S.

Deputy Secretary of State James Rubin, stating that the terrorism in "Iraq had changed,

pointing to more attacks against civilian targets and fewer large scale attacks against

American soldiers."

See Table 3 for statistical assessment of Iraq security June to

October 2003.

Many Bush administration policy-makers assumed office supporting Iraqi regime

change but it was not a top priority during the 2000 campaign. Moreover, Bush came to

office believing, "American leadership, and especially its use of force,[be] restricted to

defending narrow and traditional vital interests..."

The 9/11 attacks on the United

States afforded the U.S. the opportunity to carry out what many of the policymakers saw

as the failure of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the policies of former President

William J. Clinton's administration.

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Many of them believed Operation Desert Storm

should have removed Saddam or at least the U.S. should have supported the later Shi`a

and Kurd uprisings. They saw the Clinton administration's use of bomber and cruise

missile attacks on Baghdad (Operation Desert Fox) as ineffective and its failure to

support Iraqi exiles after signing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 as a demonstration of its

lack of commitment to solving the "Saddam problem." They believed the Bush

administration should avoid Clinton era "nation building operations", Bosnia, Kosovo,

and Somalia, that they considered a quagmire and waste of resources to be avoided.

Lastly they had little if any experience or academic study of the Middle East--its culture,

history, or human geography--if they had understood the Middle East, applied critical

thinking, and risk probability the decision making process would have likely been

different.

The foreign policy focus of Bush's administration changed after the attacks of

September 11 and Jonathan Renshon used operational coding to divide Bush's foreign

policy into four temporal periods: pre-presidential, pre-9/11, post-9/11, and end-of-term

presidency beliefs.

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The attacks on 9/11 acted, as the traumatic catalyst that behavioral

theorists argue is needed for a dramatic change in a person's beliefs and raised the

perceived threat of Saddam Hussein to the United States. Working from this "increased"

threat the administration's national security policymakers moved the focus towards

regime change in Iraq as a means to prevent the "next attack."

General George Patton was quoted in an interview with Feith, "I would rather

have a good plan today than a perfect plan two weeks from now..."

If there was an

impeding threat the quote could be considered correct, however the Bush administration

created the threat in the minds of America after 9/11. Haass quoted President John

Quincy Adams when he advised that the country "does not go abroad in search of

monsters to destroy..." the administration created Saddam as that monster.

U.S. Army historians offer that Operation Iraqi Freedom planning began on

March 1, 1991--the day after the end of Operation Desert Storm.

However, historical

events in the Middle East dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the landing of British

troops at Fao (Faw), and the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 in which the United

Kingdom and France created Iraq and other Arab states affected the later U.S. occupation

of Iraq.*

* Translation of geographic names has changed over time and is dependent on whether it

was originally an English or French translation. Geographic names mentioned in this

paper will be the name as shown in a quoted text and with the current common name in

parentheses if different i.e. Fao is now Faw.

The British mandate attempted to create a government and the issues surrounding

the British colonial experience re-emerged as the Coalition attempted to create a new

Iraq.

Additionally, the role of "occupier" in Arab culture has historical connotations of

"humiliation and oppression" (often associated with the creation of Israel) rather than the

idea of freedom and liberty usually associated with the western idea of "liberator" and

this image remained in the Iraqi conscious that would result in the failure of the Coalition

to "win the peace."

Patrick Lang, a former senior defense intelligence officer,

argues Americans in general have a difficult time accepting that other people are different

from Americans and "we tend to attribute to them motives that we're comfortable with,

that we think where society and human nature ought to be at the time."

A priority for

the Bush administration was to ensure that the elements of the Saddam regime

responsible for persecuting the Iraqi population did not reemerge after the invasion or

that the country did not fall into chaos described as--"Saddamism without Saddam.

Many of the administration policymakers believed this meant changing the foundation of

Iraq society and that democracy was a universal ideal that would naturally emerge with

the fall of Saddam.

The administration under estimated what would occur after the

invasion in addition to the time and resources which the U.S. would need to commit to

achieve a "new Iraq."

There is a common idea that the Bush administration did not plan for Phase IV

operations (operations when no fully, legitimate civil governing authority is present.

)

This paper argues that a number of agencies conducted planning. However, it was shaded

in the definition of planning by the various agencies of the government; from general

policy planning of the State Department to the very detailed Time Phased Force

Deployment Data (TPFDD) the Defense Department uses to move a soldiers and

materials into an area of operation.

From 9/11 through 2002, as the plan for invading

Iraq was refined and troops moved into place in the Middle East, the attention given to

fighting the war was not afforded to Phase IV operations. Haass advised Powell in a

memo in September 2002 of the lessons from past reconstruction and how they could

occur in Iraq. He stressed "...we must prevent a security vacuum after Saddam's

ouster..." and continued to state "long term success hinges on the establishment of

effective and legitimate governance..."

The administration; State, Defense, National Security Council and ultimately the

President's, lack of attention to Phase IV was evidenced in National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD) 24 being issued on January 20, 2003, only a few weeks before the

commencement of combat operations, giving the Department of Defense primary control

over Phase IV operations.

Although post-conflict operations were in the past the

purview of the Department of State, Secretary Powell did not argue for control and

allowed Defense to take control. Dobbins states, "Powell and Armitage believed Defense

had the money and resources to devote to the postwar mission and therefore was entitled

to run them."

Haass argues that the White House via the National Security Council

should direct stability and reconstruction operations because of their multi-agency

nature.

Moreover, NSPD 24 directed ten agencies to provide experts to OHRA at a

seniority level adequate to represent their agencies but failed to provide clear lines of

command or provide for inter-agency coordination needed in developing a whole-of-

government approach required to focus the capabilities of the government departments,

international and non-government organizations.

The appointment of Bremer as both

the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA as well as presidential

envoy, compounded the problem; it gave him direct access to the president while

nominally reporting to the Secretary of Defense.

Army historians describe the period from May to August 2003 as the window of

opportunity to create a new Iraq.

"Right after we got into Baghdad, there was a huge window of opportunity that if

we had this well-defined plan and we were ready to come in with all these

resources, we could have really grabbed a hold of the city and really started

pushing things forward."

Colonel

David

Perkins

During this period, the insurgency was at its infancy, although looting contributed to the

general failure of law and order that planners failed to anticipate and several commanders

as well as newly arrived CPA administrator and Presidential Envoy L. Paul Bremer III

later considered as contributing to the failure of Phase IV operations.

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At this time,

negotiations were underway to bring the international community into the process, the

U.S. military was planning to go home, and General Tommy Franks was planning his

retirement.

Soon after arriving in May 2003, Bremer issued two orders, which created a pool

of 400,000 idle men--trained and armed--alienated against the occupation to fuel the

emerging insurgency. Retired Army Lt General Jay Garner, the outgoing director of

OHRA, referred to the two orders plus the U.N. declaration establishing the U.S. and

U.K. as the occupation authority for Iraq as the "three tragic decisions."

The two orders enacted with little debate within the administration or between the

military and civilian decision makers changed the pre-invasion assumptions that affected

the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Phase IV, Stability and Reconstruction

Operations after the cessation of major combat. Richard Haass, director of policy

planning for the Department of State argued the discussion of whether the decisions

originated in Washington or Baghdad is "illuminating" on the administration.

War planners used the administration assumptions. First, Coalition Forces would

evaluate the Ba'ath Party members based on their past and remove only the top tier; those

with "blood on their hands."

Second, it assumed the Iraq Police and Army would

remain intact and be a resource to maintain law and order in addition to performing other

reconstruction duties.

This paper argues that not only did these decisions increase the insurgency threat

that successfully countered the Coalition until the "Surge" in 2006 but also supported the

emerging violent groups which spread through the region especially to Syria. The Iraqi

insurgency used Syria as a safe haven for Ba'athist Former Regime leaders fearing

prosecution in Iraq--including Saddam's family that had the ways and means to support

the insurgency. Furthermore, it would create an under-governed area between Iraq and

Syria, which allowed for the free flow of insurgents and weapons into Iraq. When civil

war broke out in Syria after Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to other Arab North African

nations, it led to a resurgence of violence in Iraq.

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There are critics of the Iraq War that argue planning would not have eliminated

the problems faced after the invasion; "endemic violence, a shattered state, a

nonfunctioning economy and a decimated society faced by the Coalition after the

invasion.

Andrew Rathmell argued that Iraq was not a good prospect for "building a

peaceful, democratic, or free-market nation" in the Middle East.

However, it is

arguable that had the U.S. (war planning was for the most part a U.S. activity without

Coalition input) made decisions based on the long term security of Iraq and the region,

Phase IV, regional security, and current global security could have been different.

The quick turn over of the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance,

to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) added to the "fog" hanging over the

operation. Rebuilding the state, economy and society could not occur until basic security

could reasonably be expected on the streets of Baghdad and without building the state,

economy and society the Coalition could not prevent Iraq from becoming a failed state--

a state which would be the base for future violence in the region. Middle East expert Ken

Pollack argued, "Security is the most important prerequisite for the reconstruction of Iraq.

Although there is no guarantee that reconstruction will succeed with adequate security, it

is guaranteed to fail without it."

The war in Iraq lasted longer than was envisioned by the Bush administration and

was acceptable to Americans in 2003 as shown in public polls and the eventual

redeployment of U.S. forces in 2011. Some critics of the employment of U.S. military

forces argue Americans have become casualty averse from the experiences in Somalia

and Lebanon, moreover Thomas Barnett argues Americans accept the cost of war "if the

goals are well defined and the cost seems worth the potential gain."

However, the Iraq

War negatively colored the U.S. in the eyes of Arabs and its European allies but more

importantly, it cast a pall of distrust of the government by American voters.

Additionally, it has restricted the options available to President Barack Obama in Syria

and will continue to restrict the options available to the president in future conflicts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a plethora of literature written on the subject of the Operation Iraqi

Freedom and specifically Phase IV, stability, security, and reconstruction operations.

Although there is a large amount of primary source literature available, there is not a

single document that shows the discussion and decision process which dramatically

shifted the administration's policies regarding disbanding the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and the

retention of the Iraq Security Forces. It leaves participants to tell their version of history,

often shaded by their association with the major principals-- President George W. Bush,

Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld--and lastly Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, administrator of

the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many historians interpreted the lack of a letter or

memorandum from the president as the president's lack of "hands on" leadership during

this portion of the operation and open to finger pointing by those in the Defense and State

Department camps.

The government released primary source documents from both President Clinton

and Bush's administrations and other officials, including former Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld, released documents as part of their official papers or books on the

period.

Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor wrote a very well researched and

detailed book Cobra II: The inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Both

have reported extensively on military subjects and had access to many of senior leaders

during the invasion as well as the Soldiers on the ground in Iraq. The authors uniquely

were able to write their book from the "ground up" including detailed tactical maneuvers

while also discussing the invasion and occupation as well as from the highest levels of

the Bush Administration.

Gordon was an embedded reporter with the staff of Lt.

General David D. McKiernan, commander Combined Forces Land Component

Command (CFLCC) as the war planning began through its execution and the resulting

occupation. Gordon and Trainor used primary documents from both the Coalition and

Iraqi government, including captured documents released by CFLCC and Joint Forces

Command to recreate Iraqi command and control and its reaction to Coalition ground

movement. They argued that Saddam did not believe Coalition Forces would capture

Baghdad and he failed to plan for the U.S. occupation and opined that Saddam's war

planning for an occupation failed as badly the U.S.

Like many critics of the occupation, Gordon and Trainor established that the first

three phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom were successful in toppling the regime and

capturing Baghdad but Phase IV failed, living up to the phrase "Winning the War but

Losing the Peace." Additionally, a one-hour Council of Foreign Relations interview The

Inside Story of the War in Iraq with the authors was compliments their books and

provides additional information

Gordon and Trainor authored a follow-on book Endgame: The Inside Story of the

Struggle for Iraq from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. The book compliments their

first book providing additional information on the occupation and carrying the operation

to its end and the redeployment of all U.S. forces. They argue the decision by General

Tommy Franks, U.S. Central Command Commander, to retire from the Army weeks after

the start of combat operations affected the Phase IV operations citing General Richard

Meyers', Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opinion that Franks had "taken off his

pack" after the invasion and Franks stating the occupation was "three-star work".

The American military chronicled its operations throughout history and OIF was

documented in a series of books; On Point I (pre-invasion to May 2003) and On Point II

(May 2003 to January 2005) cover the period addressed in this paper. On Point II steps

back to include information from the previous period that was not available at the first

book's time of publishing that provides a better perspective of Secretary Rumsfeld's

inflexibility in altering the operation plan as the war progressed. Lt. General William

Wallace, V Corps commander, was reported in the New York Times saying "The enemy

we're fighting is different from the one we war gamed against".

This added to the

turmoil in the early days of transition to Phase IV, the replacement of OHRA, and the

arrival of the CPA.

As the Iraq war progressed and policymakers left the Bush Administration, many

wrote books that included personal vignettes about decisions made leading to the

invasion and Phase IV operations. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith

in his book War and Decision defended the decision-making of his office supporting

Secretary Rumsfeld and blamed the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency

for the errors and misjudgments.

Feith argues the two mistakes made in executing OIF were, "maintaining the

occupation for over a year" and secondly, failing to "organize an adequate security

force".

He attempts to place blame on General Meyers and General John Abizaid,

deputy and later commander of CENTCOM, in addition to Secretary Rumsfeld, for the

small number of troops, however for the troops to be effective during the window of

opportunity they needed to be on the ground in Iraq.

Richard Haass compares the two wars; Operation Desert Storm (George H.W.

Bush) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (George W. Bush) in his book War of Necessity War

of Choice where he challenges the threat created in 2003. He argues the second Bush

administration operated under the guise of having won the election by a landslide and that

"power was to be used... and successful presidents generate power by using it."

"The standards for wars of choice must be high if the human, military, and

economic costs are to be justified. There are unlimited opportunities to use

military power--but limited ability to do so... Even a great power needs to

husband its resources. American democracy is ill-suited to an imperial foreign

policy where wars are undertaken for some 'larger good' but where the immediate

costs appear greater than any benefit. Wars of choice are thus largely to be

avoided--if only to make sure there will be adequate will and ability to pursue

wars of necessity when they materialize."

He uses his experience in both Bush administrations, the White House, State

Department, and National Security Council, to examine the relationship of the principals

in each agency. He argued the uniformed military often sided to a more moderate

position than the civilian leaders based on the fact they would be the ones on the

battlefield. This carried over to Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage. Both were

combat veterans compared to Rumsfeld and others in the Defense Department that lacked

combat experience.

His final analysis is that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war that

was preventable but counsel arguing against the war was "rebuffed."

There is a large amount of pre-war literature arguing for restraint and questioning

the apparent decision to go to war. In The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading

Iraq Ken Pollack, a recognized Middle East expert and former National Security Council

and CIA analyst, in 2002 warned the impact of decisions made regarding Iraq will have

"enormous repercussions."

Throughout his book, he brings to point many of the ideas

of pre-war planning which in hindsight appear to be errors, such as limiting the invasion

force rather than utilizing the Powell Doctrine of an overwhelming force.

A number of "think tanks" produced pre-war studies including the Center for

Strategic and International Studies' Anthony Cordesman who has written extensively on

Iraq including the pre-invasion Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: U.S. Policy to

Reshape a Post-Sadam Iraq where he argues that planners must admit to a "level of

ignorance and uncertainty."

The Atlantic Council teamed with American University

and released Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful Transition in Iraq which argued

that a clear vision of the future of Iraq was critical not only for the U.S. but also for the

Iraq people.

Although the Bush administration had not publically made the decision to go to

war, it was an assumption globally accepted. Ivan Eland of the CATO Institute argued

against the war and pointed out the risk of it destabilizing other governments in the

region in his article Top 10 Reasons Not to "Do" Iraq and an essay by Daniel Byman,

"Iraq after Saddam" in the Washington Quarterly pointed out the removal of Saddam

would not solve many of Iraq's problems

Presidential administrations face an array of problems and chose to react to or not

react based on the "personality" of the administration. Many critics of the administration

argue President Bush entered office without any notable foreign policy experience and

depended on Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell and National

Security Advisor Rice.

Fred Kaplan argued Rumsfeld was the epicenter of Iraq War

decision-making within the Bush administration.

Bush saw the National Security team

as strong leaders that would complement each other; however, Bradley Graham's book

By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld

revealed the strong personalities antagonized rather than complemented the team.

Dr. Ali A. Allawi, who served in a number of positions in the CPA, Iraq

Governing Council and later in the new Iraq, government wrote Occupation of Iraq:

Winning the War, Losing the Peace which provides an Arab and Iraqi view of invasion

and the aftermath. Allawi argued the testimony given by Under Secretary of State Marc

Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith on February 11, 2003

demonstrated the disconnect between the two departments in planning Phase IV

Operations.

As a participant, he provides a unique look into the attempts made early in

the occupation to establish a government starting with the Nasiriya Conference on April

15, 2003 to establish the Interim Iraqi Authority and following with a conference held in

Baghdad prior to the arrival of Bremer. The Baghdad Conference, overseen by Garner,

voted to form a post-war Transitional Government--the conference believed a

government rather than an administration would lead more quickly to sovereignty.

Allawi argued the arrival of Ambassador Bremer reversed the work of Garner and

OHRA in creating an interim Iraq government. At Bremer's first meeting with the Iraqi

leadership council known as the G-7, he established his position as the ultimate power in

Iraq. Until sovereignty was transferred in June 2004, the Iraqi leaders and the new

governing council would be subordinate to CPA

Allawi argued "Iraq became a victim

of chaotic scramble to impose conflicting agendas on the government of the country,

ranging from the neo-conservative warriors on one hand, to the hard headed `realist' of

the national security state on the other".

The order to disband the Iraq Army had immediate impact on security in Iraq and

this paper argues that it affected regional and global security. The order banning the

Ba'ath Party has continued to affect the political arena in Iraq through the process of de-

Ba'athification instituted by the CPA and later became Iraqi law administered by the

Higher National Office for De-Ba'athification (HNDB). The Center for Transnational

Justice studied de-Ba'athification and produced two reports, Briefing Paper: Iraq's New

"Accountability and Justice" Law in 2008 and later A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-

Ba'athification in Iraq in 2013, and argued the process was a "deeply flawed process"

which has contributed to the current internal instability. The idea of de-Ba'athification

had historical roots in post-World War II de-Nazification of Germany and the Bush

administration considered two approaches: limited dismissal of senior party members

(Department of State and CIA) and secondly a broader dismissal of the civil service and

military (Vice President Cheney and Department of Defense).

See Figure 2,

Ba`ath

Party Membership Levels, which explains the levels of membership.

The authors contend that the CPA lost control of the process to the Iraqi

Governing Council and Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi, the first commissioner,

transformed the process into a Shi`a dominated political strong arm used as late as the

2010 national elections to decertify Sunni candidates and came to be known as "de-

Sunnificiation."

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The authors describe the commission as being "widely criticized as

secretive, all-powerful, and manipulative" and to demonstrate the long term effect of the

process in the 2010 national election, the government tried to decertify 511 candidates--

including sitting members of the Council of Representatives and 15 parties--based on

past ties to the Ba'ath Party.

Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki (formerly deputy chairman of the commission

under Chalabi) has kept the Ba'ath Party alive by using the Justice and Accountability

Commission to prosecute and disqualify Sunni politicians. After the redeployment of

U.S. forces in 2011, Prime Minister Maliki removed Ahmed Chalabi as chairman and

ordered the arrest of a large number of "Ba'athists" including Vice President Tariq al-

Hashimi.

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Andrew Terrill in Lessons of the Iraq De-Ba'athification Program for Iraq's

Future and the Arab Revolutions argued this has "serious consequences for Iraq's ability

to build a unified and successful state".

De-Ba'athification he argues was not one

decision but a number of decisions made by the CPA and the new Iraqi government that

has alienated the Sunni people in Iraq and surrounding countries.

He also argues that

Arabs in Arab Spring see de-Ba'athification as a worst-case scenario of what can happen

when a long-standing dictator falls.

The Bush administration failed to see the linkages that would play out by

invading Iraq especially with its closest neighbor Syria. The war plans failed to include

forces to secure borders with Syria and Iran resulting in the free flow of weapons and

fighters to support both the Sunni and Shi`a factions. Many of the same authors that

wrote on pre-war Iraq also contributed to literature on Syria and especially President

Barack Obama's options in the region. Daniel Byman and others argue, "To protect U.S.

interests, the régime of Bashar al-Asad cannot triumph. But a failed Syria...would be

just as bad."

The rhetoric sounds familiar to pre-invasion literature but the authors

argue it has greater international implications because of the international implications

and the Russian and Iranian support of the al-Asad regime.

METHODOLOGY and RESEARCH DESIGN

The Bush administration experienced the most traumatizing event that affected

U.S. national security since the attack on Pearl Harbor. The decisions made after the 9/11

attacks were intended to "prevent the next attack". However, the decisions; first to

invade Iraq and then CPA Orders No. 1 and 2, fueled the insurgency and created an

under-governed area used by the insurgents, as a safe-haven, and for traversing weapons

and fighters, continue to affect security in Syria and Iraq.

To examine the administration's decision-making process through the political

psychology process, the researcher can study a leader's "operational code" (subset of an

individual's beliefs) as well as their personal characteristics to explain their decision

making process and as an indicator of why and how a leader responds to an event and

then reacts.

9293

Political psychologists explain behavior by the "factors internal to the

decision makers, and that consequently these personality variables represent links"

between the leaders and their behavior.

Margaret Herman, an early researcher in this

area developed six characteristics in political leaders: "nationalism, the need for power,

the belief in one's ability to exercise control over events, the need for affiliation,

cognitive complexity, and suspiciousness" are linked to form two basic orientations to

foreign policy (the "independent" and "the "participative"). Using content studies of

speeches and interviews, a researcher can assess "aggressive or conciliatory" behavior.

Karen Rasler, William Thompson and Kathleen Chester in their research depart

from Hermann's original research to argue that rather than using a random period of time

such as a decade, the research is temporally based on a specific period which can be

decided by a major events--the attacks on 9/11.

Renshon goes further and breaks

Bush's campaign period and eight years in office into four distinct periods where his

operational code changed.

The trauma of 9/11 is the catalyst that affected Bush's operational code and

beliefs. Bush's beliefs are considered as stable or unchangeable are represented by his

deep religious faith and self-confidence compared to those that may change due to an

event or are situation based. Beliefs are the filters, which an individual uses to sort

information. After 9/11, the shift of situational beliefs makes it is easier to understand

how Bush accepted the assumptions made by his administration.

The administration can be broken politically into three groups; the realist, the

nationalist, and the neoconservatives.

By understanding these three groups and their

placement within the administration and inter-play, one can begin to understand how the

president was influenced by Cheney and Rumsfeld as "nationalist" fueled Wolfowitz and

Feith as neoconservative and their propensity to create a new world with the U.S. as the

leader. Lastly, the pragmatic realist, Powell and Armitage recognized some of the faults

in planning but did not yield the power to counter-act the need for retribution after 9/11.

The paper cites literature from multiple sources to compare assumptions made

prior to the invasion by the planners in the Department of State, Department of Defense

and academia that were the basis for administration decisions especially Phase IV

operations and specifically the orders to remove the Ba`ath Party and the order to disband

Details

Pages
Type of Edition: Originalausgabe
Year: 2014
ISBN (PDF): 9783954899746
File size: 920 KB
Language: English
Institution / College: American Public University System – Faculty of American Military University
Publication date: 2015 (September)
Grade: 3.95
Keywords: Iraq CPA MNFI Bremer Bush Rumsfeld Syrian Civil War Ba`ath Party

Author

David Mattingly (Author)

Creating Enemies

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Author

David Mattingly (Author)