The New Turkish Foreign Policy: Reassessment and Change
©2013
Textbook
59 Pages
Summary
During the recent years, Turkey has put immense efforts in healing relations with its neighbors, establishing closer ties regarding various interest areas, be it economic, cultural or political issues and acting as a facilitator in its close environment. However, once one looks back in history, Turkey during the 1900s conducted a very different foreign policy strategy and viewed its close neighbors with suspicion and mistrust. <br>This study argues that there has been a reassessment in Turkish Foreign Policy which has helped Turkey to acquire a new role in the Middle East. In this regard, this research aims to analyze whether there has been a changeover in Turkish Foreign Policy and if so, what were the consequences regarding Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. Along with that purpose, this study will elaborate on the factors which have shaped Turkish Foreign Policy, primarily on economic aspirations. Furthermore, the goal of this research is to focus particularly on Turkey’s relations towards its Middle Eastern neighbors. Consequently, this research will help to understand fully Turkey’s recent involvement regarding the Arab uprisings and increasing commitment to the Middle East.
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
2
that purpose, this study will elaborate on the factors which have shaped Turkish foreign
policy, primarily on economic aspirations. Furthermore, the goal of this research is to focus
particularly on Turkey's relations towards its Middle Eastern neighbors. In this context this
study provides an overview about the different phases Turkish foreign policy has undergone
and examines Turkey's changing role in the Middle East. Consequently, this research will
help to understand fully Turkey's recent involvement regarding the Arab uprisings and
increasing commitment to the Middle East.
This study is relevant in order to follow up Turkey's increasing new role in the
international arena. Nowadays, Turkey fills the news and headlines either in the Middle East,
Europe, Asia and even in Africa
4
. In order to understand recent discussions about Turkey one
has to look behind Turkish foreign policy and in this sense, this research provides a certain
insight about former and current foreign policy goals of Turkey. Thus, to be able to see an
overall picture, especially regarding the developments tied with the Arab spring, it is relevant
to enlighten Turkey's role in her surrounding regions, particularly in the Middle East.
1.2. State of Research on Turkish Foreign Policy
As mentioned earlier, Turkey recently has managed to catch the attention of the international
community, especially through its foreign policy engagement. Thus, many scholars have
conducted researches about Turkey's recent foreign policy strategy with the aim to look
behind the curtains.
On the one hand, there is an ongoing debate about Turkey cutting down its ties with
the West and intensively moving towards the East. Soner Ça÷aptay, a scholar at the Washing-
ton Institute for Near East Policy, argues that the AKP is "guided by an Islamist worldview";
therefore, he concludes, maintaining relations with the West becomes difficult for Turkey
(Ça÷aptay 2009). According to him, the Turkish government has slowed down the reform
process which is mandatory for Turkey, if it wants to be accepted as a full member by the
European Union. Josef Joffe, editor of the German newspaper DIE ZEIT, claims that Turkey's
strategic orientation to the Middle East started back in 2002, when the AKP under Tayyip
Erdo÷an, according to Joffe an Islamic Justice Party, came to power. He states that this trend
accelerated, when the AKP won an absolute majority during the 2007- elections (Joffe 2010).
In this context, there are studies which elaborate on whether and how AKP's political party-
program and a new emerged elite contributed to Turkish foreign policy.
5
Some scholars also
4
(Kimer
2012)
5
cf. (Hale/Özbudun 2010)
3
consider "the Davuto÷lu era" as a reason for a transformation in Turkish foreign policy and
claim that "[Foreign Minister] Davuto÷lu is the intellectual architect of Turkey's new foreign
policy" (Aras 2009: 139).
On the other hand, many scholars define the "`shift of axis' argument" in Turkish
foreign policy as "a rather crude characterization" (Öniú 2011: 48). Ziya Öniú, professor at the
Koç University in Istanbul, argues that Turkey has not changed its foreign policy direction
from the West. Although, the relation between Turkey and the European Union currently
seems to be at a low point, one should not jump into conclusions and proclaim that the
Turkish government has abolished her interests in the European Union, since Turkey is aware
of the EU's importance in many areas.
6
"Turkey is already deeply integrated into the EU in
the economic, political and cultural realms and the integration process is an-ongoing process"
(Öniú 2011: 48). Mensur Akgün, director of the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul,
states in Le Monde diplomatique, that "Turkey is in transition" because of "changing dynam-
ics of international politics rather than any animosity to the West" (Akgün 2010). According
to Akgün, Turkey deals with its past and that includes also conflicts with its neighboring
countries (Akgün 2010).
Certainly, all these perspectives provide a different access to Turkish foreign policy.
However, so far literature has paid little attention to economic factors as a driving force in
Turkish foreign policy. Mustafa Kutlay divides the ongoing debate about Turkish foreign
policy into two categories, namely "security-based explanations" and "identity-based explana-
tions" (Kutlay 2011: 68). Nevertheless, Kutlay suggests that besides identity or security
issues, both "economic dynamics" and "the transformation of Turkish financial and industrial
capital" should also be taken into consideration (Kutlay 2011: 69)
Kutlay sees similarities between the complex interdependence approach, developed by
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, and Turkish foreign policy. He argues that "Turkey
seems to be following the functionalist framework so as to exploit economic opportunities and
interdependence in further institutionalizing its relations with neighboring countries by
downgrading military power in favor of economic interactions" (Kutlay 2011: 71). In other
words, the three main characteristics of complex interdependence, namely "multiple channels
of communications, an absence of hierarchy among the issues (the rejection of high politics
vs. low politics dichotomy), and the diminished role for military power" are somehow
noticeable in Turkish foreign policy (Kutlay 2011: 71). Kadri Kaan Renda also argues that
6
cf. (Öniú 2003a)
4
foreign policy making in Turkey "resemble[s] the characteristic features of complex interde-
pendence"; in addition, Renda supposes that Turkey's redefined foreign policy strategy
enables to establish strong ties with neighboring countries and "create complex interdepend-
ence between Turkey and its neighborhood" (Renda 2011: 90).
As a result, security or identity-based approaches do not seem sufficient enough to
understand the current developments in Turkish foreign politics. Therefore, this study aims to
analyze Turkey's latest foreign policy-strategy with focusing on various factors, and particu-
larly on economic factors. In this sense, this study is subdivided into five sections. After this
introduction, a theoretical approach will follow. At first glance, this research will introduce
the concept of complex interdependence, developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S.
Nye, in more detail to present the groundwork of the applied theoretical framework. This
book claims that Turkey's recent foreign policy resembles the characteristic features of
complex interdependence, especially Turkey's relations with her neighboring countries.
Therefore, the next chapter will explain similarities between the Turkish case and the concept
of complex interdependence by elaborating on the three key characteristics, namely absence
of hierarchy among issues, increasing use of multiple channels of interaction between states
and declining primacy of military force. Subsequently, the third chapter will provide a close
up of Turkish foreign policy activities during the Cold War and Post-Cold War years till
recent events. The fourth chapter will put Turkey's foreign policy activism into a broader
context and discuss the consequences of the new approach along with the implications of the
Arab uprisings on Turkey. In conclusion, a summary containing the main facts will be
presented.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Complex Interdependence
By publishing "Power and Interdependence" Keohane and Nyes' main purpose was to
question the realist approach and its predominant role in international politics. As for
Keohane and Nye the realist framework puts forward an "extreme set of conditions or ideal
type"; however, their study aims to provide a completely different, so to say, a contrary
perspective, namely the concept of "complex interdependence" as this approach "comes
closer to reality than [..] realism [does]" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 20). According to Keohane and
Nye, "dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external
forces" whereas "Interdependence" is specified as "mutual dependence" and signifies
5
"situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different
countries" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 7). The causes of these "reciprocal effects" are "flows of
money, goods, people, and messages across international boundaries", in short "international
transactions" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 7). As described before, Keohane and Nye define
interdependence as mutual dependence; nonetheless, they clearly indicate that the term
interdependence should not be restricted to "mutual benefit" since this attitude is not far-
reaching and so could not explain cooperation among "industrialized countries and less
developed countries" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 8). In short, the concept of complex
interdependence considers that cooperation is tied with expenses since such a relation
includes limitations. In addition, one may not be able to predict the outcome, which is
affected by the principles of the individuals and the course of the association in the first place.
In the end, it is not self-evident, that complex interdependence will automatically lead to
"mutual benefit" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 8).
In order to fully explain "the role of power in interdependence" Keohane and Nye
differentiate between "two dimensions, sensitivity and vulnerability" (Keohane/Nye 2001:
10). With sensitivity the authors refer to "degrees of responsiveness within a policy
framework"; that means in detail the state's "liability to costly effects imposed from outside
before policies altered to try to change the situation" while vulnerability covers an "actor's
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered"
(Keohane/Nye 2001: 11).
In comparison to the realist framework, the complex interdependence concept
presents us a completely different portrait of world politics. Three significant attributes have
to be mentioned in this context, namely "multiple channels", "absence of hierarchy among
issues" and the "minor role of military force" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21-23). First, Keohane and
Nye argue that "multiple channels of contact among advanced industrial countries" have been
devopled (Keohane/Nye 2001: 22). These channels of communication enable interaction
among very different groups, such as between statesmen and business assocciations, non-
governmental or transnational organizations and may be considered "as interstate,
transgovernmental, and transnational relations" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21-22). The idea of
interstate relations can also be found in the realists literature; however, the latter ones describe
channels which emerge, when one challenges the realist presumptions about the states acting
"coherently" and being the "only units" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 21). The second characteristic,
absence of hierarchy among issues, refers to the minor role of military concerns in the
political discourse compared to the past. Nowadays, states have to cope with many questions
6
related to specific areas of interests and several local groups. Consequently, there is no exact
ranking among these issues available. Especially, the foreign policy agenda covers a wide
range of topics since the borderline between domestic and foreign policy is disappearing
(Keohane/Nye 2001: 21). Lastly, Keohane and Nye explain the third characteristic aspect of
complex interdependence, namely the declining role of the military force since applying
violence involves costs. The authors argue that states do not experience fear or threat
anymore, like they used to, particularly developed states. In addition, the relation between the
states is characterized by "mutual influence" where violent means may be insignificant and
insufficient during negotiations regarding economical or ecological issues (Keohane/Nye
2001: 24). In short, although military force seems to be a secret weapon during negotiations,
applying violence may lead to a deterioration of relationships towards other partner states
seeing that other mutual agreements regarding different policy areas could be affected
(Keohane/Nye 2001: 25). Whereas realism attributes military security questions a higher
priority, the complex interdependence concept emphasizes that states pursue different goals
respectively depending on the various agenda topics. In this regard, "transgovernmental
politics" hamper the process of goal determination (Keohane/Nye 2001: 32).
Keohane and Nye point out that "asymmetrical interdependence in particular groups
of issues" as well as "international organizations and transnational actors and flows" clearly
provide power capabilities to states, which possess a "less vulnerable" position (Keohane/Nye
2001: 27). "States will approach economic interdependence in terms of power as well as its
effects on citizens' welfare, although welfare considerations will limit their attempts to
maximize power" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 27). According to Keohane and Nye, the concept of
complex interdependence leaves room for the discussion about "high politics" like military
security questions versus "low politics" which refers to other issue areas (Keohane/Nye 2001:
28). Various areas of interests have emerged and are mentioned in the international political
debate; therefore, the agenda setting process in the complex interdependence framework
differs significantly from the realist approach since one can not draw a clear border between
foreign and domestic politics. Moreover, non-state actors have gained a significant position in
policy-making (Keohane/Nye 2001: 29). "National interests will be defined differently on
different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units"; that is why, national
interest is influenced by various external factors which hinder the work of high-level
statesmen from creating a consistent policy strategy (Keohane/Nye 2001: 30). Within the
political discussion international organizations took up a more active role that is coupled with
various functions. They create new opportunities for dialogue between different negotiation
7
partners like politicians, governmental or nongovernmental actors, so generally between
groups, who normally would not sit together at a round table. Moreover, they raise up
questions related to various areas. Therefore, the political agenda consists of a diversity of
issues. In addition, it should be noted that international organizations provide less powerful
states assistance in conducting "linkage strategies" (Keohane/Nye 2001: 31).
Eventually, there are many approaches to Turkish foreign policy ranging from
identity or security focused explanations. However, in the following this study will elaborate
on whether there are any similarities between complex interdependence and contemporary
Turkish foreign policy. The purpose of this section is to adapt these characteristics on the
Turkish case and provide a useful framework to follow up the developments in Turkish
foreign policy.
2.2. Complex Interdependence and Turkish Foreign Policy
Turkish foreign policy recently gained a lot of recognition around the globe. Turkey is
mentioned during political plenary sessions whether it is in Europe
7
, in the Middle East and
the Caucasus
8
, in Central Asia
9
or in the Balkans
10
. It seems that Turkey is actively engaged
on international level compared with the past.
As mentioned earlier, Keohane and Nye argue that "multiple channels of communi-
cation" have emerged and created room for interaction among different groups, be it between
statesmen and business groups or nongovernmental and transnational organizations. (Keo-
hane/Nye 2001: 22).
Mustafa Kutlay refers in his work to characteristics of complex interdependence and
adapts these on the case of Turkey, because he sees similar developments. Kutlay agrees that
"multiple dialogue channels" enable "bilateral relations between parties", which discuss a
wide range of issues than just security concerns and in the Turkish case in particular economy
plays a far more important role (Kutlay 2011: 80). "The increasing intensity of commercial
relations between Anatolian businessmen and Middle Eastern markets has created spill-over
effects and facilitated the establishing of new dialogue and cooperation mechanisms" (Kutlay
2011: 80). This development is particularly evident when one observes the relationship
between Turkey and Syria, where Turkish entrepreneurs from Anatolia urged their govern-
ment to develop and implement agreements with Syria to promote business relations and in
7
(The Economist 2011)
8
(TODAY'S ZAMAN 2012b)
9
(TRT 2012)
10
(TODAY'S ZAMAN 2012c)
8
the end "free trade and visa-free travel agreements" were put into force (Kutlay 2011: 80).
Renda, also states that more communication channels have emerged in Turkey and by saying
that he particularly refers to Turkey's efforts in establishing closer ties with her neighbors.
According to Renda, various platforms have been set up to facilitate communication "between
state institutions of Turkey and their counterparts in other states"; in this regard, "high level
strategic cooperation councils held between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Russia" can be interpret-
ed as a multiplication of communication channels in Turkish foreign policy (Renda 2011: 99).
As a second characteristic of complex interdependence Keohane and Nye have
pointed out, that there is no given hierarchy among issues anymore (Spindler 2007: 207).
Renda argues that there is a similar development in Turkish foreign policy visible. Turkey
perceived it as a difficult challenge to rise as a regional player since serious conflicts within
Turkey, such as the PKK issue, shook the country and dominated the political agenda. Once
the European Council announced Turkey's candidacy for membership in the European Union
in Helsinki in 1999, a new page was opened. Turkey was given a set of tasks to complete, in
order to join the European Union as a full member. While the Turkish government initiated
the reform process to meet Europe's requirements, Turkey has undergone a significant
changeover. One of the most important developments was the emergence of new actors in
Turkish politics besides the traditional ones. One has to point out, while new actors started to
raise their voice, others had to lower theirs. In the case of Turkey, military has lost its superior
position and power in Turkish policy making since "the Europeanization process in the post-
Helsinki era has belatedly transformed the civil-military relations in accordance with socio-
political dynamics of the post-Cold War" (Renda 2011: 95). Consequently, this development
offered new ways of political engagement for nearly everyone. While in the past "national
interest" was determined only by an "exclusive circle of foreign policy elites within the
states"; non-state actors found access to the foreign policy making process such as "a new
class of businessman", who began approaching to Turkey's close neighbors mostly because of
commercial interests, which then may evolve to closer relationships (Renda 2011: 96).
Since the AKP won the elections in 2002, Turkish foreign policy took a new route,
with a far wider focus on various issues. The traditional foreign political agenda, which
contained and prioritized mostly security concerns, was broadened; so, new interest areas
found their way into the political discourse such as economy and foreign trade, just to
mention a few. In this regard, Renda sees a certain similarity between this new approach in
Turkish foreign policy and complex interdependence and concludes that "the ultimate
dominance of high politics over low politics was challenged" (Renda 2011: 96).
9
Regarding the third characteristic, Keohane and Nye mentioned the decreasing role
of military and argued that military power has a rather inferior role within the complex
interdependence concept; states are reluctant in applying military force in the first place, yet
new policy tools with lower costs emerged (Spindler 2007: 207). In the case of Turkey,
military and security have always been very important issues (Renda 2011: 95-96). However,
in comparison to the "Cold War era" or the "post-Cold War" period, Turkey has pursued a
different approach towards her neighbors during the last years (Öniú/ùuhnaz NOS: 1). Öniú
and ùuhnaz state that "AKP's foreign policy style is characterized by greater emphasis on the
use of soft power and developing friendly relations with all neighbors" rather than an aggres-
sive course (Öniú/ùuhnaz NOS: 3).
In sum, the complex interdependence approach, developed by Keohane and Nye,
seems to provide a useful framework to explain patterns of contemporary Turkish foreign
policy. After setting the theoretical framework, the next section aims to provide an overview
on Turkey's foreign policy strategy. This research argues that there has been a reassessment in
Turkish foreign policy and along with this restructuring the role of Turkey in the Middle East
has changed. Consequently, this section will provide an examination of contemporary Turkish
foreign policy with a special focus on Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. In
the course of this analysis the complex interdependence approach will provide a certain
framework according to which the results will be classified.
3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN CLOSE UP
3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during and after the Cold War
If we were to take a snapshot of Turkey and its environment today and compare it with
Turkey during the 20
th
century, we would observe a completely different setting in both
pictures. In the past, "Turkey was surrounded by serious ethnically-driven conflicts in the
Balkans and the Caucasus, while Turkey itself was experiencing a violent internal ethnic
dispute involving its own Kurds" (Kiriúci 2006: 7). Hasgüler argues that after the demise of
the Soviet Union, the Republic of Turkey became the other loser of the Cold War. Turkey
may not be separated/ disintegrated; however, it has lost its fundamental role and its identity
in the international arena. Three sides of Turkey, the Balkans, the Middle East and the
Caucasus, turned into hell and Turkey was caught unprepared for this situation. Moreover, its
foreign policy agenda was intense; on the top of it, Turkey entered a period of unstable
10
governments and was dragged into a vortex of political and economic chaos.
11
Hasgüler
characterizes the relationship between America and Turkey as a classic Turkish TV-
melodrama
12
and further states against all the odds from outside, who argue that Turkey
experienced stability for half a century of the Cold War, that Turkey neither was free from
worries nor in a comfortable position during that time.
13
In the face of the bipolar world after
the end of the World War II, an emerging power, the Soviet Union, was claiming territorial
rights; Turkey saw no choice but to enter the field of the other superpower and was obliged to
set up a `strategic alliance' with America
14
(Hasgüler 2009).
Sabri SayarÕ, a well-known scholar who has focused on Turkish domestic and foreign
policies among other research areas, states that the demise of the Soviet Union and "the
resulting superpower competition" have seriously affected both "global and regional politics"
(SayarÕ 2000: 169). In this sense, Renda states that during the 20
th
century the "increasing
sensitivity of Turkey to its neighborhood forced Turkish policymakers to `regionalize' their
policies, whereas increasing vulnerability of Turkish society and particularly the Turkish state
led to the `renationalization' of its foreign and security policies" (Renda 2011: 93). Renda
also points out that Turkey has failed to build up close ties with its neighbors be it cultural,
political or economical ties due to her fear from being dragged into trouble. "Turkey lacked
linkage strategies that might incorporate several issues into one package" (Renda 2011: 94).
During the 1990s Turkish foreign policy was generally formed and decided by the
Turkish military in collaboration with the Foreign Ministry. That is to say, these two decision-
makers "perceived threats to Turkey's territorial integrity and unity emanating from various
quarters around Turkey, including Northern Iraq" (Kiriúci 2009: 31). At that time, Turkish
foreign policy generally concentrated on security issues because those were seen as the most
urgent and important ones (Kiriúci 2009: 31).
Having said this, one important public figure, which has put an immense effort in
developing Turkey, politically and economically has to be mentioned in this context. Turgut
Özal, who was elected as "the first Prime Minister in the 1980s and then President of Turkey
11
"So÷uk Savaú'Õn Sovyetler Birli÷i ile birlikte bir di÷er ma÷lubu da Türkiye Cumhuriyeti olmuútur. Belki
Türkiye da÷ÕlmamÕútÕr ama uluslararasÕ alanda kimli÷ini ve temel rolünü yitirmiútir. [...]
Türkiye'nin üç
yanÕ, Balkanlar, Orta Do÷u ve Kafkaslar cehenneme dönerken, Türkiye duruma hazÕrlÕksÕz
yakalanmÕútÕr. Üstelik, dÕú politika gündemi bu denli yo÷unken, bir de istikrarsÕz hükümetler
dönemine giren Türkiye, politik ve ekonomik kaoslar girdabÕna sürüklenmiútir" (Hasgüler 2009).
12
"Türk-Amerikan øliúkileri: Bir Yeúilçam MelodramÕ" (Hasgüler 2009).
13
"AslÕnda dÕúardan bakan yazarlarÕn Türkiye için görece bir istikrar dönemi olarak tanÕmladÕklarÕ So÷uk
Savaú'Õn yarÕm yüzyÕlÕ Türkiye açÕsÕndan hiç de öyle rahat ve mutlu geçmemiútir" (Hasgüler 2009).
14
"II. Dünya SavaúÕ akabinde ortaya çÕkan iki kutuplu dünyanÕn süper güçlerinden biri olan Sovyetlerin toprak
talepleri karúÕsÕnda çareyi di÷er süper gücün etki sahasÕna girmekte bulan Türkiye, ABD ile `stratejik
ortaklÕk' kurmak zorunda kalmÕútÕr" (Hasgüler 2009).
11
early in the 1990s" has contributed to the development in Turkey in many ways by introduc-
ing liberal market policies and opening new markets abroad (Kiriúci 2006: 11). During the
Iran-Iraq War he chose to stay away from this conflict in Turkey's neighboring countries, but
at the same time continued to establish closer mercantile and economic ties (Kiriúci 2006: 11).
In 1986, he aimed to create "interdependency" between Turkey and the Middle East through
his pipeline venture in order to yield peace in this region; more precisely this "pipeline would
carry Turkish water to the Gulf countries as well as Israel" (Kiriúci 2006: 11). Özal expressed
his wish to be part of the European Community and applied in 1987. Consequently, Özal did
not just want to collaborate with his Middle Eastern neighbors but also with the West; he was
seeking for cooperation instead of isolation (Kiriúci 2006: 11). When Saddam Hussein
attacked Kuwait and the Gulf War broke out in 1990, Turgut Özal convinced the traditional
Turkish policymakers to get involved and provide assistance for the allied forces (Kiriúci
2006: 11-12). However, the repercussion of the Gulf War hit Turkey very hard since PKK
separatists were giving the Turkish government serious headaches. In addition, the "Kurdish
issue" along with "the rise of an increasingly virulent political Islam in Turkey" made the
situation for Ankara even worse (Kiriúci 2006: 12). As if the challenges within Turkey's
borders were not enough, the Balkan conflict broke out. Considering the endangerments
surrounding and within Turkey, the military establishment became active and regained its
influential position in foreign and domestic policy making, in particular "through the National
Security Council" (Kiriúci 2006: 12).
Consequently, the foreign policy agenda was dominated again by security concerns
and perceived concerns to Turkey's unity and "territorial integrity" (Kiriúci 2006: 12).
According to Kiriúci Turkish policymakers had the impression that Turkey was "encircled by
strategic threats at a time when the Turkish state elite felt that the West was abandoning
Turkey" (Kiriúci 2006: 13). During this period, not only Turkey's economic performance
decreased but also its political performance left much to be desired. The government could
not cope with these internal and external challenges. At that time, Turkish policymakers were
in particular skeptical about their neighbors Syria and Iran providing shelter for PKK sepa-
ratists; therefore they have expressed their discontentment and offered violence (Kiriúci 2006:
13-14).
America, a close ally of Turkey, expressed criticisms regarding Turkey's handling
with democracy and human right issues. Since PKK militants were hiding in the northern part
of Iraq, where a severe power "vacuum" existed, plus the Kurdish problem at home came to a
head, in the end Turkish military operations increased (Kiriúci 2006: 13-14). The EU also
12
openly faulted Turkey's violation of human rights and harsh approach to the Kurdish prob-
lem. That is to say, the EU's criticism was used by some Turkish authorities, who vehemently
stated that the West was trying to undermine Turkey's development and unity. Especially,
with the decision by the EU to disqualify Turkey as a potential candidate Turkey experienced
a profound disappointment and subsequently cut down ties with the EU (Kiriúci 2006: 16).
In order to describe the ambience, Kiriúci mentions ùükrü Elekda÷, who has a long
experience in Turkish foreign policy, through working in important positions such as an
ambassador for Turkey and as deputy undersecretary for the Foreign Ministry. According to
Kiriúci, Elekda÷ seems to have expressed the thoughts of the Turkish foreign policy decision-
makers trenchant like no one other during that period (Kiriúci 2009: 31). By saying that,
Kiriúci refers to Elekda÷'s "2 ½ War Strategy" in which Elekda÷ states that "Greece and
Syria, who have claims on Turkey's vital interests, constitute an immediate threat for Turkey"
(Elekda÷ 1996: 1). Moreover, he accuses these two neighbors of supporting the PKK.
Therefore, he concludes that, Turkey has to install preventive measures in case of a battle
against Greece, Syria and the PKK, all at once (Elekda÷ 1996: 11).
In this sense, Ziya Öniú argues that Turkey's course of action against the PKK
militants in the 1980s and 1990s resembled patterns of "a coercive regional power" meaning
that Turkey more likely tended to implement a rather violent approach towards emerging
problems (Öniú 2003b: 2). Kiriúci adds that only a small group has enjoyed access to foreign
policy making, which mainly concentrated on security issues (Kiriúci 2006: 13).
Apparently, Turkey thought to be the victim of a conspiracy, led by all neighbors with
whom Turkey had strong disagreements. Due to these suspicions Turkey agreed on cooperat-
ing with Israel, especially because of military interests. However, the Arab world did not take
this collaboration with Israel calmly but expressed their discontent at several occasions such
as at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which was held in Tehran at the end
of 1997(Kiriúci 2006: 15-16). During this gathering the participating states openly made their
complaints; main point of criticism was Turkey's alliance with Israel regarding military
issues. Süleyman Demirel was in office as the President of the Republic of Turkey and
present at that summit; however, he had to depart in the very beginning due to these animad-
versions (Kiriúci 2009: 31).
In addition to these conflicts with neighboring countries, the Refah party (Welfare
party- RP) with its leader Necmettin Erbakan, who is prominent for his pro-Islamic attitude,
entered the parliament after the elections in 1996 (Kiriúci 2006: 13). The Refah party then
agreed in joining a coalition with the Do ru Yol Party (True Path Party-DYP) and subse-
13
quently, Erbakan "became the first Islamic revivalist prime minister of Turkey" ( arko lu/
KalaycÕo lu 2009: 11). However, the military did not agree with Erbakan's policy-making
strategy that is why the military establishment took initiative and limited the scope of action
of the government to tackle "Islamic fundamentalism", which in the end led to the " 'post-
modern' coup", the collapse of the ruling government (Kiriúci 2006: 13). "The RP-DYP
government of Erbakan lasted for only eleven months and was forced to resign in 1997 under
strong pressure by the military and most of the leading secular civil society organisations"
(Hale/Özbudun 2010: 4).
While the previous described incidents portray Turkey during the 20th century, Kiriúci
notes, that these circumstances will take an unexpected turn in the future. He writes that "the
extent of transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the accompanying attitudes towards
Turkey is probably best captured by the standing ovation that the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs Abdullah Gül received at the OIC meeting again in Tehran in late May of 2003";
although, he was harshly criticizing the circumstances in the Arab world and in particular the
slow process in advancing democracy and human rights (Kiriúci 2009: 32). However, this
development did not happen overnight. There are many factors and personalities which
shaped Turkish foreign policy and consequently, changed the perception about Turkey in the
world, especially in the Middle East. Thus, these factors will be examined in the following
section.
3.2. Reassessment of Turkish Foreign Policy
Renda puts forward two developments which had a significant impact on Turkish foreign
policy, "democratization" and "economic liberalization" (Renda 2011: 95). Renda argues that
"free trade and democracy" seem to be the main driving forces of Turkish foreign policy-
making considering that it started by Turgut Özal (Renda 2011: 95). Özal, who initiated
various new reforms, brought a fresh wind into Turkish politics. Alper Y. Dede notes "by
liberalizing the Turkish economy and enabling the emergence of conservative businessmen
coming mostly from conservative towns in central Anatolia, Özal actually sowed the seeds for
the pluralization of Turkish politics and of foreign policymaking mechanisms" (Dede 2011:
26). Although the initiatives of Özal were haltered during the 1990s, his policies were revived
in the year 2000 (Renda 2011: 95).
According to Renda, the Helsinki summit in 1999 filled Turkey with new hope.
Turkish policymakers abandoned their traditional security approach and adopted a more open
foreign policy strategy, which favors economic growth. For Turkey it was always a challenge
14
to gain a more significant role in the international arena, with having serious internal prob-
lems which affected Turkey's inner stability and integrity. Therefore, being on the EU-
membership candidate list offered new possibilities; more precisely accelerated the process of
democratization. In this regard, Renda concludes "the Europeanization process in the post-
Helsinki era has belatedly transformed the civil-military relations in accordance with the
socio-political dynamics of the post-Cold War" (Renda 2011: 95). Regarding the EU-
accession process Turkey actually made small steps since the "right-wing nationalist party in
the coalition government together with conservative circles in the country" blocked the
reforms, demanded by the EU (Kiriúci 2006: 23). Despite supporters of the security-approach,
new policies were approved by the general assembly, such as allowing TV-programs in
different local languages in late 2002. Subsequently, the ruling government buckled down and
general elections were antedated to November 2002 (Kiriúci 2006: 23). The winners were the
AKP and the Social Democrat Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP).
"The AKP won the 2002 parliamentary elections with a landslide with 34.3 per cent of the
vote and almost two-thirds of parliamentary seats"(Hale/Özbudun 2010: 5). The AKP policy
agenda focused on facilitating Turkish-EU relations, accession negotiations and the associated
reform process. Moreover, stabilizing and maintaining closer ties with all neighbors, especial-
ly with Cyprus, gained much attention. Reform packages regarding the financial structure of
Turkey that were initiated by the former government were continued by the AKP along with a
comprehensive reform process (Kiriúci 2006: 24). Regarding the Cyprus problem, the new
government openly pursued a "`win-win' solution" and supported the Annan Plan (Kiriúci
2006: 19). "Turkey's support for the re-unification of the island overnight changed Turkey's
image in the international community" (Kiriúci 2006: 26). In comparison to Turkish foreign
policy making during the 1990s, this approach seems to differ significantly from the security
approach promoted by the military establishment back then (Kiriúci 2006: 19).
According to Renda "the ultimate dominance of high politics over low politics was
challenged, with the outcome being the abandoning of hierarchy among issues and an increas-
ing variation in foreign policy preferences, as assumed by the complex interdependence
model" through AKP's policy agenda (Renda 2011: 96). He concludes that "democratization"
along with "liberalization and internalization in Turkish economy" finally forced Turkish
policymakers to change their traditional foreign policy approach; consequently, this led to a
more diversified foreign policy agenda (Renda 2011: 99).
Kemal Kiriúci pays especial attention to the impact of economy on Turkish foreign
policy and argues that contemporary Turkish foreign policy is shaped by "economic consider-
Details
- Pages
- Type of Edition
- Erstausgabe
- Publication Year
- 2013
- ISBN (eBook)
- 9783954896073
- ISBN (Softcover)
- 9783954891078
- File size
- 3.1 MB
- Language
- English
- Publication date
- 2013 (August)
- Keywords
- Turkish Foreign Policy The Justice and Development Party Ahmet Davutoglu Arab Spring Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) Middle East
