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Is Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ enough to maintain US Influence in East Asia?

A look at Security Issues and the Senkaku Islands Dispute

©2015 Academic Paper 145 Pages

Summary

The 20th century has been defined as the American Century, however, the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia.
Today, East Asia is home to a third of the world’s population and includes some of the world’s largest economies. Hence the US has placed more emphasis on the region, to strengthen its economic ties and to show its long term allies that it has not forgotten about them. Disengagement from the Middle East and the rise of China has meant that the US has again turned its focus to the Asia-Pacific and East Asia, a region rife with old, long seated distrust and territorial disputes.
The dissertation will focus on how the US is executing its ‘Pivot to Asia’ focusing on the many security issues which it must deal with, both those involving its allies and those involving its strategic rivals. All while trying to maintain its influence over East Asia in the face of a rising China.
Whilst the US is welcomed by some and unwelcomed by others, the dissertation will try and determine whether the US’s renewed interest will contribute to the prosperity of East Asia or whether the US will again be bogged down in a region where it is not welcomed.

Excerpt

Table Of Contents


5.5.
Conclusion ... 50
Chapter 6 Case Study 1: Military Comparisons in East Asia... 51
6.1.
Introduction ... 52
6.2.
The Importance of Naval and Aerial Assets ... 53
6.3.
Economics ... 55
6.4.
China and the US ... 55
6.5.
Japan ... 58
6.6.
Vietnam and the Philippines... 59
6.7.
Taiwan... 61
6.8.
Conclusion ... 62
Chapter 7 Case Study 2: The Senkaku Islands Dispute ... 64
7.1.
Introduction ... 65
7.2.
Historical Context and Claims ... 65
7.2.1.
Japan ... 65
7.2.2.
China and Taiwan ... 66
7.3.
Geographical Evidence ... 67
7.4.
Reactions and Actions since 2012 ... 69
7.5.
US Involvement ... 72
7.6.
Conclusion ... 74
Chapter 8 Conclusion... 75
8.1.
Overview ... 76
8.2.
Findings and Results... 78
8.3.
Gaps and Limitations... 80
8.4.
Conclusion ... 82
Appendix A: Maps and Infographics... 85
Appendix B: Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution... 105
Bibliography ... 106
iv

Table of Figures
Figure 1: The East and South China Seas and surrounding countries... 85
Figure 2: East Asia as defined by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs... 86
Figure 3: Island Disputes in East Asia... 87
Figure 4: ADIZs in the East China Sea and the declared Chinese ADIZ... 88
Figure 5: ADIZs in the East China Sea after November 2013 ... 89
Figure 6: China's nine-dot line... 90
Figure 7: Major Chinese land reclamation project on Duncan Island ... 91
Figure 8: Chinese Construction on Woody Island ... 92
Figure 9: Chinese Activity on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spartlys ... 93
Figure 10: The First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain ... 94
Figure 11: Naval firepower in the Northern Pacific Rim... 95
Figure 12: US forces deployed in East Asia ... 96
Figure 13: US bases in East Asia... 97
Figure 14: New bases opening in East Asia as part of the US pivot to Asia ... 98
Figure 15: Military Power in East Asia... 99
Figure 16: Trade flow in East Asia ... 100
Figure 17: The Spartly Islands and their claimants ... 101
Figure 18: The increase in military budgets across East Asia since 2012... 102
Figure 19: Upgrade Priorities in East Asia since 2009. ... 103
Figure 20: RIMPAC 2014 infographic... 104
v

List of Acronyms and Terms
A2/AD ­ Anti- Access/Area Denial
ADIZ ­ Air Defence and Identification Zone
APEC ­ Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN ­ Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASM ­ Anti-Ship Missile
ASW ­ Anti-Submarine Warfare
BMD ­ Ballistic Missile Defence
East Asia ­ The US Department of State considers East Asia to include all countries
East of Burma and West of Samoa (fig. 2) and are managed under the Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This book adopts this meaning when referring to the
region.
East Asia ­ Geographically East Asia includes the countries of China, Japan,
Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan.
Southeast Asia ­ Geographically Southeast Asia includes the countries of Brunei,
Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
FDI ­ Foreign Direct Investment
GDP ­ Gross Domestic Product
GWoT ­ Global War on Terror
ICJ ­ International Court Of Justice
vi

IFV ­ Infantry Fighting Vehicles
JASDF ­ Japan Air Self-Defence Force
JMSDF ­ Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force
JSDF ­ Japan Self-Defence Force
MEU ­ Marine Expeditionary Unit
PLA ­ People's Liberation Army
PLAN ­ People's Liberation Army Navy
PRC/PROC ­ People's Republic of China, colloquially known as China
R&D ­ Research and Development
RIMPAC ­ Rim of the Pacific Exercise
ROC ­ Republic of China, better known as Taiwan
SLBM ­ Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles
SSBN ­ Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear
TPP ­ Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNCLOS ­ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US/USA ­ United States of America
USAF ­ United States Air Force
USMC ­ United States Marine Corps
USN ­ United States Navy
USSR ­ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Soviet Union
vii


Chapter 1
Introduction
1

1.1. Aims, Objectives and Background
East Asia is home to two billion people or 30% of the world's population (World
Population Data Sheet, 2014), and boasts the world's largest and most successful
modern economies. For this reason the United States has always been interested in
this part of the world; it has a long history of involvement here, and today plays a major
role in the region. This book will focus on US influence in East Asia, specifically
how Barrack Obama's so called `Pivot to Asia' aims at keeping the US at the heart of
the region.
After ten years of focus on the Middle East with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
Global War on Terror, Barrack Obama came to the Presidency with the idea of shifting
US attention to East Asia, a region which offers many opportunities. Economically East
Asia has vast markets and potential; offering immense opportunities for trade,
investment and technology which President Obama is determined to exploit to further
expand the American economy. Militarily East Asia is a region where the US has
invested significant energy and resources in the last 70 years and is home to both long
term allies: Japan and South Korea, and rivals: North Korea and China.
To this end this book looks at the historic role the US has played vis-à-vis the
other nations in the region and how the rise of China is threatening to upset the
`balance' which exists with an emphasis on security issues in an area that is full of flash
points which can potentially lead to war. Indeed many have argued that one of the
underlining causes for the shift in focus is the fact that the last thirty years have seen
the rise of the economic giant that is China. Today we are living in a world where China
is the world's second largest economy (BBC, Dec 2014) and where it is increasingly
2

flexing its muscles in both regional and global affairs that are threatening US hegemony
and the unipolar world order.
At the heart of this study is the discourse surrounding the `Pivot to Asia', with
emphasis on security issues. This book
looks at the intentions of President
Obama's shift, the scale of the rebalance, the advantages gained from this shift and
the criticism surrounding the `Pivot to Asia'. The US pivot `on the ground' has meant
the deployment of troops and assets to the region, together with the reinforcing of
security commitments and a renewed push to pursue friendly ties. These actions are
discussed at length, with the hope of providing an accurate picture of US action in Asia
and try to determine whether these are enough to guarantee US influence.
Despite the obvious emphasis on the US and China this book also looks at a
number of players in the East Asia region. This was done to show that; US and Chinese
actions do not exist in a vacuum and, more importantly, that the US cannot maintain
influence here if it is not welcomed. This means that this study will focus on both
long term US allies like Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines but also on countries like
Vietnam, which traditionally are not considered as US allies. What all these countries
have in common however is outstanding issues with China which has meant that the
US rebalance to Asia was welcomed by these countries as an initiative that will counter
China's growing power and guarantee the rule of law and the protection of shipping
lanes in the East and South China Seas.
1.2. Study Outline
This study
is divided into eight chapters, each chapter discusses a different
aspect of the `Pivot to Asia'. The following chapter will treat US history in the context
of East Asia and the Asia Pacific, this is done by giving some background on the US
3

position in East Asia. The Historical Context Chapter will look at the involvement of the
US since the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 1854 until the end of the Cold
War. Each period brought with it renewed challenges for the US which it was able to
overcome. Similarly today the US is facing new challenges in East Asia.
This is followed by a literature review which analyses the literature surrounding the US
`Pivot to Asia', specifically the writings of analysts and authors, together with critique
and policy documents. The idea is to give an insight into the challenges and problems
facing the US in Asia and how the US aims to overcome these challenges. Specifically,
the literature review looks at the discourse surrounding Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD) strategies and the viewpoints of the different players regarding the `Pivot to
Asia'. Criticism is discussed both in regard to the validity of the Pivot itself and the
means taken to achieve it.
The fourth chapter will treat theory and methodology. In this chapter two theories, the
Security Dilemma and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability are examined and applied to
the situation in East Asia. This is done to try and determine the possible future of East
Asia in the context of renewed US interests in the region. This is followed by a
Methodology where the tools and techniques used to write this study are
mentioned so that the research can be better understood together with an overview of
the case studies and the techniques used. This section also mentions the difficulties
encountered when researching the study and how they were overcome.
The fifth chapter analyses the `Pivot to Asia' in more detail; it looks at the actions of the
US `on the ground', rather than focusing on policy or strategy documents. Of
importance in this chapter is the role that the various countries play and how the US is
engaging China, not solely on its own initiatives, but also through the use of third
4

parties and multilateral talks. Emphasis is placed on security issues, territorial disputes
and the protection of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
in the China Seas. A brief mention of the economic importance of East Asia is also
undertaken, most notably the importance of the TPP and willingness of the Obama
administration to undertake such an agreement. Together with this, the `Pivot to Asia'
is looked at as not solely a new concept that President Obama created but rather a
continuation of the work of previous administrations; since 1989 US administrations
have always had an East Asia aspect which some Presidents pursued to a great
extent, but others chose to ignore.
The sixth and seventh chapters are the case studies where two specific issues are
looked at and analysed. These were specifically chosen to demonstrate the
involvement of the US in the region and complements the work done in the theory
chapter.
The first case study will focus on the effects of China's military rise, specifically focusing
on the impact of the increased capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and
how the region is in the grips of an arms race. Countries are increasingly re-arming
and modernising their armed forces in an attempt to counter China's massive military
build-up. Emphasis is placed on the countries which have outstanding issues with
China and the case study aims to establish a general trend in the re-arming of East
Asia. Most importantly the role of the US in re-arming said region is scrutinised.
The second case study will focus on the Senkaku Islands and the role that the US is
playing in the dispute, and how it differs from the territorial disputes in the South China
Sea. The Senkaku Islands saga is of particular interest since they are one of the few
instances where China was unable to occupy a territory claimed by another country. A
5

point of interest is also the fact that the US, Japan and, to a certain extent, Taiwan are
presenting a common front against Chinese aggression. The case study can in itself
be used as an example by the countries in the South China Sea of how to deter further
Chinese aggression.
In the eighth, and final chapter, the findings of this study are summed up and a
conclusion is derived to answer the research question, followed by the opinions of the
author. Possible gaps in the research which could not be addressed for various
reasons are hereby mentioned. The importance of East Asia, both to US foreign policy
and to the world in general, is established.
6

Chapter 2
Historical Context
7

The US has a long history of involvement in East Asia going back more than 150 years.
In this context a rebalance towards Asia is nothing new, indeed the US undertook
similar rebalances at different intervals during its existence. This chapter aims to
provide some historical context to the presence of the US in East Asia today and show
that the US has maintained a strong presence in the region for the last century and a
half.
Historically, US expansion has always been westwards not only in terms of territorial
annexation and acquisitions but also in colonial terms. This was due to a number of
reasons, chief amongst which is the fact that as a country formed in 1783 (when the
Treaty of Paris was signed and officially recognised the US) it is a rather modern nation
when compared with the European nations which had colonised it. In this sense the
US, flanked by the European nations to the East had to look westward for expansion.
This resulted in the US expanded first to the shores of the Pacific and then in the later
part of the 19
th
century beyond them to Asia.
Economically the US became involved in East Asia in the 19
th
Century. Alongside other
European nations it benefited from treaty ports which were open to foreign trade after
the defeat of China in the First Opium War. In 1842 the Americans gained access to
Shanghai in Central China and in 1876 to the port of Beihai in Southern China.
However US involvement was limited to these ports. The US did not seek to acquire
leased territory unlike the other powers. Instead it focused its effort on opening trade
with Japan, which at the time had effectively isolated itself and its trade was limited to
its neighbours and, occasionally, the Dutch. The US government realised the potential
of establishing a relationship with Japan and in 1853 commissioned Commodore
8

Matthew Calbraith Perry to take a fleet to Japan and establish diplomatic relations with
the Japanese Government whatever the cost. Against the threat of naval bombardment
and over two trips Perry negotiated the opening of Japan and in 1854 signed the
Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity that opened a number of ports to US trade and
established a permanent US consul. This can be considered as the start of US
involvement in East Asia, in a move that for the first time was not a catching up to the
actions of the other European powers, but rather a unique initiative aimed at offsetting
the late arrival of the US in Asia.
It was also during this period that the US first got involved in Taiwan. Commodore
Perry on his way to Japan saw the advantages of the island and proposed setting up
a base there. In the late 1850s there was talk of either conquering or out-rightly
purchasing the island, however US policy at the time did not involve the acquisition of
land in East Asia (Long, 1991: 18).
The 1890s were an important period for the US in the Asia-Pacific. In 1893 the US
overthrew the native government of Hawaii, resulting in the annexation of the territory
in 1896 and in 1898, during the Spanish-American War, the US also acquired the
Philippines from Spain. Other territorial possessions in the Pacific included various
smaller islands like the Midway Islands, Johnston Atoll, American Samoa, Jarvis
Island, Howland Island and Wake Island, all located in the Mid Pacific. Today these
possessions are still territories of the US but are mostly uninhabited or maintained as
military outposts. Control over the Philippines was especially useful due to the
geographic location of the islands; near the Asian mainland but still at a considerable
distance, meaning that its ports were well protected. Later these possessions proved
to be indispensable, with the construction of the Panama Canal 1881 - 1914, increasing
US accessibility to the Asia-Pacific. The Spanish-American War served to establish
9

the US as a major maritime power capable of operating anywhere in the world (US
Pacific Fleet Website).
The start of the 20
th
century saw further expansion of US interests in Asia. In 1907 the
Asiatic and Pacific Squadrons merged and in 1922 a restructuring of the US Pacific
and Atlantic Fleets was undertaken in the Pacific where the main body of fighting ships
was stationed, a first for the US navy (Ibid.) representing what was in fact a rebalance
towards the Asia-Pacific. Due to its late entry into WWI the US did not see action in the
Pacific, the only substantial campaign undertaken here during the first part of the 20
th
century was the Philippine­American War (1899­1902) where the Navy played an
important role. Apart from this the US role in the region was purely an economic one
during this period.
This however changed with the onset of WWII. For the first time the US faced a number
of unique challenges, as it had to divide its forces between the Atlantic and the Pacific,
whilst conducting a campaign alone against the Empire of Japan, which involved
assaulting small Japanese held islands across the pacific as a preparation of an
assault on the main islands of Japan which was labelled as the `Island-hopping
campaign'. The campaign involved the retaking of the Philippines, Guam and the
Mariana islands amongst others, which would become important strategic US bases
after the war. The defeat of Japan resulted in the US gaining bases in Japan and the
start of a close alliance between the two which is still in force today.
After the war the US became increasingly involved in East Asia in the ongoing
ideological struggle against the USSR. Indeed WWII highlighted the difficulties of
waging war across two oceans, something which the US would have to again
undertake if the cold war turned hot. This was further aggravated by the advent of
10

SLBM, resulting in the need to adopt a new naval strategy. This new strategy would
encompass the lessons of WWII operations and would involve controlling strategic
choke points; prohibiting the transition of Soviet vessels from the Barents Sea into the
Atlantic, control of the Strait of Malacca in the Pacific and limiting Chinese Naval activity
to the China Seas. Together with this was the use of airpower, based at the many US
possessions in the Pacific and Asia, as vital in finding and destroying Soviet vessels
especially Soviet nuclear submarines which could launch directly on the US (Polmar
and Moore, 2005). In the early stages of the Cold War the relationship with China was
soured by the fact that a communist revolution took place resulting in the US and its
allies being outnumbered in the Asia-Pacific region, having to fight both the USSR and
the Republic of China (PRC), however this did not last long as tensions between the
USSR and the PRC resulted in the Sino-Soviet Split during the 1960s.
The importance of bases and naval assets to project power in East Asia was
demonstrated during the US involvement in the Korean and Vietnam War. In both
cases US bases in Japan and the US Navy (USN) were vital in supporting and
supplying troops on the ground. This was followed by huge expenditure by the US to
expand and upgrade its bases in Japan, Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere.
Together with this was the US position of not recognising the PRC, which had a
communist regime in place, and instead recognising the Taiwan (RoC) as the
legitimate China.
In the 1960s and 70s the situation still did not look entirely favourable as the US lost
more of the region to communism; South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. However in
the 1970s this was offset by the opening of relations with China, thanks to the work of
the Nixon Administration and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It was this event that
laid the foundation for the Sino-US economic and diplomatic ties we see today. In effect
11

the recognition of Communist China by the US opened China to the world and
transformed it into the factory of the world. In the context of the Cold War the relation
between China and the US meant that China was denied to the USSR and it would not
get involved in a Soviet-US struggle. In 1979 there was official recognition by the US
of the PRC, much to the condemnation of Taiwan. In many ways the situation in the
region today is a legacy of the Cold War, East Asia was a region where the Cold War
was actively being waged.
The end of the Cold War and the economic growth of the region as a whole, has meant
that the US has become more intertwined with the region. Today it maintains diplomatic
relations with most states even those still under Communist rule. US policy today does
not exist in a vacuum but is influence by past actions. The irony being that the US
which opened relations with China to further isolate and contain the USSR, is today
very much engaging with Communist China. In a region where the US, China and its
neighbours have a lot of outstanding issues, ranging from human rights abuse to
territorial dispute to currency manipulation, the US is welcomed at the discussion table
as a mediator and a counter to the strong position that China enjoys in the region.
12

Chapter 3
Literature Review
13

3.1. Introduction
This literature review is intended to analyse the presence of the US in East Asia,
looking at the challenges which the US faces in the region, including the commitments
to its allies and containing the rise of China which is looking to become the hegemon
in the region while also taking into account the other main players. After being
embroiled for more than a decade in wars in the Middle East, with arguable results, the
US is looking to shift its emphasis to other regions of the globe, representing a shift in
policy from a focus on the Middle East and Europe to a focus on Asia.
The phrase `Pivot to Asia' became popular after then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
used it in an article called `America's Pacific Century' (2011). Subsequently the terms
`pivot' and `rebalance' became buzzwords signifying this shift in American foreign
policy. Clinton outlined the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for the US and why
such a shift was justifiable. Amongst these she mentions the fact that the region is
home to almost half of the world's population representing an economic interest and a
growing consumer base for American firms, reassuring its allies in the region, including
Japan and South Korea against a nuclear North Korea and balancing the rise of China.
According to Clinton this has to be achieved by strengthening the already existing
bilateral security alliances that the US maintains in the region and consolidating the
already broad US military presence to reassure allies and meet future challenges.
These points were further elaborated upon by a speech that President Obama gave to
the Australian parliament in 2011 (Obama, 2011) where he stated "Our enduring
interests in the region demand our enduring presence in the region. The United States
14

is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay", showing the importance and the effort that
his administration is taking to widen US presence in the region.
This shift has been met with mixed success. Renewed turmoil in the Middle East and
unexpected events in North Africa and Eastern Europe meant that the US could not
completely focus on Asia. Many have welcomed this shift and applauded its aims whilst
others question the methods undertaken despite agreeing in principle that a rebalance
was needed, ultimately questioning whether the efforts of the Obama administration
are enough to guarantee success. Others still question if this rebalance comes at the
expense of US commitments elsewhere, notably in Europe, or if a rebalance towards
Asia was ever needed at all. This literature review aims to evaluate these concerns.
3.2. The US and Asia
Michael Cox (2012) states that although the US has been a major power in the Pacific
region since 1941, its place has never been really secure; its loss of China to
communism, the loss of North Korea and finally the loss of Vietnam during the Cold
War undermined its position. Cox argues that it was only with the end of the Cold War
that the US firmly established itself in the region. Still more than twenty years after the
end of the Cold War, debate rages on regarding the role of the US in the region. This
in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and the 2008 financial crisis. Despite
all this he still firmly believes that the US will remain a major player, for the time being
for three reasons. Firstly it is a welcomed player in the region ­ it is welcomed by China
as a force that brings stability to the region, vital for its `peaceful rise', while Japan and
South Korea continually look at the US for guidance and protection with the US
presence ensuring South Korea's continued existence. Secondly the current stability
in the region does not mean that the region can do without US interference, the US will
15

remain to safeguard its growing economic interest while at the same time ensuring that
states in the region remain in its sphere of influence. The third reason, according to
Cox, is the fact that players in the region have fewer doubts regarding the US's
intention than they do about their neighbours. Despite the setting up of a new (current)
Asian order, the legacy of the region's bloody past still lives on.
Ashley J. Tellis (2013) examines the irony of the rise of China. He mentions that there
could not have been a powerful China without a powerful US sustaining the
international economic order which allowed China's peaceful rise. In return China has
become completely integrated in the international economic system. According to
Tellis the idea should be of balancing and not containing China. The reference being
that the US cannot take up the same policy of containment that it did with the USSR,
where a trade relationship between the US and the USSR was non-existent and this is
where the importance of balancing comes in according to Tellis. He believes that
although Beijing's intentions are peaceful today it does not mean that they will remain
so and according to him the US must balance this by integrating China's neighbours
into a unified alliance system, developing collective defence strategies and support the
rise of other Asian powers in what he labels as "Not pushing China down, raise others
up". This sees the US helping states like Japan, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia
and Australia realize their strategic potential and increasing their mutual cooperation
with each other and the US. This, according to Tellis, would have the result of balancing
and inducing good behaviour from China. However, Tellis admits that this strategy will
only work if the US can maintain its military superiority in the region, an area in which
the US faces various challenges.
16

3.3. The View from China and US Challenges
The problem with the `Pivot to Asia' is the fact that it comes at the expense of the
biggest country in the region: China. Many, including the Chinese, see the rebalance
as being aimed at containing their rising power. The Chinese ambition is to once again
be a central power within the region, something which they hope to achieve through
economic performance and military prowess (Saunders et al. 2011).
Indeed military factors weigh heavy on the minds of planners and observers. Many see
China's military modernization as a way for China to further augment its presence in
the region; many specifically point to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
modernisation as a way for China to extend its influence beyond its shores, into its
immediate seas and, in the future, beyond the region as it develops blue water
capability. In the last 20 years the Chinese Navy has seen extensive modernisation
which has transformed it from a coast guard type force into a green water navy (Nan
Li, 2009). According to Li (2009) this was the result of various factors: the fact that
China has integrated into the word economy and depends on imports via sea, the fact
that it has a huge coast and the fact that the US 7
th
Fleet, the largest US fleet, is forward
deployed to the region. Li estimates that around 2020 the Chinese navy will have
achieved blue water capability with access to various advanced technologies despite
the fact that acquiring these capabilities, which include aircraft carriers, is contradictory
to the image that China wants to convey of a `peaceful rise'. The transition from a green
water force to a blue water force is also outlined in the PLAN strategy (fig. 10) where
it first wants to extend its influence to Taiwan (the 1
st
Island Chain) and then to Guam
(the 2
nd
Island Chain) (The Economist, 7 Apr. 2012)
17

The idea that China will achieve a `peaceful rise' seems to have been premature, as
Arthur Waldron (2014) points out. According to Waldron these last few years have seen
China put diplomatic and military pressure on her neighbours. He cites a chain of
events starting in 1974 with the seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam and
of the Spratly Islands in 1988 (fig. 3). There was also the occupation of Mischief Reef,
taken from the Philippines in 1994 and the 2012 attempt to take over Scarborough
Shoal from the Philippines which was not successful. The uneasy relationship with
Japan over the Senkaku Islands and the establishment of an Air Defence Identification
Zone (ADIZ) over the Islands in 2013 (fig. 4) show China's intent to use military might
to increase its influence. Waldron also mentions various confrontations between USN
and PLAN vessels at sea (specifically the USS Cowpens incident [Harper, 2013]) and
sees this as a sign that China is willing to engage in potentially reckless behaviour.
However, Waldron, does see it as being rather difficult for China to achieve hegemony
in the region ­ describing the strategy that China is taking as being unrealistic. He cites
the example of the ADIZ where China cannot even make its neighbours adhere to it.
The reality is that China's neighbours simply ignored it, indeed the US, South Korea
and Japan all sent military aircraft to test China's intent and China failed to take action
(Waldron, 2014). Similarly China has only once, in recent years, successfully taken
over territory previously administered by other nations ­ the Mischief Reef where China
built military fortifications and installed a garrison on the islands, mostly due to
Philippine indifference to the matter as it did not want to antagonise China. Despite this
a recent action by China to occupy the Scarborough Shoal did not succeed instead
this produced an unintentional effect where China's neighbours are undertaking naval
modernisation programs and increasing military spending to deny China an easy take-
over of territory. The idea behind this tactic is to deny China local superiority near
18

contested islands. Waldron points out that the Chinese have a particular method of
taking over contested islands; first they drop temporary buoys, then they send their
fishing fleet, they then erect temporary military fortifications and after a while they
become permanent reinforced concrete constructions and a garrison is established
(fig. 7/8/9). This according to Waldron shows how China cannot prevail decisively
against an opponent with a weak navy let alone a regional or worldwide power.
Denying access to certain areas is a strategy not only limited to China's neighbours
but is also used by China when confronted with much stronger opponents like the USN.
Due to the fact that China's own navy is not up to the task of challenging the USN's
superiority and the fact that a US battle group stationed off China's coast can exert
command and control over wide areas, even inland, China has adopted an A2/AD
strategy where it hopes to deny any opponent the use of the South and East China
Seas (fig. 1). This strategy involves the use of submarines, mines and land based
launchers to sink approaching enemy flotillas. According to James R. Holmes (2014),
this presents various challenges to the USN, amongst these is the fact that the USN
has not engaged in this type of warfare since the days of the Cold War. This according
to Holmes has resulted in a generational gap in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and
A2/AD tactics have become an afterthought in post-Cold War navies (this is not limited
to the USN) who are instead trained to engage enemies inland and in peace-
keeping/disaster relief missions. This is further proven by the instance when a Chinese
submarine surfaced within range of a US Carrier Group (Hickley, 2007).
The A2/AD challenge is further elaborated upon by David W. Kearn (2014). He takes
it a step further by introducing the concept of Air-Sea Battle to counter the A2/AD
strategy which entails close cooperation between the USN and USAF. This strategy
entails increased diversification of bases (fig. 13/14) which would be able to withstand
19

an initial strike by weaponry associated with A2/AD and after having withstood these
attacks the USAF and USN would then attack and destroy these weapons. Keeping
this momentum the Air Force and Navy would keep identifying targets and attacking in
depth until the area is secure. This strategy would allow the US the ability to take up a
defensive posture and seize the initiative in any potential conflict in Asia.
Again A2/AD is not limited to China, indeed according to Holmes (2014) and Michael
J. Cole (2013) it can also be used against China. The US and its allies must look into
plans to deny the Western Pacific to China by deploying a net of Anti-Ship Missile
(ASM) launchers on strategic islands to bottle the PLAN within the South and East
China Seas. This means that smaller powers can counter China's bigger navy as
Waldron states. The flaw in this system is the fact that ASM emplacements cannot be
pre-positioned in this stance without create uneasiness in Beijing but instead they are
to be pre-positioned for rapid deployment with assets available for their immediate
transportation and deployment.
According to William Kyle (2014) the challenge facing the USN is the uncertainty it
faces when it comes to funding after the GWoT and the 2008 financial crisis. Kyle
mentions how the US is focusing more on economic integration through diplomatic
efforts rather than security issues. This might be due to an "unfavourable budgetary
environment" (Kyle, 2009: 2) which might mean that the vision of a strong Naval
presence in Asia might remain on paper. This has led, according to Kyle, to the Obama
administration adopting a more balanced posture. Kyle believes that the USN must in
effect carry out a `pivot' of its own in military terms and not ignore the military
component in the context of China's growing military strength. On the other hand the
challenge for China is to counter this and it is not only limited to military means
20

(Kazianis, 2012). Kazianis believes that China's large foreign exchange reserve can
be used to counter the US `Pivot' and also challenge it worldwide.
3.4. Tokyo's Uneasiness and South East Asia
The US is not alone in wanting to counter China. China's neighbour Japan is looking
apprehensively at China's expansion. This is discussed by Kenneth B. Pyle (2008) who
talks about Japan's position and how, due to the fact that it was the antagonist during
WWII, it is not trusted by its neighbours. Despite this Japan sees itself as the dominant
economic power in Asia and is threatened by the rise of China, this is further enforced
by the anti-Japanese sentiment of young Chinese (Pyle, 2008: 312). Despite the close
cooperation with the US, Japanese and US aims when it comes to China are not
always aligned. This is due to the fact that, according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry,
"[Our] position is much more vulnerable than that of the United States, so what we can
do or say is very limited" (Pyle, 2008: 332), thus Tokyo relies heavily on economic tools
to shape its relation with China. How much of this will remain possible is up for debate;
the recent dispute over the Senkaku Islands, Chinese nationalism and demands for
national repentance have strained the Sino-Japanese relationship. The fact that the
US is a long term ally of Tokyo has created, according to Pyle, a strategic triangle
where the US and Japan are trying to maintain the status-quo while China is trying to
alter it. There is increased debate within Japan on how to counter China and whether
Tokyo should embark on a remilitarization program (Hughes, 2009).
The last fifteen years have seen Tokyo stepping up its efforts to guarantee security in
the region according to Hughes (2009). He believes that Japan faces an immediate
military threat from North Korea and a medium to long term challenge from China. It is
in this context that successive administrations have tried to involve Japan more in
21

international missions: the sending of Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) units to Iraq
to help in reconstruction (Watts, 2003) (the first such deployment since WWII) and the
use of the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) to aid in the fight against piracy
off the coast of Somalia (BBC News, 19 June 2009). This is not to mean that Japan is
looking to hold North Korea and China alone but rather show its allies that it is a
capable and reliable ally. Tokyo has strengthened its ties with the US while also getting
closer to Australia in a `quasi-alliance' in what J. Berkshire Miller (2013) describes as
`a trilateral with purpose' aimed at presenting a unified front against China, however
he believes that this should not be the only purpose for this newly found cooperation.
The threat of Chinese naval encroachment and territorial claims have cast doubt
whether Japan's current forces are enough to counter China. People suggest a
modification of the constitution or the scrapping of Article 9 to allow Tokyo to set up a
full-fledged army. Either way, currently, Tokyo is undertaking plans to create an
Amphibious Force (Hayashi, 2014) modelled on the United States Marine Corps
(USMC) (Schogo, 2014) aimed at responding quickly to any Chinese landings on
disputed islands. This according to Koh Swee Lean Collin (2014) is a task that many
other Southeast Asian nations are undertaking. In the space of 20 years, six Southeast
Asian Nations; Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam, have set up some kind of amphibious force equivalent to the USMC or
Russian Naval Infantry. While their role is still unclear according to Collin they are a
response to China's island `creep'.
According to Dr. Munir Majid (2012) the contest between the US and China is also
drawing in the states of Southeast Asia and their maritime disputes. This is partially
due to China being at the economic heart of the region; being the biggest trading
partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Majid, 2012: 23) and
22

despite the 2008 financial crisis it continued to invest in the ASEAN countries at a time
when US investment slowed down (Ibid.). Despite this, China has still not surpassed
the US in total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in ASEAN countries (Ibid.). Majid
advices caution as while China is on the rise, the US is still the world's largest single
economy, the player with most FDI in ASEAN countries and still has the biggest
defence budget. The fact that China is pursuing an aggressive strategy in the South
China Sea when it comes to territorial claims has pushed the ASEAN countries into
closer cooperation with the US, whose chief aim remains the protection of international
trade routes. Abhijit Singh (2013) mentions that the pentagon has proposed a potential
fifty percent increase in funding to support foreign militaries and training in Southeast
Asia (Chin Hon, 2013), to force China to sign a code-of-conduct in the South China
Sea.
3.5. Criticism
Robert S. Ross (2012) disagrees with the stance that the Obama administration has
taken regarding Asia. Ross sees China's takeover of small islands and its rhetoric as
aimed at keeping nationalistic elements at bay. On the other hand he feels that the US
is greatly overestimating the capabilities of the Chinese military, especially when it
comes to naval strength. According to him China was also not immune to the 2008
financial crisis, resulting in a rise in unemployment and inequality which in turn led the
government to believe that unemployed students would destabilise the cities. In
response Beijing invested six billion dollars to employ them. Ross believes that the
idea that China is catching up to the US as being the result of the 2008 financial crisis.
While the US fell in recession, China's economy grew by a staggering ten percent. This
together with successful antipiracy missions, space program, and tests of advanced
23

military aircraft led China to adopt a more assertive foreign policy only to alienate its
neighbours.
A further criticism by Ross is the fact that the `Pivot to Asia' is not an idea unique to
Obama's presidency but rather builds on the work of the Clinton and Bush
administrations. Indeed according to Harry Kazianis (2012) the Bush administration
was already looking at China as a strategic competitor. Ross highlights 1997 as the
crucial year when Washington decided to devote more resources to the region; it based
a submarine at Guam, it deployed every major weapon system to Japan, the building
of an aircraft carrier facility at Changai Naval Base, Singapore and the deployment of
sixty percent of USN submarines to Asia in 2005. If anything to him the Obama
Administration is continuing the work of previous administrations and in a negative
way. He is critical on the stance that Secretary of State Clinton took on the island
disputes in the South China Sea, as needless involvement in complex legal disputes.
Together with this he also views the deployment of more troops to South Korea
(something which the Bush Administration tried to reduce) and large scale military
exercises in the region as only serving to challenge Beijing unnecessarily. He believes
that in the long run this will have the undesired effect of further antagonising China
making it unwilling to collaborate with US policy.
On the other hand Justin Logan (2013) believes that it is the US that is to blame for
China's acts in the China Seas. The US has encircled China and created alliances and
bilateral relations which are more or less anti-China. He mentions that dealing with
humanitarian assistance, stifling nuclear proliferation, suppressing narco-traffickers,
and dispatching pirates does not require sixty percent of the USN's assets, quoting
former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage "When the administration says it's
not about China, it's all about China. China knows this." Similar to Tellis (2013) he sees
24

the irony in the US-China relationship, where on one hand the US is working to contain
China and on the other hand trading with China is making China wealthier, stating: "If
Washington isn't comfortable with a more powerful China...making China wealthier by
trading with it doesn't make much sense."
These views expressed by Ross (2012) are not shared by Shawn Brimley and Ely
Ratner (2013) who disagree with Ross's viewpoints. They argue that the way to deal
with China's anxieties is not withdrawal from Asia but rather sustainable and deepening
engagement. According to Brimley and Ratner, Ross fails to account for the "changing
geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century" (Brimley and Ratner, 2013: 1) where
the disengagement from the Middle East has allowed the US to invest more heavily in
Asia, a region central for US economic and strategic interests. This is not only an issue
of countering China and accuse Ross of solely focusing on military issues when they
are only a part of the overall strategy. Brimley and Ratner believe that the US's
involvement in disputes is not to challenge China but to construct a "regional order
undergirded by rules and institutions" (Ibid: 2). They also mention the cooperation
which exists with China where the number of meetings between the Chinese and
American presidents were never so numerous and the cooperation which exists in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The only problem with the strategy
according to Brimley and Ratner is that the administration must make sure that the
resources are available, both in terms of finance and personnel, to maintain and
expand the commitment to East Asia further into the future.
Criticism is not only directed to the US but also to China. Munir Majid (2012) criticises
China's aggressive stance, especially in the South China Sea (since the Scarborough
stand-off in 2012), where the threat of the use of force has only serving to frighten
regional powers. Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines have been actively
25

Details

Pages
Type of Edition
Erstausgabe
Year
2015
ISBN (PDF)
9783960675105
ISBN (Softcover)
9783960670100
File size
5 MB
Language
English
Institution / College
University of Malta – Department of International Relations
Publication date
2016 (February)
Grade
A
Keywords
International Relations Senkaku Islands East Asia USA Foreign policy Asia-Pacific China
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Title: Is Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ enough to maintain US Influence in East Asia?
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145 pages
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