Feminist language forms in German: A corpus-assisted study of personal appellation with non-human referents

Posch, Claudia

Feminist language forms in German: A corpus-assisted study of personal appellation with non-human referents

by Claudia Posch (Author)

German Studies - Linguistics

53115

Summary

This study uses constructivist language theory based on Lann Hornscheidt’s research as a framework. Grammar is viewed as a form of language use being more or less conventionalized. So, the debate on feminist linguistics is viewed from a new perspective. The study begins with an introduction summarizing the state of research and establishing the research questions. Ch. 2 presents the constructivist framework: The notion of extra-linguistic reality is abandoned and also the idea of language as reflection of reality. The strict distinction between a preliminary language system and language use no longer exists. Ch. 3 provides an overview of German feminist linguistics with a critical perspective on its early discussions. Ch. 4 gives a historical overview on grammar theoretical views on gender. Ch. 5 deals with more recent approaches including diachronic approaches to the question of grammatical gender. The critical evaluation shows that feminist linguistics is now part of different fields of study, even if grammar theorists often do not recognize the results of feminist linguistics. In Ch. 6 a corpus-assisted study of so-called genderfair forms in German is presented and the methodology is explained. In Ch. 7 results are summarized and presented with a particular focus on the usage of genderfair forms with non-human referents. Conclusions from the findings and a general outlook are presented in Ch. 8.

Excerpt

List of Figures

2.1

Metaphorical mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.1

MAN-Principle in human anatomy atlases . . . . . . . .

3.2

Pedestrian underpass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.3

Pedestrians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.4

Hits for Landeshauptfrau in COSMAS II . . . . . . . . .

5.1

Two gender system in PIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

6.1

Semantic categories of personal appellation with selected

examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6.2

KWIC-display of search results in COSMAS II . . . . . . 134

6.3

Example for COSMAS II exportation function . . . . . . 135

6.4

VBA macro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

7.1

Input form (draft version) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

7.2

MS-Access database draft: data sheet 1 . . . . . . . . . . 142

7.3

MS-Access database draft: data sheet 2 . . . . . . . . . . 144

7.4

Distribution of hits with suffix `-in' and gender symmetric

patterns for Erzeuger-* in % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

7.5

Aktionärin hits per year n=766 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

150

7.6

Aktionärin with animate referents n=525 . . . . . . . . .

152

7.7

Aktionärin inanimate referents countries n=226 . . . . .

153

7.8

Anbieterin: inanimate referent countries n=424 . . . . .

156

7.9

Anbieterin: inanimate referent peaks . . . . . . . . . . .

158

7.10 Anbieterin: country and year

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

7.11 Anbieterin: animate

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1 Introduction

The objective of this book is, first of all, to critically evaluate different

approaches towards feminist linguistics, especially those that theoreti-

cally deal with the strategies of gender symmetric language. This theo-

retical debate takes place between the poles of diachronic and synchronic

linguistic theory, which have been treated as strictly divided approaches

since Saussure et al.. Paradoxically, on the one hand, diachrony and syn-

chrony are two independent directions in linguistics, on the other there is

the problem that there is no clear line along which they can be divided.

Thus, it is discussed if one still can speak of such a strong division of

both in the field of feminist linguistics. Furthermore, if such a distinction

does not really exist how does this affect the division between language

system and language usage (langue vs. parole), a basic dualism which

is basically assumed within feminist linguistics. Therefore, this disser-

tation discusses two basic problems: Which problems arise for feminist

linguistic theory if it assumes a strict division between the language

system and language usage (langue vs. parole)? Is the differentiation

between language system and language usage not analogous to other

binary oppositions and which consequences does the assumption of un-

derlying oppositional pairs have for the discussion (for example scientific

vs. non-scientific, culture vs. nature, etc.). This includes an assumption

raised by Hornscheidt (2006, 2003, 1998 and 04.06.2007), who suggests

that linguistics has overlooked the importance of the so-called Diskur-

swende (`linguistic turn') that captured the humanities in the 1990s. Or

as Günther and Linke (2006) put it:

"Linguistics up to now remarkably has not commented on the

paradigmatic aspect and the effective history of the `linguistic

turn', at least not in the form of programmatic contributions.

Has linguistics even missed out on it? This indeed has to be

admitted." (Günther and Linke, 2006, p. 4)

With this Hornscheidt (2006) suggests that linguistics is still a very struc-

turalist field as opposed to other fields in the humanities, which no longer

1 Introduction

work with a differentiation between discourse and the actual `things' it

describes.

1.1 State of research

Feminist linguistics in the German language area is still deprived of recog-

nition as part of the field of linguistics and is often framed as something

other, something non-linguistic. It is thus the aim of this study to eval-

uate the standing of feminist linguistics within the field of linguistics on

the one hand and to again raise the discussion on language usage which

is claimed by feminist linguistics. The frequent usage of the so-called

generic masculine in German is questioned and discussed. Furthermore,

the debates on the semantic rooting of sexus in grammatical gender in

German are critically evaluated. The scientific argument on gender sym-

metric language usage is a starting point. The topic is still very contro-

versial, not only in the public sphere but also in university discourse.

Linguistics, especially feminist linguistics, treats it as part of so-called

language system critique (as opposed to language usage critique). Femi-

nist linguistics investigate the possibilities of gender symmetric language

within the grammar of a language with a focus on personal appellation.

This focus resulted in proposals for gender symmetric language usage

which have now been partly implemented in public discourse in public

institutions it is mandatory to `gender' texts. However, feminists locate

a certain backlash in the usage of gender symmetric language strategies

and in the public sphere those strategies are still very disliked. The

linguistic debate as well stagnates and takes place between the pure

formalists and their critics. The former appeal to the regularities and

systematics of language from the basis of its naturalness. According to

them language(s) function a certain way and this must no be changed

through artificial influences from outside. They usually suspect that

those who criticize this view confuse grammatical gender with biologi-

cal sex. A true, serious linguist and grammarian therefore should view

grammatical gender as a formal category (even if some undefined seman-

tic `residue' is generally accepted). On the other hand, feminist linguists,

never questioned the idea of the language system versus language usage

but rather it assumes that by ways of political correct language usage

the underlying system will gradually be changed. Its main focus was and

is the usage of personal appellation.

1.2 General outline

In this book a recent, post-structuralist theory (constructivist) is used

as a framework. Particularly the research of Lann Hornscheidt provides

starting point, which was presented in the book Die sprachliche Benen-

nung von Personen aus konstruktivistischer Sicht (2006). Hornscheidt

defines grammar as a form of language usage which is more or less con-

ventionalized. Grammatical gender is a category of knowledge in which

information also is more or less conventionalized. Hornscheidt's approach

is based on Marmaridou's (2000) definition of `conventionalized' mean-

ing, which is that contextual meaning is `lost' and `schematized' by on-

going repetition. Even the elusive category of grammatical gender has a

certain semantic content (or as said before `residue') which is not even

denied by traditional linguistics. It is rather unclear, if or to what ex-

tent this information influences the so-called language system. By using

a constructivist frame the debate on feminist linguistics can be viewed

from a new perspective. It is possible to ask how far the semantic content

of grammatical gender (especially the content `sex') is schematized.

1.2 General outline

In the second chapter of this dissertation a new perspective on grammar

will be presented as a framework. This framework is based on the work

of Lann Hornscheidt and thus it is constructivist approach to grammar.

Hornscheidt criticizes that form a constructivist point of view

. . .] many problems which are discussed in the linguistic

and philosophical literature become irrelevant as they take

extra-linguistic realities as a starting point for evaluating if a

reference is specific or not, if aims at existing or non-existing

objects" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 100).

The main points of a constructivist view on language are the following:

This new approach does no longer assume any kind of extra-linguistic

reality and thus also abandons the idea of language as reflection of real-

ity. Hence, the strict distinction between a preliminary language system

and language usage is abandoned. Hornscheidt assumes that certain

types of language usages are strongly conventionalized and repeated so

many times that they become the status of a system and appear natu-

ral. Hornscheidt particularly emphasizes the relevance of language as a

medium that constitutes our reality. It is essential that meaning as well

1 Introduction

as grammatical functions are procedural. They are subject to continu-

ous negotiation in very particular situations of speaking. Thus, the focus

here shifts from grammar to language usage. In the first chapter of this

dissertation this new view is laid out in more detail. It will be used as a

framework to gain a new perspective on research in the field of feminist

linguistics in the following chapters.

Chapter three provides an overview of the field of feminist linguistics

with a strong focus on German feminist linguistics. A critical new per-

spective on the literature based on the previously laid out framework is

given by re-evaluating authors like Trömel-Plötz (1997), Pusch (1997),

Kalverkämper (1997) and Kalverkämper (1997b). Important questions

here are: How does feminist linguistics look today? Does it still exist?

What are the problems this field of research faces and is it still a neces-

sity? Also more recent psycholinguistic (or neurolinguistic) studies on

the subject are integrated in this chapter.

In chapter four, grammar-theoretical discussions on gender are re-

evaluated critically. The time-frame was chosen to represent earliest

works up to the beginnings the previous century. Important research

questions in this chapter will be: How did early grammarians view gram-

matical gender? How is the early debate on the semantic content of

grammatical gender depicted and how did it influence the work of early

feminist linguists.

In chapter five more recent grammar-theoretical approaches will be

evaluated. These includes diachronic approaches to the discussion on

grammatical gender. The critical evaluation with the above framework

shows that feminist language critique is now part of different fields of

study, even if grammar theorists often do not recognize the work of

feminist linguistics.

An empirical study forms the second part of this thesis. Metaphors

(more exactly personifications) are analyzed according to their degree of

conventionalization. The idea is that metaphors especially hint at more

or less schematized language structures. The study asks if the semantic

content of grammatical gender is transferred onto things or items and if

so, if traditional gender dichotomy is reproduced and constructed in this

way. It is expected that there is a tendency to personify unanimated

entities, as for example institutions, by using grammatical gender as an

indicator for the perceived gender of the target metaphor. Furthermore,

the study is intended to raise the issue if the continuous repetition of

the `gendering' of objects, concepts and abstracta with the help of the

1.2 General outline

linguistic tool grammatical gender is contributing to the reinforcement

of `male bias'. Chapter 6, thus presents the methodology used in this

study. Combined methods from computer and corpus-linguistics were

implemented in order to create useful data. The major research tool

was COSMAS II, a linguistically annotated POS-tagged, corpus appli-

cation with which the German reference corpus (3,6 Billion words) can

be searched.

In chapter seven, the resulting database is presented. A few examples

from the data contained in this database illustrate its possible uses and

preliminary interpretation of this data is provided. Particularly, uses

of the German suffix `-in' with inanimate referents are shown. A com-

parable study was conducted by Jobin in 2004. Nomina referring to

institutions were checked according to their nominal predicates and if

those were using the feminine gender in accordance with the gender of

the noun.

2 Theoretical framework

In this chapter a post-structural approach to language and grammar

is developed, which forms the basis of this study. First, the idea of a

preliminary language system is investigated. The usage of the terms

grammatical gender and (biological) gender in this study is established.

Then, the concept of `embodiment' in thinking (and language) is expli-

cated. Subsequently, an overview on conceptual metaphor theory and its

relation to the notion of embodiment is given. Furthermore, the relation

of such a constructivist viewpoint to the theory of Linguistic Relativity

is discussed. In concordance with a constructivist approach, the notions

of `conventionalization' and `appellation' are presented.

2.1 Post-structuralist approaches to language and

grammar

This study incorporates a somewhat different view of grammar and, more

precisely, the category grammatical gender based on the substantial work

Die sprachliche Benennung von Personen aus konstruktivistischer Sicht

by Lann Hornscheidt (2006); Hornscheidt (1998), and the pragmatic ap-

proach of Sophia Marmaridou (2000); Marmaridou (2005); Marmaridou

(2005b). The most central concept in Hornscheidt's work is that gram-

mar, in a constructivist sense, is not a category that is strictly separable

from language usage but rather a "highly conventionalized form of la-

nguage usage" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 37). Feminist language criticism

has been divided into two branches so far: the criticism of the lang-

uage system and criticism of language usage. For the German language,

system-critique has centered on the so-called generic masculine or else the

default gender (cf. chapter 3). The theoretical framework in this study

is applied to feminist language criticism and grammar theory approaches

by embodying a constructivist perspective which no longer supports the

strict differentiation between the language system and language usage in

order to show that the very ideological debate pursued so far is based on

this strict division or, more particular, on the idea that such a division is

necessary. The main idea of a post-structural approach is that grammar

2 Theoretical framework

and gender in particular cannot be understood without regard to lang-

uage use. Grammar, in particular gender, not only entails some kind of

meaning but is a grammatical tool that triggers and produces meanings.

This is one of the key assumptions of the recently developing field of

cognitive linguistics, too. If this key assumption is considered appro-

priate, "then strategic language change appears in a new light" (Horn-

scheidt, 2006, p. 39). It can no longer be assumed that anyone is able to

view the concept of grammar objectively and separated from the parole.

Furthermore, all descriptions of grammar are themselves language uses

and thus actively contribute to the reinforcement of certain linguistic

practices. Structural linguistics, also its feminist branch, has been view-

ing language as mirroring reality, especially when it comes to the topic

of language and gender. This, first of all, presupposes that there is such

a thing as extra-linguistic reality which is disconnected from language

and precedes language (and thus grammatical gender). Secondly, it also

presupposes that there are precisely two genders in the world, man and

woman, and nothing else. According to Hornscheidt the first point en-

tails the idea that one systematically can change language. Hence, it

is suggested by Hornscheidt to shift focus from the language system to

language use and to view use as being at the core of language. It is fur-

ther insisted on the relevance of language as an instrument to construct

our realities. Those media which use and convey language, according to

Hornscheidt, play an important role as they often have normative effects.

Consequently, it is not inherently language that is discriminating but it

is how speakers are used to speak. But also what we call the language

system partially defines and normalizes and legitimizes how we are used

to speak.

The investigation of language hence is shifted towards a pragmatic di-

rection. Also Marmaridou aims at a "re-definition of pragmatic study" in

a constructivist sense. This means that pragmatic meaning is no longer

viewed as being independently existing but rather as a part of thought or,

as she puts it, as `internalized' (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 13). Marmaridou

provides an overview of three major developments of pragmatics, starting

with the "tradition of the philosophers of language" such as John Austin

and John Searle. According to Marmaridou, later approaches then either

focused on the hearer or on the speaker and developed two-way models

of communication. Their main interest was to find out how people could

come to some sort of understanding of each other's utterances when la-

nguage itself was not unambiguous. There is a strong focus on "context"

2.1 Post-structuralist approaches to language and grammar

in these kind of approaches as well. More recent views are based on a

different view of language. One, the so-called cognitivist framework sees

language as being a product of mental activity. The other, the societal

approach, "regards it as a social construct" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 14). It

is Marmaridou's aim to bring these two seemingly non-compatible views

together because mainstream approaches to pragmatics do "[

. . .]not ac-

count for language as both a biological and a social phenomenon" (Mar-

maridou, 2000, p. 42).

Marmaridou (2000) similarly explains the objectivist paradigm as such

that it assumes that language mirrors an external reality. In semantics

this paradigm operates from the basis that expressions "get their mean-

ing only via their capacity to correspond, or failure to correspond, to the

real world" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 44). Words, phrases and expressions

are therefore theoretically able to correctly express an item or content

and they can be true or false. This objective approach does not link

human cognition and existence in any way or even sees them as being

related. Rather they suggest that "[e]xistence cannot depend in any way

on human cognition" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 44). Thus, there is a certain

way in which the world actually is, independently of how people think,

interpret, believe or perceive the world.

Objectivist viewpoints of word meaning need to presuppose two types

of knowledge: definitional knowldege and encyclopedic knowledge. This

means, it is presumed that language users know which features consti-

tute an entity on the one hand and on the other that the users know

about features that can be optional in an entity. In this way, objectivist

semantics can distinguish between what is in the language (definitional

knowledge) and what is not (encyclopedic knowledge). Marmaridou crit-

icizes this approach because it "manages to exclude social aspects from

the definitional meaning of words" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 45). Such as-

pects are then interpreted as being beyond the power of language because

they are part of the existing world. This is also the reason why abstract

concepts such as emotions etc. cannot be systematized very well with

this approach because it is not possible to define their properties "objec-

tively and externally to human beings" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 46) that

is detached from the human body and experience.

2 Theoretical framework

2.2 Hen or egg? Is language structure preceding

language use?

The above is also entailed in the discussion on whether or not there actu-

ally is meaning in the grammatical category gender. Hornscheidt (2006)

suggests to present a new model of analyzing reference. The term refer-

ence (in accordance with the constructivist viewpoint) is called personal

appellation. Studies so far were focussing on portraying the relationship

between grammatical gender and (human) gender. Especially, studies of

German still focus on separating genus from sexus without taking into

account that the notion of sexus has fundamentally changed: i.e. re-

placed by Butler's

notion of gender. Gender is a constructivist view of

a social category and the constructivist viewpoint doubts that linguistic

structures are preceding language use. This view of language has severe

consequences for what meaning and grammar signify and which status

is attributed to grammar and grammatical gender respectively. Meaning

thus is dependent on conceptualization and it is viewed as something

dynamic and situational it is not just there. A very simplified summa-

rization of this view could be:

Meaning does not exist until you mean something.

What Hornscheidt (2006) aims at with this is a to express the "per-

spective of action" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 616) of language i.e. speech as

an action. In terms of research she suggests a change of terminology that

goes from static concepts to a more dynamic, process-oriented terminol-

ogy. An example for this would be to use term `pejorizing' instead of

`pejorative'.

The use of a progressive form is intended to make it easier

to grasp the term as a dynamic concept.

Furthermore, some forms of language use are viewed as strongly stan-

dardized or normalized. Because they are functioning in such a way, they

obtain the status of a system:

"In the model developed here it is suggested to conceptual-

ize language fundamentally as language usage and to criti-

cally analyze assumptions of a pre-discursive, linguistic an-

tecedence, to critically ask what is naturalized by this act

cf. Butler 2004

"pejorisierend statt pejorativ" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 616)

2.2 Hen or egg? Is language structure preceding language use?

and what is evading critical analysis of language use, which

always looks at aspects of power and authority, for example

power of interpretation" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 616).

If we assume that the category grammatical gender at least includes

some semantic residue, then it cannot be studied by grammar theory

alone. Thus, it cannot be treated as a `purely grammatical' category for

two reasons: first, the semantic residue needs to be taken into account

when dealing with grammatical gender; secondly, if grammar itself is

no longer seen as preceding language use, it follows that it is cannot be

viewed as entirely separated from meaning.

But if language is grounded

in cognition, "then cognitive structure and conceptualizations of social

reality must characterize language use, which thus contributes to the pro-

duction, maintenance or change of social meaning" (Marmaridou, 2000,

p. 2).

According to Marmaridou (2000), thus, social meaning is directly re-

lated to structures of thinking instead of being a mental image of some-

thing that exists in an external reality. The metaphor of knowledge as

being engraved in the brain, as something that determines how we act

and what we say has become obsolete. Rather our gray matter is flexible

and changeable and so social meaning is not something that is constant

but rather processual. Both, Marmaridou and Hornscheidt, put find-

ings from "philosophical, cognitive and societal approaches to pragmatic

meaning within an alternative theoretical framework, that of cognitive

linguistics and experiential realism" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 3). An im-

portant point in these approaches is that they conceive of language as

being motivated by cognitive structure as well as interacting with it. Be-

cause of the direct interaction between brain structure and language the

language users are acting as social agents and are thereby maintaining,

reproducing, challenging or changing seemingly external parameters like

power relations between interlocutors, institutional roles and relevant

social values and cultural beliefs" (Marmaridou, 2000, pp. 34).

What is interesting, and does not go very well with the described the

constructivist view are the terms cognitive structure and brain structure

cf. Coseriu (1988): language is a dynamic process, the `system' is produced, repro-

duced and modified continuously; it gains a certain stability by reproducing it very

often; cf. Kienpointner (2000): the sexist tendency in vocabulary and grammar

is not a problem of the language system but of language norms (Kienpointner,

2000, p. 228).

2 Theoretical framework

do not suggest synaptic plasticity and processuality. Of course, brain

plasticity has to be taken into account when regarding the interaction

between language users and brain structure. This means that the inter-

action is not only influencing the way we speak but also our experience

with language could theoretically change the way our brain is formed.

"One of the key principles of behavioral neuroscience is that

experience can modify brain structure long after brain de-

velopment is complete. Indeed, it is generally assumed that

structural changes in the brain accompany memory storage"

(Kolb and Whishaw, 1998, pp. 44ff., and references therein).

This processuality of the brain itself also goes hand in hand with the

representation of `reality' in the brain. Such a view could in general be

described as an internalist view of language in opposition to the struc-

turalist view, which always distinguishes between language and external

reality. One key concepts in such internalist approaches is that language

and meaning are `embodied'.

2.3 Embodiment of thinking

Clark (1998) accurately describes models that separate between an in-

ternal and external (or real) world as isolationalist views of the mind.

This means that the mind functions by sending-receiving input or as he

puts it: "The world is (just) a source of inputs and an arena of outputs.

And the body is just an organ for receiving inputs and effecting out-

puts (actions)" (Clark, 1998, p. 2). Also most approaches to grammar

and grammatical gender can be classified as isolationalist, as they distin-

guish between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic, between language

and the real world. In such approaches the mind is viewed as an entity

by itself that is independent of the body by which it is carried.

But what exactly is meant by the term embodiment in internalist app-

roaches? In cognitive science, as Ziemke (2001) puts it: "Embodiment is

nowadays by many researchers considered a conditio sine qua non for any

form of natural or artificial intelligence" (Ziemke, 2001, p. 1). According

to Wilson (2002), what has become known today as embodied cognition

has its starting point in earlier theories that assumed that there is no

thinking without vision. Embodied cognition assumes "that the mind

must be understood in the context of its relationship to a physical body

that interacts with the world" (Wilson, 2002, p. 625).

2.3 Embodiment of thinking

Wilson (2002, pp. 626634) discusses six prominent views on embodi-

ment and the mind, which are briefly summarized in the following para-

graph:

1. Cognition is situated

2. Cognition is time pressured

3. We off-load cognitive work onto the environment

4. The environment is part of the cognitive system

5. Cognition is for action

6. Off-line cognition is body based.

The first view on embodiment states that cognition is situated which

means that thinking is related to tasks. As Wilson puts it this claim does

not entail abstract cognitive activities like future planning and thus can

be evaluated as describing a very basic process or "our fundamental cog-

nitive architecture" (Wilson, 2002, p. 626). Point two means that there

are sometimes situations in which the cognizer needs to react quickly to

a situation. That this time pressure is the important factor in human

cognition is denied by Wilson, as according to her, time pressure is not

always included in human action. The third type of theory presumes that

we try to use less memory in situations i.e. to safe memory power and to

be as resourceful as we can. This saves energy, for example, when we turn

ourselves in a direction while explaining the way to someone. Fourth,

cognition is not only involving the mind but also includes the body and

environment--situation and cognizer are one system. The fifth approach

views cognition, especially the function of memory, as having developed

for moving through a three-dimensional space. Memory thus developed

for action. Wilson though criticizes this view for assuming a too direct

link to action. It is rather believed that "cognition often subserves action

via a more indirect, flexible, and sophisticated strategy, in which infor-

mation about the nature of the external world is stored for future use

without strong commitments on what the future use might be"(Wilson,

2002, p. 633). The basic idea of the last approach to embodiment of

cognition is that: "Sensimotor simulations of external situations are in

fact widely implicated in human cognition" (Wilson, 2002, p. 633). Wil-

son here lists as example mental imagery: "Imagery involves analogue

2 Theoretical framework

representations that functionally preserve spatial and other properties

of the external world, rather than consisting of bundles of propositions"

(Wilson, 2002, p. 633).

In linguistics, the term embodiment was introduced by the field of cog-

nitive linguistics, a relative young branch of the discipline. The most

important definition of embodiment for linguistics probably comes from

Lakoff and Johnson (1999), who claim that thinking is not happening

outside the body and that the body is also more than just a vessel car-

rying the mind. Thinking is rather some kind of bodily function and

cannot happen without linkage to our "brains, bodies, and bodily expe-

rience" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 4; cf. Goschler 2005). They further

state that: "The same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to

perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems and modes

of reason" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 4). The notion that our think-

ing is embodied hence implies that it is in some way associated with our

sensory-motor system. It is argued that the sensory-motor system "not

only provides structure to conceptual content, but also characterizes the

semantic content of concepts" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 4). It is fur-

ther assumed that imagining and doing something use a shared "neural

substrate", which basically means that the brain does not distinguish

between just thinking about doing something and actually doing it.

For example, if someone suffers from Agoraphobia, the fear of spiders,

simply imagining a spider can lead to symptoms of fear like rapid pulse,

increasing perspiration and so on. The brain thus cannot distinguish

between a thing being there and seeing it or just imagining it. Gallese

and Lakoff (2005) argue that understanding something, understanding

language, is done by the same `matter' in the brain that is activated when

we act. Gallese and Lakoff explain this with the following example:

"Harry picked up the glass." (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005, p. 456)

In order to understand a sentence like this, we need to be able to imag-

ine picking up a glass or even more so, we need to be able to imagine

someone, who is picking up a glass. Gallese and Lakoff call their theory

an interactionist theory of meaning. They assume that everything we

know is embodied, which means that we process our experiences accord-

ing to how "our constant encounter and interaction with the world via

our bodies and brains" is structured (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005, p. 456).

for a more detailed view of this approach Wilson recommends Kosslyn (1996).

2.3 Embodiment of thinking

What does this concept of embodiment thus mean for the study of

the relationship between grammatical gender and gender? If we first of

all assume that "imagination is mental simulation" (Gallese and Lakoff,

2005, p. 458), what we say simulates how we perceive the world. If we

use grammatical patterns like the generic masculine thus, this results in

two problems: first of all, we cannot simulate a gender neutral person.

If we think about people it is a social imperative to divide them into

females and males

. How would anyone imagine a `neutral Swiss per-

son' to look like?

Secondly, as the masculine form coincides with the

generic form and is thus much more often used than the feminine form,

this leads to an over representation of the category `men' in our think-

ing. For the study of grammatical gender this means that what is often

downplayed as semantic residue in grammar cannot be ignored. Most

studies do not actually deny that there is some (often vague) connection

between grammatical gender and gender. Often though this connection

is viewed as minor and thus ignored in studies on grammatical gender.

But more recent studies from cognitive linguistics focus on exactly how

this connection functions and see it as central to the study of grammat-

ical gender. Also grammar is viewed as being embodied and from that it

follows that it must carry meanings that relate to our bodily experience.

As Wilson (2002) puts it:

. . .] the field of cognitive linguistics is reexamining lingui-

stic processing in terms of broader principles of cognitive and

sensorimotor processing. This approach, in radical contrast

to the formal and abstract syntactic structures of traditional

theories, posits that syntax is deeply tied to semantics" (Wil-

son, 2002, p. 634).

In this view the embodied knowledge of the physical world forms the

connection between syntax and semantics. From this follows, if language

is embodied it is also engendered because it is a primary imperative in

our daily lives to distinguish between men and women.

According to Christiansen and Chater (2008) the starting point is that

see also page 95; there is a social imperative to categorize people in binary gender

opposition (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2007, p. 228).

cf. Pusch (1997)

for a review Wilson suggests: Langacker 1999; Langacker [1999]2008, Talmy 2003

and also Tomasello 1998

2 Theoretical framework

"language must inevitably be shaped around human learn-

ing and processing biases deriving from the structure of our

thought processes, perceptuomotor factors, cognitive limita-

tions, and pragmatic constraints" (Christiansen and Chater,

2008, p. 490).

This means that language has formed along the lines of language usage

and not that language usage is just some sort of side-product of lang-

uage structure. Christiansen and Chater (2008)'s approach is a language

evolutionist approach that sees languages as having a symbiotic relation-

ship with humans. If language and thinking respectively lie in the human

body, the question is, how this functions and how our bodily experiences

are organized?

2.3.1 Metaphors as embodied thinking

One possible answer to this question may be provided by conceptual

metaphor theory, also first introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (2003).

Lakoff and Johnson have claimed that our brain organizes such experi-

ences in conceptual metaphors and idealized cognitive models. Metaphors

in conceptual metaphor theory are seen as major constituents of both

natural language and thought. It is assumed that metaphors indicate

underlying thought patterns (Deignan, 2005, p. 4). Deignan lists as the

most important tenets of conceptual metaphor theory the following:

· Metaphors structure thinking

· Metaphors structure knowledge

· Metaphor is central to abstract language

· Metaphor is grounded in physical experience

· Metaphor is ideological (Deignan, 2005, p. 13)

The first point acknowledges that many abstract topics are often solely

implemented in language in the form of metaphoric expressions. Lakoff

and Johnson (2003) argue that knowledge is linked to language by what

they call conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphors are defined as

semantic areas or categories which help organizing our knowledge of the

world. Conceptual metaphors generally have to be differentiated from

2.3 Embodiment of thinking

linguistic metaphors as they usually are not expressed but lie behind or

"below" language. They structure thinking or ideas in people's minds

or as Deignan puts it: "Conceptual metaphors function at the level of

thought, below language, and they are rarely, if ever, used in speaking or

writing" (Deignan, 2005, p. 14). These conceptual metaphors are then

realized through language in the form of linguistic metaphors. In this

sense the conceptual metaphor approach could be classified as a rational-

istic approach as it assumes underlying ideas and concepts that humans

derive from their experience of the world. At the same time metaphors

are also used to structure new knowledge. Deignan exemplifies this as-

pect by relating it to our knowledge of a relatively new semantic domain:

the internet. The knowledge-domain of `web' (network of fine threads)

or `net' was transferred onto knowledge about computer sciences in order

to make it accessible for computer laypersons.

It is important to note that the most essential of these conceptual

metaphors are "grounded in our physical experience" (Deignan, 2005,

p. 19). One could therefore maybe speak of the embodiment of language,

because even different languages which are not related in their structure

often share the same conceptual metaphors:

"Where two groups of people do not share language or culture

but have the same metaphors, the roots of the metaphorical

connections probably lie in perhaps the only experience they

have in common: inhabiting a human body" (Deignan, 2005,

p. 19).

If in fact most metaphors are grounded in bodily sensations, then it

is most likely that the concept of gender is also mirrored in conceptual

metaphors. Thus, below actual metaphoric expressions lie conceptual

metaphors that structure our thinking, also structuring our gendered

thinking. An example for this would be the following

Alder & Eisenhut ist nach eigenen Angaben erstes zertifiziertes

Unternehmen und Marktführerin der Branche.

(A97/DEZ.39144 )

`Alder & Eisenhut is, according their own data, the first cer-

tified enterprise-NEUT and brand leader-FEM of the indus-

try.'

Deignan (2005) is very tentative here about using the term `embodiment' here, as

the term is not always used in the same way in the literature.

retrieved by COSMAS-Corpustool

2 Theoretical framework

As we see in this example there is not really any grammatical reason

why the word Marktführerin should be in the feminine form, as it refers

to a neuter word. Behind this maybe lies an appellation to the status

of the named company as a joint-stock cooperation, in German die AG,

a feminine word which the noun implicitly could refer to. Still, even if

agentive nouns do not necessarily need to agree in grammatical gender,

a sentence like

Alder & Eisenhut ist nach eigenen Angaben erstes zertifiziertes

Unternehmen und Marktführer der Branche.

`Alder & Eisenhut is, according their own data, the first cer-

tified enterprise-NEUT and brand leader-MASC of the in-

dustry.'

would equally be grammatically correct, even preferable. From a point of

view of conceptual metaphor theory one could say that it is very common

to cognitively structure abstract entities such as corporate enterprises as

human. The source domain, from which the metaphor is taken, is the

domain `people'. The target domain onto which the metaphor is mapped

is the domain `enterprises', which is very common. This conceptual

metaphor that we perceive of enterprises as people even has found en-

trance into laws, as we conceive of the status of such enterprises as juristic

person or artificial person. Thus, the cognitive theory of metaphor does

not actually investigate in how metaphors appear in language but tries

to find structures that exist `below' linguistic expression, hence struc-

tures that are pre-linguistic. According to Lakoff and Johnson (2003)

such conceptual metaphors are structured by so-called idealized cogni-

tive models.

2.3.2 Idealized cognitive models

Idealized cognitive models (hereafter referred to as ICM) are categoriza-

tions that are represented in the mind or frames of thinking that we

have

. They correspond roughly with prototypes but they also are cog-

nitive or pre-linguistic. This means that only a comparison of a cogni-

tive model with a concrete situation enables a decision on which words

to choose when trying to express a concept. Lakoff and Johnson (2003)

refer to the very popular example of the word Bachelor (cf. Wildgen

2008, p. 71).

Lakoff and Johnson 2003.

2.3 Embodiment of thinking

A `Bachelor' is a man, who has never been married. Still, one could

not call the pope a `bachelor' as the concept entails more than this one

property. Often, thus, more than one ICM is at work at the same time,

which have to be balanced. Here the example of the concept `mother'

consists of (at least) four categories:

· birth model: someone who gives birth

· genetic model: next female relative

· nurturing model: person, who raised you and brought you up

· marriage model: your mother is your father's wife

All these categories form a picture of the concept `mother' we have in

mind. Not all of these categories have to apply constantly or with every

mother. But in the `ideal' case, hence idealized models, all four are

accurate. The important point is that we as speakers usually are aware

of all four of these categories.

ICMs are also very closely related to prototypes. Prototypes are the

most typical representative of a concept so in the above case the pro-

totypical mother would integrate all four of these categories. Lakoff and

Johnson (2003) thus do not define language as being an instrument of

mirroring or picturing some external reality but rather as language be-

ing structured in so-called mappings. This means that metaphors simply

function in a way that one `maps' one concept on another or that one

explains one thing by using another thing, as figure 2.1 demonstrates.

Wildgen lists the following further functions of conceptual metaphors:

· highlighting and hiding

· orientational metaphors

· ontological metaphors

· personification

· metonymy

For the study of gender the functions personification and metonymy

are the most important functions. For example, if we ask the question

to what extend we need to personify abstract entities to be able to speak

2 Theoretical framework

Figure 2.1: Metaphorical mapping

about them? If we personify things, if we have a tendency to anthropo-

morphize things, does that mean we automatically `gender' them? ICMs

usually are not reflected and for the most part never questioned within

a society. As Hornscheidt (2006) puts it, they are `conglomerates' of

complex cognitive patters, "which are dynamic and are changing in con-

nection with social developments" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 97). According

to Hornscheidt (2006) ICMs also are better suited than semantics to

explain attributions of meanings as they show asymmetries.

As in the example above, if the word `father' is compared to `mother' in

semantics, only gender distinguishes them; but the ICMs of both would

definitely not be very much alike. Hornscheidt (2006) also criticizes

Lakoff and Johnson (2003)'s model for considering the category gender

as underlying or for not questioning this category. As in the example

above, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) seem to take gender for granted and

is not questioned. That the ICMs also construct gender is not touched

by Lakoff and Johnson (2003). Further criticism on Lakoff and Johnson

is that their model is a one-way street, i.e. the brain (and our bodily

experience) influences our language but not the other way around.

The idea that there is an interdependency between speaking and think-

ing though has been taken up again more recently in cognitive linguistics

as well. Marmaridou (2000), for example, assumes that on the one hand

"conceptual structure determines language structure" but on the other

the usage of language within a special frame creates "culturally relevant

patterns of thought" (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 5). Thus, meaning is discur-

2.3 Embodiment of thinking

sive and is only produced in contexts, in accordance with (Hornscheidt,

2006, p. 90).

In summary, cognitive linguistics no longer assumes that language sim-

ply entails meaning but rather that it also triggers meaning. Meaning is

not some external reality that exists independently of speaking. Hence,

there is an interdependency between speaking and thinking. With this

point one has ask in which direction this interdependency goes. Is la-

nguage influencing thinking or is it the other way around? Approaches

which assume some influence of thinking on speaking are often subsumed

under the label linguistic relativity.

2.3.3 Linguistic relativity

The principle of linguistic relativity was formulated by Benjamin Lee

Whorf and was, for a short period, followed with interest. After 1965 the

topic was dropped by linguistics, especially formal linguistics showed no

more interest in it. Only recently this principle has gained new interest

(cf. Werlen 2002, Marmaridou 2000). Feminist linguistics especially

were often associated with this principle and thus also were disregarded

as `Whorfian' and in some way deterministic. A very useful definition

of how the principle linguistic relativity is viewed today is provided by

Werlen (2002):

Linguistic Relativity "[

. . .] says, that the language(s), which

an individual acquired or has learned in a language com-

munity, influence the manner how the world is interpreted

by this individual; this influence however can be diminished

through reflection " (Werlen, 2002, p. 28).

Werlen (2002) and others (esHornscheidt 2003, Levinson 2003) par-

ticularly criticize the generative understanding of language as it favors

the system over the parole. This, according to Werlen (2002), is prob-

lematic empirically as languages are only accessible through the parole.

"The linguist", so Werlen, "is in a similar situation as language learning

children are: they also acquire language only through utterances from

others" (Werlen, 2002, p. 13). Hornscheidt (2003) goes even further in

her critique of generative approaches that are especially prominent in

the U.S.A. and Western Europe. For her it is problematic that the focus

of research was for too long on language competence, and in an extreme:

"the linguistic realization (of competence) is rather an incident than the

2 Theoretical framework

normal case, a potential source of mistakes" (Hornscheidt, 2003, pp. 64

65).

Also Levinson (2003) stresses the point that the actual speaking is, by

some advocates of generative approaches, felt as noise produced by the

biological basis. According to Levinson (2003) there is an "ideological

overtone" in such approaches, as "the independence of thought from la-

nguage opens up to us the freedom of will and action [

. . .]" (Levinson,

2003, p. 33). This means that `Whorfianism' and `linguistic determin-

ism' cannot be possible. Levinson (2003) concludes that Whorf's ideas

are often misconceived as too deterministic and even `anti-American'.

Levinson (2003) cites numerous recent studies, which have brought

forward evidence for a relation between language and thought. Some

studies on color coding, for example, have shown that not all people

distinguish the same colors

. If a language like English, for example,

differentiates between `blue' and `green' and another language, in one

case Tarahumara

, does not, then the English speakers will "exaggerate

the perceptual differences on the boundary" (Levinson, 2003, p. 38). For

speakers of English, thus, one could casually say that `blue' appears

somehow blue-er. Because they have words for `green' and `blue' the

difference of the two colors appears greater or more significant to them

than it is for speakers of Tarahumara.

Similar studies tested spatial directions in different languages. Levin-

son (2003) speaks of languages "without words for `left' or `right' di-

rections, but where the spatial directions must be specified in terms of

cardinal directions like `east' (so one has to say things like `Pass the

northern cup', `There's a fly on your northern leg', etc.) (Levinson,

2003, p. 32). Speakers of such languages were found to be much more ac-

curate in their senses of direction compared to speakers with egocentric

(or viewpoint) spatial systems. Levinson (2003) rates this as "[

. . .] con-

vincing evidence that linguistic coding is both a facilitator of a specific

cognitive style and a bottleneck, constraining mental representations in

line with the output modality" (Levinson, 2003, p. 40). Thus, as Werlen

(2002) puts it:

"The principle of linguistic relativity not only asks if there is

thinking without language but rather that `every single lang-

uage' (co)determines the picture of the world a speaker has.

cf. Hardin and Maffi (1997), Lucy (1996) and Wolff and Holmes (2011)

a northern Mexican language, cf. Kennedy (1990)

2.4 Language and grammar from a constructivist point of view

This results in different languages having different pictures

of the world (Werlen, 2002, pp. 2526).

Grammatical gender, in the discussion about linguistic relativity, was

discussed quite frequently. The argument of feminist linguistics that

women are not visible in language because of the generic masculine form

and that for this reason they are simply forgotten is, according to Werlen

(2002), a classical language relative argument: "language influences the

perception of reality" (Werlen, 2002, p. 61). From this point of view it

comes evident that traditional linguists, especially formalist and gener-

ative linguistics, tend to negate the ideas of feminist linguistics. Fur-

thermore, like with Whorf's ideas, classical linguists do not get tired of

defaming them (Werlen, 2002, pp. 6162). Also Rothmund and Scheele

(2004) agree with Werlen in that a language psychological view of the

situation of discrimination through the generic masculine necessarily re-

turns to the principle of linguistic relativity (Rothmund and Scheele,

2004, p. 41). Transferred onto the study of gender this suggests that if a

language is able to signal gender through a grammatical gender system,

like in German personal appellation, then speakers will also make this

distinction and find it central for their communication.

To summarize, in opposition to the cognitive linguistic view developed

by Lakoff and Johnson (2003), cognitive linguistics today no longer speak

of a onesided influence of the body on language (thinking). Rather, lang-

uage influences how we think AND our body influences how we speak--

the influence is reciprocal in its nature. This approach is criticized by

Hornscheidt (2006) for not going far enough in that it still assumes `un-

derlying' structures. For her the processual nature of language and thi-

nking are not represented well in this approach. She suggests that it may

be better explained by a constructivist approach.

2.4 Language and grammar from a constructivist point

of view

In post-structural theory language is defined in the framework of a con-

structivist understanding in the following way. Language is

. . .] a means of producing an inter-communicatively ac-

cepted and mutually supposed reality in a social and com-

municative process. Language is thus understood as means

2 Theoretical framework

of actively creating a distinctive imagination and view of re-

ality through the usage of language [

. . .] and so corresponds

to a specific, linguistic-pragmatic understanding [

. . .]" (Horn-

scheidt, 2006, p. 21).

What does this mean in difference to linguistic relativity? First of all,

the definition of reality is no longer an external one but rather internally

formed - there is no extra-linguistic world. The world as humans see it

is constructed discursively. In her theoretical outline Hornscheidt (2006)

refers to the philosophical discussion on constructivism, among others

also to Ernst Glasersfeld and Pierre Bourdieu

. According to Horn-

scheidt (2006), Glasersfeld explains that constructivism does not want

to deny `reality', as it is often accused of. It does not say that the tree

one sees outside of one's window is not there. It rather states that reality

is not discernible i.e. that we have no way of knowing how this tree really

is constituted and the only thing we can do is to approach it with our

human senses.

Therefore, the strict separation between the denoting

and the denoted object is abandoned.

This philosophical view has a strong effect on basic principles in ling-

uistics, because it asks why linguistics separates what we know about

language from what we know about the world. Post-structural theory

sees the context as the crucial moment at which we negotiate meaning.

Thus, what a word or even a sentence means is constructed through

and with language while we use it.

. By questioning the supremacy the

langue one can also question `natural' categories such as Gender. Fur-

thermore, also the `communicative pre-occurrence of the langue' has to

be questioned as it is continually reproduced by structuralist linguistic

studies. This means, the idea of a language system that exists `before'

communication is questioned. This approach is thus also a language rel-

ative approach in that it says that "language forces speakers into distinct

patterns, categories" which are at the same time perceived as reality.

But instead of asking how structures of language influence how we

speak, the question is rather what are the consequences of this, or

cf. Bourdieu (1990); Bourdieu (1991) and Glasersfeld (1996)

In the eyes of a housefly the tree simply looks very different, it is nevertheless in

the same way `real' to the fly as it it real to humans; We cannot say the fly's

viewpoint is not valid (I want to thank Elisabeth Mairhofer for this example).

see Hornscheidt (2006) and also references therein to Michel Foucault: cf. Foucault

(1974, 1980); Foucault and Raulff (1977)

2.4 Language and grammar from a constructivist point of view

"which social groups state their own view on reality as a

generally binding norm through linguistic practices of nam-

ing and defining amongst other things and how this process

works" (Hornscheidt, 2006, pp. 2326)

. In the field of linguistics however these consequences have not been

highly regarded so far.

So far, it was assumee that there is a difference between the language

system and language usage. This fact is criticized by post-modern theory

and especially by constructivist theories. Hornscheidt (2006) deplores

that linguistics so far has "broadly ignored the interaction of linguistic

and extra-linguistic" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 20). Thus, linguistics has so

far completely disregarded its own highly normative character. Language

is in this new viewpoint no longer seen as inherently carrying meaning

as well as it is not separated from an independent system of grammar.

Rather, meaning in language is constructed through usage, more pre-

cisely through repeated use and reinforcing use. As Hornscheidt (2006)

puts it: "language forces its users into specific patterns or categories

which are at the same time felt as being natural" (Hornscheidt, 2006,

p. 25). Through the repetition of a specific use such patterns are rein-

forced. If then, the idea of a language system which exists independently

is reinforced, this too seems to be a natural phenomenon. Hornscheidt

(2006) raises the question if it is possible that no such system exists

and that language is really exclusively consists of "conventionalized and

authorized language usage" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 36).

Hornscheidt (2006)'s radical framework consequently does no longer

take up the strong Saussurean separation between the identifier and the

identified, because it no longer assumes that the knowledge of language

is different to the knowledge of the world. In that sense what we know

about the language we acquire is, like what we know of the world, a

result of experiences we make. Meaning is something a group of speakers

appoints to a word and it does not lie in the word itself. In this view

a word, a phrase or even a language does not exist independently of its

user and thus is not bound to any strict system. The system as well

as the meaning we give to it is created through using the language. In

Reference to Bourdieu's Theory of Practice: "Practice is observable in instances of

ongoing social interactions among individuals, which most often involves language

[

. . .]" (Watts, 2007, p. 148)

2 Theoretical framework

the same way looking upon the language and describing it (i.e. doing

linguistics) is also a form of using it (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 20-24).

Hornscheidt suggests that based on this perception also the category

gender can appear in a new light. In this context, it is thus important to

ask which social group(s) declare their view on the world and on what

we in our every day language call reality and regard as the reality, and

how they do this and what kind of appellation and standardization prac-

tices they use (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 25). The focus here is on linguistic

practice(s) and in this context Hornscheidt (2006) again refers to Bour-

dieu (1990) and his Theory of Practice (Hornscheidt, 2006, pp. 27, and

references therein).

Bourdieu (2008) develops a process related way of viewing different

social structures which is not contingent on drawing borderlines between

polar opposites or dichotomies (Watts, 2007, p. 147). The main focus in

his theory is on the processual nature of structures which we also find

mirrored in recent theories on grammaticalization (cf. section 2.5.3 on p.

40). Watts (2007) defines practice as being "observable in instances of

ongoing social interaction amongst individuals, which most often involves

language [

. . .]" (Watts, 2007, p. 148). In this sense any kind of language

usage could also be termed as a form of social practice. This theory sets

language as a means to continually construct the world. Hornscheidt

(2006) here raises the question if not the notion of a language system

only came into being through its continual repetition that made it ap-

pear natural. In other words, was grammar not created by repeatedly

describing grammar? Hornscheidt (2006) introduces two terms to grasp

the level of the language system in an alternative way. It is viewed as

a combination of convention and authorization of a very distinct lang-

uage use (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 37). This would then explain language

change simply as preferring another (new) convention over the old one.

Language standards and norms as they are found in grammars are thus

"the manifestation of a dominant language usage, which as authorizing

source nurtures the idea of their own pre-existence to language usage"

(Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 37).

cf. Bourdieu (1990); Bourdieu (1991)

2.5 The prestige of structure or a structure of prestige?

2.5 The prestige of structure or a structure of prestige?

In her discussion of feminist linguistics Hornscheidt (2006) observes such

authorizing processes and concludes that one question becomes apparent,

namely:

"how `language' is accessed in the field of linguistics and how

other ways of theorizing about language were rejected and

excluded from `real' linguistics" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 12).

In linguistics the most prestigious way of looking at language is look-

ing at its structure

. Other ways of dealing with language are often

labelled as not being `the real thing' or have become known, in the Ger-

man scientific community, as so-called Bindestrich-Linguistiken

. More

recent approaches, however, especially from the cognitive and pragmatic

perspectives, reclaimed space within linguistics and thus Hornscheidt

(2006) maintains that in post-structural approaches today "the way how

we arrive at knowledge is more important than trying to explicate some

assumed `reality' as an object of research"(Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 14).

If linguistics has language as an object of research this cannot only

entail parts of language and there cannot be a hierarchy regarding which

parts of language are more scientific and more real. This idea also should

be valid for the field of feminist linguistics. Hornscheidt (2006) sees the

most important aim of feminist linguistics at the time of structuralism

to be the "description of general linguistic structures, which are valid

through space and time" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 15) and in which the

langue (language structure) is fronting the parole (the concrete and in-

dividual realization of langue). Furthermore, the langue is traditionally

treated as the more important thing whereas the parole was treated as a

minor point. In concordance with Hornscheidt (2006), this study takes

a different road in that it focuses on parole as being the major trigger

of language change as well as it being a determiner of how the langue

especially, in the generative tradition linguistics is viewed as more of a natural

science rather than a humane disciple

"The generativist hegemony in the institutionalized field of linguistics had as a re-

sult, amongst others, that interests in language and culture, which do not conform

with generative views, had to take a place outside or at the borders of linguist-

ics" (Hornscheidt, 2003, p. 65). "From the point of view of pragmatics we can

only regret that a relative dominance of the Chomskyan paradigm seems to have

interrupted the flow of Saussure's ideas in linguistics" (Verschueren, 1999, p. 271)

2 Theoretical framework

develops. Thus, structuralist linguistics only was interested in `the re-

lation between significate and significant and did not take into account

the bezeichnete Referenzobjekt (the reference object that is meant). Re-

cent theory asks rather how relationships and links of signs are and how

meaning arises from these relationships and links. The `holy cow' arbi-

trariness of the sign (cf. chapter 3.2, on p. 57) is thus also questioned to

a certain degree. Furthermore, according to Hornscheidt (2006), post-

structural theory doubts one of the key assumptions of structuralism,

the idea that "a model is descriptive" and thus all kinds of prescrip-

tive approaches are to be rejected per se. Post-structural theory does

not go along with the earlier, purely prescriptive approaches of the 19

century but rather goes in the other direction in that it assumes that a

purely descriptive view on language is not possible (Hornscheidt, 2006,

pp. 1416). Hornscheidt criticizes that in linguistics the interdependence

of language and extra-linguistic factors has been largely ignored because

linguistics often defines itself as "independent of political questions such

as authority, power and ideology" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 20).

In summary, the constructivist approach of Hornscheidt is also to be

classified as a science critical or science historical approach to the field

of linguistics. Especially the field of feminist linguistics was and is crit-

icized for being ideological as opposed to theoretical. With her critique

Hornscheidt demonstrates that also within structuralist and generative

linguistics ideological biases exist and that more recent approaches, es-

pecially in feminist linguistics, have their validity exactly because they

look at language use. In the following section, some basic concepts de-

veloped by Hornscheidt (2006) are introduced, as they are understood

and used in this study.

2.5.1 Conventionalization and conventionalized meaning

Conventionalization is the basis for the power of linguistic speech acts:

"Specific grammatical patterns and structures are held up through so-

cial practice, which at the same time also justifies the social practices

themselves" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 75). So for a convention to remain

a convention it needs to be continually repeated and it also has to be

repaired continually. The convention could be viewed as in competition

with other conventions and thus it has to be restated again and again to

Hornscheidt here refers to Joseph and Taylor (1990, p. 25)

2.5 The prestige of structure or a structure of prestige?

strengthen it--otherwise it might be replaced. This effect is visible in the

following example: In German the word die Studierenden is used instead

of the generic die Studenten. It is a form of grammatical abstraction by

using a nominalized participle in its plural form. But the abstraction

from grammatical gender only works in the plural form. There is, how-

ever, a tendency to use the participle in the singular and with a masculine

article i.e. in analogy to other generic forms. So, the convention of using

the generic masculine is repaired. Hornscheidt (2006) views conventions

as a historic processes in which social norms are sedimented. For Horn-

scheidt "conventions are manifestations and effects of power relations,

which are at the same time constructed and reproduced by such conven-

tions" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 75). Thus, in a constructivist framework

we speak of conventionalization as this better indicates the processual

character of this phenomenon. Conventionalization is defined as "set-

ting a standardized language use as norm at a certain point of time in

a certain society" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 75). By setting such a norm

it is further implied that a certain kind of language usage is valid over

time, that it also is unchangeable and that it mirrors something underly-

ing. Thus, Hornscheidt (2006) replaces Coseriu's

notion of norm with

conventionalization. The dispute on grammatical gender in linguistics is

thus also a form of conventionalizing and authorizing a certain language

norm. Linguistic theories on the generic masculine, for example, that

assume its neutrality are reflected in grammars and language textbooks.

In this way the convention is continued and also the linguistic discourse

on gender so has a normalizing effect. Grammar theories are thus not, as

many claim, more objective and exclusively descriptive. Rather, gram-

mar theories also promote and pass on standardized language usage (i.e.

conventionalized language) and so function equally normative.

The concept conventionalized meaning is introduced to replace the idea

that meaning actually resides within a word and is static. Hornscheidt

(2006) here follows Marmaridou (2000) and explains conventionalized

meaning as emerging when contextual meaning is continually repeated

and thus becomes schematized. Such conventionalized meanings then no

longer bear contextual meaning, but rather sanction contextual meaning

via processes of schematizing. This means that similar meanings are so

often generated in the same context that we as language users believe

the meaning is not developed in the context but resides within the word

cf. Coseriu (1992)

2 Theoretical framework

itself. We are used to think that words mean something by themselves

and tend to forget that we as language users actually have a say in what

words mean. Therefore, we as language users do no longer conceive

of language as being something creative but rather see it as expressing

thoughts passively. This is what Hornscheidt (2006) calls conventional-

ized meanings:

"They are linguistic elements that in the process of conven-

tionalizing of a certain language usage are perceived decon-

textualized by the language users and then are considered as

semantically specified" (Hornscheidt, 2006, pp. 4344).

Constructivist approaches thus view grammar also as a form of la-

nguage usage, which has become strongly conventionalized: "The stan-

dardization of language norms as it can be found in dictionaries and

grammar books is viewed as a manifestation of a dominant understand-

ing of language usage" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 36). These are at the same

time the authorizing sources that evoke the idea of being more important

than actual and concrete language usage. By focusing on the context in

analysis a different view on meaning develops. Rather than regarding

meaning as an aspect of a linguistic sign it is perceived to be evolving

in interaction. Hornscheidt (2006) criticizes that most pragmatic app-

roaches keep assuming an underlying, relatively static language system,

even if it does not play a major role in their analyses. In this context

the question is raised if assuming a language system is not rather an

analytical item rather than a language inherent one. Furthermore, did

not the continuous repetition of the idea of a language system naturalize

different aspects of language usage as system? According to Hornscheidt

(2006) a complementary pragmatic approach contributes a further level

of meaning to the structuralist and generativist approaches by building

on the aspect of grammaticalization of different phenomena. Hornscheidt

(2006) takes up a perspective view of pragmatics in which the borderlines

between pragmatics and semantics are given up: "All meaning is viewed

as pragmatic in this perspectivist variant and it is only possible to an-

alyze meaning on this level." (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 35). Furthermore,

this view doubts that there is an inherent or core meaning to words,

which can clearly be extracted from them

Language is not seen as a

for a criticism of this and a plead of core meaning see Kienpointner (2008, p. 77)):

. . .]the assumption of a language-specific, context-independent core meaning of

words and sentences will be defended."

2.5 The prestige of structure or a structure of prestige?

"means of mirroring extra-linguistic reality but as a means of creating

reality". The level of the language system is thus defined in a different

way. It is moreover a convention and actively conventionalizing and au-

thorizing of a certain kind of language usage. This means, the approach

of Hornscheidt gives up the idea of a system that exists before language

usage altogether (cf. Hornscheidt 2006, pp. 2837).

One criticism in Hornscheidt's approach is that research exclusively

interested in the language system actively naturalizes the perception of

grammar as an instance that determines language. In this way research

avoids analyzing actual language usage. With the so-called linguistic

turn discourse analytical approaches appeared that in contrast stress

the analysis of language usage. But even in these, often a separation

between language and an extra-linguistic reality is implicit. Regarding

gender it is important to ask if one can distinguish between formal and

semantic criteria of gender assignment at all, because even recent cog-

nitive approaches and also feminist linguistics "remain in a structuralist

paradigm, which is reproduced again in those approaches" (Hornscheidt,

2006, p. 617). It is suggested to rather view gender assignment along

pragmatic criteria which means that language is fundamentally viewed

as language use. All efforts of stating the pre-discursive should be anal-

ysed critically by asking which phenomenon such approaches naturalize.

In summary, Hornscheidt, as well as other constructivists, define lang-

uage as "reality constructing medium" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 28). Within

linguistics the relationship of language and thinking was associated with

linguistic relativity exclusively for a long time. This had the effect that

this topic was ignored for quite some time in linguistics, as the topic

had become unappealing for linguists

. More recently language has

detached from the field of linguistics and became interesting for other

fields of research as well. Thus, a new understanding of language has

found its way into the humanities. Its center of interest is language us-

age. Another important level is the relationship of language usage to

the language users. Even the relatively young field of research cognitive

lingusitics often has a structuralist character. According to Hornscheidt

(2006, p. 45-46) many cognitive approaches focus on the aspect of mental

representation. But also here the basic assumption is that language ex-

cf. Werlen: "Spätestens jedoch mit der Publikation von B. Berlin / P. Kay (1969)

schien das Thema für die Sprachwissenschaftler uninteressant geworden zu sein"

(Werlen, 2002, pp. 31, and references therein);

2 Theoretical framework

presses or influences mental representation in some way or the other. A

post-structural understanding of gender according to Hornscheidt (2006)

must rely on Judith Butler's notion of gender. Butler goes even further

by saying that even the body is cultural [cf. Butler (2004). The con-

struction of the body without question is also emphasized: the notion

of gender in Butler's sense is comparable to the artificial dichotomy of

nature and culture. There is no approach, no way of understanding na-

ture: "The subjects, who are called `women' are created solely through

discourse by their appellation" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 47). The problem

with constructivism in this sense is that it leads into a certain extend

of determinism. By that the ability to act, which women only just have

reached as subjects, was questioned again. For Hornscheidt (2006) the

so-called de-construction of the category woman does not negate the

category but allows us to focus at the category as such. The notion of

linguistic action is crucial in constituting the category i.e. in personal

appellation the category woman is often constituted by using grammat-

ical gender. This construction is an ongoing process, language is viewed

as a performative act that evokes what it denominates (Hornscheidt,

2006, pp. 4649, and references therein). Thus, grammatical gender can

be pragmatically used to construct the category gender in language and

this is done frequently.

2.5.2 Reference vs. appellation

For the study of gender in language, Hornscheidt (2006) also rejects

the term reference as it too conventionalizes the idea that language and

reality are separable. Hornscheidt (2006) sees a central problem here, es-

pecially in linguistics, in which "[

. . .] the relationship between language,

world and reality is reduced to a mirroring function of language"

(Horn-

scheidt, 2006, p. 55). In much the same way the term personal reference

implies a distinction of reference and person and this means that referring

to someone is temporally subordinated to the actual person. Hornscheidt

(2006) constitutes reference rather as a communal communicative per-

formance of interactants--it is possible that trying to achieve reference

does not work. There is a reciprocity of communicative events (Horn-

scheidt, 2006, pp. 5558). In the case of grammatical gender this means

that understanding a reference as gender specific or not does not only de-

. . .] der Zusammenhang von Sprache, Welt und Wirklichkeit auf eine sprachliche

Abbildfunktion reduziert wird"

2.5 The prestige of structure or a structure of prestige?

pend on language systematic categories i.e. grammatical gender but also

on conventionalized usage interpretations (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet,

2007, p. 61).

Hornscheidt (2006) speaks of reference in a pragmatic way as acts

of denomination. How we refer to people is also a something we are

used to do, a practice we have internalized, while we are unaware of the

categorizations of humans we also promote with this:

"Acts of denomination are based on the continual repetition

of a conventionalized language code, in the case of personal

references on the continual repetition of different forms of

the categorization of humans, which is naturalized by this

continual repetition and is thus interpreted as objective in the

understanding of the speakers" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 62-63).

This repetition, however, is not a simple replication of one and the same

thing but it is always interpretation as well as transfer and modification.

If we use a masculine form to refer to people in general, for example, we

actively categorize humans in this way and not in another. It is what

we are used to do that dictates us to do it, not that grammar does not

offer other possibilities. Hence,

"[f]or a study on personal appellation this means the necessity

to analyze, besides the concrete realizations of appellation,

the possibilities and borders of what is considered as `sayable'

within a linguistic community. This means, who or what

we can appeal to on which basis in order to find possibly

conceptualizations or ones that are excluded" (Hornscheidt,

2006, pp. 6264).

Hornscheidt (2006) introduces the term appellation as opposed to the

traditional term reference and argues that to refer to someone actually

constitutes an act of naming: "The subject is only and always newly

created through the act of naming" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 66). Accord-

ing to Hornscheidt linguistic appellation is the "central instrument of

constructing a social reality and it constitutes the world" (Hornscheidt,

2006, p. 67).

2 Theoretical framework

Personal appellation and gender

Hornscheidt (2006) defines personal appellation the following way:

"All personal linguistic appellations share that they linguisti-

cally denominate one or more humans, who are categorized in

a certain way by this appellation" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 77).

Personal appellation can be viewed as a continuum at the very end

of which proper names are found and at the very beginning collective

nouns

All Germanic languages especially categorize appellation according to

gender, which has partly led to a grammaticalization of this categoriza-

tion. Linguistically, gender differentiations appear in combination with

many other possible features but not all features are equally relevant in

all linguistic communities and thus they are not conventionally found in

personal appellation in all linguistic communities. The main point in this

observation is that grammatical gender can neither be seen as something

that existed before there was a relation to gender or it can be said that

there is a clear relation of grammatical gender to gender. This further

entails the basic assumption that "every linguistic form can be used in

a pejorizing and/or discriminating form" (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 80). In

contrast to feminist linguistic theories Hornscheidt does not assume that

linguistic gender is inherently discriminating but rather that it opens the

pragmatic possibility to be used in such a way (cf. Hornscheidt 2006,

pp. 7783).

2.5.3 Grammaticalization

How can grammaticalization theory be of use for the analysis of gender

specifications? According to Hornscheidt this is only possible in con-

nection to a constructivist view of language according to which "gram-

maticalization is a consolidation of a certain language usage, which at-

tains the status of a preexisting linguistic truth which cannot be chal-

lenged" (Hornscheidt, 2006, pp. 111112). In this process the relative

pre-existence of a rule set is constructed. It is relative because it al-

ways is retro-actively established by abstracting from a certain language

this continuum is comparable to the notion animacy hierarchy, cf. section 6.2.1,

on p. 132

2.5 The prestige of structure or a structure of prestige?

usage. In our every day understanding of language, supported by gram-

mar textbooks, this achieves the status of a system. Following Meil-

let

, grammaticalization is perceived as "attribution of a grammatical

character onto an autonomous word" (Hornscheidt, 2006, pp. 112, and

references therein).

Hence, grammaticalization theory is especially suited for this approach

as it is on the one hand "concerned with regularities in language use as

they can be observed in spoken and written linguistic discourse" and on

the other it does not "require assumptions to the effect that `language'--

however this notion may be defined--is or should be conceived of as a

system (Heine and Kuteva, 2007, p. 33). Grammaticalization offers the

possibility to connect diachronic and synchronic perspectives on lang-

uage. A very clear definition of grammaticalization is from Heine and

Kuteva:

"Grammaticalization is defined as the development from le-

xical to grammatical forms, and from grammatical to even

more grammatical forms" (Heine and Kuteva, 2007, p. 32).

Grammar is thus a construct of social agreement. One of the major start-

ing points for a grammaticalization process is, according to Lehmann

(1995), that speakers have the feeling that their linguistic means are

insufficient and inadequate. Grammaticalization is a diachronic pheno-

menon because language change is a historic process, but the basic in-

terest is synchronic and focuses on actuality (Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 115).

Within cognitively oriented research into grammaticalization it is further

assumed that there are source concepts. These basic concepts, similarly

to ICMs, refer back to the physical basis of human cognition. According

to Hornscheidt (2006) here it is important to ask in how far the basic

concept of gender is of such high relevance (cf. social imperative, section

5.1) that it is expressed within grammatical categories such as gender

(Hornscheidt, 2006, p. 116). This further implies that there may be cases

in which it is obligatory and thus rule based to express gender and thus

gender specification could be understood as a grammatical phenomenon

that sometimes employs grammatical gender.

cf. Meillet (1982)

2 Theoretical framework

2.5.4 Summary

I summary, this chapter asked for the "potential relevance of a scientific

discourse with a certain power of normalization and authority" (Horn-

scheidt, 2006, p. 119) for the development of gender in language. A

theoretical framework for the further discussion on linguistic research

has been laid out. The most important assumption is that the language

system is viewed as a form of language usage which is more or less con-

ventionalized. Thus, a strong focus on language use for linguistic analysis

is promoted.

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Pages
Type of Edition: Erstausgabe
Publication Year: 2014
ISBN (eBook): 9783954897827
ISBN (Softcover): 9783954892822
File size: 5.6 MB
Language: English
Publication date: 2014 (May)
Keywords: feminist german
Product Safety: Anchor Academic Publishing

Author

Claudia Posch (Author)

Feminist language forms in German: A corpus-assisted study of personal appellation with non-human referents

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Author

Claudia Posch (Author)