Denying History: The United States' Policies Toward Russia in the Caspian Sea Region, 1991-2001.
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Textbook
137 Pages
Summary
The historical record seen through Offensive Realism presents evidence illustrating that the United States' approach toward the Caspian Sea region between 1991 and 2001 was governed by idealistic principles rather than balance of power considerations. That was led by the false notion that democratic Russia would act in accordance with US goals.<br>The United States denied the competitive nature of international politics, refusing to criticise abuses by Moscow in the region, and failing to intervene when US interests were marginalised. The US failed to prevent Russia from refashioning conditions conducive to the re-absorption of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a sphere of influence; nor did it account for China’s expanded role and trajectory as a challenge to US power. This analysis shows, for example, that Russia’s proximity and willingness to use force exceeded the capabilities of the US’ use of its global predominance to shape regional events.
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
1
1.
INTRODUCTION
Political history of international relations can be viewed through many different theories.
Sometimes in democracies foreign policy is thought to be a direct result of domestic
policy and the values and principles of its people. There is also a tendency to view history
through the lens of ideology. Of the United States, the historian Richard Hofstadter
lamented: "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one."
2
The United States has seemed to struggle to define its role in the world suitable to
its self-perception. The founding fathers of the American republic defined their nation as
a distinct and separate member of the community of states, belonging to an enlightened
class and a modern entity that all states would emulate. John Quincy Adams described
this:
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be
unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers
be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-
wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and
vindicator only of her own.
3
Henry Kissinger describes the thinking of this generation as recognizing no incompatibil-
ity between "high-minded principle and the necessities of survival.
4
Symptomatic of American exceptionalism, this sentiment challenged the foreign
policy of great powers that put survival at all costs ahead of morality. The US had the
luxury of its location in North America, a large landmass without any great powers firmly
established there. It became an insular great power, protected by oceans and the fruits of
2
Richard Hofstadter, Quoted in, Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of Political Correctedness on
American Campuses," Howard Dickman (ed), The Imperiled Academy (London: Transaction, 1993),
72.
3
John Quincy Adams, "Address of July 4, 1821," quoted in John Quincy Adams and American Continental
Empire: Letters, Papers and Speeches, Edited by Walter Lefeber (Chicago: Times Books, 1965), 45.
4
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 34.
2
its triumphs over American Indians, Mexicans and the British. As the US grew in
strength, so too did its interests. The growth of the American national interest created
conflict with various states at various times in the last couple hundred years. Throughout
its short history, seldom has the US been vulnerable to existential threats. Nor has the US
often been in the role of conqueror. Just as the Romans in the republican era cursed the
word King as morally repugnant, Americans have always shunned the idea of empire. As
the American historian Walter Lippmann observed: "Our imperialism is more or less
unconscious."
5
Yet, in the 20
th
century Washington had accrued power enough for a grand impe-
rialism, but chose not to imitate the much-maligned European powers. At times the US
was forced to go abroad, joining war in conflicts to prevent the domination of a region by
one great power who threatened all the rest, but its military did not conquer or colonise
for wealth. The US joined an alliance to balance against Germany twice to prevent its
domination of Europe and to defeat Japan's attempt to control the resources of South and
East Asia. America emulated its former master, Great Britain, only in its way of engaging
militarily as an offshore balancer to stabilize the balance of power. Like Great Britain
during the Great War, the US entered the European theater because Germany possessed
the potential to achieve hegemony and challenge the security of the United States from
across the Pacific Ocean. After a period of isolationism in the 1920s and 1930s, the US
went abroad again to combat Nazi Germany and Japan.
6
5
Quoted in Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin
Books, 2004), 62. Ferguson discusses in several chapters the US' "imperial denial".
6
Ibid., 14-15.
3
At the end of the Second World War the Soviet threat compelled the US to stay in
Europe and in Japan.
7
The international system suddenly became bipolar as former great
powers bled their strength away leaving two heavyweight powers centred around Mos-
cow and Washington. The security vacuum in the continent also compelled Moscow
toward control of Eastern and Central Europe creating a security dilemma that pushed
and pulled until the Cold War established a balance of power between two superpowers
and their alliance blocs.
8
John J. Mearsheimer describes the tragedy of international
relations in this way. Despite the US ideology of principle, its survival imperative
demanded it take a more aggressive coarse of action than it would otherwise prefer. Harry
Truman, president of the US during the start of the Cold War, demonstrates this observa-
ble tragedy in a letter he wrote to Josef Stalin of the USSR in 1945:
It is often implied... that we have imperialistic designs, and thus constitute a
threat to your own security and that of the newly emerging nations. There not
only is no evidence to support such a charge, there is solid evidence that the
United States, when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself,
made no effort whatsoever to do so... May I say, there is absolutely no
substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or
attempts to impose its will on other countries...
9
Regardless of the sentiment, both states firmly engaged in a rivalry that determined the
foreign policy of virtually all states in the world. The Cold War had the side effect of
challenging US exceptionalism, a challenge that became very pronounced when it ended
suddenly without a giant bang. Robert Levgold described the enormity of change in US
foreign policy thinking:
7
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 327-327.
8
Mearsheimer (2001), 49-51.
9
Quoted in Kissinger (1994), 317.
4
For three decades, Soviet power has obsessed American foreign policy. By it
we have judged our own; because of it we have committed ourselves far from
home and justified our commitment in terms of the menace it represents;
around it we have made a world order revolve. For us, Soviet power has been
the ultimate measure and the central threat, a seminal idea and source of
orientation.
10
The period between the end of the Cold War and the start of the War on Terror provides
an opportunity to test the veracity of the notion that the post-Cold War world was
somehow different than the patterns of states' behaviour contained in the history of
international politics. The structure of international politics was defined by the
predominance of US power at this time giving Washington an enormous freedom of
action. On September 11, 1990, as US forces prepared for the Gulf War against Iraq,
George H.W. Bush described a "New World Order" in which "the principles of justice
and fair play... protect the weak against the strong..." suggesting a revolution in
international politics. He described: "a world quite different from the one we've known.
A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice."
11
This world did not reflect the politics understood by Realists. Was there reason to
suspect that the world was made different by the example of the United States? Toward
that end: Did principle guide the US' pursuit of the national interest in search of security
instead of power considerations? Did its principled approach to foreign policy succeed in
suppressing threats to its security? For this to be evident it is necessary to ask: Did other
states accept the same principles of this new order and forego opportunities for power
accumulation? These hopes and President Bush's assertions about a different world was
10 Robert Legvold, "On Power: The Nature of Soviet Power," Foreign Affairs 56, no. 1 (1977): 49.
11
George H.W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the
Federal Budget Deficit," 11 September 1990; accessed online via: www.presidency.ucsb.edu, 11/09/07.
5
punctuated by Francis Fukuyama's End of History thesis, which celebrated liberal
democracy as the final development in human political organisation. As the Soviet
Empire became the democratic Russian Federation, liberal theories shunned Realism for
its cynical portrayal of politics and its role in condoning war. According to the Realist,
Robert Gilpin: "Liberals want to make the world over in the liberal's image," and they
target "malevolent `untruths' such as those held by realists... lest they cause mischief."
12
Presumably, in the new world order anarchy was not on the menu.
On the other hand, the balance of power, according to Realism, is an expression of
constant pushing and pulling tendencies between states. States act according to a set of
assumptions that predict the behaviour of other states seeking to protect themselves from
the dangers of the anarchic international system. Denying these assumptions result in
suffering the consequences of diminished security and a weaker standing in the balance
of power. It is now possible to examine the historical record to assess the relevance of
Realism and the wisdom of its warnings.
Using John J. Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism as contained first and foremost in
his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, this study will answer the above questions
by focusing on the US approach to the Caspian Sea Region. This region emerged from
the Soviet Union and became strategically significant due to its vast resource potential.
Its resources also attracted interest that created competition between great powers and
elicited comparisons to the Great Game, a rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in the
19
th
century. Confirming a New Great Game in the Caspian Sea between 1991-2001 is
then useful for identifying a security dilemma, which Realism is well-equipped to
12
Robert G. Gilpin, "No One Loves A Political Realist," in Realism: Restatement and Renewal, ed.
Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 3-4.
6
analyze. The conclusions reaped from a Realist analysis of a state's behaviour during a
specific era in a specific geographical space provide a deeper understanding of its present
predicament. My methodology will feed US policies and actions into historical models of
behaviour and relate Realism's predictions with actual and expected outcomes during this
time.
I will prove that US foreign policy toward the Caspian Sea Region was governed
by principles not balance of power considerations, led by the false notion that democratic
Russia would act in accordance with western norms. Using Realism I will show how the
US suffered the consequences of this approach by losing relative power to Russia, and
later to China--both of whom did maximise power in the region largely by the absence of
the US. Significantly, the 2000 Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership Agreement and the
strengthening of the SCO as an anti-hegemony--anti-Pax Americana--organisation
follows balancing tendencies that Realism is aptly capable to explain. Consistent with this
trend, Christopher Layne, another prominent Offensive Realist, predicts "new great
powers will merge to offset U.S. power, and these new great powers will coalesce to
check U.S. hegemonic ambitions."
13
Offensive Realism is the ideal tool to analyse the US approach to the Caspian Sea
Region during the 1990s for several reasons. Like all broader Realist theory, Offensive
Realism is pessimistic. Offensive Realism does not embrace the illusion that the US
relative power advantage can or could overcome the perils of anarchy without first
eliminating all great powers from all regions on the planet. Contrary to Layne this,
Defensive Realists embrace the stability of US primacy and predict its durability. That
13
Christopher Layne, "The Offshore Balancer Revisited," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2002): 238.
7
does not seem likely given the lessons of history and balance of power tendencies. In the
Caspian Region, following the first decade of independence, signs of conflict and
competition within and between the eight Caspian states is a bitter confirmation of the
anarchy that drives security competitions. That insecurity is a threat to Russia and
therefore an inevitable target of its expansion.
Offensive Realism is best suited to describe the 1990s, because it does not accept
unipolarity as a state of order, and views the developments in one distinct region to be
components of the international system on the whole.
14
In other words, the distribution of
power at the global level does not provide an accurate depiction of the relative power
relationships in individual regions. Regions are critical component parts of a state's
Grand Strategy, illustrating pieces of international political developments as they pertain
to Great Powers. The international system is an expression of the set of interacting,
interdependent regions.
Typically, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East have been the strategic or vital
regions of interest on account of the exploitable wealth and power located there. I will
explore the Caspian Sea Region, which became the focus of Great Power competition
after the discovery of vast deposits of oil and gas. It is in this region over which Imperial
Russia and Great Britain competed during the 19
th
century in what Rudyard Kipling
popularised as the Great Game. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union a New Great
Game manifested, constituted by a scramble to exploit the region's fossil fuels, worth as
much as $12 trillion.
15
In 1998 Dick Cheney commented that: "I can't think of a time
14
Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar
Moment," International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 12.
15
Quoted in: "The Great Gas Game," Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 2001,
www.csmonitor.com (accessed 19/09/06).
8
when we've had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the
Caspian."
16
Comprised of the three states of the Caucasus and the five states in Central Asia,
the Caspian republics emerged from decades behind Soviet hegemony to an international
system defined as much by the power of the United States as by the absence of the Soviet
Union. Of the eight states, only Georgia has access to the open sea, the rest being
landlocked in a potentially dangerous part of the world. They share borders with Turkey,
Iran, Afghanistan, China and Russia. The distribution of power in this group of states,
including two great powers, was not balanced in 1991-1992. Into this field the eight
Caspian states emerged weak and plagued by ethnic tensions and even civil war as the
leaders clung to power. The US maintained both in rhetoric and legislation, the goal of
ensuring the independence of these states. In this way, no power could dominate the
region and rise to challenge the international system with the US on top.
17
I have split the main text into two parts after a chronology that reflect two distinct
phases of US engagement. The first part examines the events during the first four years
into independence. US policy, especially the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992, will be
explained and analysed to measure how effective it was in helping the newly independent
states strengthen their sovereignty. I will describe the US strategy, based on a Russia First
principle, and demonstrate how it was incompatible with the logic of Realism's balance
of power. The democratization and human rights agenda will be analyzed to test whether
security improved.
16
Ibid.
17
Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: How America's Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us (London: Penguin, 2005),
146-152.
9
I will illustrate how legislation isolated Azerbaijan and had the side effect of
constraining Turkey, whom Washington assumed would balance against Iran's expansion
into the Caspian. I will illustrate how US behaviour during 1991-1994 created the
conditions that damaged its ability to secure the Caspian states' freedom in the later
development of the oil and gas resources.
In the second part, I will explain how the New Great Game began in earnest, how
the US clung to a win-win strategy in continued sympathy for Russia's democratic
movement and I will illustrate how the US refused to take a prominent leadership role
until 1998. This refusal continued well toward the end of the decade even though
Russia's shrewd actions proved it was the region's only potential hegemon. Two cases of
Russian intervention--in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan--will be analyzed to
demonstrate Russia acted according to Realism's portrayal. I will describe how this
transpired in the scramble for control over oil and gas fields and in the competition over
pipelines. Russia's strategy of monopolizing the transit infrastructure competed with the
US struggle for a main export pipeline to transit oil from lucrative finds in Azerbaijan's
section of the Caspian Sea.
The implications of the failure in the US Caspian strategy are evidenced today by
Russia's dominant role in European energy security. In edition, the growth of China's
influence in Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
illustrates the failure of NATO's Partnership for Peace program to sustain multilateral
initiatives that held promise of establishing a stronger security profile for Washington.
The SCO represents a framework capable of excluding Washington from the Central
Asian security dialogue. It has the potential to evolve into a type of Asian NATO able to
10
push the US out of Central Asia and potentially out of East Asia should Russia and
China's strategic partnership hold together in common pursuit of achieving multipolarity.
Examining the US approach toward the Caspian Region through the lens of a
Realist methodology will illuminate which policies succeeded for the US and whether
they were effective in suppressing the security competition.
11
2.
OFFENSIVE REALISM
As one of the earliest contributions to the school of Realism, Thucydides' History of the
Peloponnesian War employed strict standards to gather evidence and explain events in a
manner synonymous with "scientific history".
18
Through history, the tenets of Realism--
without necessarily being identified as such--have provided explanatory answers and
prescriptions to states in the hostile arena of international politics. Like Thucydides,
Realism has striven to shave away any superstitious or normative biases that prevent
objective analysis. It is, as Robert Gilpin points out, as much a philosophical position as it
is a theory.
19
He observes a "liberal intolerance" in academia toward Realists due to their
refusal to "believe that, with the defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war,
the liberal millennium of democracy, unfettered markets, and peace is upon us."
20
The
liberal bias spawns from its dislike for Realisms amoral approach to politics, most
notable in the Classical Realism of Hans Morgenthau.
"[P]olitics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their
roots in human nature," wrote Morgenthau in 1954 following two global conflicts and the
onset of the Cold War.
21
Morgenthau saw the inherent lust for power within the psyche of
the human species behind the motive to compete for power. While new versions of
Realism have appeared to refine its core tenets, all respect the parsimonious approach to
objectively ascertaining why states behave as they do. Morgenthau argued that states
strive to gain power as an end in itself.
18
Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), 139.
19
Robert G. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996), 5.
20
Ibid., 3.
21
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954), 4.
12
On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work The Theory of Internation-
al Relations focused on the structure of the international system as the root cause for
security competition. Anarchy, not human nature drive states to find security where they
can because of the dangers inherent in the structure of politics. Waltz' Structural Realism
holds that states first and foremost try to maintain their position in the balance of power,
going on the offense only out of miscalculation or desperation.
22
This book utilizes a successor branch of neo-Realism. Called Offensive Realism,
the theory was established by John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. This theory builds on the Realist assumptions and "falls thus in the tradition of
Realist thinkers such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz."
23
Like these
theoreticians, Mearsheimer too argues that "theories about how the world works play an
important role in how policymakers identify the ends they seek and the means they
choose to achieve them."
24
As a methodology, Realism can provide answers to real-world
questions in addition to elucidating insights into the emerging political reality. My
intention is to use Offensive Realism to analyse the case of the US approach to the
Caspian Sea Region in order to identify and explain political developments there.
I have chosen to use Offensive Realism because of critical nuances it contains in
its regard of the balance of power. The theory puts great emphasis on geography as a
factor in explaining events in the real world. The Offshore Balancer concept provides a
key for explaining both why the US has maintained superior power advantages without
suffering balancing and why its influence in Europe and Asia did not expand following
22
Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Rotberg & Rabb (eds), The Origin and
Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40.
23
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
2001), xii.
24
Ibid., 10.
13
the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Separating US global forces as an expression of
its power from its actual influence in a remote region can thus be achieved to better
reflect the balance of power in the Caspian Sea Region. Similarly, the concept of the
Potential Hegemon is an indispensable tool in describing Russia's impact on the region.
Like this, Offensive Realism is well-developed to explain the post-Cold War peri-
od better than other Realist tracts, which tend to treat international politics as if it were an
enclosed room full of paranoid alpha-male gorillas eyeing each other suspiciously. Great
Powers have distinct regional interests and can cooperate or compete at the same time in
different places based on their specific objectives. Cooperation between the US and
China and Russia on the Korean peninsula is an example of common goals that bring
states together in partnership; whereas disagreement over the sanctions regime against
Iran can appear to resemble rivalry by the same states. Too often, the Caspian Sea Region
is viewed through the lens of Taiwan, Europe or the Middle East, which provide too
many distortions.
Offensive Realism also distinctly explains and predicts that states are never status
quo powers.
25
That does not mean that they act when there is no room to advance
objectives. It means that states always seek advantage over other states. To deny a chance
to weaken a state and strengthen one's own without suffering a balancing action is
illogical to the survival imperative.
26
This pushing and pulling tendency offers a more
compelling description of balance of power under anarchy than other Structural Realist
literature claiming that states seek only to maintain their position in the balance of power.
25
Christopher Layne, "The `Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," Security
Studies 12 (2002/2003): 128-129.
26
On this point, Layne contests Mearsheimer's claim that the Hegemons in the own region can become
status quo powers. He defines Mearsheimer's theory as "diet Offensive Realism" and his version as
"robust Offensive Realism". Christopher Layne, "The `Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as
a Global Hegemon," Security Studies 12, no. 2 (2002/2003): 129.
14
I will describe further the assumptions of Offensive Realism, its logic, and outline
the models that will classify foreign policy behaviour and project an image of their
expected or actual outcome. In this way, I can induce an answer to the questions about
US foreign policy and the structure of the international politics between 1991-2001. The
concepts of the Potential Hegemony, the Offshore Balancer and power versus security.
Whereas Waltz holds that states act primarily out of defence, both Morgenthau and
Mearsheimer portray great powers as relentlessly seeking power.
27
Offensive Realism focuses primarily on the relative strengths of great powers be-
cause their influence on regional and international politics is greatest. Great powers are
defined as actors capable of fighting a conventional war against the most powerful state
in the world.
28
According to Mearsheimer, great powers must also possess a nuclear
deterrence capability; but nuclear capabilities do not make a power great if it still lacks
conventional assets to challenge the system leader. Furthermore, in the unlikely scenario
of a nuclear hegemon emerging, conventional forces would be rendered obsolete.
29
The
inherent insecurity in the structure of the international system drives states to seek power
and, ideally, refuge in the seldom attained hegemony. This element is a departure from
other structural realist branches.
Controversy over power and restraint vis-a-vis balance of power theory led to
controversy within realism, creating two diverging positions contesting about how much
power can sufficiently secure the state. This debate has spawn from two pairing sets
within the realist camp, according to Stephen Van Evera: between hawkish realists versus
27
Ibid., 21.
28
Ibid., 5.
29
Though for this to occur, all other nuclear powers would have to lose their capabilities.
15
dovish realists and pessimistic realists versus optimistic realists.
30
In a more concise
manner, the split revolves around power versus security. Waltz believes states' prefer-
ences will oscillate between pursuing power and pursuing security.
31
Offensive realists portray the international system as an unregulated free market.
Like corporations seeking to maximize profits, similiarly: "States are driven by the
system's competitive imperative, which produces what could be termed `influence-
maximizing' behavior."
32
They believe that a state will pursue power as a means to
acquire the means to better protect itself with the ultimate goal of regional hegemony.
When the leading power in a given system enjoys primacy relative to its peerage, there is
little need to coercively modify the balance of power because security has reached a
surplus for that state.
33
According to the most prominent offensive realist, this makes the
hegemon a status quo power, while the secondary powers act according to their capabili-
ties.
The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power,
which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers
do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that
is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon--that is the
only great power in the system.
34
Keeping contenders down through preponderance--in other words, the best defence is a
good offence--is the reasonable pursuit according to this realist strain. For the United
States, the Monroe Doctrine (1823) was about keeping the European powers out of Latin
America, maintaining a sphere of influence that the US enjoys today. Regional hegemony
30
Stephen Van Evera, "Elements of the Realist Paradigm: What Are They?" typescript, 27 January 1992, 4;
quoted in Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," in Frankel (1996), xix.
31
Waltz, Theory, 118.
32
Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," in, The Perils of Anarchy:
Contemporary Realism and international Security, eds. Brown, Michael E. et al (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1995), 479.
33
Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," 81.
34
Mearsheimer (2001), 2.
16
has proven a pacifying element, lending credibility to the peace through preponderance
hypothesis that offensive realists contend form the basis for a great power's expansion.
35
The awkwardness of external balancing, as exhibited by the allies' attempt to stop
German expansion in the 1930s further supports the offensive inclination to use force
when opportunity arises. Coalition building is inefficient and a clever aggressor can
single out weaker states to buckpass or freeride in order to attenuate the counterbalancing
potential. Rather than spawn a security dilemma, primacy or preponderance can keep
trouble from lesser states to a minimum, while hegemony can keep them adequately
complacent. Hegemony must first be achieved, and that is the faultline between these two
contemporary realisms. Trying for hegemony is the obvious choice for offensive realists,
but doing so prudently by applying the means at the state's disposal without engaging in a
potentially damaging scenario is in keeping with the rational appraisal of one's relative
power vis-a-vis other powers in the system. The U.S., for example, has often been
concerned about appearing 'imperialist' during its Cold War competition in places like the
Middle East, committing forces to the region when possible, but warily nonetheless.
36
It
is, however, the aggressor that has the advantage, according to Offensive Realists, who
have succeeded when using force more often than not, due to the tendency to buck-pass
and the inefficiency of balancing.
37
Furthermore, using information technologies to
control populations is viewed as a means to counter the inevitable nationalist insurgencies
within occupied territory if appropriately used. This belief combined with the recognition
35
This also washes with Power Transition Theory. See Douglas Lemke, "Great Powers in the Post-Cold
War World: A Power Transition Perspective," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21
st
Century, eds. T.V. Paul et al (Stanford, CA: University Press, 2002), 52-75.
36
The case of the Suez crisis illustrates U.S. Concern over the perception of imperialism toward the U.S.
and her allies due to the Anglo-French campaign. The U.S. ultimately feared a Soviet supported
counterattack. See, Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 71.
37
Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," 76.
17
that states need not be occupied, but can rather be sliced up or modified to create a
preferred geopolitical condition.
Defensive realists on the other hand argue that the balancing imperative does not
permit concentrations of power after which a hegemon seeks. Most definitely will action
arise if restraint is not employed, causing a backlash that will eventually overwhelm the
system leader. Expansion or conquest is, accordingly, neither necessary nor helpful when
security is not compromised. Defensive realists, therefore, are security-maximisers.
Furthermore, states on the defensive are considered having the advantage against an
aggressor that is unfamiliar with the terrain, and not fighting for one's homeland. Wars of
choice, and unilateralism will expedite the balancing imperative and is thus a strategic
error because it draws attention to the aggressive motives of a capable power. Defensive
realists point both to the tendency of the system leaders to commit abroad ushering in an
overextension of resources and to the advantages bestowed upon defenders of territory as
ample reasoning behind showing strategic restraint. Proponents explicitly consider
pursuit of hegemony foolish, choosing rather what Waltz declares "an appropriate
amount of power".
38
Pursuit of hegemony is unrealistic given the absence of hegemonic
powers in human history. When a great power pursues hegemony it increases the likeli-
hood of central wars, defined as war involving most if not all of the great powers. While
warfare is not unique, provoking an attack rather than being the aggressor is tantamount
to suicide. Therefore, Defensive Realists "will only seek the minimum level of power that
is needed to attain and to maintain their security and survival."
39
38
Waltz, (1979), 40.
39
Joseph Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in New Thinking in
International Relations Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyle (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 167.
18
But since the U.S. has achieved hegemony--without much controversy at least in
North America and Central America--and Napoleanic France and Wilhamite Germany
likewise came close in the early 19th and early 20th centuries respectively, it must be
assumed states still want hegemony; that, rather than being a myth concocted by a realist
conspiracy to perpetuate the destruction of human lives as some well-known commenta-
tors suggest,
40
the systemic pressures of unipolarity act as a restraint against great power
war. This appears to reflect the successful pursuit of hegemonic preferences, maintaining
the status quo by avoiding a redistribution of power; and if we were to accept the 'lump
concept of power--that is the aggregated economic, military, technological, cultural and
diplomatic assets of a nation--it would confirm America's international influence.
41
Another distinction Offensive Realism notes is the geographical limitations of
power. Accordingly, the United States is the preeminent power in the world but its
influence is constrained by the "stopping power of water". I will discuss this later, but it
is important in establishing how the distribution of power defines the international
political architecture. A system can be hegemonic (directed by a single great power),
bipolar (controlled by two great powers), or multipolar (dominated by three or more great
powers).
42
Another crucial element is the identification of a potential hegemon. The
presence of a potential hegemon makes the system unbalanced and therefore prone to
war.
43
Mearsheimer defines a potential hegemon here:
40
Christopher Hitchens, "What 'realism' has wrought in Africa," The Slate Online, 7 Monday, November
2005, www.slate.com/id/2129657 (12/01/07).
41
Stephano Guzzini, "The Use and Misuse of Power Analysis in International Relations Theory," in Global
Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, ed. Ronen Palan (London: Routledge, 2002), 55.
42
Mearsheimer, (2001), 12.
43
Ibid., 44-45.
19
A potential hegemon is more than just the most powerful state in the system.
It is a great power with so much actual military capability and so much
potential power that it stands a good chance of subduing and controlling all
of the other great powers in its region of the world. A potential hegemon need
not have the wherewithal to fight all of its rivals at once, but it must have
excellent prospects of defeating each opponent alone, and good prospects of
defeating some of them in tandem. The key relationship, however, is the
power gap between the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state
in the system: there must be a marked gap between them. To qualify as a
potential hegemon, a state must have-by some reasonably large margin-the
most formidable army as well as the most latent power among all the states
located in its region.
44
Bedrock Assumptions
Offensive Realism lies on five "Bedrock Assumptions", each to represent an important
aspect of life in the international system.
x The international system is anarchic compelling nation-states to rely on them-
selves in the absence of a higher authority
x All states possess some offensive military capability
x States can never be certain about the intentions of other states
x Survival is the primary goal of great powers; they seek to buttress the security of
their sovereignty
x All states are rational actors considering their strategic environment and the inter-
ests of other states vis-à-vis their own.
45
These five assumptions are mutually reinforcing elements that encourage great powers to
behave offensively in the international system. The patterns of behaviour can be confined
to three identifiable tendencies.
The first pattern is based on fear. States concerned with their security need to
consider the potential that other states endowed with the ability to use force for gain will
do so. States' interests are never subordinated to the interests of another.
The second behavioural response is to initiate self-help. States faced with fear of
attack must guarantee their own survival. Absent a world authority or policeman, a state
44
foreignaffairs.org (author update), Interview with John J. Mearsheimer, September 2001. Access via:
www.foreignaffairs.org, 01/04/06.
45
Mearsheimer, (2001), 30-32.
20
is its own first and last line of defence.
The final pattern is based on power maximization. Cognizant of the self-help
reality in the system, states naturally pursue power as a means to ensure their survival.
"The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those
rivals will attack it and threaten its survival."
46
A state will seek to increase its share of
power in a system relative to all others because it understands and views any change in
the status quo as zero-sum. Trapped in this paradigm great powers ultimately harbour
aggressive intentions.
A state can never have too much power and therefore seeks hegemony as the ul-
timate refuge in the anarchic and unpredictable system. What the balance of power will
look like ten or twenty years from now cannot be divined. Security, being finite, may
only increase for a state at the expense of another. Thus, the zero-sum quality depicts the
difficulty facing a state seeking to "increase its own chances of survival without threaten-
ing the survival of other states".
47
States must prepare for the worst. Great powers with the potential can do so by
pursuing hegemony despite the balance of power logic. Potential hegemons will be
confronted, by states alone or in alliance seeking to check the leader. Yet the fruits of
hegemony are too irresistible. The struggle for and against hegemony, in opposition to or
in support of an offensive state will maintain or change the balance of power based on the
outcomes. Offensive Realism considers the balance of power in terms of the distribution
of material capabilities. In the above context, power is viewed in terms of relative gains
as opposed to absolute. Since states think strategically, great powers will pass up oppor-
46
Ibid., 33.
47
Ibid., 36.
21
tunities to increase their power if it provides a rival state with an opportunity to make
similar or superior gains. "In short, great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on
gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories."
48
A great power will only act aggressively after considering its ability to achieve its goals
in a cost-benefit analysis. Differing from Defensive Realists, Mearsheimer is more
skeptical of systemic factors that will quickly create a balancing coalition. Nor does he
view the role of a state on the defence as more advantageous than the state that initiates
an attack. On the other hand, Offensive Realism does focus on misrepresentation as
strategy in itself that can lead states to miscalculate. Deception is an element of interna-
tional relations and therefore can lead a state to believe a potential target is infinitely
more weak or stronger than its observable capabilities. Misrepresentation can also lead
aggressor states to discount the wherewithal of third party states that may have the
capabilities to join battle and turn the tide. Germany did not believe the United Kingdom
was capable of joining the French and Russians in the summer of 1914 proving decisive
in the Great War.
49
States' Operational Goals
Having stated the bedrock assumptions, followed by the three patterns of states' behav-
iour, it leads into what great powers' operational goals are. Mearsheimer details four: 1)
Great Powers Strive for hegemony in their region 2) Wealth supports military power 3)
Armies supported by air and sea capabilities are the core ingredient of military power,
and 4) Nuclear superiority
50
48
Ibid, 37.
49
Ibid., 138.
50
Ibid., 140-147.
22
The ideal situation for any state is to be the hegemon in the system. Even Imman-
ual Kant acknowledged: "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a
condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world."
51
Hegemony can, accord-
ingly, conquer anarchy. "Only a misguided state would pass up the opportunity to be the
hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive."
52
Mearsheimer illustrates this point by considering the hypothetical scenario of replacing
Canada with China, Mexico with Germany; and noting that the US would prefer its
hegemony over its neighbours rather than competing in a balance of power in its region.
53
Peace in North America is the dividend of American hegemony for which the US would
never trade. Hegemony is also the explanation that describes US benevolence in North
America. Hegemony has removed the threat of future and potential challenges to the US
in its region.
The US has the luxury of geography. It is an insular great power, without any oth-
er great powers on a large body of land surrounded by water on all sides.
54
Off-shore
balancers, like the US and the UK enjoy a geographical protection that continental
powers do not. When oceans act as buffers to off-shore balancers, they intervene against
states abroad only when the presence of a potential hegemon warrants their engagement.
For the United States, it did not enter the First World War until the risk of German
domination became a real threat. Rather, buck-passing the balancing role to another is the
first choice. If the local players cannot balance, the distant great power will move in and
51
Quoted in Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), 40.
52
Mearsheimer (2001), 35.
53
Ibid., 415-416.
54
Ibid., 126.
23
balance against it. Containment is the main goal of any offshore balancer, while seeking
out opportunities to undermine the threat only when they present themselves.
55
Maximising wealth is also a prominent goal. States care about relative wealth be-
cause economic might is the foundation for a strong military. A strong economy enhances
both the welfare of a state's populace and supplies the wherewithal to gain military
advantage over rivals. The ideal economic situation for any state is to experience sharp
growth while its rivals' economy grows slowly or not at all. A large population and a
dynamic economy therefore are attributes of a great power not to be taken lightly when
predicting their future behaviour. Great powers that slide down the economic food chain
become less of a concern individually. Invariably, they will affect the balance of power,
meaning if one goes down, one is likely to go up.
Critics of this Realist view of economic competition argue that the free-flow, in-
stantaneously movement of capital investment has created an interdependence that binds
states together in common cause, removing zero-sum considerations. Since 1945, the US
dollar has been the preferred currency for central bank reserves,
56
integrating states into
the US economy and vice-versa. President Clinton believed this presented: "a new
structure of opportunity and peace through trade, investment, and commerce."
57
The
Sino-US relationship underscores the virtues of this argument. The Chinese central banks
have acquired extraordinary sums in American bonds, buying up dollar assets to suppress
its currency in support of exports.
58
Any crisis in one economy would damage the other,
55
Ibid., 141.
56
Ronald McKinnon, "The Dollar Standard and Its Crisis-Prone Periphery: New Rules for the Game,"
quoted in Ferguson, (2004), 283.
57
Quoted in, Steven Erlanger & David Sanger, "On the World Stage, Many Lessons for Clinton," New
York Times, 29 July 1996, www.nytimes.com (accessed 11/09/07).
58
For example, between April 2002 and August 2003, the Chinese and Hong Kong central banks acquired
US$96 billion in American securities. David Hale, "The Manchurian Candidate," Financial Times, 29
24
supporting the anti-Realist argument. However, in the decade before 1914, Niall Fergu-
son notes, economic interdependence between Great Britain and Germany made war
seem unlikely to contemporaries.
59
His point is that sudden shifts and shocks due to an
unexpected crisis can break an equilibrium. The argument for protecting American jobs
during a recession could be that lightening rod that sparks conflict.
Great powers also seek to prevent rivals from controlling influence in wealth-
generating areas of the world. This usually means industrial regions, but will also include
areas endowed with critically important raw materials like oil. Areas with little intrinsic
wealth are of less concern to great powers. "The United States paid less attention to
Africa, the rest of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the South Asian subcontinent,
because there was little potential power in those regions."
60
Charles V led Spain to
threaten hegemony over all of Europe due to gold and silver exploited in its South
American colonies in the early 16
th
century.
Great powers pay close attention to the balance of land power. They seek to be the
preeminent land power. States spend a significant portion of their military budget on
creating the most powerful regional army because they aim to dominate the balance of
land power. It is the best way to maximize their share of military might.
61
The last goal great powers pursue is nuclear superiority. A state achieving nuclear
superiority would be the global hegemon. It would require that it possessed the only
arsenal in the world, or that it was impervious to attack rendering other great powers'
nuclear capabilities marginal. Such a state of affairs would also render armies irrelevant.
Despite Defensive Realists' belief that MAD is a force for stability, it does not guarantee
August 2003, www.ft.com, (accessed 23/11/08).
59
Ferguson, (2004), 285.
60
Mearsheimer, (2001), 145.
61
Ibid., 83.
25
perpetual peace. States won't be satisfied with the prospect that another great power
could launch an existential threat, or might achieve nuclear superiority, so they are
compelled to seek advantage.
62
Although the US ballistic missile shield reflects this
impulse, it would not render the US impervious to nuclear weapons delivered by other
means, including cruise missiles and aerial drop.
Behavioral Models for States Under Anarchic Conditions
Operational goals provide tactical and strategic guidance on policy choices. Throughout
history patterns emerge that reveal probable outcomes with each identified behavioral
tactic. Establishing the methodology is dependent upon identifying these tactics and these
expected outcomes to test US actions against Realist predictions.
Aggressive Power Seeking Tactics
Operational goals trickle down into strategic thinking when states consider their envi-
ronment. Depending on the distribution of power, states pursue eight different tactics for
improving their chances for survival.
The first tactic is also the most unpopular path to gaining power. Waging war will
most likely change the balance of power in any given system. Mearsheimer, in contrast to
Defensive Realist objections illustrates that since 1648 the state commencing war is
victorious 60% of the time.
63
Still, there are several criticisms evident in contemporary
literature questioning the feasibility of war as a tool. Mearsheimer deals with these each
in its turn and concludes by noting warfare demands sound judgment and allocation of
62
Ibid., 146-147.
63
Ibid., 147.
26
resources to improve a state's position.
64
In short, war must be efficiently and effectively
executed for optimal results. Not all wars are run well, and many occupations fail.
In the aftermath of the recent US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Mearsheimer
points to Peter Liberman's study of conquest, which concludes: "Coercive and repressive
conquerors can make defeated modern societies pay a large share of their economic
surplus in tribute."
65
Blackmail is the second tactic a state employs. The threat of force, that is intimi-
dation as a coercive tool intended to achieve or acquire a desired outcome without the
commitment of military resources is most desirable. Blackmail is not effective when
dealing with another great power that has a comparable military, nor does it shift the
balance of power as an action on its own. Germany's success in preventing Russian
intervention in the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1909 is one such successful use of
blackmail. Russia's comparative weakness following war with Japan was the cause.
66
Blackmail involves high stakes and can escalate tensions into conflict and great power
war. The First World War was a consequence of states' attempt to blackmail others,
ending in bloody multi-state war.
67
These tend to be useful for great powers in relations
with minor powers.
The third tactic, bait and bleed, involves manipulating two powers to square-off
against each other and fight in order to drain them of resources while the provocateur
husbands its strength on the sidelines. Optimally, a conflict between two rivals is the
64
Ibid., 148-149.
65
Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 28; cited in Mearsheimer, (2001), 148. See his defence of war as a
feasible tool of statecraft, pages 147-152. It should be noted that Mearsheimer was and remains a vocal
opponent of the strategy to wage war against Iraq, arguing that it would end up hurting US standing in
the balance of power.
66
Mearsheimer, (2001), 153.
67
Ibid.
27
result most desired. The case of Russia manoeuvring Austria and Prussia into war with
France following the French Revolution is cited as the best example.
68
States are mindful
of dangers associated with peripheral wars when a great danger looms. It is difficult to
trap a state into waging a war it otherwise would not initiate on its own.
The aim of bloodletting is to sap the strength of one's rival by supplying its
opponent with support to enhance the damage it can inflict on the rival state and bleed it
dry as much as possible. Weakening one's rival to enhance one's relative power is most
attractive and often employed as a tactic. Initial support to Iraq during its war with Iran
was a US strategy to attenuate the Islamic Republic. Supplying the Mujahadeen in
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s is also case in point here. Truman also
uttered this thought vis-à-vis Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941 saying, "If we
see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought
to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible."
69
Checking the Aggressor
Survival by gaining power over their rivals is only one strategy great powers pursue.
States will also try to prevent other states from gaining power due to the zero-sum
element. Balancing and buck-passing then is the fifth strategy to which states resort.
Threatened Great Powers, unable to contain a rival from challenging its security, resort to
buck-passing to encourage another state to check the aggressor. If left no option, they will
engage in balancing against the threat.
Balancing occurs when a great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing
an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power. By drawing lines in the sand to deter
68
Ibid., 139.
69
Ibid., 155; quoted in David McCoullough, Truman (New York: Touchstone, 1992), 262.
Details
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