The truth behind Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan: A case study on the ground
©2014
Textbook
62 Pages
Summary
This book investigates Germany’s real reasons for its involvement in the international Afghanistan intervention since 2001. The goal is to evaluate whether the main reason for the operation is defending its security by combatting international terrorism as German authorities have claimed or strengthening political and economic benefits. The research is based on an analysis of literature and official documents combined with findings from an empirical research trip to Kabul and Mazar-i-sharif in 2013. The author conducted exclusive personal interviews with high officials from the Afghan government and German authorities. The book concludes that Germany´s decision of intervening in Afghanistan serves above all its politic economic interests. The security threat coming from Islamic terrorism can thus not be considered the main reason for the intervention. Nevertheless, the involvement in the conflict strengthened Germany´s position in the NATO, which it regards as essential in the changing security environment. Moreover, this research revealed that the source of Germany’s decision to intervene in Afghanistan was a discrepancy between elites and the public.
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
Abstract
This book investigates Germany's real reasons for its involvement in the international
Afghanistan intervention since 2001. The goal is to evaluate whether the main reason for the
intervention is defending its security by combatting international terrorism as German
authorities have been claiming or a decision that was made due to political and economic
benefits. To follow this goal the research is based on an analysis of existing academic material
together with official documents on the one hand and on findings coming from an empirical
research trip to Afghanistan, where personal interviews with experts were conducted, on the
other hand.
The main theoretical framework that underlies this research is Gramsci's contribution to
Global Political Economy literature, which helps to explain structural reasons for Germany's
decision to intervene in Afghanistan. Finally, the book concludes that Germany serves first of
all its politic economic interests by its decision of intervening in Afghanistan. Although it also
serves its basic security interests by strengthening its position in NATO and with regard on
the changing security environment, it is not the security threat resulting from Islamic
terrorism threat from Afghanistan, which can be used as the main reason for its intervention.
Moreover, this research revealed that the source of Germany's decision to intervene in
Afghanistan was a discrepancy between elites and the public. Consequently, this book
suggests continuing to monitor whether the Afghanistan intervention with the support of
Gramsci's theory about hegemony helped to implement consent in the civil society, which
can be the basis that could drive also future German foreign policy decisions.
Introduction
"The security of the Federal Republic of Germany is also defended at the
Hindukush" (Peter Struck, Former German Minister of Defence, 2002)
Since the first years of Germany's intervention in Afghanistan, this official claim by Peter
Struck has been frequently used in Germany to explain the main reason for Germany's
involvement in this region. In recent years, the official explanation has focused more on
stabilizing the whole region through international cooperation and rebuilding a sovereign
Afghan state through mainly development cooperation. Is the explanation of decreasing the
threat of international terrorism for Germany after more than 10 years of involvement
justifiable or is Germany serving other national interests in Afghanistan? The objective of this
project is to investigate Germany's real reasons for its involvement in the Afghanistan
intervention. It will be evaluated whether the main reason for the intervention is defending its
security by combatting international terrorism or a decision that was made due to political and
economic benefits.
Information about terrorist organizations and their activities in Germany reveal that Germany
was much safer before its involvement in Afghanistan than after 2001. Moreover, regional
stability can serve economic and political interests, especially for developed countries in a
capitalist system. Most obvious in Germany's efforts in Afghanistan is its role as a reliable
ally of the US hegemony and its awareness of its security dependency from international
alliances like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in the new global world order.
Certain gaps in the literature concerning these assumptions, make a detailed research on the
reasoning behind Germany's intervention in Afghanistan necessary.
A) Background
From the beginning on, Germany was involved in the Afghanistan intervention. In the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Germany assured to contribute within an intervention of the
international community to fight against international terrorism. In 2001, the Bonn Agreement
in Petersberg was arranged in Germany to agree on a strategy for the re-creation and
reconstruction of an Afghan state. That year, the UN (United Nations) also decided to
establish ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). Initially it purpose was assuring
security for the Afghan government and the UN personnel. At the same time, Germany
decided not only to take part in the development aid programme for Afghanistan, but also to
send its army (Bundeswehr) to Afghanistan both to contribute to the goal of a permanent
stabilisation of Afghanistan and to combat international terrorism. Germany's contribution to
the international mission in Afghanistan has increased steadily, both in the military area and
in its civilian and reconstruction programmes. Germany has been the third biggest troop
contributor as well as the third greatest financial donor within this NATO mission
(Bundesregierung, 2013a; Bundesregierung, 2011).
Germany is mainly involved and responsible for the northern region around Mazar-i-Sharif
and plays also an important role in Kabul and Kunduz. Moreover, it has been mainly
responsible for the formation of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and invests up to 430
million euros each year for civil reconstruction purposes. In addition to that, around 5.000
German soldiers have been deployed in Afghanistan in each of the recent years. In general
Germany enjoys a close relation to the Afghan government. Its role throughout the
international mission can be described as an "honest broker" (Bundesregierung, 2011, p. 8),
who was able to moderate in difficult situation of this intervention. Its efforts in form of
contributions on various levels in Afghanistan have shown that it has been a staunch ally, who
can play a leading position in an international intervention of the international community
(Bundesregierung, 2011). Additionally, Germany committed itself to continue its support for
Afghanistan, financially as one of the major donors for development aid and through the
presence of NGOs, diplomats, instructors and specialists beyond the NATO troop withdrawal
in 2014 (Bundesregierung, 2013a; Bundesregierung 2013b). A view on these activities raises
the question of why Germany has made such an effort for Afghanistan, which this book will
try to answer.
B) Structure & Research question
The overall research question in this book will be: Is Germany's intervention in Afghanistan
driven by protecting its security from terrorism or by political-economic reasons?
All other sub-questions that follow can be linked to the overall research question and can be
divided into two sections of identifying security or political-economic interests. To answer the
main research question this book is divided into four chapters.
The first chapter will identify the official reasons for Germany's intervention in Afghanistan
by analysing official governmental sources, which provide justifications for the German
government's decision to be involved in the international mission in Afghanistan.
The second chapter will evaluate whether the main official argument of the German
government, which was identified in the previous chapter (the protection against international
terrorism), can be proven through available data. Therefore, this chapter will firstly determine
whether the German intervention in Afghanistan did increase or decrease terrorism threat in
Germany. Secondly, the link between failed states and terrorism will be discussed and
consequently the impact of a possible failed Afghan state on Germany's security. Finally,
Afghanistan's role in the context of the global War on Terror and how it has changed since
the NATO intervention will be evaluated. The analysis will reveal that the Islamic terrorism
threat in Germany has not decreased since Germany's intervention in Afghanistan and that the
German government rather exaggerates the threat coming from it.
In the third part of this book it will be analysed why Germany justifies its intervention in
Afghanistan particularly with the threat of international terrorism. In this context Germany's
recent history will be discussed as well as its close connection to the NATO and the
implications on Germany's foreign policy and its military. The change of its security strategy
will be explained through the influence of an elitist consent about the desire of a powerful and
influential German state in global world politics. The theoretical framework of Gramsci will
be used to explain this process. This theory will demonstrate how Germany benefits from US
hegemony.
Finally, the fourth chapter will analyse possible political-economic interests of Germany in
Afghanistan. The determination of economic benefits from this intervention needs to be
analysed with the due care to strengthen or disprove the hypothesis coming from the previous
chapter. However, this evaluation is limited to determine the role of a cost-benefit analysis
and geopolitical interests in Germany's decision to intervene in Afghanistan. In conclusion,
the overall research question will be answered and the book will demonstrate that Germany's
involvement in Afghanistan can be explained with the help of the applied theoretical
framework.
C) Methodology & case study
The methodological approach to address the research questions is based upon a combination
of a theoretical-empirical research strategy. This means that the findings coming from the
book are based on the one hand on a theoretical research through an analysis of existing
academic material together with official documents and on the other hand on an empirical
research by the conduction of personal interviews with experts about the research topic.
The theoretical research required an in depth analysis and collection of relevant data from
multiple primary (agreements, governmental official papers, public polls and reports of
international institutions) and secondary sources (mainly books and journals). Due to the
contemporary relevance for the German government and public, investigative newspaper
articles will be used as well as Think-Tanks and German foundations, which are constantly
drafting reports about the situation in Afghanistan and about Germany's foreign policy
interests.
The discovered gaps in the literature about the topic and its sensitivity in the German political
environment made an empirical research approach within this book necessary. Additionally,
confidentiality and sensibility of this topic as well as the fact that information about economic
and individual benefits or about security and intelligence are not publically accessible were
some of the main limitations for this research. The researcher aimed to reduce those
limitations and help to close the information gap within the literature about this topic by
conducting interviews. However, the researcher decided to limit the empirical research to only
one research trip to Afghanistan, mainly because of three reasons. Firstly, in contrast to the
vast amount of accessible German literature about the research topic, accessible academic
literature from Afghans, who have been on the ground, about this topic is limited. Secondly,
the researcher's experience with personal interviews with German officials revealed that they
usually do not contribute to new findings and rather point to already existent official
documents online.
For this reason, a research trip to Kabul and Mazar-I-Sharif in Afghanistan was made from
the 24
th
of June to the 9
th
of July 2013. The Ethic Code was applied throughout the research.
During this research trip a number of high ranked Afghan and German current and former
governmental representatives and bureaucrats, who are dealing with the international conflict
in Afghanistan, were interviewed. The participants were selected according to their expertise
about the research questions for this evaluation and their accessibility to the researcher.
Within the participants there were very high-ranking Afghan officials like current governors
or members of the Afghan government. Additionally, high representatives of the National
Directorate of Security and the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs & Disabled as well
as the German embassy, members of the National Assembly, a former Afghan resistance
fighter, members of the Ministry of Commerce and university professors were selected for
personal interviews. This part occurred methodologically qualitative in open-ended semi-
structured interviews and was conducted in the offices of the experts in Mazar-I-Sharif or
Kabul.
As agreed with participants and to avoid any harm for the interviewees and their careers as
well as having in mind the unstable political situation in Afghanistan the researcher decided
that this book guarantees complete anonymity for all participants of the qualitative analysis.
Therefore, the received information from this research trip will be used as background
information for a better understanding of the research topic. However, if information from the
interviews are quoted in this book the participant will not appear by name, but by his
institutional affiliations.
In the analysis of political-economic interest the researcher had to consider several
problematic aspects. In this regard this book acknowledges for instance the possibility to
evaluate the development of trade business between Germany and its NATO allies since the
intervention in Afghanistan in order to examine Germany's economic benefits from the
intervention. However, to claim such an argument it would be also necessary to analyse also
other aspects like e.g. development of world economy that could have affected the increase or
decrease of trade business during that time period. Such an analysis would expand the
capacity of this research and will consequently be ignored. A similar problem arose in the
analysis of the security threat of international terrorism in Germany. When arguing that the
intervention in Afghanistan has increased the terror threat in Germany it can only be proved
relatively and not absolutely. This is because too many other aspects exist, which could have
affected the terrorism threat but which are not measurable. For instance US military bases in
Germany potentially increase the terrorism threat in Germany after the US call for the War on
Terror. Even if Germany had not intervened in Afghanistan, attacks, which aim to target the
US could harm Germans as collateral damage. Therefore, the claims coming from this book
regarding the analysis of the security threat for Germany has to be understood more as a
correlation between terrorism threat and Germany's intervention in Afghanistan, rather than a
direct link between them.
These examples show that the selection of monetary and non-monetary benefits as well as
conclusions resulting from the analysis of certain international correlations have to be made
carefully. Due to the complexity and the limited capacity of the research a detailed analysis of
intangible benefits like power and reputation will not be measured.
The focus on the case study of Afghanistan intends to illustrate an example of the general
conflict of German foreign military intervention decisions within NATO missions. It is the
best possible case study for that question, because it is the longest mission of the German
military in the history of the German army (Bundeswehr) as well as highly relevant for
Germany's international foreign policy ambitions. Germany's intervention in Afghanistan
indicates the beginning of a key change of its military in an expeditionary force in order to
meet global security challenges of the 21st century. It will be academically relevant, what role
US hegemony plays in Germany's decision to intervene and connect it to Germany's
sovereign national interests. This case study approach aims to find out what motivates a
developed country with only limited security resources and power to intervene in a foreign
conflict, from which it might not be immediately threatened. Moreover, the question whether
security reasons or political-economic interests are dominating such a decision in Germany is
not sufficiently discussed in the literature.
Finally, the Afghanistan case was selected by the researcher due to his personal German-
Afghan cultural background and to his accessibility to first hand information on the ground.
D) Literature Review
Concerning Germany's intervention in Afghanistan an enormous amount of literature focuses
on analysing and criticising Germany's military strategy and its role within NATOs ISAF
mission in Afghanistan (Merz, 2007; Noetzel & Schreer, 2008; Belkin, 2010; Becker & Wulf,
2011). Opposed to that the literature review in this book will be divided in two aspects. On
the one hand it will discuss literature that links Germany's intervention in Afghanistan to the
terrorism threat and on the other hand it will point out those authors who link it to political-
economic interests.
Former defence minister Peter Struck is known for his phrase: "The security of the Federal
Republic of Germany is also defended at the Hindukush" (Struck in Becker & Wulf, 2011, p.
16). He was the first German official who claimed the link between Germany's security
interests and Afghanistan in the public. Consequently, his statement started a debate about the
validity of this claim, which is why a vast amount of secondary literature refers to this
statement when analysing Germany's intervention in Afghanistan (Becker & Wulf, 2011;
Meiers, 2010; Merz, 2007; Miko & Froehlich, 2004). However, Risse (2004, p. 29) argues
that this statement has to be understood in a different context. He emphasises that Struck
referred particularly to the necessity that Germany has to take responsibility, adapt its foreign
policy strategies and contribute with its own resources to new challenges in a new
environment of global security, where conflicts can be asymmetrical and are not anymore
only authorised by states, but also by private actors. This book aims to clarify this
disagreement in the literature.
To evaluate whether Germany's intervention has aimed at decreasing the terrorism threat for
Germans the literature review needs to be broadened by general international terrorism
literature. This enables the identification of whether the terrorism threat in Germany has
increased or decreased since the intervention in Afghanistan.
Germany's involvement in Afghanistan started under the US called War on Terror. This US
strategy focuses on defeating Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates, which also seems to be, at
least officially, the main concern for Germany's security. Consequently, the broader
international terrorism literature review will focus on Islamic influenced terrorism and AQ as
its representative organization. Pape (2006, p. 47) claims that the ultimate aim of AQ
ideology and its main driver is to end the Western occupation of the Arabian Peninsula.
Having this aim in mind this book will determine whether Germany's involvement in
Afghanistan is a driving force for provoking potential terror attacks in Germany. Such an
assumed rationality of terrorist organizations, where terrorists want to provoke a desired
response with their attacks is advocated and represented by Fromkin (1975). The Madrid
bombings in 2004 exemplified politically motivated terrorism. Authors like Steinberg (2009)
argue that there is evidence that these political reasons made Germany one of the highest
ranked targets for Islamic influenced terrorists in the last years. The validity of this
assumption will be examined in this book.
The claim made by German officials, making a connection between failed states and terrorism
to justify military involvement in Afghanistan for the sake of Germany's security is mainly
disproved by academic literature. Despite of the existence of an academic study, which claims
that failed states are more likely to host international terrorism and commit transnational
attacks (Piazza, 2008), the majority of authors in the literature deny a direct correlation (Pape,
2006; Simons & Tucker, 2007; Hehir, 2007).
Pape's research (2006, pp. 114-115) for instance reveals that only a minority of AQ suicide
bombers were citizens of failed states, but more than 80% of attacks were committed by
individuals from US allied countries. Nevertheless, his findings imply that those individuals
could be radicalized by Germany's involvement in Afghanistan. Furthermore, several authors
like Simons & Tucker (2007) or Hehir (2007) conclude with their empirical research that
there is no correlation between state's level of failure and proliferation of terrorism. They
argue that this link is rather misused by many Western countries to justify democracy
promotion and interventions with state building initiatives. Simons & Tucker (2007, p. 388)
offer many arguments for this hypothesis. They assert that a terrorist organization has many
reasons to avoid failed states. A recruitment of a potential international terrorist from a
developed society would pass easier border controls with a passport that does not arouse
suspicion. Additionally, due to a familiarity with the environment the potential candidate
would be better integrated in its developed "target" country compared to someone who comes
from a failed state. They suggest that "in chaos not even terrorists are safe" (Simons &
Tucker, 2007, p. 388). Furthermore, infrastructure and logistical problems would make it even
more difficult for terrorist organizations to operate. When choosing settlement locations the
main focus for terrorist organizations are socio-geographic aspects. The acceptability and
support of a local population in a marginalized zone with a terrorist organization or with the
ideology, delivers a much stronger protection for the terrorist organization than any failed
state could assure (Simons & Tucker, 2007, pp. 397-398).
Moreover, the Afghanistan case seems to illustrate an example for Simons & Tucker (2007)
findings. The reason why it became a harbour for AQ terrorists before 9/11 was not because it
showed many typical characteristics of a failed state e.g. regarding its failed administrative
capacity. Instead, it was rather decisive that the leaders of this country at that time, the
Taliban, who have been also the dominant population in the essential border region between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, were able to guarantee essential support and stability to AQ (Hehir,
2007, pp. 318-319).
Furthermore, Afghanistan's role in the broader context of the War on Terror needs to be
identified. If Germany's intervention shall be explained through an international terrorism
threat coming from Afghanistan, it will need to be demonstrated that AQ and its affiliates still
play an important role in this country and is using it for the recruitment of international
terrorists. In the international terrorism literature the majority of authors distinguish between
before 9/11 and post 9/11 when considering AQs role in Afghanistan. They underline a
transformation from a small terrorist network with a base between the borders of Afghanistan
and Pakistan into a radical ideology without a central authority that has inspired extremist
Muslims around the world (Atwan, 2012; Burke, 2004; Pape, 2006). After the US destroyed
the base of AQ in Afghanistan and killed a lot of members out of the inner circle, the
remaining activists spread to different parts of the world (Atwan, 2012, p. 9). In addition to
that, Wagner (in Tal, 2010, p. 119) emphasises studies in which the evaluation of the
insurgents, who are fighting against the Afghan government and the international forces,
reveals that only 10% of those insurgents identify themselves with an ideology of radical
Islamism of the Taliban, which is similar to AQs ideology. These findings question the
argument that the main reason for the Western involvement in Afghanistan is the fight against
international terrorism and the AQ network. It therefore needs to be further analysed in this
book.
The starting point in the literature to link political-economic interests as the main driver for
the German intervention in Afghanistan can be identified in former Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder's declaration on September 12th of 2001 to promise "unlimited solidarity"
(Schröder, 2001) in the following of the 9/11 attacks to the United States.
Hein (2011, p. 137) indicates two reasons for Germany's intervention in Afghanistan. On the
one hand he underlines Germany's national self-interests as well as its strive for becoming a
powerful actor in political decisions about global security issues within the international
community. On the other hand he emphasises the elimination of historical restrictions, which
resulted from the World War II experience on Germany's sovereignty. He as well as Tal
(2010) identify an elite consensus as the driving force behind the decision, which recognized
that the international community expected a greater international security role from Germany
after the Cold War. Germany has been able to assert this role through its military loyalty to
NATO in the Afghanistan case (Hein, 2011). Belkin adds on that because of this action
Germany expects "to be considered a credible partner, and maintain alliance security"
(Belkin, 2010, p. 219). Other authors recognize also the World War II experience as a reason
for Germany not to promote officially political-economic national interests to justify the
mission in Afghanistan to the public (Belkin, 2010, p. 220) and agree with Hein (2011).
Many authors refer to the "Weißbuch" as the fundamental security strategy outline for
Germany and assert that it illustrates perfectly Germany's adaption to the security challenges
of the 21
st
century and a changing world order (Belkin, 2010; Hacke, 2012). Additionally,
authors like Meyer (2007, pp. 22-23) remark that the Weißbuch legitimizes foreign military
interventions for the sake of serving national interests; however it remains vague to define
those national interests and prioritize them (Meyer, 2007, pp. 22-23). The book aims at
clarifying to which degree economic interests can be considered as national interest with the
Weißbuch, which could be legitimately defended even through a military intervention like for
example in Afghanistan. In this context former president Horst Köhler was also highly
criticized by the media, but simultaneously initiated a debate in the literature (Meiers, 2010;
Becker & Wulf, 2011, p. 89; Hacke, 2012), because of his statement in an interview about
Afghanistan. He referred to the hypothesis that it is also the job of Germany's military to
defend national economic interests through foreign interventions in certain cases.
A deeper analysis of those economic German interests and benefits in Afghanistan lacks in
the literature as well as a cost-benefit analysis. Most probably this is due to the fact that
suggesting or assuming a hegemonic or imperialistic attitude as basis for German foreign
policy decisions is still an absolute taboo subject, because of the already mentioned German
history.
At least Destradi et al. (2012) mention economic benefits from regional stabilisation, nation
building and geopolitical interests (Baraki in Tal, 2010, p. 36) in Afghanistan. However, an
analysis of the actions that were taken on the ground and the strategies of governmental
decision makers reveal that a strategy that prioritize nation building was never followed
within the US led war in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2009; Woodward, 2010; Hassan & Hammond,
2011). Nevertheless, there are some authors who discuss the costs of the German intervention
in Afghanistan (DIW, 2010; Miko & Frohelich; 2004, Tal, 2010). In conclusion, neither on
Details
- Pages
- Type of Edition
- Erstausgabe
- Year
- 2014
- ISBN (eBook)
- 9783954897872
- ISBN (Softcover)
- 9783954892877
- File size
- 379 KB
- Language
- English
- Publication date
- 2014 (May)
- Keywords
- germany’s afghanistan
