Blacks in the New Deal: The Shift from an Electoral Tradition and ist Legacy
					
	
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			Summary
			
				No group of American minority voters shifted allegiance more dramatically in the 1930s than Black Americans did. Up until the New Deal era, Blacks had shown their traditional loyalty to the party of Lincoln by voting overwhelmingly the Republican ticket. By the end of F.D. Roosevelt’s first administration, however, they tremendously voted the Democratic ticket. The decades long, wholesale attachment of Blacks to the party of Lincoln, with its laudable efforts to support Blacks (Emancipation Proclamation and Reconstruction) was understandable and inevitable enough. The anomaly was the massive shift by Blacks to the Democratic Party, traditionally identified with its long list of constant anti-Black and premeditated opposition to Black liberation: opposition to emancipation and Reconstruction, and with an ongoing record of all forms of racial discrimination, segregation, disfranchisement, exclusion, white primaries, and white supremacy. <br>The transformation of the Black vote from solidly Republican to solidly Democratic did not happen instantaneously, but rather it developed over decades of maturing as a result of the amalgamated efforts of Presidents and Black leaders. The move of Black voters toward the Democratic Party was part of a nationwide trend that had occurred with the creation of the Roosevelt Coalition of1936. This national shift would make the Democrats the majority party for the next several decades including a very decisive margin of Black voters in the balance of power.
			
		
	Excerpt
Table Of Contents
 .
1932
)
Reconstruction
(
)
New Deal
  (
 .
.
1896
-
1930
 .
   .
 .
 :
 .
 .
   .
1936
 .
 .
1936
 .
.
1940
1960
   .
1940
1960
1964
.
List of Used Abbreviations and Acronyms in Alphabetical Order: 
Abbr.  
Full Name 
AAA 
Agricultural Adjustment Act                          
AFL 
American Federation of Labor 
CCC 
Civilian Conservation Corps   
CIO 
Congress of Industrial Organizations 
CIO-PAC 
Congress of Industrial Organizations-Political Action Committee 
DAR 
Daughters of the American Revolution 
ER Eleanor 
Roosevelt 
F.D. R 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
FERA 
Federal Employment Relief Agency 
FHA 
Federal Housing Administration 
FLSA 
Fair Labor Standards Act  
GNL 
Good Neighbor League 
GOP 
Grand Old Party 
KKK 
Ku Klux Klan 
NAACP 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
NACW 
National Association for Colored Women 
NCNW 
National Council for Negro Women 
NIRA National 
Industrial Recovery Act 
NLRA      
National Labor Relations Act 
NLRB      
National Labor Relations Board 
NRA       
National Recovery Administration 
NUL 
National Urban League 
NYA       
National Youth Administration 
PWA Public 
Works 
Administration 
RFC Reconstruction 
Finance 
Corporation 
STFU      
Southern Tenant Farmers Union 
TVA      
Tennessee Valley Authority 
UMW      
United Mine Workers 
UNIA 
United Negro Association 
WPA Works 
Progress 
Administration 
WPA 
Work Projects Administration 
Blacks in the New Deal 
The Shift from an Electoral Tradition and its Legacy 
Table of Contents 
Introduction  ... 1  
Chapter I: The Situation of Blacks before 1932  ... 10 
1- The Rise of Political Consciousness  ... 11 
2- Black Political Organizations and the 1928 Election  ... 31 
3- The 1932 Election  ... 45 
Chapter II: The Legacy of the First Deal  ... 59 
1- A Raw Deal for Blacks  ... 61 
2- Blacks and Labor Unions  ... 8
3 
3- Blacks as an Interest Group  ... 
90 
Chapter III: T
he New Trend and Its Legacy... ................................................................ 105 
1- The 1936 Election and its Aftermath  ... 10
5 
2- Why Blacks Turned to Democrats  ... 1
21 
3- The Effect of Black Shift on the National Scene  ... 13
4 
Conclusion  ... 1
51 
Bibliography  ... 15
9 
Appendix  ... 18
4 
1
Introduction 
No group of American minority voters shifted allegiance more dramatically in the 
1930s than Black Americans did. Up until the New Deal era, Blacks had shown their 
traditional loyalty to the party of Lincoln by voting overwhelmingly the Republican ticket. By 
the end of F.D. Roosevelt's first administration, however, they tremendously voted the 
Democratic ticket. The decades long, wholesale attachment of Blacks to the party of Lincoln, 
with its laudable efforts to support Blacks (Emancipation Proclamation and Reconstruction) 
was understandable and inevitable enough. The anomaly was the massive shift by Blacks to 
the Democratic Party, traditionally identified with its long list of constant anti-Black and 
premeditated opposition to Black liberation: opposition to emancipation and Reconstruction, 
and with an ongoing record of all forms of racial discrimination, segregation, 
disfranchisement, exclusion, white primaries, and white supremacy.  
Having aligned themselves earlier with Lincoln and his Emancipation Proclamation 
rather than with Democrats of Southern Jim Crow and White Supremacy, what made African 
Americans switch to the Democratic Party during the Depression era? The transformation of 
the Black vote from solidly Republican to solidly Democratic did not happen instantaneously, 
but rather it developed over decades of maturing as a result of the amalgamated efforts of 
Presidents and Black leaders. The move of Black voters toward the Democratic Party was part 
of a nationwide trend that had occurred with the creation of the Roosevelt Coalition of 1936 - 
a coalition that was kept by the increasing interests of the different counterparts during the 
Depression. This national shift would make the Democrats the majority party for the next 
several decades including a very decisive margin of Black voters in the balance of power.  
This happened despite the paradoxical fact of its occurrence in the New Deal 
administration of the Democratic Party that had traditionally denied Blacks their basic civil 
rights. The party's earlier position and strategy against Blacks and their basic civil rights had 
2
not been ancient history. In addition, its Southern strategy along with Roosevelt's inclination 
to racist practices and segregation during his incumbency, for fear of jeopardizing his New 
Deal measures, undermined liberal efforts to advance the issue of Black civil rights. 
Nevertheless, when Roosevelt's promises of a New Deal for all Americans- the promise of 
providing jobs and better life  were not very appealing, the incessant wooing of Democratic 
political machines and the effort of many liberal Democrats created the adequate atmosphere 
that prompted Blacks to join the party.  
The question of why African Americans shifted their historical allegiance to the 
Republican Party in the Depression era evokes some interesting questions. Firstly, was a vote 
for Roosevelt only the result of economic welfarism in the African- American community? 
Secondly, did Roosevelt and his administration support basic civil rights? Thirdly, was there 
any motivating emotional factor to boost this vote? Or simply, was that shift due mainly to a 
rise in political consciousness among Black people and more precisely among Black voters 
that matured by the time of the New Deal? And finally, what eventually was the subsequent 
effect and legacy of that shift?  
To answer these and other questions, the present study is an attempt to look into the 
inner dynamics and motives that led Blacks to vote for their oppressors rather than for 
Republicans. A deep analysis of the Blacks' shift and its legacies contributes largely to the 
historiography of the Civil Rights Movement and the future of the Democratic Party in other 
ways as well. Thus, the current work treats the shift within a "Black protest" framework, by 
focusing on Black activism and individual experiences within a communal context.  
As a matter of fact the allegiance of Black voters seemed to begin earlier before the 
coming of the New Deal. Thus, the primary condition of the current research work is to set a 
historical comprehension of Black politics in the realm of the New Deal and its outcome. 
Historical reconstruction and analysis are important tools used in this study to situate the 
3
overwhelming tendency of Blacks towards both the Democratic and Republican parties and 
the reasons behind their changing sides. Historical examination of Black activism and white 
politics prior to and during the New Deal uncovers the main discrepancies in dealing with the 
Blacks' issues and hence catches the specifics of the period, recognizes the factors influencing 
the shift of voting patterns and what outcome it might have in the following decades.  
Based on the collection of adequate statistics, figures, and charts which, in their turn, 
after being analyzed and interpreted, would eventually lead to the specific reasons behind the 
Blacks' electoral shift toward the Democratic Party despite wholesale exclusion from the New 
Deal arena. To excavate the broader meanings and experiences of this national shift, primary 
sources and a variety of voices from the period, as well as witness participants from both sides 
in the shifting process are paired and examined to discover how the New Deal benefited 
African-Americans, and why Black voters switched their allegiance during the period.
Within this methodological framework, a number of cases are brought in to support 
and enrich the study: Black workers' struggle for jobs and relief is a case in point, the Black 
intellectuals' efforts as insiders of the Roosevelt administration were crucial to the shifting 
process, and finally, the Depression and the New Deal uncovered the Blacks' grievances and 
provided the adequate atmosphere for corporate work between white liberals and Black 
reformers. The case-study approach is used to bring these cases carefully into analysis and to 
detect their advantages as well as their inconveniences to Blacks. The cases are stretched 
chronologically through the period. Although the selection of these cases is conscious and 
purposeful there is an artificial coherence in narratives that keeps apart a single issue in 
examining its origins, development and final outcome since they occur simultaneously and 
along the same period of time. Moreover, these cases are interrelated and balancing to one 
another since they deal with the same central issue of Black electoral shift within the same 
context of the New Deal.  
4
Historians generally regard the New Deal as the center-stage for this realignment, but 
they remain uncertain as to why Blacks turned Democratic in the 1930s and what for. While a 
large literature exists on the Black shift in general, previous scholarship has largely failed to 
cover the subject from balancing points of view. Explanations have been troubled by 
controversy and had drawn too much debate ever since. Two main divergent viewpoints had 
emerged earlier to interpret the New Deal and its impact on African Americans.  
The first view had little to say about the racial impact of New Deal policies, and 
focuses mainly on Roosevelt's personality and New Deal achievements while seeing Blacks 
as passive recipients only. Historians such as James McGregor Burns pointed to the inclusion 
of Blacks in an off-handed way. They approved of some inequities but never capitalized on 
their effects. They argued that Blacks liked FDR's personality but were reticent of his 
policies.  
The second view had taken for granted Black exclusion by providing strong evidence 
of racist discrimination or elimination throughout the different agencies, which was no news 
then. Historians such as Barton Bernstein noted that the New Deal did not achieve equality 
and generally pervade racial discrimination. Other historians, such as Paul Conkin, had the 
postulation that Blacks had been politically inveigled by New Deal reformers, bureaucrats or 
Mrs. Roosevelt and mainly purchased by relief. Consequently, they excluded any effort by 
Black civil rights activists and their organizations in these years.  
However, another wave of scholars such as Raymond Wolters, john Kirby and Nancy 
Weiss dealt specifically with the New Deal racial policy and its impact on Blacks. Along with 
this wave of mildly critical scholars, another wave including Patricia Sullivan and Harvard 
Sitkoff found the New Deal more appealing. Despite their condemnation of the shortcomings 
of New Deal liberalism that served only the most powerful interest groups and white cartels, 
they pointed out the mutual relationship between New Deal liberalism and new left 
5
radicalism. According to Patricia Sullivan in Days of Hope, the national crisis of Southern 
poverty created opportunities for Southern liberals to attempt to change the deep-rooted 
economic, political, and racial traditions of the South. The policy to remedy the economic 
problems of the South created a unique chance for those involved in reversing the status quo 
for African Americans.  
Nevertheless, conceding that the New Deal had been so miraculously appealing to 
incorporate a large majority of the population in a long-term coalition, including an unusual 
majority of Blacks, it is reasonable to conclude that most Black Americans had found 
something tangible in the New Deal to sway their allegiance.  
This work is an attempt to establish an intermediary link between these diverging 
viewpoints and to bring them close together by delving into the circumstances and analyzing 
the factors behind such a trend in the American politics. By exploring the political, social, and 
economic conditions that marked the Blacks' determination, in connection with the fruitful 
activism of some prominent civil rights advocates, it is likely to presumably determine why 
Blacks voted primarily for Roosevelt, and then later for the Democrats up until the present 
day.  
This study is divided into three chronological chapters dealing with the main time 
lapses related to this era and determinant episodes in the life of Blacks. In the first chapter, 
understanding the circumstances that led to the 1930s Black political resurgence is very 
necessary to understanding the different changes that occurred before the 1932 election. One 
important reason behind the developments of the 1930s was the dramatically altered 
demographics of the beginning of the 20
th
 century and its effect on the political scene. In 
consequence of the concentration of Blacks in big Northern industrial cities as a result of the 
great migration, there developed a political resurgence that gave Blacks more advantage in 
political life. The increasing role of Blacks in Northern Black urban areas from the WWI to 
6
the mass political protest movements in the 1920s was stirred by the cultural renaissance in 
Harlem and political activism of Black organizations. This drove the upsurge of political 
consciousness before the coming of the New Deal.  
The depression was another significant point of time in which Blacks had come to 
recognize the intensity and dullness of their plight, which needed a fundamental change. This 
initial context is very important to the understanding of the change that began by 1928 and 
was behind the political shift of the 1930s and the central role of African Americans, 
especially workers, and rising intellectuals played in the politics of the 1930s. African 
Americans as local activists who claimed policy changes, engaged in independent Black 
Republican activities in the period 19151930, and helped prepare the way for the drift of 
Black voters from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party in 1936. Analyses explaining 
this Black voter realignment mainly focus on the 1930s events and Blacks perception of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies. 
The second chapter deals mainly with how the depression had adversely hit African 
Americans and Black workers more particularly, and how they responded to the New Deal's 
social and economic legacy. More significantly, how they strongly reacted to that long 
endured situation with the help of the New Deal liberal progressive spirit and its color-blind 
policy despite Southern conservatism and incessant Jim Crowism. Blacks did not possess 
enough political power to end segregation but they were able, however arduously, to press for 
equal treatment. The pressure from black workers and Black militancy achieved a certain 
political recognition and more advantage within the ranks of the Democratic Party. The 
struggle of Black workers for employment and permanent recognition from labor 
organizations was not an immediate success, but - as many Black leaders saw it - would 
benefit Blacks on the long run. The integration of African Americans into the industrial 
system through a uniform federal labor policy would be of extreme importance to the Black 
7
issue. By and large, they achieved a great deal in the Roosevelt's second term by becoming an 
integral part of his 1936 political coalition.  
This chapter also sheds light on how Democrats and Republicans of the time 
responded to the call for Blacks' economic and social rights. The Southern conservative wing 
in the Democratic Party often acted as a bulwark to the advancement of Black rights and to 
the efforts of liberal New Dealers to include Blacks in their reforms. The Republicans, 
instead, denounced New Deal policies as being harmful and inadequate to Black 
advancement. In the midst of such ambivalence, the enduring racism in public life continued 
impudently and the rigidity of influential Southern congressional representatives prohibited 
any chance for substantive civil rights legislation. Nevertheless, Northern Democrats came to 
notice the growing Black vote in the North and started wooing it.  
As soon as Blacks arrived to Northern cities, the Democrats' political machines and 
bosses astutely absorbed them into their system by providing services and patronage to 
immigrants in exchange for their votes. In contrast, Republicans missed another opportunity 
to maintain their once strong hold on Black support. Their machines reacted coolly to Black 
voters' demands and to Black politicians' ambitions leading many to leave the party, and join 
the rival camp despite growing opposition and continuing racial mores from conservative 
Southern Democrats.  
The pressure and activism of Blacks in the demand for fair treatment from New Deal 
measures turned to be a demand for civil rights legislation to end the poll tax, segregation and 
lynching in the South and to have equal chances in the Northern labor markets. Nevertheless, 
Roosevelt's administration did little to alleviate the plight of Blacks. In fact, Roosevelt's 
problem was that in order to retain his position of leadership, he had to keep the Southern 
Democrats  who time and again denied African Americans the vote in their states  within 
the party and within his coalition. Although Roosevelt's economic programs strengthened this 
8
so-called "Roosevelt Coalition," as they simultaneously aided Southern whites and Northern 
Blacks, the issue of civil rights, which appealed strongly to Northern Democrats but infuriated 
Southern Democrats, remained a subject of controversy. However, it never mired the Blacks' 
decision to vote the Democratic ticket. 
The third chapter deals mainly with Roosevelt's efforts to maintain an enduring 
coalition of different factions of the American nation for the 1936 election and his wife's 
efforts to include African Americans within this coalition and the legacy of such a shift in 
electoral tradition for the Blacks. Indeed, despite setbacks, efforts by the Roosevelts and their 
entourage set up a foundation during the Depression for subsequent civil rights reforms 
through the alliance of Blacks with white liberals. Some Black activists and progressives 
acknowledged the trend and became partisans of the Democratic Party. They extremely 
helped in the effort to bring Blacks closer to the Roosevelts' view.  
In addition, and partly through the efforts of Eleanor Roosevelt, a group of Black 
leaders informally organized as a Black Cabinet by the educator Mary McLeod Bethune, 
influenced New Deal policies. Although Roosevelt made no daring move toward reversing the 
legal segregation of the time despite the pressure and lobbying exerted by different Black 
movements and political organizations such as the NAACP , he did invite several Black 
leaders and intellectuals to serve as advisers to the administration . Roosevelt assured that 
Blacks had access to relief and some jobs during the worst days of the depression by means of 
his federal agencies. Yet, his New Deal measures had more-or-less mixed record on Blacks, 
even though Blacks benefited more than ever before from its agencies.  
Although the promises of a "fair deal" and a better life for all people were far from 
being achieved, Roosevelt's willingness to consider African Americans as Americans won 
him their votes and became the trend in favor of Democrats for the decades to come. This was 
primarily due to the amalgamation of a certain number of political, social, economic, and 
9
emotional factors that crystallized the realignment under President F.D. Roosevelt and his 
party, and paved the way for future activism in the field of civil rights. The legacy of the New 
Deal had tremendous effects on the national scene since then. It had changed the political, 
economic, and social landscape of Black America. It also put presidential politics at stake vis-
à-vis the issue of civil rights, and became a determinant factor in the overall process of 
decision making. 
The specific actions that followed from this fundamental shift in policy and voting 
behavior of Blacks were to far outweigh the limited substantive benefits that flowed from it. 
Indeed, this shift gave Blacks the propensity of understanding the prospects for change in this 
country's racial status quo. The racial problems that were not directly addressed during the 
New Deal became the focus of the ensuing acts in the drama of American race relations - the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and the Black revolution of the 1960s - and they made 
more likely the subsequent development of affirmative action. Both parties became strident 
contenders for Black vote. The developments that occurred by the late twentieth century were 
a subsequent result of it. The situation of Blacks and their political as well as their social 
status are fundamentally related to those developments accumulating by time since the New 
Deal liberal policy had been established.
10
Chapter I: 
The Situation of Blacks before 1932 
The political realignment of Black voters with the Democratic Party gradually 
accelerated in the early 20th century pushed by demographic shifts and Black discontent with 
the increasingly conservative racial policies of the Republican Party in the South. The Black 
voting upheavals of disfranchisement following Reconstruction combined with the great 
migration of Southern rural Blacks to cities South and North, in addition to the activism of 
many leaders in the field of civil rights had a profound effect on the Blacks' shift to 
Democrats. By the end of this era, the major parties' policies and a re-emergent activism 
among younger African Americans positioned Blacks for a mass movement in the early and 
mid-1930s to the Northern Democratic Party.  
The 1932 election was not the starting line of Black drifting toward the Democrats. As 
early as 1924 prominent Black leaders started effectively deserting the Republican Party and 
the trend continued until the 1928 election. The alienation of Black Republicans did not occur 
abruptly during the 1930s. The political experience of Blacks in Northern states between 
World War I and the New Deal showed to which extent the dissatisfaction of Blacks with the 
Republican patronage and their policies occurred especially when the depression intensified 
their sufferings (Giffin, African Americans 226). Meanwhile Republican governments could 
not meet the Blacks' needs; Democratic political machines welcomed Black leaders who were 
looking for alternatives.  
When in the South Blacks were living in permanent circumstances of 
disfranchisement, intimidation and violence, the Southern States, on the one hand, relegated 
the African American to his proper initial political and social sphere by adopting Jim Crow 
laws. On the other hand, and as a matter of fact, African Americans could not vote for 
11
Republicans even if any campaigned in the solidly Democratic white South. Protest was met 
with the draconian state of repression or terror - lynching was the most frequent of techniques.  
However, WWI ended America's sense of innocence and with it the idealism of Black 
conservatives (Suggs 88) who had been disappointed by little if not any interest from 
Republicans, and enhanced the militant philosophy of W.E.B. Du Bois. In addition, Black and 
Tans started to fade by the end of WWI, and came to an end by the election of Herbert 
Hoover in 1928
1
. Consequently African Americans adopted another kind of political 
expression in response to the disfranchisement in the South and the Black Republican purge 
by changing party allegiance. In short, the Lily-White strategy employed by Hoover 
precipitated a significant enough shift in partisan African American identity to make the 
national Democratic Party competitive with the GOP by the coming of the New Deal. 
1
  The Rise of Political Consciousness 
From the 1870's to the 1930's, the dominant social and political experience of Blacks 
in the United States was under the patronage of Northern Republicans. The Republican Party 
was once the concerted choice for Black Americans. The Republican Party was formed on the 
basis of opposing the policy of slavery dealings and limiting its expansion in the United 
States. Under slavery, the social and economic control of Black people was total and was fully 
reinforced by all levels of legislation, from the federal government to the smallest districts in 
the South. Republicans, consequently, backed the Emancipation Proclamation presented by 
Abraham Lincoln and passed legislation in Congress that resulted in the adoption and 
ratification of the 13
th
, 14th and 15
th
 Amendments to the Constitution, giving Blacks voting 
and citizenship rights (Greenberg "The Party of Lincoln"). The greatest impact was felt in the 
1
 Many states developed what were in effect two Republican parties, the "Black and Tans" and the "Lily 
Whites," which competed for qualifications and for nominations at GOP conventions. By 1928, when Herbert 
Hoover solidly sustained the Lily White delegations, the Black and Tans were virtually powerless. Of course, by 
then the issue was practically contentious: Starting in 1890 many Southern States stripped African-Americans of 
the vote altogether (Greenberg "The Party of Lincoln"). 
12
South, where over 90 percent of the Black population resided (Orey 196). Fearing a potential 
threat to their political and economic hegemony, however, white Southerners bitterly resented 
the Republican-Black regimes that were formed accordingly. 
By the time of Lincoln's election as President of the United States under the 
Republican Party, the party toned down its protest concerning the slave issue. However, the 
American Civil War and Reconstruction were the years of emancipation. It was the period in 
which Blacks were "molded into a definite nationality, a people sharing social, cultural, 
economic, and political experiences" (Allen "The Rural Experience" 81). After Lincoln's 
assassination, the Radical Republicans helped establish the Freedman's Bureau, passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, preventing states from 
denying rights to U.S. citizens. In 1868, Ulysses S. Grant was elected President with the help 
of Southern African Americans, who were voting for the first time in a presidential election 
(Moore 26). It was during his incumbency that the Fifteenth amendment was ratified stating 
that a citizen's "right to vote shall not be denied or abridged" under any circumstances of 
"race, color, or previous condition of servitude" (The Constitution of the United States). They 
also encouraged Black participation in Republican politics during Reconstruction
2
.                        
Blacks enthusiastically played prominent roles in Reconstruction governments in the 
South in different positions: as lieutenant governors, members of state legislatures, speakers 
of state houses of representatives, and secretaries of state. Consequently, this period 
established the Republican Party as the liberator of slaves and enhanced the allegiance of the 
overwhelming majority of Blacks to it. Therefore, Blacks became loyal members of the Party 
ever since. Since the end of the Civil War in 1865, Blacks had voted primarily with the  
2
 Between 1869 and 1901, 20 Black Republicans from the South were elected to the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and 2 were elected to the U.S. Senate (Fay "The Real Deal on Blacks"). 
13
Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator (Greenberg "The Party of 
Lincoln"). Unfortunately, this acquisition did not last long as Blacks were going to suffer 
more than ever before their emancipation at the hands of Southern Democrats who wanted to 
uphold their supremacy.  
Once Northerners secured their economic and political dominance of the South, 
Republicans began to retreat from policies favorable to Blacks. In fact, the party moved 
toward a "Lily-White" strategy at the expense of African American supporters in the South. 
They left white Southerners alone to deal with Blacks
3
. In the Compromise of 1877, which 
settled the basis for a period of reconciliation between the North and the South, Blacks were 
abandoned to their fate and the Republican Party abandoned its Black constituency in the 
South after the Reconstruction period (Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks 3-4; Orey 203, 207). 
Republicans agreed to withdraw federal involvement in the government of Southern States in 
exchange for Southern electoral votes to retain the presidency.  
Congress ceased appropriations for federal marshals to protect Black voters, and 
eventually retreated behind closed doors, where Southern Democrats conceded the presidency 
to Hayes in exchange for the end of Union occupation of the defeated Confederacy. This 
compromise cleared the path for Southern states to institute Jim Crow which meant that 
Blacks became vulnerable to the white oppression (Lacewell 6). Indeed, the compromise 
resulted in the "acquiescence on the part of Northern liberals and government officials to the 
desires of the white South to institutionalize its discriminatory and racist beliefs" (Tafari "Jim  
Crow"). The Blacks were no more needed by the Republicans after 1876 as the Northern 
industrialists were looking for Southern peaceful markets and trade by approving a "hands 
off" policy on the question of Blacks. 
3
 For more details about the fate of Blacks after Reconstruction see Litwack: Been in the Storm so Long. The 
Aftermath of Slavery. 
14
Hence, Democrats regained power and worked tooth and nail to disenfranchise Black 
voters and enforce segregation in order to retrieve their self-esteem. The Democratic Party 
identified itself as the `Whiteman's Party' and demonized the Republican Party as being 
`Negro-Dominated', even though whites were in control. Determined to recapture the South, 
Southern Democrats "redeemed" the South state after state. Soon, a profusion of Jim Crow 
laws for disfranchisement was developed. The poll tax, property qualifications, literacy and 
civic tests, good character and residency requirements, disqualifications for petty crimes, and 
grandfather clauses effectively blocked the possibility of Blacks engaging in electoral politics 
(Allen, "The Rural Experience" 89). These severe measures were conservative devices to 
minimize the Black vote and to keep the Black man in the place to which he was assigned. 
They were also indicative of the bitter resentment white Southerners had for Black 
Republicans. 
Despite their blind loyalty to the party for over half a century, Blacks found little hope 
for amelioration in politics. There had been a great disenchantment of Blacks with 
Republicans well before 1932. During the early part of the twentieth century, there was a 
comprehensible synchronicity between Congress and the incumbent presidents to limit and 
eradicate federal appointments to Blacks and to ensure that federal officials in the South were 
sympathetic to the cause of white supremacy (Tafari "The Congress"). President William 
McKinley (1900) initiated an overwhelming policy of disfranchisement in the South, he was 
committed to sectional reconciliation, and he ignored the disfranchisement, segregation, 
lynching, and poverty suffered by Blacks (Orey 203). In 1901, the Progressive Theodor  
Roosevelt became President, bringing together the progressive cause and the Republican 
Party.  
Despite his initial record of interest to Blacks, the most lasting legacy was the 
alienation of a number of young Black leaders, including Mary Church Terrell and Archibald 
15
Grimke. Although he relied on Black conservative educator Booker T. Washington for advice 
on racial issues- the event provoked heated criticism by white Southern and Democratic 
politicians and newspapers ("Theodore Roosevelt's Record") - his appointment however was 
"not to improve the situation of Blacks, but because they agreed that Blacks should not strive 
for political and social equality" (Tafari "The President") since Washington's policy of 
accommodationism was the most influential among whites. Theodore Roosevelt publicly 
opposed lynching, too. However, he was not different from the other white presidents of the 
progressive era. He indeed disappointed Blacks during his second term by summarily 
discharging three companies of Black soldiers; the soldiers had been accused of refusing to 
inform on fellow soldiers who were charged with terrorizing the town of Brownsville, Texas 
(Sherman 256). Southern white GOP officials after 1900 wanted to preserve their grasp on 
local patronage jobs by embracing Jim Crow. They also passed more anti-Black legislation 
than it has never been done before
4
The popularity of eugenics and the philosophy of social Darwinism reached its peak 
during the early part of century, and racism was integrated into presidential party platforms 
(Tafari "The President"). Roosevelt's successor in 1908, President William Taft, was less 
committed to the progressive cause. Courting the support of Southern whites, Taft did not 
appoint any Blacks to federal offices in the South where there was local white opposition. 
Taft proclaimed that the restrictions Southern States had placed on voting were constitutional 
and suggested that the Fifteenth Amendment had been a mistake (Felzenberg "Calvin 
Coolidge and Race").
He publicly endorsed the idea that Blacks should not participate in 
4
 By 1900, the ideals of egalitarian citizenship and freedom as a universal entitlement had been repudiated. In 
1898, the Supreme Court gave the green light to the disenfranchisement movement by ruling, in Williams v. 
Mississippi, that the suffrage provisions of the state's 1890 Constitution did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment 
Along with disenfranchisement, the 1890s saw the widespread imposition of racial segregation in the South. De 
facto racial separation had existed in Reconstruction schools and many other institutions. But it was not until the 
1890s that the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, gave its approval to 
state laws requiring separate facilities for Blacks and whites. The Plessy decision was quickly followed by laws 
mandating segregation in every aspect of life, from schools to hospitals, waiting rooms to toilets, drinking 
fountains to cemeteries (Foner "Expert Report"). 
16
politics, and perpetuated the racist party line of his predecessor (Tafari "The President"). This 
rendered unsuccessful his attempts to appeal to Blacks by appointing them to diplomatic and 
consular offices (Fay "The Real Deal on Blacks"). Neither president was able to crack down 
the solid South.
Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft followed the lead of Hayes by also 
adhering to a hands-off policy.  
Disfranchised and demoralized, few Blacks voted these years leading to a greater 
indifference of both parties to the Black vote, as they would not be held accountable anymore. 
The Republicans did not need Black votes to control Congress, and Democrats did not care 
about a Black constituency (Tafari "The Congress"). There was a total conspiracy over the 
Blacks' rights between moderate Republicans and extremist Democrats to the uttermost. 
When there was any legislation to be introduced to protect Blacks, Democrats convinced 
Republicans to join them in their disregard and neglect of civil and voting rights for Blacks. 
Southern Democrats regularly acted as a barricade for liberal Congressmen's attempts to pass 
any legislation that is meant for the welfare and protection of Blacks.  
Southern Democrats had such common values, and principles that made the South a 
one-party region until the civil rights movement began in the 1960s. Northern Democrats, 
most of whom had prejudicial attitudes towards Blacks, offered no challenge to the 
discriminatory policies of the Southern Democrats (Wormser "Democratic Party"), while 
Republicans continually gave in to the demands of Southern Democrats since the end of 
Reconstruction. No president dared interfere or succeeded in doing so until the late 1930s. 
Because Southern Democrats were automatically re-elected at every election occasion, and 
due to seniority in the Congress, they were able to control most of the committees in both 
houses of Congress, and oppose and kill any civil rights legislation. Southern Democrats 
through their influence in party councils and the Congressional seniority system, served as a 
brake on the pro-Black movement (Silbey "Democratic Party"). That is why no president did 
17
daringly challenge the well-soldered Southern block by endorsing any proposals for social 
and political progress for Blacks.  
Within this turmoil and to counter Southern Whites' hegemony emerged a greater 
stratification of protest. This included the activism of a new, more assertive working and 
intellectual class that was critical of the accommodationism of the "Old Negro" like Booker 
T. Washington (Jordan 10). With the NAACP, the Urban League, emerging as early as 1909, 
occurred the tremendous flowering of the organized struggle of Black people that played a 
decisive role in the politics of the 1930s. The fact, however, is that these Black leaders were at 
the same time outstanding leaders in the Black community and played a prominent role in its 
councils and political life. Many of them had participated in progressive causes before 
(Haywood 190). Consequently, they were able to secure certain influence and made 
significant contribution to Black welfare.  
Since Blacks were in effect barred from Southern politics - the white primaries formed 
the major obstacle to Black voting
5
, Black Republicans, nevertheless, maintained their loyalty 
to the party by keeping "Black and Tan" local clubs to rebuff deliberate political exclusion 
and to maintain their relationship with the party. Blacks labored mightily to register voters  
and enjoyed some relative success. Meanwhile, Black leaders continued to debate a long 
range of strategies to voice their protests as lynching reinforced the legal barriers of white 
domination. From the old means of accommodationism and self-help by Booker T. 
Washington, to the civil rights protests proclaimed by Ida B. Wells and William Du Bois 
through the nationalist and emigration movements led by Henry McNeal Turner. This meant 
one thing: nurtured by the traditions of protest, activism, and resistance, some work was under 
achievement that would develop into a social and political resurgence in the next decades. 
5
 In 1923, in Texas as in other states, the state legislature revised the election laws to prohibit the Blacks' 
participation in Democratic primaries. When the US Supreme Court ruled the statute a violation of the 14
th
Amendment's equal protection, it was rewritten with deletion of any reference to Blacks (Biles 107).   
18
The spread of industrial capitalism in the North and terror in the South changed 
fundamentally Blacks' economic, political, and social life at the local as well as at the national 
level. The deteriorating economic situation in the South, and the great migration were among 
the essential factors that negatively affected the life of Blacks. In addition, the First World 
War established a new community among Blacks that was able to share in the affairs of the 
nation at a larger scale (Franklin 342). Most importantly, the Great Depression of the 1930s 
established a new Black society with new experiences and strategies in all aspects of life. 
Many Black writers, poets, and university graduates exploited these circumstances to voice 
their protests against racial segregation beginning by the Harlem Renaissance and on to the 
Black working class movement of the 1930s and 1940s. The hardships encountered at the 
hands of white supremacists, almost infinitely, hindered the most capable of them to reach 
dignity and self-esteem, and were enough to awaken in Blacks a kind of self-consciousness 
and awareness of their critical status. They continued the struggle during the 1920s and 1930s 
that culminated with the civil rights movement of the 1960s. However, the circumstances 
were so hard to achieve such goals at once.  
By the dawn of the twentieth century, Blacks were almost extinct from political life as 
government and politics had become inaccessible and more complicated to most Black 
Americans. In the South they were completely barred from politics while in the North they 
were a small minority that blindly voted for the republican machine (Schlesinger, The Politics 
of Upheaval 426). The profusion and persistence of Jim Crow laws effectively blocked the 
possibility of Blacks engaging in electoral politics. While the tide of lynching and other forms 
of anti-Black violence and terrorism reinstated the whites' hegemony, Blacks began looking 
for ways to overturn the status quo. When all the rudiments for peaceful and restful life 
expired, Blacks began their eruptive protest against "de facto" segregation in locally 
organized boycotts and even violent demonstrations broke out at several occasions (Sullivan 
19
"Civil Rights Movement"). The social repression of Black people aggravated enormously 
with the violent genocidal practices of lynching.  
Table 1 below provides figures about the number of lynching that occurred between 
1882 and 1946. These data, of course, give only a glimmering idea about the intensity and 
Table 1: Lynching of Whites and Blacks, 1882-1946. 
Period Whites 
Blacks 
Total 
1937-1946 
1927-1936 
1917-1926 
1907-1916 
1897-1906 
1887-1896 
1882-1886* 
Totals 
2 
14 
44 
62 
146 
548 
475 
1,291 
42 
136 
419 
608 
884 
1,035 
301 
3,425 
44 
150 
463 
670 
1,030 
1,583 
776 
4,716 
*: it is a five-year period while the other intervals are of a ten-year period.     
Source: qtd in Allen "The Rural Experience" 90. 
atrocity of the lynching since these incidents were often unnoticed and hardly recorded. In the 
100 years following the end of the Civil War, more than five thousand African Americans 
were lynched and not a single president denounced the atrocities. Once again, presidential 
silence characterized Black America's relationship to the country (Lacewell 7). Blacks' 
appeals to the Republican Party remained unanswered almost indefinitely. In consequence, 
Blacks adopted another kind of political expression in response to the disfranchisement in the 
South. Such response was a long-term migration from the South to the urban North 
(Orey206). This migration enhanced Blacks' political and economic status.  
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Black population had known a tremendous 
change and movement from the old restraints of rural life to a new multi-dimensional life in 
20
urban centers. Before 1910 Blacks were overwhelmingly located in the rural South-over 90 
percent before 1900 (Goldfield 209). They were almost invisible to the world and to the 
country. However, the situation began to change between 1910 and 1940, and boosted by the 
WWII, thus affecting the whole structure of the Black population within the country and its 
politics providing an appealing opportunity for urban and Northern politicians.  
     The migration changed the nature of Black population in two ways: first, it resulted in a 
massive movement out of the South and into the North making a shift of population from the 
Black Belt
6
 where slaves had been concentrated for agricultural work, to the industrial states 
of the Northeast and Midwest. The urban population, consequently, increased by nearly 
671.292 or 105 percent, while that of Southern cities increased by 886.173 or 65 percent. 
From the figures in Table 2 (see p 21), it is clear that the main growth of population was in the 
largest industrial states of the Northeast and Midwest. Second, Blacks in both the North and 
the South became increasingly urbanized throughout the 20
th
 century. Blacks changed from 
rural farmers to urban workers, consequently, exposed to new experiences in different 
situations. The large movement of Blacks from the Southern States to the Northern and 
Western ones began during WWI and continued through the 1930s. It was mainly aimed to 
making a better living including better jobs, better schools, more freedom, and a less racist 
environment.  
Once Black communities established in Northern cities, the flow of Southern migrants 
continued for decades (Lemann 91). A number of forces were driving Blacks out of the South 
and into Northern and Western cities. Socioeconomic and political conditions in the South 
made Blacks likely candidates for migration (Crew 34). Actually, Blacks had no other choice 
6
 The Black Belt is the name of a broad region in the American South characterized by a high population 
percentage of African Americans, acute poverty, rural decline, substandard living conditions. Over time the term 
"Black Belt" came politically to refer to the larger area of the South with historic ties to slave plantation and the 
socially repressive Jim Crow laws. By the late twentieth century, the Alabama Black Belt became a region of 
insurgent African American aspirations (Allen Tullos "The Black Belt"). 
21
than to leave the South. In the late nineteenth century, depression and lack of opportunity in 
the South sent some of the most adventurous or the more desperate on their way. Never mind 
that they would suffer at the hands of the Northerners.  
Table 2: U.S. Population by Race and Region (in thousands) 
NORTHEAST: 
Year 
Population Total 
Black 
Urban Total 
Black 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
21,047 
25,869 
29,662 
34,427 
35,977 
39,478 
385 
484 
679 
1,147 
1,370 
2,018 
13,911 
18,563 
22,404 
26,707 
27,568 
31,373 
312 
410 
607 
1,055 
1,265 
1,946 
NORTH CENTRAL: 
Year 
Population Total 
Black 
Urban Total 
Black 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
26,333 
29,889 
34,020 
38,594 
40,143 
44,461 
496 
543 
793 
1,262 
1,420 
2,228 
10,165 
13,487 
17,776 
22,351 
23,437 
28,491 
324 
403 
674 
1,203 
1,278 
2,137 
WEST: 
Year 
Total Black Population 
Urban population in South 
1900 30 
Year 
Total Black Population 
22
Source: Goldfield p. 210.
Conditions in the North were telling of a more advantageous and prosperous life. 
Blacks in the North did not face legal barriers to voting and thus some actively took part in 
the political process. Eventually millions of Blacks were introduced to a world in which 
formal segregation did not exist and basic facilities, like transportation, restaurants, and public 
bathrooms, had almost equal access. It was only natural, therefore, that white Northern 
politicians with large Black constituencies began to oppose segregation and to support civil 
rights for the sole purpose of amassing Black support (Finkelman 7-9). The job opportunities 
in the industrial North gave millions of Blacks the chance to climb out of poverty and 
discrimination. 
As Black communities in Northern cities grew larger, Black workers became a 
significant part of an expanding Black professional and business class, gaining in political and 
economic leverage. While "Jim Crow" laws persisted and political oppression continued to 
discourage Blacks from voting in the South, African Americans in Northern cities became an 
important political force (Horton 85).The movement to the cities concentrated Blacks in 
specific neighborhoods, making them "more identifiable as a group in parts of the country 
where they actually could vote. The Negro's movement Northward and Westward and city 
ward was a movement toward a larger role in national politics" (Boorstin 301). Blacks moved 
out from the realm of political impotency into the land of political potentiality.  
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
51 
79 
120 
171 
571 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1,369 
1,862 
2,261 
3,310 
3,631 
4,922 
23
By existence in the urban Northern centers, Blacks developed a resurgence that placed 
them well into American politics and gave them a leverage they had never experienced since 
Reconstruction (Franklin & Moss 342). Blacks in the city expressed a great will to participate 
in electoral politics at the grass roots level, soon a large number of associations and 
organizations including the National Urban League (NUL) and the National Association For 
The Advancement Of Colored People (NAACP), emerged and expanded (Berry 169). This 
fact gave them enough voting power to elect local and national public officials
7
. However, 
they still identified themselves with the Party of Lincoln, and they revealed their electoral 
tendencies by the election of their own Republican Party members. The trend continued 
despite segregation and began however to move rapidly toward the Democratic Party  
especially in urban areas. These migrations accelerated significantly during World War I, 
when the cessation of mass immigration from Europe opened urban job opportunities to 
African Americans. 
The period of WWI brought with it new economic and social opportunities for Blacks, 
hence, a new hope for a greater exercise of political power (Crew 34). This hope stemmed 
from exercise in certain practical situations, in which Blacks lived during the war, much more 
than it did from any national policies or promises of wartime leaders (Franklin & Moss 342). 
If the war afforded Blacks an opportunity to demonstrate their patriotism, it also answered the 
basic question about Black allegiance: "Today," asserted Kelly Miller in 1919, "the Negro is 
no longer a Negro, nor Afro-American, nor colored American, nor American of African 
descent, but he is American ... and nothing more"(qtd in Suggs 88). Ideologically, the war's 
impact on Blacks was more powerful than for any other ethnic group. An
African American 
7
 Prior to becoming solidly Democratic in 1934, the South Chicago district elected Republican Oscar De Priest in 
1928, 1930, and 1932. Chicago's Republican machine was firmly established and headed by William Hale (Big 
Bill) Thompson, who served as mayor from 1915 through 1923 and again from 1927 through 1931. Mayor 
Thompson and the machine promoted Black politicians such as De Priest who, in 1915, became the city's first 
African-American alderman (Gordon 586-588). 
24
consciousness characterized by confidence, assertiveness, and militancy seemed to emerge 
after World War I (Jordan 134). It impelled a kind of consciousness for the acquisition of 
more political equal rights.
The American Black political consciousness started to crystallize immediately after 
WWI when African American soldiers returned home expecting a warm welcome from the 
nation and a new life that they long waited for as a compensation for their effort. If the Black 
"did not expect that the war would improve his lot, he certainly did not think it would be to 
his disadvantage" (Quarles 179). However, they were disillusioned and quickly realized that 
the pursuit of freedom and democracy was miles away to reach before the last gun was fired. 
Blacks continued to fight in the view that Blacks' wartime sacrifices entitled them to first-
class citizenship.  
At the end of the war, Blacks were determined to demand respect from the nation for 
which they had fought, but they were severely scolded by white lynch mobs. The humiliation 
continued into the 1920s and made them more determined to, militantly, defend their rights. 
However, there was not enough unity and collaboration among Blacks to establish a well 
based, and identifiable community at that time. Strong Black leaders and intellectual activists 
were still few in number, but they generally provided articulate political and cultural 
leadership. These militant Blacks demanded respect and full equality from America and 
refused to take "No" as an answer. They exemplified a militant "New Negro"
8
 who longs for 
first-class citizenship.  
8
 As a concept, the "New Negro" accurately sums up what was happening to Black people. "New" described the 
migration out of the South, urbanization of Blacks in the Northern ghettoes, and the proletarianization of rural 
Southern Black farmers. It described a renewed race spirit with a wide range of new subjective and ideological 
developments. It became the credo of the Black writers, artists, musicians, actors, intellectuals, and their patrons 
who emerged during this period. See Allen pp.167-186. The term was first used on June 28, 1895 by the 
Cleveland Gazette. The concepts "New Negro", "New South", and "New People", although emerged at the end 
of the "Civil War" in April 1865, it was Booker T. Washington's A New Negro for a New Century (1900) and 
Alain Locke's The New Negro: An Interpretation (1925)  that popularized the term (Suggs 89). 
25
World War I spurred the Black community in their effort to make America truly 
Democratic by ensuring full citizenship for its entire population by including Blacks. 
Unfortunately,
 racial relations in the U.S. reached a nadir during what became known as the 
"bloody summer" of 1919. A wave of violence raged from Washington, D.C., to Chicago and 
points South and West against Black people, fueled by the potent post-war mixture of 
unemployment, job shortages, above all, fear of Black political power and social 
advancement.
In response to the war aftermath, African American leaders increasingly called 
for federal action to assist Blacks. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, a change had occurred in the life of Blacks 
because the political, social, and economic conditions changed. The 1920s were prosperous 
times. After a brief period of decline in the aftermath of WWI, the economy soared because of 
the benefits and immense profits earned from the war. Blacks, as recent arrivals in the 
industrial centers of the North, enjoyed this prosperity as well, although the living conditions 
revealed that the city was not that welcoming.
As opportunities for Black labor opened up by 
the early 1900s and throughout the 1920s, anti-labor Republicans in Congress and the White 
House worked to strengthen ties with Southern whites.  
Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge appointed few Blacks to federal 
posts. As former Senator, Harding was natural as a politician. He remained on good terms 
with the Senate's inner sanctum which had facilitated his nomination. Coolidge spent much 
time on appointments fearing racial overtones which were evident in the ones he made. C. 
Bascom Slemp had been a Republican Congressman from Virginia when Coolidge tapped 
him to be his secretary. Slemp had opposed the Dyer
9
 bill and had been involved in attempts 
9
 In 1920, when the horror of lynching was at its peak, Congressman Leonidas Dyer, a Missouri Republican from 
a largely Black St. Louis District, introduced an anti-lynching bill, which was endorsed by the new President 
Warren Harding. However, it did not see the light. Even though they controlled the senate as well, the GOP 
could not pull out the tops to pass the bill into law. While majority leader Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts 
supported the bill, the powerful Idaho Republican William Borah opposed it. Borah believed the measure 
26
to reduce the number of Black delegates at GOP conventions (Felzenberg "Calvin Coolidge 
and Race"). His appointment drew protests from many of the President's supporters.  
Both Presidents also failed to reverse the policy of segregation in the civil service that 
had been initiated by President Wilson despite their efforts in response to increases in racial 
violence
10
. Some Blacks supported Wilson by the beginning of 1912, on the appeal of some 
leaders such as Du Bois, who proclaimed: "I was plunged into the `Bull Moose' campaign. I 
thought I saw a splendid chance for a third party movement on a broad platform of votes for 
Negroes and industrial democracy" (Autobiography 261), and William Trotter, the most 
radical Black leader, and co-founder of the Niagara Movement, who believed in and preached 
for his promises
along with a maverick of black leaders
and refused to shrink from demanding 
all the rights they believed African Americans deserved (Jordan 10). The President's 
enthusiastic and sympathetic attitude to Blacks changed immediately after his election 
because of the "extremely delicate" situation in the Senate as he told Oswald Garrison Villard 
from the NAACP (Clements 45). As a result of the president's attitude racism was licensed in 
the White House. 
When the Democratic Party won and the next Congress met, there was the greatest 
flood of discriminatory bills both in Congress and among the States that had probably ever 
been introduced since the Civil War (Du Bois, Autobiography 263). Federal departments such 
as the Treasury and the Post Office instituted segregation everywhere although practices were 
not uniform. Throughout his incumbency, and despite his firm stand against the cruder 
demands of white supremacists, Wilson and probably all of his cabinet naturally accepted 
amounted to interference with the states autonomy and helped Southern Democrats kill it. This was the last 
major civil rights issue on which Republicans were out in front (Barton "The History of Black Voting Rights"; 
Greenberg "The Party of Lincoln").  
10
 Presidents Harding and Coolidge proposed a commission to bridge the divide between the races. Harding told 
Congress in 1921 that such a body could formulate "if not a policy, at least a national attitude" that could bring 
the races closer together. Coolidge in 1923--and again in 1925 echoed this theme. He urged the creation of a 
"Negro Industrial Commission" to promote a better policy of "mutual understanding" (Felzenberg "Calvin 
Coolidge and Race"). 
27
segregation, social and official. But regrettably, although there had been informal and 
unofficial segregation in the government departments before, now the federal government had 
approved on the Southern caste system. Although Wilson reiterated that segregation was 
instituted in the interest of Blacks, it was a catastrophic affair that tarnished his administration 
record (Link 65-66). Although the experience with Wilson proved the unattractiveness of the 
democratic choice, the 1920 election made things even worse.  
Despite increasing racial violence in the South, neither Harding nor Coolidge sturdily 
supported federal anti-lynching legislation (Fay "The Real Deal on Blacks"). The efforts of 
the NAACP to get to terms with Harding concerning racial violence, patronage appointments 
and disfranchisement did not have beneficial results (Berry 168). By now, the Black electorate 
grew disillusioned with the policies of both parties. But by 1928, Blacks began to learn to 
vote for candidates who were not Republicans. As a result, the shift of strategy in casting 
ballots for the right candidates was inevitable (Quarles 204-205). Black organizations such as 
the NAACP and NUL were very prominent in leading Black public opinion.  
Black fraternal orders, political organizations, social clubs, and newspapers channeled 
the potentialities and asserted an urban consciousness that became the foundation for the 
militancy and Black cultural innovations of the 1920s, and opened new horizons for Blacks 
where they were urged to up- rise and eliminate the burden of white supremacy. Eventually, 
new movements emerged forming a new leadership on the basis of activism in the field of 
civil rights. They were more lenient to having power based in the Black communities rather 
than depending on connections to influential whites (Horton 85). "As Negroes moved to the 
North and to the cities, they became part of the new urban constituency," explained historian 
Richard Sherman. "Just as America had ceased to be predominantly Anglo-Saxon, so had 
Black-white relations ceased to be primarily a problem for the South...In short, Republicans 
failed to develop a program which could attract major elements of the new, urban America," 
28
(258) a constituency that formed the core of the Roosevelt New Deal coalition that propelled 
Democrats into power in the 1930s. 
This idea was substantially boosted by the coming of the New Dealers and the role 
that Democrats played in fighting the depression by allowing a number of Black politicians 
within the ranks of the party. This new leadership was dominated in large parts by the church, 
but it also included fraternal organizations, the Black press, and sororities. Churches often 
focused the mobilization of community resources to provide educational and social welfare 
services, leadership training, and organizational networks. They supplied collective identity 
and empowerment to assess critically America's racial domination (Sullivan, Days of Hope 
14). The war accelerated this movement to urban areas where Blacks started to learn from 
whites the business of making a living and to be involved in many sections of civic life.  
The postwar restlessness of Blacks found expression in the Black Renaissance a 
creative movement in art and literature that exploded in the 1920s as swarms of talented 
Blacks from across the country were attracted to New York to participate in the Harlem 
Renaissance. As culture is the expression of the sum of values and behavioral preferences that 
make-up a people's life style and approach to daily activities, cultural production changed as 
the period of the 1920s changed economically and politically (Allen 168,176-180). On the one 
hand, the Renaissance articulated the discontent of the Black with his status, and on the other 
hand, explained Alain Locke, midwife to the movement as well as its chronicler, was an 
evidence of "a renewed race spirit that consciously and proudly sets itself apart" (ix). 
Although Harlem was the most widely known center of Black culture, the tide of cultural 
Renaissance reached out to other cities with substantial Black population such as Chicago, 
Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. and made an echo that was felt and considered by Black 
as well as white intellectual circles.  
29
This movement played a formative role in the emergence of intellectual leaders and 
advocacy groups to plead the cause of black civil rights. Although artistic and intellectual 
achievements did not win for Blacks political participation and economic parity with whites, 
the influence that was exerted by the Harlem Renaissance on Blacks yielded more effective 
results than expected at the level of political consciousness. Blacks eventually changed their 
perception of voting according to one single line: voting for Republican candidates, a fact of 
long time affiliation. Nevertheless, by the coming of WWI and the shift of population that 
occurred from rural to urban life, there developed a new perception of the role they should 
play in the new political life.  
The shift of interest from patronage was tuned to an interest in overall programs for 
the improvement of the conditions of the Black population.
Gradually Blacks came to 
conclude that the Republican support of states' rights for "the resolution of such issues as 
voting, lynching, segregation, and the white primary were fundamentally inconsistent with 
core Black interests" ( Orey 208). Racial attitudes, they found, no longer followed party lines. 
Democrats were as willing as Republicans to provide their grants, recognition and assistance 
(Lichtman 150). Consequently, Blacks learnt from Northern politicians that Republican 
politicians were no more caring for Blacks' rights. 
    As the Black communities in the North grew larger, so did opportunities for the talented 
and enthusiastic people of this period more of whom became politicians , newspaper 
publishers, real estate brokers, insurance agents, lawyers, and teachers serving their own 
people (Horton 4-6). These acquisitions helped them achieve a certain respectability that they 
seized to present for political positions and hold office jobs once reserved for whites.
They 
could run for office and were actually encouraged to vote (Sternstrom 56). The efforts of the 
Black elite to uplift Black working people were very prolific.  
30
As they exercised in these leading positions "Black professionals acquired additional 
prestige, status, and sometimes income as well, when the leadership involved paying jobs in 
private institutions and in government service" (Giffin, African Americans 222). This, 
consequently, gave the Black people an opportunity to support and elect officials from their 
own neighborhoods and communities who would serve them, and defend their interests. In 
addition, because Blacks became more-or-less aware of their own qualifications and power in 
effecting local and federal politics, they did not miss the chance of opposing and hindering the 
election of white candidates who were reluctant about Black issues (Finkelman 8). In Ohio, 
Kansas, and California, for example, Blacks helped elect and defeat whites who supported or 
opposed civil rights advances
11
. The power of urban Black voters changed the political 
landscape and accelerated the pace of civil rights.  
Combined with the ambitious and restless nature of the new arrivals, this led to a 
greater political power that was manifest in the election of Black politicians to many state and 
local offices in the North. In Chicago, for example, where most Blacks were located, political 
leaders began to realize the potential and importance of Black vote in their areas when Oscar 
De Priest was elected alderman, a precedent in the history of Black America (Nordhaus-Bike, 
"Oscar DePriest"). In big cities and urban centers such as New York, Blacks gained much 
more strength that by 1917 they were able to send Edward A. Johnson, the historian and 
teacher to the state assembly (Franklin 342). With time Blacks learnt to seize opportunities 
and take advantage from their status and political potentialities.  
11
 In the 1920s, several Black candidates won seats on the Chicago City Council and, even though Blacks were 
less than 7 percent of the population, an African American was elected to a municipal judgeship in a citywide 
contest. By 1928 five African Americans from Chicago were sitting in the lower house of the Illinois state 
legislature, one was in the state senate, and one was in the U.S. House of Representatives. In addition Blacks 
held important appointive positions  six assistant corporation counsels, five assistant city prosecutors, and an 
assistant state attorney (Sternstrom 56). However many white Republicans were defeated or opposed for their 
attitudes toward race and for being unfair to Black politicians in distributing patronage (Giffin 25-45). 
31
In elections, Blacks became more conscious to weigh candidates by their interest in 
race issues, and cast their ballots for those who showed will and readiness to help their 
communities. Although in the past many Blacks had been satisfied with President Taft's 
appointment of W. H. Lewis of Boston as Assistant Attorney General of the United States, 
and President Wilson's appointment of R.H. Terrell of Washington as judge of the municipal 
court of the District of Columbia, now they realized that such appointments were no more 
than symbol gestures. Indeed in 1924, when the Democratic candidate for President J.W. 
Davis promised that if elected he would make no distinction on the basis of race or creed, and 
when the Progressive candidate Robert La Follette, who ran as an independent Progressive 
candidate for President, made a similar statement, Blacks began to desert the Republican 
Party (Franklin 342-343). On the basis of such new rhetoric and activism, Blacks began to 
change their party alignment.  
2
  Black Political Organizations and the 1928 election: 
By the beginning of the 1928 election Black leaders felt a more growing need to vote for 
an alternative to the Republican candidate than in 1924. GOP Presidents in the 1920s did little 
about key Black issues. The attitude of the party's relative lack of enthusiasm for doing 
something about the daily humiliation of Blacks, or seriously acting for an anti-lynching 
legislation convinced many African Americans that the GOP's political priorities were no 
longer compatible with those of the Black community. Even though Black leaders had little 
control over the Black population, this change of political behavior was the result of 
campaigns by Black newspapers publishing reports on the political activities of Black leaders 
and their statements, the comments of white politicians, and the experiences of prominent 
Blacks in campaign organizations for both parties (Lichtman 149-150). By the election of 
1928 no prominent charismatic Black leader had a strongly large and devoted following 
among Blacks. However, some organizations such as the NAACP, the NUL and the Black 
32
churches played important roles in enticing Black voters. However, leaders of the Black 
community did not form a unified entity in 1928 and provided different perceptions. 
The most influential group in promoting Black rights was the NAACP. Founded in 
1910, it was led by Northern white liberals and Black leaders such as W.B. Du Bois. Many 
Black people including William Trotter and Ida Wells Barnett were strongly critical of the 
dominant role that whites played in the formation of the NAACP (Du Bois, Autobiography 
254). The imperative goal of the new organization was to wipe out segregation in American 
public life, or, in its own words, "to make 12.000.000 Americans physically free from 
peonage, mentally free from ignorance, politically free from disfranchisement, and socially 
free from insult" (Cannady)
12
.
The primary goal for this faction was to seriously educate 
people, as an adequate solution to social problems. Its main strategy, however, was legal 
action aimed at reviving the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
A series of early court battles helped establish the NAACP as an imperative legal 
advocate for helpless Blacks (Tuttle "NAACP"). A completely successful role aimed at 
reviving the 14
th
 and 15
th
 Amendments was played by the organization. One example of such 
battles included a victory against a discriminatory Oklahoma law that regulated voting by 
means of grandfather clause (Guinn vs. US, 1910)
13
. At its 1926 national convention, the 
NAACP was determined in asserting that, "Our political salvation and our social survival lie 
in our absolute independence of party allegiance in politics and the casting of our vote for our 
friends and against our enemies whoever they may be and whatever party labels they carry."
14
12
 An excerpt from the speech Beatrice Morrow Cannady delivered at the 19th Annual Conference of the 
NAACP in Los Angeles on June 28, 1928. Beatrice Morrow Cannady helped found the Portland chapter of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1914 and served as its first secretary. 
She quickly became a leading spokesperson and eventually assumed the role of Northwest Organizer. 
13
  Guinn v. United States struck down the "grandfather clause" in Oklahoma's Voter Registration Act of 1910 
because the clause discriminated against Blacks and, therefore, violated the Fifteenth Amendment. In the case of 
Guinn v. United States (1915), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. Justice Edward White went on 
to strike down the grandfather clause. See Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: Guinn and 
Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (Supreme Court, June 21, 1915). 
14
 Annual Report of the NAACP (1926): 32; cited in Sherman p. 224. 
33
During the 1930s, the NAACP's legal campaign gathered momentum. One prominent 
example that arose to the public was the celebrated Scottsboro Case of 1931
15
 , which 
symbolized the ugliness of race relations in the depression era.
As the great depression was 
proportionately disastrous to Blacks, the NAACP began to focus on economic justice but not 
as much as the National Urban League (NUL).  
Unlike the NAACP, which had been judged for how successfully it has fought for the 
Blacks' civil and political rights, the NUL had had less measurable goals. It reflected the 
increased migration of Black people to the cities of the South and North. The organization 
provided direct services and assistance to migrants and their problems of adjustment to 
Northern urban life (Haywood 189). But when social conditions changed, it undertook 
scientifically based sociological research that disputed commonly held misconceptions about 
Blacks' inferiority
16
.
It began to lobby the government, business, and labor unions especially 
the AFL: 
Our intention today is to urge this point: that fifty-five years of A. F. 
of L. history have proven that good intentions on the part of its official 
leadership are not sufficient... We strongly urge that the American 
Federation of Labor accept the challenge of Negro labor by doing 
something definite to eradicate a cancerous situation which has been 
winked at for a half century. (Johnson 247) 
Although it was in favor of direct protest during the civil rights movement, the NUL 
carefully avoided the real political issues facing Black people- lynching and the struggle 
against disfranchisement. Rather it developed as a social service organization because of its 
15
 Nine Black youths were convicted of raping two young white women while riding a freight train in Alabama 
and sentenced to the electric chair. The supreme court over turned their conviction in Norris vs. Alabama, 1935. 
16
 For a detailed study of the image of Blacks in white society and white thinking, see George M Fredrickson, 
The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny (1817-1914).  See 
also Stephan Sternstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible, especially Ch. 1and 2, about the 
social traits and attitudes of Blacks in their neighborhood during the 1920s to the New Deal. 
34
ruling-class connections
17
. Nevertheless, it was always one of the organizations called upon 
during time of crisis (Allen "Civil Rights" 272). During the depression the organization 
broadened its activities to end discrimination in allocating government benefits and NUL 
leaders sought to shape public opinion around issues of social problems through its 
Opportunity Journal and criticized the NAACP's journal the Crisis as being more biased (Fay 
"National Urban League"). The NAACP on the contrary began to concentrate more on 
economic justice. 
Nevertheless, by publicizing the commitments the NAACP had achieved, the 
association sought to educate Black voters to hold candidates accountable when they went to 
the polls. They also urged the importance of voter registration and encouraged Blacks to 
qualify to exercise their franchise, even in the Deep South. As in the NAACP's membership 
secretary words: "We began to try to build the image of the Negro as a voting personality, as a 
person who would influence his government by his vote" (qtd in Weiss 64). This strategy 
worked well especially when more and more Blacks started using their votes to register their 
protest. They examined the voting records of members of Congress and watched the 
utterances and policies of the would-be presidents in order to ferret out those whom they 
considered their enemies or allies.  
The campaigning by the NAACP, as well as a greater awareness among Blacks of 
their potential political power led to the defeat of certain Congressmen in the 1930 and 
1932
18
. Although the NAACP and NUL differed in policy and practices they met on the views 
and goals, and met the aspirations of Blacks toward making them more politically minded, 
17
 Eugene Kinckle Jones, the Executive Secretary of the National Urban League on leave with the federal 
government, goes to the record to appraise the work of the League in his article: "A Dream, A Quarter Century, 
A Reality! How the Urban League Has Served". p. 328 
18
 Blacks turned their guns on those senators who supported the confirmation of John J. Parker to the US 
Supreme Court. Indeed, they helped to defeat Henry J. Allen of Kansas and Roscoe McCulloch of Ohio, and  in 
1932, turned against Samuel Shortridge of California whom they helped elect for the senate in 1926.(Franklin 
344; Giffin 40-42) 
35
organized, and more identifiable group and a self reliant community that could be accountable 
in the decision of any national policy. The NAACP and Urban League, which had actively 
promoted the Renaissance in the 1920s, shifted their interests to economic and social issues in 
the 1930s. This struggle was considered by some as the ideal opportunity to divert the Black 
into a new political direction insisting on his social and economic conditions.  
One of the largest groups that opposed the NAACP during the 1920s was the United 
Negro Association (UNIA) led by the West Indian Marcus Garvey. His largest base of support 
came from urban Black American lower classes. Garvey attacked racial inequality, Black 
exclusion from unions, restrictions on Black businesses, unemployment of Blacks and 
discrimination in general (Goldfield 190-191). The organization used different ways and 
tactics to gain the support of many people. Garvey emphasized the idea of Black Nationalism, 
which taught pride in race. He told Blacks to rejoice in being Blacker than the colored 
aristocrats like Du Bois; retorting "sometimes we hear he is a Frenchman and another time he 
is Dutch, and when it is convenient, he is a Negro. Now I have no Dutch, I have no French, I 
have no Anglo-Saxon to imitate: but I have the ancient glories of Ethiopia to imitate" (qtd. in 
Carroll 328). He insisted on Black cultural expression and most extremely Black 
exclusiveness.  
Racial bias, as he thought, was so embedded in whites' psyche that it was useless to 
appeal to their sense of justice (Tindall, America 667). The organization grew rapidly as his 
dogma and philosophy found outlet especially under the strains of the WWI post-war years. 
Thus, claiming about six million members by 1923. Nevertheless, at the peak of his activism, 
as he constituted a potential driving force for the Black masses, he was convicted of mail 
fraud and imprisoned in 1925, and then he was deported to his native country Jamaica in 1927 
by President Coolidge after receiving presidential pardon. Although Garvey died in obscurity 
in 1940 in London, his memory was kept alive with an undercurrent of Black Nationalism that 
36
would re-emerge later under the slogan of "Black Power" (Vaughn "Black People and their 
Place"). While the UNIA faded with the disappearance of its leader and the coming of the 
depression, other organizations gained credit within the Black communities insisting on other 
more tangible claims such as social and economic justice.  
Despite the fact that the Communist Party constituted a strong attractive pole between 
1928 and 1932 a small minority of Blacks was drawn to the Party which made special efforts 
to attract them and ran a Black candidate, James Ford, for Vice-President in 1932, 1936, and 
1940 (Walton 232, Franklin 345). The party's Black support remained small however and 
many Black members became disillusioned by time and left. The communists made few 
Black converts by the 1928 elections. Neither the circumstances nor the Blacks' immediate 
needs fitted for such an orientation. The communists' tactic of mingling with other Black 
organizations in a united front against racism did not bring much result. That is, explained 
Benjamin Quarles in his book The Negro in the Making of America, the "Negro's sense of 
gratitude toward the communists did not prompt him to join the party, however" (206). The 
Blackman was "individualistic, not likely to submerge his personality in conformity to a party 
line from which there could be no deviation" By the same token, the "basic conservatism of 
the Black in accepting new theories of government did not extend to political party affiliation, 
for in the decade following WWI he made a major shift in party loyalty" (207). With the new 
perception of party politics since the turn of the twentieth century, Blacks initiated a new era 
of political party affiliation that would be fulfilled by the mid 1930s. 
Although in the presidential election of 1924, the Black newspapers and voters again 
supported the Republican Party as usual, a change has been setting in , engineered partly by 
enterprising Democratic political bosses and machines in Northern cities where Blacks 
flocked by thousands looking for more life opportunities and more freedom. W.B. Du Bois 
noted that with the Black migration northward and into urban areas, the Black vote's 
37
importance in presidential elections had grown appreciably. The number of Black voters in 
the states of New York, Illinois, and Ohio for instance, 150.000, 175.000, and 125.000, 
respectively, revealed that they could decide the outcome of close presidential contests 
(Booker "African Americans and the Presidency"). Democratic politicians began to awaken to 
the existence of this new voting group.  
While some Republicans,
like William Hale Thompson of Chicago, tried hard to keep 
the presumably unalterable Black vote within the ranks of the GOP, The urban politicians had 
taken careful note of this large migration. The first Democratic boss to woo and win the Black 
electorate was Tom Pendergast of Kansas City (Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval 426). 
As Black voter registration increased during the 1930s, so politicians increasingly provided at 
least lip service to their needs (Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks 88). Knowing that these new 
comers were Republican-minded, they offered everything they could afford in seeking them 
out to register to vote. Indeed, they offered Blacks "small political jobs, such as watchers at 
the polls, and provided small favors, such as baskets of food or tickets to an entertainment" 
(Quarles 207). The result was that Blacks began to realize that their vote was connected with 
their economic conditions.
By 1928, meanwhile the party of Lincoln seemed unresponsive to the changing 
electorate and lacked a strategy for adjusting to new political realities, most Black leaders had 
become disillusioned with the Party. The 1928 presidential campaign marked a significant 
step toward the eventual Black exodus from Republican ranks. Although a majority of Blacks 
cast their vote for Hoover, Black drift from the GOP was greater than in any prior election. 
Manufacturers of public opinion within the Black community, including publishers, editors of 
Black newspapers, educators, businessmen, ministers and bishops, fraternal officers, minor 
government officials and leaders of well established organizations such as the NAACP and 
 
					