The Putin Paradox: An attempt to shed light on Russian reasoning for full-fledged support of their president
©2015
Textbook
80 Pages
Summary
Russia is an enigma. In the western hemisphere, respectively the countries of the European Union and USA, it produces a lot of suspicion and resentments. Its vast spatial dimensions, in terms of size; its controversial history and its stubborn focus on sovereignty, when it comes to foreign policy and the international community, are the most prominent sources for difficulties of understanding. In addition, the Russian people liketo sustain a hint of mystery themselves, in claiming that no other nationality can understand them. Apart from stereotypes and prejudices about typical Russian people and characteristics, there are a handful of assumptions one encounters that cling to public opinion about Russia’s political landscape.<br>This work will treat the Russian political system as a contemporary phenomenon. Let us assume all of those assumptions are held true; why does the Russian population still accept those deficits? The fact that the circumstances can be that unpromising, and not many people try tochange something, leaves many spectators speechless. Where does the popular support of society for President Putin come from? Which is the source of stability? Why were the civil opposition movements in 2012/2013 mostly ignored by the majority? What are the reasons for the lack of proneness to protest? Do Russians perceive the political system differently; do they maybe put another focus? Or do they simply fear oppression? <br>The central question, which will be answered, consequently reads "Why does the Russian population supports Putin’s political system and regime?"
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
VIII
T
ABLE OF
C
ONTENTS
List of Figures ... X
Part 1
Introduction ... 1
1.1
State of Affairs ... 1
1.2
Hypothesis... 2
1.3
Structure ... 3
Part 2
Theory ... 5
2.1
Democracy ... 5
A western view on the concept of democracy: Robert Dahl's Polyarchy ... 5
2.2
Legitimacy ... 8
2.2.1
Glaser: Three-Criteria Theory ... 9
2.2.2
Scharpf: Dimensions of Legitimation ... 12
2.3
Lippmann: Public Opinion ... 14
2.4
Path Dependence ... 16
2.5
Berg-Schlosser: Input/Output-Dualism and indicators of Democracy . 17
Part 3
Case Study Russia ... 19
3.1
State of Inquiry ... 19
3.1.1
Result 1: "The Russian Political System is defect and
dysfunctional" ... 19
3.1.2
Result 2: "A majority of Russians support President Putin's
presidency" ... 23
3.1.3
Result 3: "Russians are in favour of democracy, respect democratic
values and hope for further democratization" ... 24
3.1.4
Contradiction: Russians are fully aware of the intrinsic systemic
dysfunctions and undemocratic inconsistencies, and support President Putin,
although they yearn for democracy ... 26
3.2
Russian Peculiarities ... 26
3.2.1
Presidential legacy ... 26
3.2.2
Russian path dependence: The Trauma Path ... 30
3.2.3
Dubin: Dimensions of Identity The Personal-Social Gap ... 31
Part 4
Explaining the contradiction ... 33
4.1
The Triple-S Pattern (S
3
P) ... 33
4.1.1
S
tability
... 34
IX
4.1.2
S
ecurity
... 38
4.1.3
S
overeignty
... 41
4.2
Legitimation through S
3
P... 45
4.3
Lippmann's tools of Public Opinion shaping in the Russian context ... 48
4.4
Huntington's Development Theory and Institutionalization ... 50
Part 5
Results and further Research ... 52
5.1
Summary of Results ... 52
S
3
P applied to the Pussy Riot incident ... 54
5.2
Reflection and free Association ... 56
Is Democracy promotion a form of Paternalism? ... 56
Annex ... I
(I)
Bibliography ... I
(II)
Index of graphics, charts and images ... VII
X
List of Figures
1: The Axes of Polyarchy (R. A. Dahl 1972, 7) ... 8
2: Interactive Model of Democratic System ... 18
3: Triade of Progress ... VII
4: Aspects of Institutionalization ... VII
5: Political Capitalism ... VIII
6: Illiberal Features of Russian Democracy ... IX
7: Index of Indices ... X
8: Security - What is it made of? ... X
1
Russia is an enigma. In the western hemisphere, respectively the countries of
the European Union and USA, it produces a lot of suspicion and resentments. Its
vast spatial dimensions, in terms of size; its controversial history and its
stubborn focus on sovereignty, when it comes to foreign policy and the
international community, are the most prominent sources for difficulties of
understanding. In addition, the Russian people like to sustain a hint of mystery
themselves, in claiming that no other nationality can understand them. Apart
from stereotypes and prejudices about typical Russian people and characteristics,
there are a handful of assumptions one encounters that cling to public opinion
about Russia's political landscape:
(1)
Political opposition does not exist, civic opposition is marginalised.
(2)
The independence of the judiciary system is a façade and de facto does
not effectively monitor the executive.
(3)
The Soviet imprint on Russian people led to a mentality of
subordination, inflexibility and obedience to any kind of authority.
(4)
The Russian media are corrupted and controlled by the Kremlin.
(5)
Putin only won the election due to massive vote manipulation.
In line with the mentioned assumptions, Western media coverage tends to be
polemic and jaundiced. As Russia is perceived as a watchdog of Sovereignty in
the international community and in that sense with a tendency to veto
humanitarian missions
1
, criticism is very easily formulated.
This work will treat the Russian political system as a contemporary
phenomenon. Let us assume all of those assumptions are held true; why does the
Russian population still accept those deficits? The fact that the circumstances
can be that unpromising, and not many people try to change something, leaves
many spectators speechless. Where does the popular support of society for
President Putin come from? Which is the source of stability? Why were the civil
opposition movements in 2012/2013 mostly ignored by the majority? What are
the reasons for the lack of proneness to protest? Do Russians perceive the
political system differently; do they maybe put another focus? Or do they simply
fear oppression?
1
Serbia and Syria are examples for Sovereignty as a principal value in Russia's foreign policy.
2
It seems that the value catalogue of the Russian population contains other
priorities than meets the eye: Order and stability, common identity and
solidarity, self-determination and sovereignty seem to be preferable to freedom
and democracy, transparency and compliance, pluralism and power balance. This
study presents a critical confrontation with this assumption and offers a
contrasting explanation.
The central question, which will be answered, is Why does the Russian
population supports Putin's political system and regime?
As a point of departure, the following study negotiates four theoretical
paradigms: democracy, legitimacy, path dependence and public opinion. The
question, where the support for President Putin and his policy stems from will be
illuminated. Concerning the academic background they originate from political
and social science and sociology. Several surveys will be taken into account. With
regards to other sources, the body of references will mainly consist of journal
entries, completed by handbooks, monographs and a few internet sources. The
time scope of the articles lies between 1990 and current times.
2
The academic debate among political scientists and sociology scholars
3
treating
Russia as a unique political actor and former superpower come up with three
major diagnoses: 1) Russia is not a full-fledged democracy and features several
deficiencies. President Putin is part of the problem. 2) Russians would like to
have a more democratic system, they yearn for democratization. 3) President
Putin enjoys wide-spread support and back-up by the Russian population.
If those three results are valid, a paradox arises. Why do the Russian people
support a key figure of the democratic demise, if they are aware of the intrinsic
intricacy of the system and actually hope for political progress?
After introducing the key concepts with the geneses of democracy and
legitimacy
,
it is dealt with this question with a novel contribution to the debate:
The author claims that President Putin is widely support by the population
because he manages to take concrete political issues to an ideological level: He
cross-refers those issues to Security, Stability and Sovereignty, which thereafter
2
Quotes from German sources are all translated by the author. The quotes are not again
separately labelled, but the roman index numbers indicate the place where in the endnotes the
original paragraphs are found. (Cf. XI)
3
(Cf. Shiller u. a. 1992; Thomas 2012; Pallin 2007; Trenin 2006; Mommsen 2010; Voswinkel
2013; Gudkov 2008; Gudkov 2011; Mishler und Rose 1997; Gusseletow 2011; Siegert 2013;
Knobloch 2002; Nicoll 2008)
3
is called the Three-S Pattern (S
3
P). He is overcharging his actions with abstract
content and thereby, creates legitimation. In doing so, he diverts the people's
dissatisfaction with the economic and political conditions on the individual level,
stressing the achievements in the realm of the three S' on the national level.
The Russian people`s receptivity to this strategy is traced back to its origin. To
develop this book on the basis of S
3
P, the author refers to Lippmann's Public
Opinion, Scharpf's Output-oriented legitimation, David's Path Dependence and
Dubin's identity-split.
The author wants to challenge the wide-spread opinion that the Russian mind-
set is prone to authoritarianism per se, and that Russians are undemocratic by
culture. Instead, it is argued that the people attribute efficiency to President
Putin on the basis of the three S and thus grant legitimacy to his authority.
To approach the reasons for support, I will introduce some basic concepts in
Part 2. Firstly, the understanding of democracy, referring to Dahl's work
Polyarchy, will be introduced.
Secondly, attempting to understand the Russian attitude towards politics, a
key concept is legitimacy. Two notions of legitimacy are to be differentiated.
Glaser (2.2.1) looks at the aspects and characteristics of legitimacy in general,
combining three understandings from different disciplines into the Three-
Criteria-Theory, looking at Legality, Conformity and Acceptance. She looks at the
extent political systems institutionally function in a democracy, and whether the
sovereign is elected by the public. Scharpf introduced the separation between
Input- and Output-oriented legitimacy. He examines the fact that legitimacy is
not only based on input in the sense of a constitution, consolidated institutions, a
common mind-set and identity. Legitimation can be created and Legitimacy
evaluated on the basis of efficiency.
Thirdly, as media coverage is a key issue in the development of my book,
Walter Lippmann's scheme of Public Opinion will be presented as a toolbox to
approach Public Relations as a necessity to influence the public.
The fourth concept which has to be introduced in Part 2 as 2.4, is the concept
of Path Dependence; simplified, a version of the idiom "history matters", to be
able to understand the Russian framework entirely, where memories and
traumata play a considerable role.
In 2.5, Chapter 3.1, three results are distilled from articles of the academic
realm of political and social sciences, which treat Russia as their object of
inquiry. On the bases of analyses and surveys, the following results are obtained:
Result 1: "The Russian Political System is defect and dysfunctional"
Result 2: "A majority of Russians support President Putin's presidency"
4
The opinion polls related to Result 3 in the following will prove that Russians
are indeed unsatisfied with the status quo and wish for systemic change.
Result 3: "Russians are in favour of democracy, respect democratic values
and hope for further democratization"
.
Claiming that those results possess an intrinsic paradox; this paradox will be
analysed and interpreted in Part 4: If the people envision and hope for a more
democratic Russia, why do they support Putin, who is striving to conserve the
current system?
Special features of the Russian nation, which are essential for the
comprehension of the system, are the core of the next Chapter 3.2. To be able to
apply Russian history through Path dependence to the query, the next two
chapters will focus on the presidential chronicle, the 3.2.1 Presidential Legacy, so
to speak, and the development of Russian path dependence as a kind of 3.2.2
Trauma Path.
Part 4 contains the major contribution to the current discussion of this work.
The S
3
P will be unfolded, using examples from political culture, identity
formation, history and policy-making to underline the importance of the three
abstract constructs in Russian daily life. The staging of the S
3
P via Legitimacy
and media is put into perspective via 4.2 Scharpf's Output-Legitimacy and 4.3
Lippmann's Public Opinion.
In Part 5 the results are summarised and future implications are formulated.
Possible prospects for further research and deepening are outlined.
5
Democracy is a systematic concept, which sees the population of a country as
the sole sovereign of power. The participation of the electorate can be assured
directly through plebiscitary votes as in today's Switzerland or through elected
representatives in parliaments as in representative democracies. The power can
be mainly confided to the parliament as in parliamentary democracies like in
Germany or to the president as in presidential democracies as in the USA. The
system should be protected from abuse of power through a system of Checks and
Balances via a bicameral system and/or the separation of powers between
judiciary, executive and legislative system, which is specified in a constitution-
like document. Theoretically this will ensure abidance to the rule of law and the
creation of a civil society. A constitution regulates the political system and the
cooperation of organs and individuals. Freedom of speech, identity and assembly
as manifested constitutionally complete the normative catalogue in a
functioning liberal democracy. Huntington refers to Schumpeter as the forefather
of the theoretical tangibility and makes the shift of dimensions very concrete:
Schumpeter advanced what he labelled `another theory of democracy'. The `democratic method',
he said, `is that in institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote"
(Huntington 1993, 6)
But are all democracies really as pure as they claim to be? Which flaws can be
found and how can understanding of democracy vary? Which steps have to be
taken to arrive to a Democratic system? A brief look at the development of
democracy in the 20
th
century shows the complexity of the process of
democratisation.
Clearly, the USA emerged as the winner from the ideological battles and the
systemic duel of the Cold War. The bipolarity of the democratic USA and the
communist Soviet Union culminated in that breakdown and capitalist democracy
was perceived as the better option. But this was only the final combat. Already
before that, democratization processes all over the world could be observed.
Beginning in Latin America, spilling over to Africa, the third wave (Cf.
Huntington 1993) ended with the democratic shift in the post-Soviet realm.
Robert Dahl is the founder of the new school of complex democratic theory. The
complexity of his approach differs from his academic predecessors in the sense
that he did not limit his viewpoint to philosophical systematizations, but
6
analysed contemporary facts and circumstances, utilizing statistical
investigation. Looking at existing types of democracies, he attempted to come to
realistic conclusions instead of developing Weberian ideal types.
To arrive at this empirical dimension, he introduces the concept of `Polyarchy
in contrast to an ideal model of democracy: `Polyarchy' is a conceptually and
ideologically downgraded version of democracy. It only considers political
opposition and suffrage. The fact that a democracy is an ideal type, wherein the
population disposes of all political powers, which in real world systems does not
exist, makes this specification necessary. (Dahl 1956, 75 In: Krouse 1982, 443)
He coins the term `Polyarchy' for a country, which is consolidated on the axes
of contestation and inclusiveness:
"Polyarchies ... may be thought as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or to put
it in another way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and
liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation." (R. A. Dahl
1972, 8)
Central to his argument is the existence of legitimacy, a term he employs, but
does not specify (Cf. Chapter 2.2). The only specification he offers is the fact that
a government, to ensure legitimacy, has to provide responsiveness. To be
responsive, the population of a given state, in his understanding, needs
"unimpaired possibilities" in a threefold manner:
1)
They have to be able to develop opinions and express preferences
2)
To make their opinions count and listened to from fellow citizens and the
government through individual and collective action
3)
The content or origin of the suggestion or bid cannot be source for
discrimination, so that it is treated equally in the conduct of the
government. (Cf. R. A. Dahl 1972, 2)
To establish these premises, a set of civic and public freedoms is vital, namely:
freedom of assembly, freedom of opinion, freedom of information (freedom of
media), privacy rights and the right to vote. Provided that all liberties are
ensured, the development to a full-fledged Polyarchy can be achieved.
The dimensions he coins as corresponding variable to the preconditions are
liberalization (public contestation) on the one hand and participation
(inclusiveness) on the other. Reducing the variables to two, he conceptually
separates his term `Polyarchy' from the common notion of democracy. Democracy
and democratisation usually include other aspects which are essential, so that
the paradigms needed for the achievement of the label `democracy' cannot be
reduced to two. He introduces the term Polyarchy only to represent the greatest
possible achievement of the two qualities he focuses on. (R. A. Dahl 1972, 8)
7
L
IBERALIZATION
(P
OLITICAL
C
ONTESTATION
)
As the goal of a liberal democracy is the achievement of full representation of
all citizens of that state, diverging interests and opinions have to be reflected by
the representative body. Therefore Dahl defines Liberalization in the sense of
political contestation as a key aspect of a polyarchal state structure. This implies
equal rights for all of those representations, mostly in the shape of a party, to
seize power through democratic means, namely elections. Confronted with the
possibility to be replaced, a government is more likely to consider the voter's
interest and well-being. This pressure is only created when the opposition is
active and a serious competitor to the incumbent government. In that way they
constantly have to defend their stances and hold their ground. To fully allow this
pressure to build up, it is the crucial that the opinion of the population really
matters in determining the leadership. Therefore, the distribution of elective
powers among the citizens plays an important role, thereby setting up the second
axis.
In sum, it is important to note that Dahl not only qualifies political opposition
as an indicator for the process of liberalization. If the authority allows civil
opposition to rise and protest for their rights, he also refers to it as a legitimate
opposition. And this is even the case if it usually undermines any political
opposition movements. Despite the rejection of an evolution of a political
counterpart, the government faces opposition and thus needs to stand his ground.
I
NCLUSIVENESS
(P
ARTICIPATION
)
Dahl introduces the second variable, which corresponds to the entirety of
suffrage, as inclusiveness or participation. This determines the degree to which
the goal that the electorate equals 100% of the population (able-to-vote) is
reached. This in return is determined by law. But as laws are written by forces in
power (Cf. Chapter 2.2.1
Glaser: Three-Criteria Theory
-
Legality
) discrimination
of minorities can take place. This discrimination in terms of suffrage directly
reflects the extent of democratic procedures. If nobody represents a certain social
group or milieu, their interests will not be considered when it comes to the
implication of measures for their sake.
~~~
According to Dahl, no state can satisfy the three necessities which grant
responsiveness consideration, significance equality of its population, without
respecting the axes of liberalization and inclusiveness. Those who are not fully
achieving one of the above are to be categorized differently. All states can be
specified according to those axes. The space generated by those axes can then be
categorized into four pure types: Closed hegemony, inclusive hegemony,
Competitive oligarchies and Polyarchies; to name the extreme types. (Figure
1:
The Axes of Polyarchy (R. A. Dahl 1972, 7)
. This grid accommodates multiple
models, all of which are at a different distance from pure Polyarchy.
8
1:
T
HE
A
XES OF
P
OLYARCHY
(R.
A.
D
AHL
1972,
7)
Exemplifying this schematic grid, he for instance classifies Switzerland before
1990 as an Oligarchy. Given the fact that up to this point, women did not have
the right to vote, full inclusiveness had not been achieved. Still, considering the
plebiscitary mechanism and the competitive political set-up of the Swiss system,
Switzerland is highly liberalized. In contrast to that, a state whose leadership
prevents other political forces to compete equally, although the whole population
has influence on political procedures in the form of elections, is categorized as an
inclusive hegemony.
Human beings need coordinated organization. As soon as any group larger
than 30 people has to be managed, it is extremely difficult to make decisions
without introducing hierarchy of some sorts. The same is true for states. The
smallest type of hierarchy comprises only two levels; the authority and the
obedient. Obedience in return can also be achieved through two means, either
legitimacy or force. Legitimate authority evokes voluntary obedience, whereas
force evokes frightened obedience. In many cases, it is in fact a mixture of the
two. Clearly, as voluntary obedience by itself promises a greater stability, even
authoritarian regimes strive for legitimation. Legitimation hereby is defined as
"a process which conveys legitimacy" (Glaser 2012, 26). As Brooker underlines
illustratively with help of White, that even autocratic rulers lay great importance
on the issue of legitimation: "`It is generally agreed that all regimes, from naked
tyrannies to pluralistic democracies, seek to legitimate themselves'" (White 1986,
463 In: Brooker 2000, 101). In the context of any type of regime, the concept of
legitimacy and thus, even more important, the ways to obtain it through
legitimation, are crucial.
9
Whenever obedience is created through a consensus between the rulers and
the ruled, the authority must establish legitimacy. The subsequent question is
which criteria can be found to achieve legitimation, to legitimize any authority
respectively. As a framework for the case study on Russia, two theoretical
concepts are introduced: The Three-Criteria Theory by Karin Glaser (2012) and
Scharpf's two-dimensional approach to Legitimacy, which Glaser also touches on
(1999).
Karin Glaser criticizes that the indicator varies, depending on the angle of
analysis be it sociologically, politically or philosophically. She therefore
suggests bringing together the three criteria Legality, Conformity and Acceptance
to avoid intra-disciplinary short-sightedness.
Legality means "according to the law". It refers to the ruling power, mostly the
government, being put into place on behalf of the judicial basis of a state.
Decision-making processes, framing their tasks and self-organisation are
determined by a form of convention. Taking a liberal democracy as the Weberian
idealtypus, the focus of this consensus is stated. The function of the constitution
is to install order in a political system, to define the rules for the ruling. This
holds true for both (1) the political activity, in terms of executing governmental
functions and tasks, and (2) the legal seizure of power and authority. Therefore,
an authority is legal, when it was put into place by a legally defined mechanism
(most commonly elections) and is executing its duties according to the rules of the
constituting document or constitution.
Glaser points at the intrinsic paradox that even a constitution can be altered
through democratic means and therefore can be subject to arbitrariness.
Therefore she refrains from accepting that legality is the only constant of
legitimacy referring to a number of theorists who equate the two terms. Legal
positivism is particularly prone to this equation; "legitimacy here only refers to
the positive statutes of law, and thus requires legality". (Glaser 2012, 16)
i
The reduction of legitimacy to the conceptual component of legality also seems
inadequate considering the systems, in which the fragments are contradictory in
the sense that a ruling power can be legally legitimate without encompassing the
other two criteria. Consequently, such a system cannot be called legitimate,
although its legitimacy de jure is uncontested. This concept of legitimacy, though,
is only defined from a factual viewpoint, and is not applicable to the moral and
normative level of legitimacy. Admittedly, most legal bases of nation states
include a moral code to arrive at legal conclusions, but it is not a valid equation
to expect all legal codes to be normative. Thus, a "certificate" of subjective
normativity, "issued" by the ruled, any states' population respectively, is
10
necessary. Conversely, advocates of legality as the key to legitimacy emphasize
the existence of a legal framework as a prerequisite to the formulation of
government-binding documents. Generally, this is true. In other words: Provided
that one can rule out the natural lack of legitimacy within any legal document,
which is constitutional in nature, the assumption is valid. But as this incidence is
to be considered highly rare, Glaser concludes that legality can only be one
criterion of legitimacy. (Glaser 2012, 18)
As a second criterion, Glaser adds accordance and conformity as means of the
ethical, normative and moral standards of the governed people. The principle of
rightful representation has to be pursued, in the sense that not only the interest
of the powerful, ruling elite has to be respected, but the entire society.
Essentially, governmental actions should serve the purpose of improving the
situation and the lives of the many, not the few. When it comes to further
clarification, Glaser gets vague. She refers to Beetham (1991), who states that "a
legitimizing basis for the enactment of power can only be found there where a
minimum of unity on those questions [of legitimate political leadership] exists
between political leadership and population [...]"
ii
(Glaser 2012, 18). Therefore it
may happen that an objectively illegal authority usurpers or coup leaders for
instance can hold, pursue and preserve power legitimately. This, of course,
requires that their ground of legitimation divine rights, for instance is
acknowledged by the majority of the citizens.
The situation in which a population does not fully approve of an authorities'
claim to legitimacy or their actions, is not hard to find, since it is easy to upset a
population. However, it seems necessary to emphasize at this point that the
absence of ethical conformity, and thus absence of legitimacy as a whole, does not
consequently result in protest. The mere absence of legitimacy only limits the
flexibility of the ruling elite in the sense that they exceed their mandate and
enact their will in defiance of the will of the potential sovereign. The voluntary
obedience of the ruled gets diminished by the discrepancy of ethical guidelines.
Access to power and executive force through oppression and force can balance
social unrest and rejection of legitimacy. In that case one cannot speak of pure
legitimacy anymore; rather, obedience is imposed by oppression.
As a third component of legitimacy Glaser suggests popular acceptance, with
reference to a general, passive agreement to the composition and make-up of the
government and its execution of state tasks. In other words, the absence of
dissent and open exclamations of dissatisfaction are a vital component to confirm
the existence of legitimacy. This also foremost includes the compliance to laws
and legal rules. The ones who comply with the rules defined by a given authority
most definitely accept the legitimacy of these rulers. Furthermore, the
11
willingness to participate in political processes e.g. elections is a strong indicator
for acceptance.
Including this factor of acceptance in the concept of legitimacy is also essential
due to the factor of quick responsiveness: Whereas legality and conformity are
long-term decisions, acceptance is short-term in the sense that some decisions,
which are perceived illegitimate, can cause an immediate backlash of resistance.
Consequently, the political elite is forced to consider changing priorities and
postures within society.
4
Criticising the short-sightedness of law scholars in determining legitimacy
through the means of legal positivism and legality, Glaser objects to the
sociological simplification of legitimacy to acceptance.
In sum, the components of Acceptance are the following:
(1)
Comply to laws
(2)
Participate in political processes
(3)
Refrain from protests
In conclusion, for a government or any type of authority to be legitimate three
criteria have to be met:
(1)
Legality: The ruling entity has to act and assemble on the basis of a legal
construct like a constitution, which lays out rights and obligations of the
party claiming legitimacy.
(2)
Ethical Conformity: The authority has to abide to the set of normative
rules and principles, which are common sense among the ruled. There
has to be a minimum of shared values, a mutual ground, which creates
the support for the authority.
(3)
Popular Acceptance: The lack of protest, peaceful acceptance and passive
connivance of decrees issued by the authority and in other words,
subordination to supremacy determines a great share of legitimacy as
well.
4
A noteworthy example would be the German nuclear exit in 2011 by the Conservative Party,
which followed a striking public outcry after the Fukushima catastrophe. One favourable way to
analyse this would be labelling it as an attempt by the Conservatives party to legitimize
themselves, although many critics attest opportunism. They cannot be singled out as mutually
exclusive in this case.
Another example, quite opposite in results, is the public response to the plans for a mall in
Gezi Park in Istanbul. It resulted in country-wide public protests, although the first two
indicators of legitimacy were fulfilled, considering the extensive electoral support for PM
Erdoùan.
12
It has to be emphasized that no authority enjoys full legitimacy without
obtaining all three criteria. This claim is hard to prove, given the fact that
legitimacy is mainly a theoretical term, but it is clear that whenever an authority
loses legitimacy, it has to compensate the loss of authority on one side by
increased efforts on the order in order to preserve the level of legitimacy. A loss of
(3) Acceptance, for instance, can be balanced in two ways. Firstly, emphasizing a
moral congruency between rulers and ruled through ideology or other means of
identification can neutralize the loss of acceptance. An increase of (2) Conformity
normalizes the loss of (3) Acceptance.
Secondly, another means of legitimation is the composition of a (new) legal
document, which manifests the limits, prospects and the order under which the
authority wants to govern. Including people's interests and norms can be a strong
signal for the authority's readiness for change. An increase of (1) Legality levels
the loss of (3) Acceptance.
Obviously, these means can only make an impact if the authority still seeks
legitimacy at the moment of the uprising. As legitimacy is the peaceful tool for
obedience, it is the most preferable option to hold on to power. But in some
instances, the prospect of preserving power through legitimation is very low.
Therefore, many authorities make use of force to exempt themselves from the
pressure of the population and shift from legitimacy as necessity for voluntary
obedience to force as a tool for subjected obedience. Especially interesting are the
cases where the numeric majority of a country stands behind the political leader
and grant him legitimacy, but a great amount of people is not in favour of the
political conditions anymore. Recent cases from 2013 are Bulgaria, Turkey,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Brazil.
In the development of his theory of dimensions, Scharpf also touches upon the
criteria, which Glaser had later systematised. Glaser's 2
nd
criterion, for instance,
the normative prerequisite for legitimacy corresponds to Scharpf's "collective
identity". The Input-perspective determines legitimacy to be dependent on a `pre-
existent' collective identity. (Scharpf 1999, 20) According to Scharpf, no authority
achieves legitimacy, if it does not draw on common grounds. Only in that way the
majority rule loses its intimidating character and individuals start may build up
the trust to believe in the representatives having the conscience of considering
the Greater Good.
Scharpf also suggests another specification. While Glaser focussed on the
necessary components to qualify a given authority as legitimate, Scharpf
discovers that perspectives on legitimacy vary between input-oriented
legitimation as in rule through the people and output-oriented legitimation as in
rule for the people (Ibd. p.16). Due to the fact that he examines the arguments,
which are adduced to legitimize a system, an authority or a state, the term
13
`legitimacy' would not be precise, which explains why he refers to the process of
achieving legitimacy as `legitimation'.
Scharpf develops his account for legitimacy, as far as the input-side is
concerned, along the lines of participation and consensus, which he declares as
the main formula of input-driven legitimation. The main argument of input
legitimation is the representation of the will of the people. Elections as the tool
for participation satisfy the need for having a say. An intrinsic duty to obey
(`Gehorsamspflicht' in German) is evoked by the fact that the result was subject
to the individual's decision. The flaw of this arrangement is the majority rule. In
a society, where consensus cannot be found by compromise and assembly
anymore, the majority principle takes effect. This influences the power gap in the
sense that a majority gets to decide over a minority. He expresses concern,
because:
"The persuasiveness of the participation formula vanishes by the same amount to which the
distance between the affected persons and their representatives increases; and the consensus-
formula fails, when solutions for the sake of all are impossible and thereby majority decisions
are necessary."
iii
(Scharpf 1999, 17)
This inequality can only be levelled by trust of the individual in every other
citizen of the electorate through the aforementioned collective identity. It has to
be the objective of every single one to improve the situation of society instead of
only privileging one's own social cluster. Glaser concludes:
If there is no collective identity, the respective political order does not possess the necessary
potential for input-legitimacy.
iv
5
(Glaser 2012, 34)
The Output-oriented legitimation in contrast focuses not on the modalities of
political decision-making processes or the assembly of decision-making bodies,
but only on the quality and efficiency of decisions. Efficiency in that context
means positive influence on the well-being and quality of life of the population.
At this point, legitimacy is derived from solving problems that cannot be
tackled by market forces, individuals or civil society. A separate, autonomous
entity (e.g. interim government, technocrats, military) needs to get in charge of
the solution. Scharpf points out, that whereas the prerequisites for input-
oriented legitimation with identity and integrity are pretty high; the required
principles for output-legitimation are set a lot lower. This can be explained by the
fact that only a consistent set of basic common interests between ruled and rulers
5
It is remarkable that even Glaser, (at least) at this point, does not clearly conceptually
distinguish between legitimacy and legitimation.
14
is necessary for output-legitimation. This low benchmark allows heterogeneity
and coexistence. (Scharpf 1999, 20) One instance for example could be the
mediating force of a "common enemy". Whenever a challenge involves different
social forces, they will settle and ignore possible differences for the sake of
finding a strategy to circumvent the issue in question in case the political system
allows them to.
An important distinguishing feature is the fact that a system, relying on
output-oriented legitimation, exists under a greater public pressure to act; the
incitement for achievement is stricter. Since its legitimation only derives from
the results, it cannot rely on its founding `myth' and cannot remain passive. To
prove itself worthy of the trust, which was granted at its establishment, the
government has to become active.
For the theoretical debate it is worthwhile to consider that the duty in an
input-legitimised system technically stops after nomination. When the electorate
confers authority to a certain group; that group is only bound to deliver progress
and success by its conscience.
P
UBLIC
O
PINION
Walter Lippmann was one of the most influential contributors to the shaping
of Public Opinion in the USA before WW II. He coined the term Cold war and is
partially responsible for the massive mobilization of manpower in its waking, due
to the successful application of his Public Opinion theory. As an advisor to
President Wilson, he suggested the establishment of a `propaganda bureau', in
the form of the Committee on Public information. (Cf. Ötsch 2009, 37) As a
theoretical thinker and philosopher of the 20
th
century, he was one of the most
important figures of the scientific realm of Public opinion, propaganda,
advertisement and media. His most acclaimed work is his 1922 oeuvre Public
Opinion (Lippmann 1922). Main components of his work are a controversial take
on how masses of individuals are summed up, form a society and how the
functioning of the human being in his view contradicts the democratic
abstractum. His observations and strategic recommendations will be used to
explain the means S
3
and how it is created.
A key aspect of his analysis of human behaviour is the fact that most often,
people base their opinions on what they expect to be true, rather than what they
know is true. In this way an automatic simplification takes place due to which a
situation or state of affairs is easier to grasp.
"We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but
on pictures made by himself or given to him. [...] The way in which a world is imagined
determines at any particular moment what men will do" (Lippmann 1922, 19)
To adjust Lippmann's approach and make his logic applicable to the present
argument, the author adopts Walter Ötsch's systematization of Lippmann's
