The Rocky Road over Emancipation to the First Black Regiments: The Emancipation of Black Soldiers in the American Civil War
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Summary
Why did American policy delay black emancipation and official enlistment until 1863, and what were the blacks’ motives for enlisting at all? This study investigates black soldiers’ participation in the American Civil War and the struggles on their way to equality. By coming in thousands, fugitive slaves forced policy to finally tackle the hushed-up issue of slavery. First I will investigate the political background, starting with introducing the three main parties in the emancipation debate, and continuing with the political steps toward official enlistment and the reactions of society to these developments. Secondly, I will focus on the black soldiers’ motives, including influences that had shaped them and obstacles which prevented emancipation in practice, and finally I will explore the war’s results for the black population. Even though it is not expected that the movie Glory, which is frequently quoted, conveys an accurate and historically verified picture of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts, it gives a possible perspective of the blacks toward the war. This study focuses only on black soldiers and not on black participation in the war in general.
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
2
Fifty-Fourth's attack on Fort Wagner on Northern opinion about the status of blacks,
nor does it give any information about the political context of black enlistment. I was
therefore curious to investigate the political background in this thesis and wanted to
explore the history behind the movie.
1.2 Composition of My Thesis
The central questions of my thesis are: Why did American policy delay black
emancipation and official enlistment until 1863, and what were the blacks' motives
for enlisting at all?
First I will investigate the political background, starting with introducing the
three main parties in the emancipation debate, and continuing with the political steps
toward official enlistment and the reactions of society to these developments.
Secondly, I will focus on the black soldiers' motives, including influences that had
shaped them and obstacles which prevented emancipation in practice, and finally I
will explore the war's results for the black population. Throughout the whole
analysis, the thesis focuses only on black soldiers and not on black participation in
the war in general.
In answering my two-part question, I will quote key scenes of the movie
Glory. Even though it is not expected that the movie conveys an accurate and
historically verified picture of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts, it gives a possible
perspective of the blacks toward the war and will therefore be taken into
consideration. The following topics from Glory will be included and interpretations
will be provided: Redville Training Camp of the Fifty-Fourth; the quartermaster's
refusal to provide Shaw's regiment with proper shoes; the punishment of Private Trip
because of his absence without official leave; the Fifty-Fourth's collective refusal to
receive inferior pay; the private encounter of Colonel Shaw and Private Trip; and the
religious meeting before the assault on Fort Wagner. Furthermore, I would like to
make it plain that I will focus neither on the cinematic depiction of these scenes nor
on the movie itself as a whole. Questions such as "what story does the movie try to
tell," "how does it convince its observers," "does it provide nineteenth century
authenticity," and "how does it depict the development of the protagonist" will not
be addressed in the thesis. Instead, I will treat the movie as a narrative of the black
soldiers.
3
As one of the first movies about the Civil War, Glory shows the perspective
of black soldiers and differs in great measure from other Civil War narratives about
blacks because its focus is not on emancipation but on identity. Robert Burgoyne,
professor of film studies, specifies this topic with identity from above, which is the
identification with the nation-state, and identity from below, which is concerned with
racial and ethnic identity. According to Burgoyne, the desire and recognition of
death, which are most elementary concerns, would define those forms of identity in
the following way. The construction of identity needs, on the one hand, the desire for
affiliation, recognition, and visibility and, on the other hand, the recognition of death,
being willing to kill and die for this identity. This thesis wants to explore, especially
in its second part, what exactly was this identity the soldiers were fighting for and
why was it so strong that it made them die for it. Burgoyne also figures out "identity
from across," which describes the "nonsymmetrical relationship between white
identity and black identity."
4
The movie constantly shows the tension between these
two parties because every side is feeling only fear and hatred for the other, which
was one almost insuperable barrier on the way to racial equality.
The correct designation of Americans of African descent has changed
drastically over the centuries and has always been subject to discussions. It should be
noted that in times of the Civil War, it was common that people of African descent
were called Negro, wherefore this word will occur in quotations which are taken
from nineteenth century texts. However, when I am referring to this group of people,
I will use the terms African Americans and blacks interchangeably.
4
Robert Burgoyne, "Race and Nation in Glory." Film Nation: Hollywood Looks at U.S. History.
Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2010, 16
17.
4
2. The Debate about Freeing and Arming Slaves
The insurrection, as the president used to call the Civil War in the beginning, lasted
unexpectedly for several years, and politicians as well as society had to face the fact
that they had to tackle more serious problems than initially thought in the beginning
of the war on April 12, 1861, after the attack on Fort Sumter. Possibly the most
fundamental problem was the issue of slavery.
The Union army's suffered a crushing defeat in the Seven Days Battle from
June 26 to July 1 in 1862 near Richmond, Virginia, which marked a turning point in
the Union's war policy. The fact that the Union army under the command of George
B. McClellan succumbed to the Confederate forces led by Robert E. Lee seemed to
have sealed the Union army's fate. Despite this huge setback, Lincoln did not falter
and called for 300,000 new recruits. In order to avoid panic in the wake of the Seven
Days Battle, he backdated the document to June 28 and he did not reveal that the
Union needed soldiers because they were going to be overrun by the Confederate
forces, but "to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and
satisfactory conclusion."
5
Lincoln wanted to give the impression that the Union army
was in the ascendancy over the rebels and that additional recruits were required only
to speed up the process. However, casualty lists had spread fear and insecurity
among the young male population and the 300,000 recruits who were needed came
forward slowly.
6
The census of 1860 revealed that the United States had a population of almost
31.4 million inhabitants, including approximately four million slaves living in slave
states, and almost 500,000 free blacks living half and half in free states and slave
states.
7
War weariness among the population and the menacing danger of defeat
finally demanded a decision about freeing and arming those four million slaves in
order to extend the Union troops and to prevent the slaves defecting to the rebel
troops. This precarious issue not only drove a wedge between Republicans and
Democrats but also divided the political parties themselves. This chapter will
describe the different parties in the debate about freeing and arming slaves, including
their different views on slavery and black emancipation.
5
Roy C. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 9 vols. New Brunswick, N.J., 1952
55, V, 297.
6
James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988. Vol. 6 of The Oxford History of the United States. 12 vols. 1982
, 490492.
7
For the whole census see James M. McPherson, The Negro's Civil War: How American Negroes
Felt and Acted during the War for the Union. New York: Pantheon Books, 1965, Appendix A.
5
2.1 President Lincoln and the Republican Party
Abolishing slavery was a difficult task to undertake because the institution of slavery
and therefore the right of property in slaves were protected by the American
Constitution. Neither President Lincoln nor the government were able to interfere
easily with slavery, and since it was deeply rooted in great parts of white American
society, nobody seemed willing to change old ideals in the first months of the war.
Before his election in 1860, Lincoln had declared himself that he had "no purpose,
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it
exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so."
8
This clearly shows that Lincoln had not planned to abolish slavery and he then, in
times of war, still believed he could find the key to end this insurrection some other
way. He spoke out in favor of the Constitution, which at the same time meant being
in favor of slavery as well.
Not all members of the Republican Party followed Lincoln unconditionally,
but three different factions over the question of slavery and black enlistment emerged
within the Republican Party. The radical faction believed that "emancipation could
be achieved by exercise of belligerent power to confiscate enemy property [slaves],"
and the conservative faction believed in an "ultimate demise of bondage ... by the
voluntary action of slave states."
9
Lincoln and his party supporters represented the
moderate faction. "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is
not either to save or to destroy slavery,"
10
Lincoln emphasized in a letter replying to
abolitionists' accusations published in the New York Tribune. Although Lincoln's
faction supported the radicals' moral aversion to slavery, they feared the racial
consequences of emancipation.
11
It was known that four million slaves could not be neutral, and sooner or later
they would argue in favor of either the North or the South. The Republican
administration respected the shield which was thrown over the institution of slavery,
although "it was known that the rebels were directly and indirectly employing their
slaves in the war against the Government," as Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Secretary of
the Navy, admitted in the aftermath in 1872.
12
The federal government did not dare
8
Basler (ed.), Collected Works, IV, 439.
9
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
10
Basler (ed.), Collected Works, V, 388.
11
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
12
Gideon Welles, "The History of Emancipation." The Galaxy. 14 (Dec. 1872): 838
851, November
7, 2013, 840.
6
to touch topics which conflicted with the Constitution, even though the anti-slavery
feeling in society increased steadily in the face of an impending incessant national
conflict. Instead, the government constantly refused to seize control from local
governments in states where slavery had always existed. Welles called this approach
a "policy of non-action and of strict construction" and he interpreted it as "the basis
of disaffection and civil war."
13
Slowly it dawned on the Republicans that the fate of the nation could not be
separated from the fate of slavery, but Lincoln's timid proposal of emancipation
earned great rejection among the population. An Ohio editor expressed discontent
with the Republicans' sentiment toward a war to free the slaves as follows: "a large
majority ... can see no reason why they should be shot for the benefit of niggers and
Abolitionists." If "the despot Lincoln" still tried to forcefully compel abolition, "he
would meet with the fate he deserves: hung, shot, or burned."
14
The vague political
course and insufficient steps were crucial reasons for the current war weariness and
doubt in the administration therewith, that in one and a half years of the war,
Republicans had not achieved any notable progress and people were, therefore,
longing for a change.
15
After the setback in the Seven Days Battle, when the war
began to turn into a total war, the Northern Democratic Party protested heavily
against the Republican war aims because they absolutely disliked this transformation.
In their eyes, the Republicans' only war aim was now "to destroy the old South
instead of to restore the old Union."
16
Republicans had a simple answer to that: arrest
for those who opposed Republican war aims, which meant that they were opposing
the war itself.
2.2 The Split of the Democratic Party
The Democratic Party split over the question of how to end the war. While radical
War Democrats switched mainly to the Republican Party, the larger part of the
Democrats became an antiwar party, calling themselves Peace Democrats or
Copperheads, who believed in a reunion through negotiations rather than victory.
The term "copperhead," the name of a venomous snake, had been invented by
13
Ibid., 838.
14
The Crisis, Oct. 15, 1862 in Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads.
New York: The Viking Press, 1942, 112.
15
Ibid., 110. On the anti-Republican sentiment see also McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 495, 560
62.
16
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
7
Republicans in the first place to insult antiwar Democrats. Although meant as an
insult, Peace Democrats proudly accepted this term and identified themselves with
it.
17
Nevertheless, the two factions of the Democrats agreed on one point:
opposition to emancipation. The issue of emancipation was raised in a time when a
racist view of the world was the norm; the Peace Democrats clearly shared that
position and "supported slavery, believing it to be the best situation for a degraded
race."
18
They perceived African Americans as inferior and the Southerners to have
fallen victim to abolitionists. They therefore strictly opposed Lincoln's plans of
emancipation because they feared that the president would act beyond his
constitutional powers, and they spread scary visions of what the freedmen would do
to Northern workers, their wives and daughters. "Free the blacks and enslave the
whites" was not their only slogan; they also extended Lincoln's slogan: "the
Constitution as it is, the Union as it was, and the Niggers where they are."
19
Peace Democrats were willing to trade victory for peace but apparently they
seemed unable to provide a realistic solution of how that state of peace could be
achieved. Moreover, they persistently remained deaf to the South's wish of being
independent, but rather planned an amendment to protect slavery in the South
forever.
20
Considering that they provided no constructive contribution to the debate,
their "refusal to deal with the complexity of the war and of governance nearly
consigns their ideas to the realm of fantasy,"
21
as stated by Jennifer Weber in her
research report about the Copperheads' political course. Although the Copperheads
must be seen as a strong opposition to Lincoln's course of politics, they never were
in the position to take the tiller, or as Weber puts it in appropriate words, "locked
into their own worldview, certain of their rectitude, they failed to appreciate that they
did not control their own destiny."
22
The black orator Frederick Douglass also
17
Jennifer Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln's Opponents in the North. Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 3. On the term "Copperhead" see also McPherson, Battle
Cry of Freedom, 494.
18
Ibid., 6.
19
Ibid.; Frank L. Klement quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 560.
20
Ibid., 4.
21
Ibid., 6.
22
Ibid., 9.
8
accused the Democratic Party of not having a clear course but being for and against
every issue at the same time.
23
During secession, many of the Peace Democrats who opposed the war did not
simultaneously support the rebels. They rather thought that secession was legal
because the constitution did not forbid it. As in the summer of 1862 and the
beginning of 1863 the Union armies had to bear military setbacks, with many people
joining the Peace Democrats because they longed for peace and were tired of the
war. All in all, it can be said that the power of the Peace Democrats ran in inverse
relation to the successes of the army: if it went well for Union forces, Copperheads
found no moral support, and vice versa. Although many Northerners considered the
Peace Democrats as traitors to the Union cause, historians have to admit that the
majority of them had always stayed loyal to the Union because their core issue was
that the nation returns to status quo ante bellum.
24
In view of their intentions and their actions, or even non-actions, I conclude
that Peace Democrats ignored the social changes completely and remained deaf to
the up-roaring voices of society which increasingly cried for freeing the slaves.
Bearing in mind that the Copperheads insisted on negotiations rather than a military
takeover, it seems ignorant to block the basis of negotiations with the South by this
refusal. Moreover, in a way they intended to keep the South under control,
completely ignoring Southern society's wish of being independent but rather keeping
on making the rules for them. In short, the Peace Democrats' answer to the war was
radical oppression of the South.
2.3 The Role of Fugitive Slaves
While politicians seemed to get wrapped up in discussions and theories about the
slavery issue, the part of the population in question decided that it was time for
action and entry into the debate. Thousands of slaves escaped from their masters and
entered the Union lines as fugitives because they saw the Union's war against the
South as a war against their masters. In the beginning they were returned to their
masters because this had been the usual procedure heretofore. However, times had
23
On Frederick Douglass's opinion on the Democratic Party see Philip Sheldon Foner (ed.), The Civil
War 1861
65. New York: International Publishers Co. Inc. 1952. Vol. 3 of The Life and Writings of
Frederick Douglass. 5 vols. 1950
1955, 381.
24
Weber, Copperheads, 1, 6
9, 16. On Peace Democrats' popularity see also David W. Blight,
Frederick Douglass' Civil War: Keeping Faith in Jubilee. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State
University Press, 1989, 156.
9
changed and since the North was now at war with the South, this method was slowly
thrown into doubt.
In returning fugitive slaves to their masters in the South, the Union was
actively supporting their enemy who was attacking the Constitution and the federal
government. McPherson points out that this might have weighed heavily upon black
people's trust in the federal government and may have driven them into the arms of
the Southerners, because they would now fight for the South in hope that their
masters would do what the Union had failed to do: set them free in the end.
25
With
this approach the Union risked losing a huge quantity of men who could be potential
soldiers.
The rebels had abjured their allegiance, refused to accept the Republican
government and, as a consequence, affirmed that they were no longer citizens of the
United States. According to Welles, Secretary of the Navy, the status of the rebels
was called into question and a discussion emerged about what rights Confederates
had to appeal to the Constitution and to make a demand on returning fled slaves to
them, which meant in fact, returning the slaves to their rebel government. Welles was
sure that the escape of the slaves expressed not only their running for shelter but, first
and foremost, their allegiance to the flag, and the Union should therefore not send
away those stalwarts.
26
The illogic of the Confederates' idea of seceding from the
Union on the one hand, but referring to the Union's constitution on the other hand,
soon triggered a debate in the North about how to deal with fugitive slaves.
As discussed earlier, politically diverse voices took part in this debate. The
conservative voice said the president must return the slaves to the slave-owners; the
radical voice said it was the president's duty to rob the slaves. Lincoln, being in the
middle of the conflict, intended most of all to obey the law.
27
One the one hand,
returning the slaves to the South could be considered as a step toward the rebels,
which asserted that the North still wanted to support Southern society and clarified
that they had no interest in boycotting the South. On the other hand, robbing the
slaves and using them for their own war aims would be a clear signal of
demonstrating power and the indefeasibility of the federal government. At the same
25
McPherson, The Negro's Civil War, 22
23. On returning fugitive slaves see also "Position of the
Government toward Slavery," DM, June, 1861, in Foner (ed.), Life and Writings, III, 104
109.
26
Welles, "The History of Emancipation," 838.
27
Ibid., 839.
10
time, the Union would also send a clear signal that they considered restructuring the
ideals of Southern society.
After the government had declared that returning fugitives to their ex-masters
would be renounced in the future, the problem was far from being solved because the
political course was not indisputably set yet. Fugitives from the four non-seceding
slave states Missouri, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky were still returned because
their masters had a right to appeal to the Constitution, which protected the institution
of slavery. This discordance about the issue was mirrored in the Union officers'
arbitrary acts, because some of them were convinced that fugitive slaves must be
excluded from the Union lines and others welcomed slaves and proclaimed their
freedom. This clearly shows that the decision of not returning fugitives to the South
did not mean the Union had abolished slavery itself and so "the country was not fully
to pronounce freedom to all slaves."
28
Another indicator of this confusion is General
Hunter's proclamation on May 9, 1862, in which he said that the states Georgia,
Florida, and South Carolina had been put under martial law because they had
seceded from the United States. Furthermore, Hunter confirmed that "slavery and
martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible" and slaves "are therefore
declared forever free."
29
Lincoln annulled this proclamation promptly with the
reasoning that no person had been authorized to make such a proclamation, and that
if such a proclamation were necessary, he as Commander in Chief for the Army and
Navy would make that decision himself, not the officers on the field.
30
These interpretations and misinterpretations of the government's political
course about how to deal with fugitive slaves show the complexity of the slavery
issue, which must be addressed with great sensitivity since it is rooted so deeply in
American society. Nevertheless, the wind of change had reached the United States.
The following chapter will show the change in the institution of slavery, with the
focus on the enlistment of black regiments.
28
Ibid., 40.
29
Basler (ed.), Collected Works, V, 222.
30
Ibid., 222
23.
11
3. The Rocky Road over Emancipation to the First Black Regiments
3.1 Arrival of the Fugitives
Union officers seemed to be overwhelmed by the circumstances caused by the war,
on the one hand, and ambiguous political instructions on the other. However, the
fugitive slaves were now present, either because political law allowed them to come
and stay or because they had come of their own initiative and officers had to deal
with the situation
although a new article of war issued in July 1862 not only
forbade the returning of fugitive slaves who were seeking refuge and freedom but
also stated that fugitive slaves were "deemed captives of war, and shall be forever
free of their servitude and not again held as slaves."
31
Although officers might obey
the first section, they did not bother to enable fugitives to live in more humane
conditions than slavery. Union General Thomas described for the New York Times a
freedmen camp which he had visited near Cairo, Illinois. He had been shattered
"seeing these black people huddled together, abused and neglected by those who had
been in charge of them." In this one camp alone, 2,500 blacks had died from
"measles, pneumonia and small-pox" due to the disastrous sanitary situation Thomas
observed and in which the fugitives were "dying like sheep." As a consequence,
many fugitives had already returned to the rebels, preferring slavery over this even
more degrading and inhuman treatment through the Union army.
32
George Luther Stearns, a later recruiter of black soldiers, to mention another
example, also observed terrible treatment in a freedmen camp near Nashville,
Tennessee, where hundreds of fugitives had found shelter with General William
Rosecrans's army. But when Stearns reported the inhumane conditions to Edwin M.
Stanton, Secretary of War, he did not receive any positive answer. Instead he got
active himself and tried to convince Tennesseans "to support a policy of humane
treatment, prompt payment, education, and enlistment rather than impressments of
the freedmen."
33
McPherson explains the varying scale of the officers' behavior
therewith, that Northern soldiers fought first of all for the Union and against treason
and only a minority were abolitionists and showed real interest in fighting for black
freedom. Officers of the Union army did not employ blacks because they wanted
31
Ibid., 435.
32
The New York Times, 20 July 1863, online archive, accessed on November 16, 2013.
33
McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, 209
210.
12
them to be free but because they wanted to weaken the enemy and seizure of the
fugitives deprived the rebels of their strength.
34
In August 1862 the First Confiscation Act was issued, "allowing for the
seizure of all Confederate property used to aid the war effort." This "property"
included fugitive slaves, who were seen as the property of the slaveholders and now,
when they entered Union lines, were treated as "contraband of war."
35
The
Confiscation Act only applied to slaves who had worked at fortifications and in
military buildings in general and had thereby helped to advance the military power of
the Confederacy. It did not emancipate blacks but it was an important step toward
emancipation and black freedom. After the idea settled of confiscating blacks, the
idea of using them as military forces against the South gathered speed. Since the
huge number of contrabands grew out of control and an end of the war was not in
sight, the idea of black enlistment became more vigorous.
36
As David W. Blight,
professor of history, appropriately interprets this new act, "initial consideration of
Blacks as soldiers must be seen in this context: a war that, if waged long enough,
would have to crush Southern society in order to preserve the Union."
37
From the
moment when black enlistment would be announced officially, there was no doubt
that American society could not restore the Union as it was, because if the blacks
fought in the Union army against the Confederates, there would be no going back to
the old status as slaves.
The question of black enlistment simultaneously raised the question of black
emancipation, for which two important steps had to be taken: the political
emancipation and the settling of this emancipation in the minds of Northern whites.
First, I will investigate the political course and the circumstances which made it so
hard to pass laws in favor of black emancipation. Then I will explore the shifting
public opinion toward the black race at the time, summarizing voices for and against
the emerging first black regiments.
34
Ibid., 208
10; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 497, 502.
35
Blight, Frederick Douglass' Civil War, 151. See also Basler (ed.), Collected Works, IV, 439.
36
Ibid., 151
52; McPherson, The Negro's Civil War, 28.
37
Ibid.
13
3.2 The Slavery Element The Struggle with the Border States
3.2.1 Gradual Compensated Emancipation
The four border-states Missouri, Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky were slave states
which had not seceded from the Union. Still, the slavery element constituted a
common interest which they shared with the rebels and not the North. Because of
this, the federal government was urged to proceed cautiously and deliberately with
laws and acts concerning the institution of slavery if they did not want to risk losing
the allegiance of the border-states. Although there was hatred of the abolitionists,
patriotism and confidence in the president still held the majority of people in the
border-states.
38
At the beginning of 1862, Lincoln did not want to move away from the idea
that the conflict might be solved without social dislocation; rather, he envisaged the
cooperation of slave owners in the border-states. Slavery became a decisive topic in
the war and Lincoln's course included "to bring the slave element to our aid instead
of having it turned against us."
39
His suggestion was a governmental pecuniary aid
for states which agreed to gradual abolishment of slavery. Lincoln offered "to co-
operate with any state which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery."
40
To
acquaint Congress with the heretofore rather utopian idea of emancipation of people
of the black race, he used "gradual abolishment" rather than "gradual emancipation"
to first of all only suggest abolishing the institution of slavery rather than suggesting
that the freed slaves must be treated as equals. These carefully chosen words show
again the complexity of the topic.
Lincoln thought that "gradual, and not sudden emancipation, is better for
all."
41
According to Lincoln the rebel states were still counting on the border-states
to finally affiliate to the Confederacy. The president assumed that since the offer of
voluntary emancipation was made to all the states, and that only the border-states
would accept this offer, the initiation of emancipation in the Northern slave states
would send a clear signal to the South that their hope would never be fulfilled. To
critics who feared immense costs of this economic compensation for the lost unpaid
38
Welles, "The History of Emancipation," 840.
39
Ibid., 841.
40
Basler (ed.), Collected Works, V, 144.
41
Ibid., 145.
14
laborers, Lincoln countered that "three months of the war would buy all the slaves in
the four border-states."
42
In May 1862 the border-states still fought shy of taking up position and were
still hoping for an imminent military victory. They wanted to shirk responsibility of
making clear assertions on the issue of slavery. Even after the great defeat in the
Seven Days Battle, the border-states politicians remained blind, and Lincoln insisted
on not doing any action before common ground was found with the border-states
because "to arm the Negros would turn 50,000 bayonets from the loyal Border States
against us that were for us."
43
Instead, he made another appeal in July in which he asked the border-states to
show "definitely and certainly, that, in no event, will the states you represent ever
join their proposed Confederacy" by making not "emancipation at once, but ... a
decision at once to emancipate gradually," because if the war continued, "the
institution in your states will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion ... it will
be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it."
44
Welles declared that
"there was little doubt after war commenced that chattel slavery was doomed, there
was much doubt and uncertainty when and in what manner its total extinction was to
be brought about."
45
Besides the offer of pecuniary aid, the colonization project was also part of
Lincoln's plan which was supposed to offer the border-states an opportunity to get
rid of the slaves after they had freed them but did not want to integrate them in their
society. "Room in South Africa for colonization, can be obtained cheaply, and in
abundance," promised Lincoln, and he predicted that "the freed people will not be so
reluctant to go."
46
According to Welles, Lincoln was of the opinion that whites and
blacks could not dwell together in unity.
47
The idea of colonization was camouflaged
in the gallant purpose to emigrate the freedmen to another land where they would
have better opportunities. The colonization project reveals once more how deeply
racism is rooted in American society. First, they were forced in a way to import
people from Africa because they had killed almost all the native population, and now
42
Ibid.; "Message to Congress" in ibid., 144
46. See also McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 498.
43
Ibid., 357. See also McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 499 and James M. McPherson, The
Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War and Reconstruction. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964, 196.
44
Ibid., 317
18.
45
Welles, "The History of Emancipation," 841.
46
Basler (ed.), Collected Works, V, 318.
47
Welles, "The History of Emancipation," 840
41.
