Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan: Nation-building and combating Al-Qaeda’s ideology
©2014
Textbook
200 Pages
Summary
This book explores the threats posed by al Qaeda in Afghanistan and examines the Western narrative of whether it is necessary to eliminate the militant threat in order to stabilize the country. It is argued that Al Qaeda's ideology has now become stronger than its ability to threaten international security; that its aim to become an agent of change within the Muslim world has come to outweigh the threat attributed to it as a conventional, kinetic, and terrorist entity. The current instability within Afghanistan is not due to al Qaeda's physical presence there but rather an amalgamation of factors. It will be argued that the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 has contributed to Al Qaeda's weakening there but it has not contributed to stabilize Afghanistan itself. The instability in Afghanistan will require a strong, long-term commitment by the international community, while the fight against Al Qaeda will require more focus on combating its ideology, and less on military action.
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
Acknowledgements
There are a number of people who deserve recognition for their contribution towards the
completion of this book.
First and foremost I would like to thank my University of Malta supervisor, Dr. Carmen
Sammut, for her guidance, encouragement and support throughout this research. Her words of
encouragement have helped me to believe that I could complete this piece, and her help has been
invaluable.
I would like to also express thanks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies and
their staff in London for the assistance they provided me whilst conducting research on the topic
there. Their advice and assistance with literary material was very useful to my research.
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife, Krystle Blaire and my parents
Peter Paul and Maryann. Their belief in my ability has surpassed that of my own for a number of
years, and they provided me with the strength and encouragement I needed to complete this
work.
Table of Contents
List of Figures ... XI
List of Tables ... XII
Glossary of terms ... XIII
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 1
Methodology ... 4
Chapter 2: Terrorism & Failed States - A review of literature ... 1
Al Qaeda as a specimen of transnational terrorism ... 2
Afghanistan in the context of foreign military intervention ... 8
Nation building and counterinsurgency ... 14
Chapter 3: Al Qaeda - Origins and Identity ... 22
The Origins of al Qaeda ... 24
The Structure of al Qaeda ... 29
The Decentralized Structure ... 30
The Centralized Structure ... 31
The Postmodern structure `market state' terrorism ... 32
Al Qaeda's Ideology and Recruitment ... 34
A transformative entity ... 42
Chapter 4: Afghanistan - Foreign Intervention & Historical Instability ... 50
Afghanistan as a traditional, tribal society ... 55
The Age of Colonialism ... 61
The Soviet Intervention and Aftermath ... 66
Rise of the Taliban ... 72
Chapter 5: Operation Enduring Freedom ... 81
U.S. position during the Bush Era (2001-2008) ... 84
The Obama Era (2009- Present) ... 92
Nation building initiatives and the role of the U.N ... 101
Chapter 6: Re-establishing an Afghan state ... 112
Political issues and objectives ... 118
Economic restructuring ... 129
Afghanistan's foreign policy challenges ... 141
Chapter 7: Conclusion ... 150
Appendix A: Maps of Afghanistan ... 155
Bibliography ... 159
XI
List of Figures
Figure 1: Historical oil prices between 1947-2010. ... 48
Figure 2: "The Natural Seats of Power" ... 52
Figure 3: A map showing pre-1893 Afghanistan, prior to the establishment of
the Durand line... ..................................................................................................... ..64
Figure 4: A map showing modern day Afghanistan. ... 66
Figure 5: Opium Production in Afghanistan between 1981-2009... . ...... 131
Figure 6: Preliminary Assessment of non-fuel mineral resources of Afghanistan ... 133
Figure 7: Foreign aid provided to the Afghan government (2002-2008) ... 136
Figure 8: A pie chart depicting the 2006-2007 percentages from each sector towards
Afghanistan's GDP. ... 138
Figure 9: A pie chart depicting the 2007-2008 percentages from each sector towards
Afghanistan's GDP. ... 139
Figure 10: A pie chart depicting the 2008-2009 percentages from each sector towards
Afghanistan's GDP. ... 139
Figure 11: The Pakistani border regions. ... 143
Figure 12: Physical topography of Afghanistan ... 155
Figure 13: Physical Map of Afghanistan ... 156
Figure 14: Provincial Map of Afghanistan ... 157
Figure 15: Map of Afghanistan's ethno-linguistic composition ... 158
XII
List of Tables
Table 1: Afghanistan's Ethnic Composition as a percentage of the population. ... 56
Table 2: Figures displaying comparative amount of Western (N.A.T.O./I.S.A.F., U.S. troops)
in Afghanistan and Iraq at similar points in time. ... 88
Table 3: The war expenditure per year, spanning from the fiscal year of 2001 to the fiscal
year of 2010. ... 89
Table 4: Figures showing U.S. casualties in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion.. ... 96
Table 5: Afghanistan's Failed State Index ratings for the years 2006-2007. . ...114
Table 6: Afghanistan's Failed State Index ratings for the years 2008-2010. ... 115
XIII
Glossary of terms
Al Jazeera
Translates to "the island". It is an Arab television news network
based in Qatar.
Al Qaeda
Translates to "the base", or "the foundation". A loosely linked
Sunni militant group allegedly led by Osama bin Laden.
Awakening, Sunni
A Sunni Iraqi self-defense force that acts as a neighborhood
watch and had openly opposed al Qaeda, from 2008 to time of
writing.
Ba'athism
A secular Arab nationalist movement, with history in Iraq and
Syria.
Burkha
An article of clothing worn by some Islamic women that covers
the majority of their body.
Caliphate
Refers to a unified, federal Islamic government ruled by a head
of state, or caliph. Often called for by radicals such as bin
Laden.
C.I.A.
Central Intelligence Agency. A civilian intelligence agency,
which mostly deals with foreign intelligence gathering and
analysis.
Durand Line
The border in the mountainous region between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
F.A.R.C.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia. An insurgent group.
F.Y.
Fiscal Year
G.D.P.
Gross Domestic Product. The total market value of all services
and goods produced in a country in a year.
Hadith
Verbal tradition of the deeds and acts of the Islamic prophet,
Mohammed.
Harakat ul-Ansar
A Pakistani militant group, which mainly operates in Kashmir.
XIV
Harakat al-Jihad
Islamic fundamentalist organization, mainly active in Pakistan,
India, and Bangladesh.
Hindu Kush
A highly mountainous range which exists between Afghanistan
and Pakistan. It is a sub-range of the Himalaya mountains.
I.E.D.
Improvised explosive device.
I.I.S.S.
International Institute for Strategic Studies
I.S.A.F.
International Security Assistance Force.
I.S.I.
Inter-Services Intelligence. The largest Pakistani intelligence
agency.
Islamic Jihad (Egyptian)
A former radical Islamist organization which had been led by
now al Qaeda lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri
Jamait-ul-Ulema-e-
Pakistan
A Sunni Islamic political party in Pakistan.
Jamait-e-Islami
Oldest religious Islamic religious party in Pakistan. It opposes
westernization and seeks to establish Islamic rule in Pakistan.
Jihad
A holy `struggle' against one's self or as a holy war against an
oppressor.
Kafir
An `unbeliever'. An individual that does not subscribe to the
Islamic faith.
Loya Jirga
A grand council or gathering, in which Afghan tribal elders
meet to discuss important political issues.
Madrassa
An educational institution. Madrasah d niyyah refers to a
`religious school', such as that attended by many Taliban
members.
M.C.A.
Millennium Challenge Account, a development fund for the
nations who meet the U.S. criteria of `good governance'.
XV
M.C.C.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, a U.S. government
establishment that provides economic aid to those who prove to
meet the criteria of `good governance'.
Mujahadeen/Jihadi
Refers to Islamic freedom fighters, although of late used
interchangeably with Jihadi, which refers to one who fights a
holy war against an oppressor.
N.A.T.O.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. A Western military
alliance.
Northern Alliance
A military-political organization comprised of various
ethnicities that had been based in northern Afghanistan.
O.E.F.
Operation Enduring Freedom
Pashtunistan
A large area of southern and eastern Afghanistan and western
and southern Pakistan comprised mainly of ethnic Pashtuns.
Pashtunwali
A traditional Pashtun code of ethics, and honor which predates
Islam.
P.D.P.A.
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the former
communist party prior to and during the Soviet invasion.
Politburo
The Soviet communist executive committee effectively
controlled nearly all governance.
P.R.T.
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Shariah law
Islamic law comprising of both civil and criminal justice
according to Islamic tradition.
Shi'a
Second largest sect of Islam, who believe Mohammed's cousin,
Ali, was his rightful heir as leader of Islam.
S.I.P.R.I.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
XVI
Sunni
Largest sect of Islam, who believed that Mohammed's
successor should be selected by the people.
Taliban
A Wahhabi Islamist political entity that rule Afghanistan in the
late 1990's, before starting an insurgency after their overthrow.
Ulema
Islamic legal scholars.
U.A.V.
Unmanned aerial vehicle.
U.N.
United Nations
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
U.N.A.M.A.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
Wahhabi
A conservative Sunni Islamic sect, based on the teachings of
Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18
th
century scholar.
Wikileaks
A non-profit organization that acts as a whistleblower entity,
whilst keeping its sources anonymous.
W.M.D.
Weapons of mass destruction.
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
What did they accomplish in Afghanistan? They evicted the Taliban government from
Kabul, but it centered itself in the villages and mountains where the real power of
Afghanistan lies.
1
-Ayman Al-Zawahiri
Deputy leader of Al Qaeda, former leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
Al Qaeda has long been a hot topic of focus for national governments, international and
organizations, and academics for the last decade. Its impact on the conventional wisdom
regarding international security and the position of the nation-state as the sovereign actor in
conflict cannot be understated. The invasion of Afghanistan, after the September 2001 attacks on
the U.S. brought to the fore a number of related and complex questions. A military intervention
was launched in a third party country (Afghanistan), whose government (the Taliban) provided
shelter to the main suspects (the al Qaeda network) of a terrorist action on foreign soil (the
United States). Now, a decade later, the question is whether that intervention has accomplished
any concrete results in dismantling the al Qaeda network, whilst simultaneously attempting to
stabilize Afghanistan after decades of war.
As a result, since September 11
th
2001, the issue of international security has become
invariably linked with the issue of transnational terrorism as a result of the attacks on New York
and Washington D.C. Such an attack on the world's lone superpower was bound to bring a
change of focus in academic research on the topic of terrorism. With the attack being planned
and carried out by al Qaeda, a radical Islamic terrorist entity, the focus also came to center on
Afghanistan, which had been deemed one of the world's poorest and most war-ridden nations.
Their status as guests of the Taliban regime in Kabul had marked the Afghan government as the
main target of America's reprisal, and their subsequent ousting from power had posed a number
of questions not least revisiting a key 1990's issue raised by the wars in former Yugoslavia,
namely that of nation-building.
1
The Al Qaeda Reader. New York City: Broadway, 2007. Print. Pg 176
2
However, as the American-led intervention in Afghanistan slowly turned into a drawn out
occupation, the capture of al Qaeda high value targets being illusive, and the progress of the
Afghan conflict being questioned, the results thus far have not appeared to be overwhelmingly
positive. The Afghan war has now surpassed most of the major conflicts of the 20
th
century in
terms of duration (both World Wars, the Korean War, Gulf War, and the Iran-Iraq war), and will
have surpassed the length of the Soviet intervention in the country on November 28
th
2010, for a
total of 3339 days. Such an ominous landmark should pose a number of questions about the
current Western presence in the country, and leads to the introduction of this book.
This book will be seeking to answer a rather interesting research question, which is
whether al Qaeda poses a threat from within Afghanistan, which is a key argument used by the
West for a continued presence in the country, as well as what would be required in order to
stabilize Afghanistan. On the surface, one would be forgiven to feeling perplexed as to how such
a question can be tackled, with one focusing on what is known in the West as a terrorist
organization, and the other issue being a long and increasingly difficult insurgency eroding at the
fabric of an already weak state. The answer lies within the Western strategy itself, which has
used its presence in Afghanistan as both a counter terrorist force against supposed al Qaeda
remnants as well as a stabilizing variable that can help to shore up the reach and power of the
Afghan central government. This strategy has been ongoing since the invasion itself, and it is
only in the last several years that it is coming into question more widely, as the years creep along
and allied casualties continue to increase.
The research question itself reflects the progress, or lack thereof, made in the war to date.
With the West, particularly the United States and its N.A.T.O. allies, investing so much in terms
of manpower and finance in Afghanistan (with N.A.T.O. arguably using the war to prove its
relevance in a post Cold War, multipolar world); it is vital to attempt to establish a bridge
between what is perceived as al Qaeda's present threat to the West and the achievement of
stability in Afghanistan. Whilst many commentators and academics have often analyzed either al
Qaeda or the war in Afghanistan, they have rarely done both simultaneously in detail. As a
result, one of the main focuses of this thesis will be to establish whether al Qaeda currently
presents a threat as the conventional, centralized terrorist organization depicted by the media and
3
Western governments; and whether the emphasis placed by Western powers on Afghanistan is
justified under the pretext to ensure Bin Laden and his supporters do not return to the country. A
comparison will be drawn between what threat may be posed by al Qaeda in its current form, and
the result of the Western powers and Afghan government failing to bring stability to Afghanistan
itself. The dissertation will seek to deeply scrutinize the Western narrative for the occupation of
Afghanistan.
In order to tackle the research question, the book will begin by analyzing the issue of al
Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization and the type of threat that it currently poses, in
order to juxtapose the al Qaeda of the present with that which had struck on September 11
th
2001. In the next chapter, the focus will shift to Afghanistan's own historic and political
development in light of foreign interventions and the results those have had on country's political
trajectory. Chapter 5 recounts the U.S. handling of the war by the Bush and Obama
administrations (until the time of writing), and what progress had been made utilizing the
strategy of both nation-building and counter terrorist operations to date. Finally, the sixth chapter
looks at Afghanistan and explores the various areas in which the country's development has been
lacking.
This research comes at an appropriate time, with the West's own economic issues being a
sensitive topic due to the recession which began in late 2007, and the Western public's growing
antipathy towards the war effort in Afghanistan pushing events towards a hasty withdrawal. The
structure of the book has been done in a manner which will allow an analysis of the U.S.-led
Afghan strategy in detail, and effectively dividing it into its counter terrorist and nation-building
pillars with in depth background information on both Afghanistan and al Qaeda, and the synergy
(or lack thereof) which has existed between the two over the years. This is done in order to
ascertain whether al Qaeda's metamorphosis as a terrorist organization or whether Afghanistan's
instability should be the prime focus for a continued Western presence in the country, if that
same presence is determined to be required at all.
4
The implications of the war in Afghanistan on international relations is certain to help
steer the discourse of future interventions in hotspots all over the globe for the next generation.
Scholars, historians and government policy makers alike will be analyzing the war for years to
come, with the Afghan story being rich with a number of issues, with repercussions for the
conflict itself, and other future conflicts alike. It touches upon nation-building and failed states,
humanitarian issues, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and the future of conflict in
underdeveloped nations. Like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the American
experience in Vietnam, it will be dissected and argued about for years, if not decades, to come -
well after the last Western soldier has left the country. Afghanistan currently represents the
future of foreign intervention and counterterrorism operations, and the variety of issues which
fall in between. As a result, it is deserving of an in depth analysis, which this book seeks to
provide.
Methodology
I had chosen this topic as the focus of my book as I had felt that it was an area in which
so many of the key questions facing International Relations, such as transnational threats to
established nation states and nation-building initiatives, could be tackled under the umbrella of
one topic. With the attention of the U.S. and the West at large focusing once again on their
mission in Afghanistan, it felt necessary to revisit and analyze some of the key points and
arguments that had been made on the subject over the period of the last several years.
Conducting research on an ongoing topic such as Afghanistan and al Qaeda posed a
number of interesting challenges. One notable example was lack of availability of research from
a non-Western standpoint in English, as well as the inability to travel to Afghanistan in order to
obtain first-hand research without risking life and limb in the prevailing circumstances at the
time of writing.
Although the theories of International Relations have been used in parts throughout the
book, this research mainly comprises of empirical sources. These sources had been a mixture of
primary sources, such as the Congressional Research Service papers, N.A.T.O. and U.S.
government documents; as well as secondary sources such as peer-reviewed journals, newspaper
5
reports (in order to include the most up to date information on the topic) and books written by
experts and analysts amongst others. I had chosen to use these sources in order to provide a
balance of official reports and data (primary sources) and analytical critiques (secondary sources)
on the issues of Afghanistan and al Qaeda. These had been juxtaposed in order to depict the scale
of the topic and the conflicting interpretations of the policies being enacted.
On the one hand, conducting research about an ongoing topic such as this one poses a
number of problems, as one can come to a reasonable conclusion based on the data available at
the time of writing, only for events to occur in Afghanistan several days later that would render
the conclusion irrelevant or incorrect. As a result, it was essential to use the research available in
order to provide the most accurate analysis possible, whilst allowing for events to alter the
circumstances somewhat, and being able to make the necessary amendments as time elapsed and
new information transpired.
The data used throughout the book had been gathered between July 2008 until October
2010. The situation in Afghanistan, as well as the questions revolving around al Qaeda as a
militant entity, have been ongoing since 2001, and the conclusions reached at the end of this
book are relevant at the time of concluding the book, which had been October 2010.
There had been some limitations in the regards of research material. In order to obtain a a
larger amount of data, I had travelled to London (specifically, the International Institute for
Strategic Studies) in January 2010 in order to obtain new research material in order to
supplement that which I had found locally, through online book retailers, such as Amazon and
Barnes & Noble, and via online databases such as JSTOR amongst others. The I.I.S.S. in London
had a wealth of information on Afghanistan, al Qaeda, nation building, and terrorism in general.
The information I had found there had been more than sufficient for me to complete this book, as
I had also found a number of primary source materials, such as Congressional Research
documents, and N.A.T.O. and U.S. government reports on Afghanistan which had been
invaluable to my research and overall understanding of the topic.
6
Another issue which had to be dealt with was that of the language of the research that had
been available. The research material which I had found had been in the English language, as my
level of understanding of French is limited, whilst I do not have an understanding of Arabic,
Pashto or Dari (the latter being the official languages spoken in Afghanistan). Inevitably, the
research found often portrays the topics from a Western point of view, although I tried to temper
this by using material from non-Western academics such as Tariq Ali, Ahmed Rashid, and Col.
Muhammad Yahya Effendi, who are all of Pakistani descent. Unfortunately, academic research
conducted by Afghans proved to be difficult to find, and those that had been available were not
available in an English translation. Thus, there had been limitations in the scope and balance of
the research material available, which I had made every effort to balance in order to conduct an
impartial piece of analytical work.
1
Chapter 2: Terrorism & Failed States - A review of literature
No challenge in international relations today is more pressing or more difficult
than that of supporting weak states.
2
Kofi Annan
Former U.N. Secretary General
The link between al Qaeda as a terror entity and Afghanistan's current instability as a
nation-state had often been cited by both Western states and scholars as a reason for continued
foreign presence in Afghanistan. With the onset of a global recession in 2008, and a drawn out
war which has not delivered satisfactory results, that view has been altered somewhat. An
increasingly loud chorus are questioning the benefit of the war effort both in Afghanistan as well
as the efforts against al Qaeda and calling for the immediate withdrawal of forces there as a
result of the lack of progress made. However, it seems as though the relation between al Qaeda
as a terror entity, and subsequently, the threat it may pose in the future, has been tied to
Afghanistan's own future prospects as a viable nation state. However, it is an issue which is
worthy of scrutiny, in order to ascertain whether al Qaeda poses a threat from Afghanistan and
what is necessary in order to stabilize the latter, with particular emphasis on whether a link truly
exists between them. Until a linkage between an elusive, transnational terrorist entity and an
impoverished war-torn nation is either proven or broken, the tangled yarn that Afghanistan has
come to exemplify as a mixture of contemporary international security, transnational terrorism
and nation-building in a globalized world will continue to confound and frustrate researchers.
It may well be that the failings are not due simply to the complexity and breadth of the
task at hand, as a number of scholars have been saying for a number of years - but also failing to
realize that the hazards posed by both al Qaeda and Afghanistan are still significant, but unlike in
Western analysis and government rhetoric, they are separate issues with their own causations. As
a result, each should with its own specific, targeted strategy, detached from one another. In
essence, the strategic trajectories for tackling al Qaeda and dealing with Afghanistan's issues
should be separate.
2
Dobbins, James. The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007. Print. Pg i
2
The purpose of this literature review is to analyze, and subsequently analyze the works
which have been published on the area of al Qaeda and its relationship with Afghanistan over the
last several years, in order to establish a foundation for the book's own analysis.
Al Qaeda as a specimen of transnational terrorism
Al Qaeda is a phenomenon that is a familiar topic in the field of international relations in
the last several years. Since 2001, a plethora of articles, books, reports and dissertations have
been written about the group, which was first established by Osama bin Laden in the twilight
years of the occupation of Afghanistan, as will be outlined in the third chapter of this book. As of
the mid-1990's, the group's professed aim was to attack U.S. interests around the globe in order
to ensure that the Americans withdraw its support for Israel and `apostate' Arab regimes in the
Middle East amongst others.
3
Al Qaeda's international agenda has come to change the way in
which terrorism is viewed in the realm of international relations, as its ambitions and rhetoric
pose a direct threat to not only to established governments in the Muslim world, but Western
interests there as well.
Conceptualizing al Qaeda as a terrorist entity within a concept as ambiguous as terrorism
has proved to be no mean feat for researchers and governments alike since September 11
th
2001.
As noted by Brown, nearly every act of terrorism has been both defined and criminalized by the
U.N, such as hijacking or hostage taking
4
, and yet an agreeable definition remains elusive. The
international community has yet to establish a working definition that can be agreed upon by
nation states, a point which has been long lamented by long standing terrorism scholars such as
Walter Laqueur "Even if there were an objective, value-free definition of terrorism, covering all
its important aspects and features, it would still be rejected by some for ideological reasons..."
5
3
Reinares, Fernando. "Conceptualizing International Terrorism". Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios
Internacionales y Estratégicos, 2005. Print. Pp 1-2
4
Salmon, Trevor C, and David Brown. "Terrorism." Issues In International Relations. 2 ed. New York: Routledge,
2008. pp 107-108
5
Burgess, Mark. "Terrorism: The Problems of Definition." CDI - Center for Defense Information - Security Policy
Research Organization. Center for Defense Information, 1 Aug. 2003. Web. 18 Sept. 2010.
<http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=1564&programID=39&from_page=../friendlyversion/pri
ntversion.cfm>.
3
In order to attempt to place al Qaeda in the broader framework of terrorism, it is vital to
define both transnational terrorism and international terrorism. The two terms have often been
used interchangeably over the course of the last several years by the media and scholars alike;
however, this may have only been the case as a result of al Qaeda being linked to both terms.
Fernando Reinares attempted to differentiate between the two terminologies, by stating that a
transnational terrorist entity had the ability to strike in various states from within a defined area
in which the affected states in question had no jurisdiction
6
. On the other hand, international
terrorism indicates that the terrorist group in question has a broader agenda to destabilize entire
regions or entities throughout the globe, affecting both structure and challenging established
powers on a larger scale
7
. According to Reinares' defining criteria, groups such as Hamas and
Hezbollah would easily fit into transnational terror entities, but with the exception of al Qaeda,
there are no clear candidates for international terrorist organizations which have the intention of
destabilizing or radically altering the shape and scope of both the structure and distribution of
power at the level of global society. In essence, Reinares justifiably places al Qaeda as a terror
entity whose very existence and ambitions puts it on a level of its own at the time of writing.
The essence of the ambiguity that surrounds al Qaeda, as well as the method in which it
operates makes it an interesting, if not daunting challenge for any potential researcher. Bruce
Hoffman remarked that al Qaeda was a difficult subject to tackle by contemporary experts. He
notes that the group is constantly evolving according to the shifting circumstances around them:
Let me make three broad observations about al Qaeda and terrorism. First, the good news is that
the treat that al Qaeda poses is changing. We have forced it to change. This is a reflection of the
successes and the progress that we have achieved in the war on terror in the past... years. But the
bad news is that al Qaeda and the threat it poses are changing precisely because they are capable
of changing.
8
Hoffman continues by stating "that the concept of a war on terror has outlived both its
usefulness and its relevance."
9
Ever since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the term `war
on terror' has become more and more ambiguous at a time in which acts of terrorism have come
6
Reinares, Fernando. Op Cit pp 1-3
7
Ibid
8
Steven Simon, cited in: Greenberg, Karen J.. Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pg 9
9
Ibid, pg 12.
4
to be overshadowed by events in Afghanistan, and the term itself may continue to fuel the flames
of hatred and the feeling of injustice in the Arab world. Moving forward, Professor Hoffman
asserts that the current battle against Islamic extremists should be viewed as a global insurgency,
or a global counterinsurgency. This hypothesis brings to light the struggle which is ongoing in
Afghanistan and Pakistan amongst others, especially when one takes into account the
composition of the so-called `Arab Afghans', which fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
They comprised Saudis, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Palestinian, Uzbeks from Central Asia, and
Uighurs from Xinjiang in China as well as Filipino Moros.
10
The point emphasized by Hoffman is one that has not yet gained traction amongst the
Western governments. Articles which take this point of view are scarce, showing that the
Western powers seem to place a simplistic label on a far more dangerous conflict than it is
realizing. Information about Al Qaeda's composition and capabilities are just as sparse, and this
is a point which will be scrutinized further in the third chapter of this piece. However, the
literature about al Qaeda is generally in agreement that al Qaeda has been forced to adapt and
change its methods of operation.
Steven Simon continues along this line by stating that al Qaeda had undergone a
transition from a mere group to an ideological movement. He states that the main difference
between the group and movement are the method in which al Qaeda finds its recruits. In the
former case, al Qaeda would actively search for prospective recruits from amongst a somewhat
politically disenchanted population, which has not proven difficult as can be seen in the case of
Iraq, as will be explored in Chapter 5 of this book. In the latter case, recruitment becomes one of
self-selection, in which little work (if any) needs to be done to indoctrinate members as they are
already drawn in by the group's ideology from what they know about them through their media
coverage. Al Qaeda's ability to make use of the media has been well documented since 9/11,
with various video recordings, audio tapes, and releases to jihadi websites being the predominant
methods in which the al Qaeda leadership reaches out to prospective recruits:
This is a phenomenon that is being fed and will be further fueled by the nature of mass
communications, whether it is the Web or videotapes or cable TV or the like... Groups like
10
Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords. Chatham: Pan Books, 2001. Pg. 128
5
Jama'at al-Tawhi wal-Jihad- that is the group of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq graft themselves
onto al Qaeda. The GSPC [Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat] in Algeria has done the
same thing. This has contributed to a blurring of the lines between the movement we see now
and...al Qaeda.
11
Al Qaeda has indeed evolved over the course of the last few years, due to necessity as
both Hoffman and Simon both state. In many ways, this evolution was forced upon it, however,
the evolution has made the group more difficult to understand, and thus oppose, than ever before.
No longer does it require a base of operations in order to plan and train for attacks. Prospective
militants seeking to conduct attacks against the West need only to search for one of those
Arab/Afghan `graduates' that had fought against the Soviets and returned to their homeland in
order to continue the jihad there. Pervez Musharraf, who was both the Pakistani head of state
(2001 2008) and the commander of the armed forces there (between 1999 and 2007), had noted
in his memoir that the influence of Osama bin Laden had attracted a number of potential recruits
to his cause; reflecting both the Saudi's influence as well as his appeal to jihadis.
After Osama bin Laden arrived in Jalalabad in southern Afghanistan in May 1996, Arab from
various countries who had left after the Afghan jihad started returning there to join him... Soon
Uzbeks, Bangladeshis, Chechens, Chinese, Uygurs, and Muslims from south India, Europe,
America and even Australia started to arrive in Afghanistan...
12
Unsurprisingly, Musharraf fails to mention any notion that al Qaeda received recruits
from Pakistan in his memoirs - although it is more than likely that it not only received recruits,
but also support and hospitality from the Pakistani tribal areas in the aftermath of the fall of the
Taliban regime in Kabul in 2001. The latter case has been well documented in the media in the
last several years, and it is only towards the second half of 2009 that any substantial push had
been made by the Pakistani military into areas where al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban militants
have been known to reside. Pakistan had allowed Taliban and al Qaeda remnants to cross from
the Afghan side of the border in the first place, although it must be said that Islamabad's control
over the tribal areas is weak to say the least, and this will be discussed in latter half of the book.
However, for several years, these jihadists were allowed to reside in the periphery of the country
entirely unabated, and this has allowed not only the Taliban, but also al Qaeda remnants to
11
Greenberg, Karen J.. Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005. Pg. 13
12
Musharraf, Pervez. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. New York City: Free Press, 2008. Print. Pg 143
6
regroup in these tribal regions. Despite what may be said by the authorities in Pakistan, including
the former President Musharraf, at the time of writing there continue to be a number of
indications in the field stemming from media reports and experts that bin Laden and his closest
deputies remain in hiding in Pakistan
13
.
However, the place of residence of the al Qaeda leadership should not be the focal point
when discussing the group. A more worthy focus may prove to be whether al Qaeda's ideology
had gained some traction since the invasion of Iraq, inciting jihadists from all over the region to
go there in order to fight Western forces, and how its evolution correlates to events in
Afghanistan, if at all. This topic is a gap that currently exists in International Relations, and one
of which will be tackled by the third chapter of this book.
In a paper written for the RAND think tank in 2003, Bruce Hoffman describes bin
Laden's claim in 1996 that the `Crusader military forces' of the West had established a foothold
in Saudi Arabia "...from which they intended to impose a new imperialism on the Middle East in
order to gain control over the region's oil wealth."
14
. This claim by Bin Laden may have only
been strengthened in the eyes of the average Muslim in the street after the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, to say nothing of the increasing tension that exists between the West and
Iran about its nuclear program. Hoffman had stated, somewhat prophetically, that should the U.S.
military presence be prolonged in the region, al Qaeda's ability to wage a guerilla war and to use
the American presence there for propaganda purposes would increase bin Laden's credibility
and it had for a great deal of time.
Whilst al Qaeda may have lost some support in Iraq due to its targeting of civilians, it still
manages to inspire groups and individuals to launch their own attacks throughout the region, at
times doing so in al Qaeda's name. With so much focus put on Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri and al Qaeda's upper echelons in general; there is not a significant amount of analysis
about the influence which al Qaeda's ideology wields in the region, with its ideology being
13
Starr, Barbara. "N.A.T.O. official: Bin Laden, deputy hiding in northwest Pakistan - CNN.com." CNN.com
International - Breaking, World, Business, Sports, Entertainment and Video News. CNN Asia, 18 Oct. 2010. Web.
18 Oct. 2010. <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/18/afghanistan.bin.laden/index.html?hpt=T2>
14
Hoffman, Bruce. "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment." RAND . (2003):
RAND. Available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P8078/P8078.pdf>. [Last Accessed 5 Oct. 2009.] pg.6
7
conceptualized in both the introduction Chapter 3 of this thesis. The efforts of the international
community have focused on defeating al Qaeda militarily in Afghanistan in order to deny them
safe haven there. However, little research has been conducted (based on the literature available at
the time of writing) concerning whether al Qaeda truly poses a military threat from there at
present, or in the near future, or whether its ideological threat outweighs that of its military
capacity. This will be one particular area which will be addressed by the book in its third chapter.
Western governments and scholars have been slow in adapting their gaze from being military-
centric, to encompassing a struggle against a militant entity that seeks to wage a war over the
course of a number of years. As Hoffman stated, bin Laden and the Taliban saw the fall of Kabul
in 2001 as "...one setback or a mere lost battle in a long war"
15
and that whilst the U.S. had at
one point grown accustomed to quick military victories by capturing Kabul and Baghdad, bin
Laden and the legion of jihadists "...see this conflict as an epic contest lasting years, if not
decades."
16
The long used concepts of military victories, capturing an enemy's capital city, as
well as the occupation of territory are not applicable in a time in which insurgencies, terrorist
acts, and nation-building efforts have come to be intertwined in the narrative of Western
occupation in Afghanistan.
Following along a related train of thought, an article penned by Ray Takeyh and Nikolas
Gvosdev analyzed the tendency of terrorist organizations utilizing a defined territory from within
which to operate and train
17
. In this essay, the authors analyze the relationship that exists
between terrorist networks such as al Qaeda, and failed states such as Afghanistan. One of the
key observations made early on in the essay is that whilst the U.S. military campaign in
Afghanistan had deprived al Qaeda of one of its main bases for both training and recruitment, the
group still retained the ability to disperse to other failed regions, such as Lebanon, Kosovo, and
Somalia amongst others. Takeyh and Gvosdev state that all terrorist networks require from a
failed state is a remote area of land where training complexes and other essential operational
services can be undertaken with little or no interference whatsoever. Al Qaeda exemplifies this
point throughout its history, first in Afghanistan, followed by a period of several years in Sudan,
15
Ibid, pg. 9
16
Ibid, pg 9-10
17
Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?." The Washington Quarterly
..Summer 2002 (2002): 97-108. Print.
8
only for the group to return to Afghanistan once the Taliban had taken over the country in the
mid 1990's.
This is a vital point which is raised by Takeyh and Gvosdev, as it does show that even
should the U.S. and the West manage to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, jihadists such as al
Qaeda can simply move their operations to other regions where they can operate with little
interference from state authorities. By simply denying al Qaeda safe haven in areas such as
Afghanistan, the West is simply denying their opponents one area in which they can house their
operations, while at the same time neglecting to tackle the group's ideological aspect. The latter,
along with the attacks undertaken in its name, are seen to be one of the foremost factors which
drive the recruitment of young men towards al Qaeda and other such groups, which will also be
discussed in detail in the third chapter of the book.
This lack of study on the changes made by al Qaeda since 2001 depict a certain gap
which exists in the current literature available at the time of writing, with the lack of focus given
to al Qaeda's evolution from a kinetic militant organization, to a transnational ideological
movement of resistance. The impact and influence which al Qaeda has in Afghanistan may not
be as prevalent, or indeed as unchallenged as it had been prior to 2001. Nevertheless, it still has a
part to play in the instability that has been prevalent there ever since. The part it plays will be
analyzed throughout the third chapter of the book, by dissecting the information known about al
Qaeda in the context of the situation in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan in the context of foreign military intervention
Foreign intervention, be it military, economic, diplomatic or otherwise, has become
commonplace after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. For the purpose of this book,
however, military interventions will be assessed in detail. Since the fall of the Soviet empire, the
United States alone has intervened 28 times (at the time of writing) in 17 different states
18
,
varying from restoring a foreign leader (Haiti, 1997), to missile strikes against `terrorist' sites
(Sudan and Afghanistan, 1998)
19
. It is not only the United States which has sanctioned such
18
Grossman, Dr. Zoltan. "History of U.S. Military Interventions since 1890." Academic Program Pages at
Evergreen. , Web. 19 Oct. 2010. <http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html>.
19
Ibid
9
operations, however, with the U.N.'s undertaking approximately 50 missions between 1991 and
the present day
20
- which is more than had been commissioned for the previous 40 years
combined. It is clear that foreign intervention, be it humanitarian, military, or a combination of
the two has come to be a global issue concerning all members of the international community.
Afghanistan represents perhaps one of the more challenging, if not high profile (in terms of
media attention and resources dedicated to the mission there) interventions if in the last decade
due to the complexity of domestic issues which exist there, as well as the perceived implications
of failure for the international community.
The concept of foreign intervention has seemingly changed little from the `boom' of the
early 1990's to the present day. Yaacov Vertzberger had provided an apt definition of the model
of foreign military intervention through the prism of the risk involved in doing so:
The term intervention refers generally to a broad range of activities that encompass many...
activities directed by one state toward another. The activities can be political, diplomatic,
economic, or military; they can have various levels of intensity and scope, and they represent a
balance between the intervener's interests, power, and opportunities and the structural
vulnerabilities of the target state...
21
Whilst it may be argued that Vertzberger had assumed that an intervening state would so
mainly out of self-interest, leaning towards realism, his definition appears to remain valid to this
day, despite the passage of more than a decade. The invasion of Afghanistan is a curious case of
an initial military invasion slowly changing into a blend of a humanitarian/political/military
interests being pursued in the guise of one occupation. By Vertzberger's definition, it is implied
that the interests of the state being occupied are not necessarily the prime motivator behind the
interventions themselves. On the other hand, one also would need to consider the list of states
which have undergone a foreign military intervention in the last two decades, such as Haiti,
Afghanistan, and Somalia amongst others. These states have spent a number of years functioning
on the periphery of the international community, while their own domestic issues had torn the
very fabric of the state from within, leaving little trace of stability. Contrasting two states such as
Somalia and Afghanistan, where the latter retains a foreign presence while the former does not, it
20
"United Nations Peacekeeping." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. United Nations, Web. 19 Apr.
2010. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>.
21
Vertzberger, Yaacov. Risk Taking and Decisionmaking. Stanford: Stanford Univ Pr 01/1//1998, 1998. Print. Pg
114
10
is arguable whether foreign military intervention solves the issues present in the country for the
long term, as not enough time has elapsed in either case in order to draw an accurate comparison.
On the other hand, the concept of foreign military interventions has also come to embody
another variable: that of humanitarian military interventions, as conceptualized in a 2008
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute publication:
Advocates of the non-political nature of humanitarian aid dislike the idea of military intervention
for humanitarian purposes. Not only is it an oxymoron-- since military intervention is inherently
political--but military intervention also causes humanitarian action to become politicized. When
foreign soldiers arrive, and particularly when they engage in relief work, foreign aid personnel
have a difficult time distinguishing themselves from soldiers in the eyes of local actors.
22
The intervention in Afghanistan may have had had military objectives early on namely the
expulsion of the Taliban and their al Qaeda `guests', however it became apparent that the
occupation of the country would require a humanitarian aspect as well. Using a predominantly
military campaign in order to provide humanitarian relief is certain to bring about questions
about the mission's objectives, as it had done in for a period in Afghanistan.
The S.I.P.R.I. publication raises a number of interesting points concerning how the
militarization and politicization of humanitarian intervention "...can also increase the intensity
of violence by adding troops, firepower and another armed group to an already volatile
environment."
23
However, whilst the S.I.P.R.I. publication had discussed the aforementioned
militarization and politicization of humanitarian intervention, there is scant literature which has
analyzed the political, economic, and security aspects of an intervention which already had its
justification in terms in a highly militarized/politicized intervention, with a thin layer of
humanitarian underpinnings. Chapters 5 and 6 of this book will seek to address the complexities
which exist in Afghanistan in its political and economic structures, with a historical analysis of
the conditions which have developed in the country over a number of years, culminating in the
situation which exists today.
22
Seybolt, Taylor B.. Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (A Sipri
Publication). Solna: A Sipri Publication, 2008. Print. Pg 17
23
Ibid Pg 17
11
The international community, led by the U.S. and the West, faces a sizable challenge in a
country which has the notoriety of being the `graveyard of empires'
24
. When the Americans
invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it had seemed as though they had managed to avoid the historical
trend by winning a decisive victory over the Taliban and al Qaeda. However, as the years came
to pass, it became apparent that al Qaeda and the Taliban were far from defeated, and attacks
against U.S. and N.A.T.O. troops began to steadily increase.
From as early as 2004, it became gradually more evident to scholars and intelligence
analysts alike that Afghanistan was not achieving the stability that was hoped for by the United
States. In an article written for the journal Iranian Studies 2004, Thomas J. Barfield took a
historical perspective of the difficulties facing any power attempting to establish a legitimate
government in Afghanistan
25
. One of the most significant points which Barfield mentions, which
has not received the attention necessary by the West, is the importance of the area known today
as `Pashtunistan' in the Afghan region throughout history but particularly since eighteenth
century. He describes the turmoil which had embroiled the country for centuries, and that the
Pashtuns viewed themselves as a privileged minority within the country. These sentiments are
unlikely to have faded over time, as the strong attachment which Afghans have to their tribal and
ethnic heritage has been well recorded in the last 20 years and will be elaborated in more detail
in Chapter 4. However, with the number of Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line, which
includes a sizable population in the border regions of Pakistan, which we now know had
provided asylum to the Afghan Taliban and remnants of al Qaeda
26
.
Whilst Barfield's 2004 article reflected a sense of optimism towards the opportunity
which the West had to transform Afghanistan into a modern, functioning state; troop casualties
and
IED
attacks had increased from the year before
27
. However, Barfield was correct in noting
24
Bearden, Milton. "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires." Foreign Affairs. Nov/Dec 2001 (2001). [Last Accessed at
05 July 2010] Available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-
empires>
25
Barfield, Thomas J.. "Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan." Iranian Studies 37, no 2..June (2004):
pp 263-293. Print.
26
Bajoria, Jayshree. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas - Council on Foreign Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. , 26
Oct. 2007. Web. [Last Accessed 21 May 2010] Available at
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/11973/pakistans_tribal_areas.html>
27
"iCasualties | Operation Enduring Freedom | Afghanistan." iCasualties: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom Casualties. , Web. 8 Aug. 2009. <http://icasualties.org/oef/>.
12
that Afghans were quick to support one occupying power, only to support a second power to oust
the first should it feel the tides were changing:
Using one foreign invader to rid the country of another fell well within the Afghan political
tradition. And the Americans could be counted upon to leave the country at some point, while it
was widely feared that Pakistanis and Arabs would not; so in this case using a non-Muslim power
to rid the country of unwelcome foreign Muslims was deemed acceptable.
28
When bringing that into contrast with the reality which has been ubiquitous in the last
few years, it becomes evident that with the increasing strength of the insurgency in the southern,
Pashtun regions of Afghanistan may prove to be an ominous sign for the foreign powers and the
Afghan government itself with some in the field going as far as comparing the situation in the
country to the U.S. experience in Vietnam
29
. This is an overly simplistic analogy, which
disregards a number of complex factors at play in the region, to say nothing of the wildly
different histories that southeast and southwest Asia have had had in terms of economic and
political development. While there is little literature to come to any solid conclusions or analysis
on the matter, the fifth and sixth chapters of the book will attempt to detail the shift of events in
the last several years in Afghanistan, particularly in the context of its development in the areas of
security, politics and economics. It may be suggested that popular support is once again turning
once again against the foreign power only to support a former ruling regime, namely the
Taliban, which the country had seemingly happily seen the end of less than a decade before.
Although benefitting from hindsight, Barfield's analysis was historically accurate, but somewhat
shortsighted in the course of current analysis. He had correctly stated that the Pashtuns had a
strong sense of identity which had been forged over the course of centuries, but underplayed the
support which the Taliban (and in turn, al Qaeda) received from the very ethnic grouping from
which the former had emerged.
28
Barfield, Thomas J.. "Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan." Iranian Studies 37, no 2..June (2004):
pg 290. Print.
29
Johnson, Thomas H., and M. Chris Mason. "Afghanistan is today's Vietnam- By Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris
Mason | Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy - the global magazine of economics, politics, and ideas. , 20 Aug. 2009.
Web. [Last Accessed 11 Sept. 2009] Available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/20/saigon_2009>
13
In a 2009 article written for Foreign Policy by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
with the title of `Saigon 2009'
30
, the authors argue that the parallels between the U.S. experience
in Afghanistan today and that of their experience in Vietnam in the 1960's and 1970's are
`sobering.' Citing a historical comparison, the authors begin by noting that both Vietnam and
Afghanistan had unexpectedly defeated a pair of strong global powers, namely Britain and the
Soviet Union, in guerilla wars of comparative length. Another example cites the long supply
lines which had existed between the U.S. and Vietnam, as well as those which exist between the
U.S. and Afghanistan today in both cases the U.S. advantages of ground mobility and artillery
had been nullified.
Any Western article which compares Afghanistan, or indeed, any other U.S. foreign
military venture to Vietnam is bound to stoke the fires of controversy. However, articles
discussing the similarities between the two appear to be increasing in number. At the time of
writing, by writing the words `Afghanistan Vietnam similarities' into the popular web search
engine Google, nearly 11 million results are displayed. However, U.S. foreign interventions have
been plagued with comparisons with Vietnam ever since that particular war was brought to a
close. This is not to say, however, that Afghanistan is heading along a downward spiral similar to
the one which Vietnam had. Comparisons are useful to utilize as a tool to plot a general trend,
however, if not taken into consideration with a country's ethnic, historical, and political
background, any comparison becomes shallow and meaningless. The article may not be one of
the most remarkable in terms of analysis, however, it is reflective of trends in current analysis,
which has taken a particularly negative view of any chance of success in Afghanistan, even more
so in defeating al Qaeda. This trend is one which, while far from being premature (given the
failure of the U.S. and its allies to stabilize Afghanistan since 2001, or effectively dismantle the
al Qaeda network in the same timeframe), does not contribute much in terms of scholarly insight.
Needless to say, the literature which views Afghanistan as being another Vietnam, or even
another Somalia (where U.S. forces had been present between 1992-1994) are increasing in
number. On the other hand, these views are not taking into consideration the successful U.S. led
30
Johnson, Thomas H., and M. Chris Mason. "Afghanistan is today's Vietnam- By Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris
Mason | Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy - the global magazine of economics, politics, and ideas. , 20 Aug. 2009.
Web. [Last accessed 11 Sept. 2009] Available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article
s/2009/08/20/saigon_2009>.
14
nation-building operations, such as those in Haiti in 1994, or Bosnia soon after. While one may
attribute the growing pessimistic view of Western involvement down to pragmatic realism, it
may be that a more entrenched defeatist mentality seems more fitting of this point of view.
Nation building and counterinsurgency
In the last several years, Afghanistan has been marred by an increasingly brutal
insurgency, which is threatening to undermine Western and Afghan government efforts to
establish a semblance of stability that would allow it to begin the process of slowly rebuilding
after decades of war. A counterinsurgency effort has been well underway in the country since
then, with the West attempting to apply some of the lessons learned in Iraq between 2004-2007
in order to attempt to bring the situation under control. However, like Iraq, the progress in the
counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts have been slow and hard earned.
The concepts of counter insurgency and nation building are quite congruent in terms of
their overall objectives. According to the Dictionary of International Relations, an insurgency is
"...an armed insurrection or rebellion against an established government in a state."
31
As a result,
counterinsurgency would an action which opposes the armed insurrection against the established
government in question. On the other hand, nation building has been defined as
A broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a
society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.
32
By definition, the concepts of counterinsurgency and nation building are not only compatible,
but also required in a situation such as Afghanistan's. The insurgency that rages on requires a
counterinsurgency effort, while the weakness of the central government in several sectors
dictates the need for a nation-building effort in order to reinforce its institutions and the
government's capabilities. In theory, a successful counterinsurgency effort, or significant
progress, would allow for all concerned (Western forces, the Afghan government, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations and regional partners) to redouble the
31
Evans, Graham, and Richard Newnham. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (Penguin Reference).
Boston: Penguin (Non-Classics), 1999. Print. Pg 252
32
Dobbins, James. The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007. Print. Pg
XVII
15
nation-building efforts in order to strengthen Afghanistan as an effective nation-state, as well as
a member of the international community.
A case of realism in the analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan comes from Daniel
Marston in the book "Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare".
33
In his essay, Dr Marston takes
note of the numerous failures which the U.S. and its allies had committed during of the war until
2007. One of the most damaging errors conducted according to Marston, and justifiably so, is
that the U.S. failed to create any sort of post-war plan for Afghanistan. This allowed the
Northern Alliance, comprised of minority Uzbeks, Hazaras and Tajiks (all mainly situated
throughout the north and western areas of Afghanistan) to take control of key areas of the
country after the fall of Kabul in 2001. The Pashtuns, as previously mentioned, had enjoyed a
powerful status in the country for many years, and soon found themselves disenfranchised with
the foreign occupiers. Similar mistakes had been made by the U.S. in Iraq, where post-war plans
had been few, and the disenfranchisement of the powerful Sunni minority had been one of the
factors which led to a destructive insurgency there. As a result, Afghanistan had not been a
mistake by mere coincidence but along with Iraq was proof that U.S. strategy for both states
had been fundamentally flawed. These flaws have been discussed to some degree, however, there
has not yet been an attempt to connect these flaws with the ongoing situation that exists in
Afghanistan, in light of the stated counterterrorist/nation-building strategy which continues there,
and the book will discuss this at length in the fifth and sixth chapters.
The political vacuum left by the Taliban in the wake of their defeat at the hands of U.S.
and Northern Alliance forces has never truly been filled, and this will be further analyzed in
Chapters 5 and 6 in the framework of the role it plays in the current political instability which it
causes within the country. There was also serious infighting between anti-Taliban Pashtuns
amongst others, which nearly guaranteed that other than the Taliban, no central government
could truly project any sense of power beyond the major cities and towns:
33
Marston, Daniel . "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-2007." Counterinsurgency in
Modern Warfare. Westminster: Oxford: Osprey Publishing,, 2008. Pp. 220-240.
16
Anti Taliban Pashtun leaders... failed to demonstrate cohesiveness. Commanders raced to
establish their own authority, creating a patchwork of predatory, competing fiefdoms. A culture of
impunity was allowed to take root in the name of stability, with abusers free to return to their old
ways as long as they mouthed their allegiance to the central government.
34
Whilst Marston's analysis criticizes the early efforts by the West to stabilize the country,
he notes that after 2004, there seemed to be a change in the demeanor and the actions of the U.S.
and N.A.T.O. forces in Afghanistan. Since then, there had been significant strides in moving
away from a conventional warfare frame of mind, to one in which a more defined and open
counterinsurgency strategy has been embraced as a solution to the security problem which
currently exists. On the other hand, Marston aptly notes that
The main problem impeding coalition forces' successful application of counterinsurgency was
decentralization of responsibility. The number of different governments involved in the
coalition... made it very difficult to implement a single, cohesive, consistent plan of action that
could be applied across Afghanistan.
35
The issue of command structure and strategy in Afghanistan has been mentioned more
and more frequently since the decision to water down U.S. involvement in Iraq. Whilst it may
not be a problem which is directly affecting the perception of foreign forces in Afghanistan, there
are almost certainly problems caused by having different countries pursuing similar strategies in
different ways. There are a total of 42 nations
36
that are supplying troops, in either combat or
non-combat capacity, to the mission in Afghanistan. As a result, despite the best efforts of those
involved, agendas and interests between these nations are certain to differ as well as the
application of any strategy agreed upon by the partners concerned. Germany is a prime example
as it has sent some forces to Afghanistan, however they were meant to serve in a relatively
peaceful area in the northern regions of Afghanistan (Germany's notorious history has played a
part in the deployment of forces abroad, which imposes a number of restrictions on the rules of
engagement of its forces). Yet, now that fighting in the country has spread throughout nearly the
entire country, many states, such as Germany, are reconsidering whether they should have their
troops there at all. The failure of the West to implement a unified strategy and chain of command
34
Marston, Daniel . "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-2007." Counterinsurgency in
Modern Warfare. Westminster: Oxford: Osprey Publishing,, 2008. Pg. 225
35
Ibid, pg. 240
36
"I.S.A.F. Contributing Nations." N.A.T.O. - Homepage. , Web. Available at
<http://www.N.A.T.O..int/I.S.A.F./structure/nations/index.html>. [Last Accessed 15 Dec. 2009]
17
is one of the contributing factors to continuing deterioration of the situation on the ground there.
The impact of the lack of a concrete strategy will be discussed in the fifth chapter, in the context
of the influence it had over the two U.S. administrations since the invasion and the manner in
which they prosecuted the war there. This will be done in order to provide an overarching
analysis, which has thus far been somewhat lacking in the literature available, of how the
situation has developed in the context of a lack of a meaningful, or achievable objective. This is
a point which Marston whole-heartedly subscribes to, and it remains an issue which has yet to be
fully resolved.
Adam Roberts takes the issue of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan a step further.
37
Roberts delivers a scathing analysis of the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan which starts
off with the initial invasion of the state itself in 2001, and produces a critical, yet interesting
analysis of the state of affairs which came about due to the involvement of varying agendas and
conflicts in one, large war
The international war in 2001 had been superimposed on two more enduring conflicts: between
the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, and between the United States and its allies against al-
Qaeda terrorists. Both continued. The war against al-Qaeda and related terrorists, now based in
Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, carried on without interruption. In addition, there was growing
resistance in southern Afghanistan to the new regime.
38
This particular quote highlighted the complex situation which the U.S. helped to create in
2001. However, as Roberts notes, the situation was made further complicated by the popular
insurgency which had began to take root in the country, and which was labeled a `Taliban'
insurrection by the U.S. (and later N.A.T.O.). Roberts quotes Ahmed Rashid in order to further
illustrate that the Taliban phenomenon is not necessarily one which is limited to Afghanistan, or
indeed Pakistan. Rather, it is a "...product of refugee camps, militarized madrassas, and the lack
of opportunities in the borderland in the borderland of Pakistan and Afghanistan."
39
As a result,
what Roberts is keen to argue is that it is not necessarily the Taliban themselves which are
fuelling the insurgency rather the circumstances on the ground, which coupled a perceived
37
Roberts, Adam. "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan." Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): pp 29-60.(Available at
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/98389__908599255.pdf) [Last accessed August 15, 2009].
38
Ibid pg 31
39
Ibid
18
growing public antipathy to foreign forces
40
and the central government, have helped to swell the
Taliban's ranks. The counterinsurgency effort may be failing at perhaps its very basic level that
of being able to convince the local population that the counterinsurgent forces can provide better
security and governance than that of the insurgents. The implications of this are not yet fully
understood in the context of Afghanistan, and the sixth chapter of this book will seek to discuss
the variables that are being addressed in order to bring some form of stability to the country.
In order to analyze this failure in more depth, Roberts turns to modern Western
counterinsurgency doctrine, such as the most recent U.S. counterinsurgency manual published by
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps at the height of the insurgency in Iraq. Roberts describes a
controversial classic counterinsurgency equation, which states that approximately 20-25
counterinsurgents are necessary for every 1,000 residents in an area of operations. Should
Afghanistan be taken a point in case, there would need to be in the region of 775,000
counterinsurgents in order to effectively police and protect Afghanistan's 31 million
inhabitants.
41
This, needless to say, is a number which is highly unlikely to ever come to fruition.
Roberts also criticizes those who use past counterinsurgency occurrences in order to apply a
similar doctrine in radically different circumstances. This is a reasonable assumption on Roberts'
part, as with different political/historical circumstances, social development; as well as the main
elements of the local economy varying dramatically between different nations and regions, there
is no effective way to translate the dismal U.S. experience in the jungles of Vietnam into the
worsening situation it finds itself in the mountains and valleys in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, Roberts interestingly raises one particular issue that many strategists and
analysts have not yet taken onboard since 2001: in their haste to compare historical examples of
insurgencies to Afghanistan, they have neglected one little mentioned aspect of the British
experience in Malaya, one of the most celebrated examples in history of a successful
counterinsurgency campaign. In Malaya, the British had completely withdrawn from the country
after setting a set date, which Roberts notes as being a major contributor to the definitive end of
the insurgency there. In the case of Afghanistan, with various states involved against a number of
40
This notion will be challenged in the latter half of the book, in order to ascertain whether a foreign presence in the
country will be feasible for the foreseeable future.
41
Ibid 35-36
19
forces (Taliban, al Qaeda, nationalists, etc), the U.S. mission to find and kill al Qaeda's leaders,
and to achieve some form of stability in Afghanistan may be countering one another. This aspect,
which has not been given the due analysis as yet in International Relations literature, will be
discussed at length throughout Chapter 5.
Roberts somberly notes, one of the costs of a failed counterinsurgency campaign may
actually lead to Afghanistan having a more grave impact on international security than it has in
the last three decades
42
. With, or without an al Qaeda presence in the country, it is possible that
the issue of transnational terrorism in weak or failed states will remain an issue to be dealt with
for the next generation as well. Eliminating the safe havens which can be used by al Qaeda
operatives may no longer be sufficient in order to eliminate them as a threat. Conversely, it is
also part of what is necessary in order to help achieve some form of stability in Afghanistan
provided that a suitable counterinsurgency strategy; which takes into account the various
political, economic and social elements of Afghanistan, be put into effect.
A key factor in stabilizing Afghanistan will certainly depend on the success or failure of
the nation-building efforts there. In practical terms, nation building has been a part of
International Relations since the interwar period between 1919-1939 in Europe, when a number
of central European powers were devastated by the economic and military toll that the First
World War had on their nations. However, it is the success that the nation-building efforts
undertaken in post-1945 Germany and Japan that have become the benchmarks for all such
operations since. Dempsey admitted as much in an analysis conducted only 10 days into the
initial invasion in 2001. However, he had criticized those, such as then Senator (Vice-President
of the United States at the time of writing) Joseph Biden, who felt that a nation-building effort in
Afghanistan and the outlying region would help to eliminate the `terrorism problem' in the long
term.
43
Demspey goes on to state that "Afghanistan and its neighbors, in contrast, have little in
the way of either liberal traditions or cultural attitudes that are agreeable to massive foreign
42
Roberts, Adam. "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan." Survival 51, no. 1 (2009): pg 34 (Available at
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/98389__908599255.pdf) [Last accessed August 15, 2009].
43
Dempsey, Gary. "The Folly of Nation-Building in Afghanistan | Gary Dempsey | Cato Institute: Daily
Commentary." The Cato Institute. , 17 Oct. 2001. Web. [Last Accessed 24 Aug. 2010] Available at
<http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3870>
20
interference."
44
He does not attempt to mask his skepticism that a modern day `Marshall Plan'
would work in southwest Asia by remarking that it was telling that one would need to go back 50
years (thus referring to the Marshall Plan itself) in order to find an example of such an
undertaking actually working
45
.
Whilst Dempsey views may now be more widely held today amongst the general
Western public, his skepticism of the nation-building process in a country known to be less than
welcoming to long drawn foreign occupations can be somewhat justified in light of the
increasing violence in Afghanistan. However, his skepticism, like that of many of his
contemporary peers (such as Johnson and Mason, who drew comparisons with Vietnam), may
not be fully justified. This book will seek to first challenge whether nation building in
Afghanistan is a feasible strategy, given its turbulent history with foreign powers in the past.
However, there is already literature that challenges Dempsey's assertion within the scholarly
community. Shamoo asserts that the nation-building effort in Afghanistan had been neglected for
a number of years after 2001, and it was only when the Obama administration been in office that
it had realized that a counterinsurgency effort without a parallel push in nation-building
endeavors was nearly futile.
46
In contrast with Dempsey, Shamoo does not question the benefits
of nation building to Afghanistan's future, nor does he question whether it is feasible like
others, including myself, he feels that the method of putting it into practice in the country has not
been effective. This will be a point that will be elaborated on throughout the book, in order to
identify whether the instability, which the nation-building effort is trying to remedy, is based
upon factors within the country itself or whether it is a result of external factors, such as the
presence of external actors (al Qaeda, foreign troops, etc).
The success or failure of the U.S. and N.A.T.O.'s ability to stabilize Afghanistan is likely
to become the yardstick against which future foreign interventions in third world nations are to
be measured for the foreseeable future, much as the U.S. intervention in Vietnam shaped their
foreign intervention policy for the following decades. The U.S. involvement in Afghanistan has
44
Dempsey, Gary. Op Cit
45
Ibid
46
Shamoo, Adil E.. "Foreign Policy In Focus | Nation-Building in Afghanistan." Foreign Policy In Focus | Home. ,
30 Nov. 2009 Web. [Last Accessed 24 Oct. 2010] Available at <http://www.fpif.org/articles/nation-
building_in_afghanistan>.
21
recently become the longest foreign intervention in its history, and its aim of eliminating al
Qaeda from the region does not seem any closer to fruition than it may have since the invasion of
Iraq. There is no easy way to gauge whether al Qaeda is in its decline, as various analysts and
pundits have used different methods, including the number and complexity of the attacks
undertaken since 9/11 as a means to measure al Qaeda's strength. However, what is certain is
that only with the passage of several decades will historians have enough time and information in
order to conclude at which point, if any, al Qaeda had begun its decline and what the impact of
the foreign forces in Afghanistan meant for the country in the long term. It is easy for one to
speculate what effect any failure of the West is likely to have in Afghanistan, but any speculation
should be justified with the empirical evidence that currently exists, as varied in opinion and
complex in the manner that it may be.
The vast array of literature which is available on the topic of Afghanistan's future with or
without al Qaeda has yet to reach the level in which entire books or journal articles are written
solely with this thought in mind. However, Stephen Walt captures the essence of both the
enormity and complexity of the question at hand
Various plots in the past were conceived in Afghanistan or Pakistan, but it hardly takes a `safe
haven' to sit around and conspire terrorists can do that virtually anywhere. In other words,
making Afghanistan an `al Qaeda'-free zone is only a small part of the problem.
47
However, it is clear from the debates that have taken place between scholars, politicians, and the
general public has drawn the line between those who believe that the mission in Afghanistan is a
worthy cause, and those who believe that the region as a whole is best left to its own devices,
devoid of any Western interference. However, whilst these lines have been drawn, both points of
view still beg the question: Does al Qaeda pose a threat from within Afghanistan, and what is
necessary in order to stabilize Afghanistan? At this stage, it is difficult to come to a conclusion
as to whether al Qaeda will or will not be a part of Afghanistan's future, and whether it can pose
a threat from within those borders. But it is this complex question which this book will be
seeking to explore.
47
Walt, Stephen M. . "Is Afghanistan really a war of necessity?." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, 18 Aug. 2009.
Web. [Last Accessed 12 Oct. 2009] Available at <walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth>
22
Chapter 3: Al Qaeda - Origins and Identity
History is merely a list of surprises. It can only prepare us to be surprised yet
again.
-Kurt Vonnegut, German-American novelist.
Al Qaeda's turbulent history has been discussed and pored over since September 11
th
2001 in detail, with an abundance of analysis conducted by intelligence agencies and scholars the
world over. However, while the history of what we believe to be a group of sorts has been
discussed to such a degree, given its importance to this topic, it is worth re-evaluating once
again. Some may say that al Qaeda's history may give insight as to what Osama bin Laden is
looking to do in the near future, however, in this case, it is unlikely that history can serve as a
solid reference for international actors, intelligence agencies and scholarly communities. It is
necessary to understand how al Qaeda as both a group and ideology has developed over the past
twenty years or so in order to give the historical background of the current war in Afghanistan, in
light of al Qaeda's long history there.
Whilst there is debate as to what al Qaeda is now, there can be few who can argue that it
had not been set up as a militant organization at the outset. There are a number of sources,
including former al Qaeda operatives who had been apprehended, as well as original documents
and hard drives (which will be discussed later in the chapter) that point towards al Qaeda's early
roots as an international jihadi
48
organization. The concept of the term jihadi refers to a Muslim
individual who commits him/herself to undertake a jihad, being a holy war. According to hadith
(although it remains a topic of debate
49
), which is the verbal tradition of Islam passed on from
one generation to the next, there are two types of jihad the Greater (or internal) jihad in which
one battles against the inclinations they may have towards sinning, and the Lesser (or external)
jihad, also known as the jihad of the sword
50
. Using this version of the hadith, Al Qaeda and
48
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Rev Exp ed. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2006. Pp 38-39, 146
49
Delong-Bas, Natana. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University
Press, USA, 2008. Pg 240
50
Op. cit., pp 240-241
23
other like-minded militants have opted to undertake the route of the Lesser jihad; by choosing to
violently oppose those they deem to be the enemies of Islam.
Al Qaeda had used Afghanistan as its base of operations early on, as the group had set up
several training camps there, and had already managed to get the core infrastructure and logistics
well underway. However, bin Laden and his followers would leave Afghanistan in order to
search out new countries where they could undertake jihad once again, not unlike the several
thousand Arab jihadi volunteers who had left Afghanistan in the years following the withdrawal
of the Soviet Union to fight in areas as far off as Chechnya, Bosnia, and Algeria amongst others.
His next port of call had been Saudi Arabia, followed by Sudan only to return to Afghanistan
once the Taliban had quelled the civil war that had been ongoing there, and effectively taking
control of the country. The return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan had been on the precondition set by
Bin Laden to the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, that his group would be protected
51
. Bin Laden's
ties with Afghanistan, and its next-door neighbor Pakistan, stretch back to the mid 1980's, and it
is a link that is still strong to this very day.
Whilst a great deal of attention had been given initially to Osama bin Laden, over the past
several years, the number of audio tapes released by the Saudi has decreased quite substantially.
No new video tape footage had been seen up until the time of writing since September 7
th
2007,
which may lead one to assume that wherever bin Laden is, his ability (or perhaps willingness) to
broadcast a videotape may be limited. On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's
number two, and often seen by Western scholars as the ideological force within al Qaeda
52
, has
begun to release more and more audio tapes lambasting the West and their Arab allies. It is
maintained that the al Qaeda leadership has long since fled to remote areas within Pakistan,
although a contrasting view states up until 2005 15 al Qaeda high value targets had been
51
Bergen, Peter. The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader. .. Reprint. New York City:
Free Press, 2006. Pg 164
52
Aly, Anne. "The Historical Roots of Al Qaeda's Ideology: Understanding Ayman al Zawahri's vision and
developing an appropriate response." Terrorism History Conference. Research Network for a Secure Australia. ,
Canberra. 10 June 2007. Speech. Available at
<http://www.explodingmediamyths.org.au/data/shared/documents/the_historical_roots_of_al_qaeda.pdf> [Last
Accessed 10/12/2009]
24
captured or killed within urban areas
53
. As a result, the group's leaders have become significantly
more difficult to track down, and strikes by Predator U.A.V. (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) drones
become riskier if deployed to attack targets in urban areas due in no small part to questions of
sovereignty and the potential for inflaming both anti-American and anti-government sentiment
there.
However, whilst al Qaeda itself may not hold the continuous attention of the global
headlines in recent years, it is still very much an issue which Afghanistan, Pakistan and Western
forces are devoting a great deal of time and energy towards stabilizing both southwest Asian
states, as well as hunting down al Qaeda militants and their allies in the region. Whilst al Qaeda
may seem to be depleted as a military force in Afghanistan, that does not guarantee that it will
always be so. Al Qaeda had been all but written off as a force to reckon with after the fall of
Afghanistan to U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in the winter of 2001. However, the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq had inflamed Arab public opinion throughout the Middle East, and al Qaeda
suddenly had a second lease of life, with scores of Arab volunteers flocking to fight against the
U.S. and its allies there. As a result, any analysis concluding that (the militant group/ideology
known as) al Qaeda is in any form of irreparable decline may yet prove to be grossly premature.
The Origins of al Qaeda
The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 came at a time in which Arabs
throughout the Middle East were still coming to terms with the defeat of the Arab armies by
Israel during the Yom Kippur war of 1973, as well as the signing of a peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel in early 1979. Both of these events were blows to Arab nationalism, and struck
the death knell for the experiment undertaken by Nasser, leader of Egypt, to interlock Arab
nationalism with undercurrents of Islamism. The invasion of Afghanistan by a foreign, non-
Muslim power was seen as an insult to Arab states and Muslims alike, which led to a flurry of
funds and fighters entering Afghanistan via Pakistan to help repel the Soviets. It was in this
climate that Osama bin Laden had made his journey to Pakistan in order to help raise funds for
53
Katzman, Kenneth. "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment.". Washington D.C.: Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, 2005. [Last Accessed 05 December 2009] Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA444819>
25
the mujahedeen
54
on behalf of the Saudi monarchy, and would come to meet a number of
likeminded Muslims who had arrived in order to assist the Afghans in their struggle.
Afghanistan was seen as the ideal battleground for various actors, ranging from local
warlords, to regional powers, as well as the two main superpowers of the day. The country had
been a party (albeit, a reluctant one) to geostrategic power plays since the early 19
th
century,
when the British first began to take notice of Russia's expanding influence in the region
55
, which
will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. However, in the case of the Soviet invasion
of 1979, the actors and their reasons to become involved varied as much as the actors
themselves: for the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it was a question over how large the Soviet sphere
of influence was to be, while the U.S. itself saw Afghanistan as an opportunity to turn the war
into the Soviet version of Vietnam
56
. The Pakistanis saw Afghanistan as a key buffer against the
Soviet Union as well as strategic depth against India (the implications of which will be discussed
in more detail in the later chapters), and saw the war as a means to strengthen their position in
the region
57
. Whilst these actors were influenced by geostrategic concerns, Saudi Arabia was
also motivated by religious factors, although that may not have been the view that was prevalent
at the time
58
. Afghanistan represented the epitome of Cold War politics, and the mountains of
Afghanistan turned out to be the final intervention conducted by the Soviets prior to the
disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Whilst the issue of the Soviet invasion will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter, it
is vital to view this event, in isolation; as a prime catalyst for al Qaeda's inception. However, for
the time being, it is sufficient to say that the invasion by the Soviets and its conflict with the
mujahedeen had merely been the tip of the iceberg in terms of the overall picture. There had been
a number of issues at play during the Soviet occupation, such as whether Shi'a Iran or Sunni
54
Bergen, Peter. The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader. Reprint, New York City:
Free Press, 2006. Pp 28-48
55
The period of geostrategic positioning by both Russia and Britain in this period came to be known as `The Great
Game'.
56
Ali, Tariq. The Duel Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2008.
Pg 129
57
Ibid
58
Quandt, S. M.. Saudi Arabia in the 1980's. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1982. Pp 42-43
26
Saudi Arabia could claim the mantle of leadership in the Islamic world
59
, Afghanistan's place as
a historical buffer state between the Russians/Soviets and Western interests in the region, as well
as the question of political Islam in Southwest Asia. The latter topic was not appreciated by any
of the foreign powers involved (a point proven when the U.S. and the Soviet Union left the
country to its devices for several years) until the Taliban took over the country in the mid-
1990's. Political Islam had been dealt a blow in the Middle East after the failure of the Arab
states to conquer Israel after the Yom Kippur war. However, it did make its revival in Southwest
Asia, due in no small part to the number of Arabs that flocked to Afghanistan, hoping to rekindle
the flame that had died out after the war against Israel in 1973. Jason Burke notes that:
The rise of political Islam in Afghanistan during the 1980's might seem to be a, slightly belated,
part of the broad trend throughout the Islamic world in this period. The similarities with the rise of
other political Islamist movements elsewhere, however, should not be allowed to make radical
Islam's eventual domination, ideologically and practically, of the war against the Soviets seem
inevitable.
60
Afghan society was, and still is, quite different to other Muslim societies in the Middle
East, not least because of the variation of its ethnicities which include Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks,
and Hazaras amongst others. Its demographic composition reflected centuries of an
economically stagnant and culturally conservative society. Whilst political Islam became the cry
of choice for Egyptians and Iranians due to the lack of economic progress and a burgeoning
population growth, Afghanistan had a wide social gap along ethnic lines, however on the other
hand it had:
Nothing even approximating a genuine middle class, let alone alienated, disappointed and
struggling urban masses ripe for radicalization existed. The Marxist People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) had discovered this very rapidly when it took power in 1978. The PDPA
cadres railed against the `superstition' and `ignorance' of the rural areas. What they had come up
against was the solidity of a genuinely profound, deeply traditional faith.
61
One element of the war in Afghanistan which certainly should not be underestimated is
the vital role played by the mujahedeen
62
. The mujahedeen were mainly comprised of Afghans
that sought to defend their land against the Soviet invasion. However, alongside the Afghan
59
Burke, Jason. Al Qaeda. 3rd edition ed. London: Penguin Group, 2007. Print. Pp 59-60
60
Ibid, Pp 61-62
61
Ibid
62
The term `mujahedeen' refers to Muslims who engage in guerilla warfare under the auspice of jihad (holy war).
Details
- Pages
- Type of Edition
- Erstausgabe
- Year
- 2014
- ISBN (eBook)
- 9783954898060
- ISBN (Softcover)
- 9783954893065
- File size
- 7.8 MB
- Language
- English
- Publication date
- 2014 (September)
- Keywords
- al-qaeda afghanistan nation-building al-qaeda’s
