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Can R2P practice what it promises? A Case Study on the Syrian Civil War

©2015 Textbook 77 Pages

Summary

In recent years, news from the Middle East, especially from Syria, have been devastating. Pictures of hundreds of thousands of civilians being killed, tortured, on the run, of refugees living under terrible conditions in neighbouring countries have shocked the public. The emergence of ISIS as a result of the Syrian civil war poses a threat to international security. Over and over again, politicians, human rights organisations and academics have been demanding that the international community, represented by the United Nations, steps in to stop the mass atrocities and protect the civilian victims from the radical opposition groups and Dictator Bashar Al-Assad. But is there a responsibility of other states towards the Syrian population? Is it morally and legally right to send money, weapons and possibly military personnel to risk their lives and resources?
The moral demand to do just that is supported by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine with which the international community committed itself in 2005/6 to protect civilians from mass atrocities and marked a milestone in international politics since it changed the definition of state sovereignty from sovereignty as authority to sovereignty as responsibility. This includes a sovereign's responsibility towards his own people but also towards people outside of his jurisdiction.
But how effective is R2P in practice? Is it a mere norm without any implications for action or is it even legally binding in obliging states to protect civilians in cases of mass atrocities? If so, why does the UN not react and intervene in Syria?
This book examines the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in ist legal and political dimensions and will thus provide some answers to the questions that occupy the general public.

Excerpt

Table Of Contents


8
List of Abbreviations
EU
European
Union
FSA
Free
Syrian
Army
GA
General Assembly of the United Nations
ICC
International
Criminal
Court
ICISS
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRtoP
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
R2P
Responsibility
to
Protect
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO
Non-governmental
organisation
UK
United
Kingdom
UN
United
Nations
UNHCR
United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
US
United
States
WSOD
World Summit Outcome Document

9
1
Introduction
"Since the Holocaust we have been required to treat others as we treat
ourselves [...] we are responsible for the other who looks at us, faces us,
who raises claims on us. We are responsible not for everyone, but
everyone who is within our reach [...]. If we do not recognize our humanity
in others we will not recognize it in ourselves" (Cooker, 2001: 148f).
With these words, Cooker (2001) summarises the development of moral theory and
international human rights in the last decades, a trend which indicates that we are all part of
an international community with a responsibility both towards our compatriots and towards
strangers. As a result, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was born, which was
adopted by the United Nations (UN) as part of its commitment to protect human rights
worldwide. However, the debate about R2P has been ongoing ever since, with academics
and politicians experiencing difficulties in agreeing on at which point state sovereignty can
be overridden for the protection of human rights (Welsh, 2011; Schütte, 2012).
This debate has its origin in the divided English school where pluralists, such as Bull (1977),
believe in the integrity of states and the principle of state sovereignty, whereas solidarists,
such as Fabre (2012) and Buzan (2004), argue in favour of a promotion of human rights over
non-intervention. Subsequently, the emerging literature on the theoretical concept of R2P
and its implementation can be divided into two main categories: the first group of scholars
are R2P critics who argue that R2P is mainly concerned with humanitarian interventions and
is thus likely to be abused by western states trying to dominate weaker countries (Ayoob,
2004; Hehir, 2010). In addition, they defend state sovereignty as an unalterable principle of
the international system which should never be overridden since R2P, with its new
perception of sovereignty, self-determination and humanitarian interventions, only

10
increases insecurity within the international system (Mason and Wheeler, 1999; Mamdami,
2010). In contrast, the second group of scholars are in favour of the concept: Bellamy (2009)
disputes the fact that the traditional understanding of sovereignty, as is understood by R2P
critics, "bears [...] resemblance to contemporary world politics" (p.60). Instead, he argues
that each state today is to some degree accountable to the international community: by
joining international institutions such as the UN, and thereby accepting some restrictions on
how to rule within state borders, sovereigns have already restrained their absolute power
(ibid; Stahn, 2007). Furthermore, the second group of scholars criticises that R2P has not
been implemented sufficiently in international law, and that more R2P ultimately leads to a
just international society (Welsh, 2004; Wheeler, 2000).
The first humanitarian intervention under R2P in Libya in 2011 fuelled the debate regarding
R2P's mechanisms and the assumed hidden interests of global players, even though R2P
advocates celebrated it as a triumph since the humanitarian intervention resulted in an end
to the civil war, and thus saved the lives of thousands of Libyans. The current Syrian civil war,
in which sexual violence, chemical weapons, torture, and killings of civilians are known to be
war strategies by all conflict parties, has led to calls for an intervention on behalf of the
Syrian civilians in the western media and by non-governmental human rights organisations.
So, why has the UN failed to intervene in Syria, as it did in the Libyan conflict? It would seem
that the international community does not to react according to a responsibility for the
Syrian civilians, even though the severity of human rights abuse exceeds the one in Libya.
Does the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have valid reasons to not pass a resolution
legitimising a joint military intervention by UN members? That is, does the Syrian case not
fall within R2P, or are state interests responsible for preventing the UN from finding an
international consensus on how to help the Syrian population?

11
While the aforementioned theoretical literature on R2P might provide arguments for a
discussion about the relevance of the principles of state sovereignty versus the commitment
to respect human rights and punish severe human rights abuse, it fails to compare the legal
and political implementation of R2P with its practice. Legal scholars, such as Stahn (2007),
concentrate on the legal implementation and implication of R2P in international law,
whereas moral theorists, such as Bellamy (2009) and Weiss (2004), focus on the normative
aspects. Despite the fact that both groups of scholars refer to the other's research field,
there is no work which thoroughly investigates all aspects of R2P. In addition, academic
literature on the current situation in Syria is rare and mostly analyses the conflicts in the
context of the Arab Spring but not in the context of human rights violation, even though it is
the scale of atrocities which set Syria apart from other Arab countries (Gause, 2011;
Hinnebusch, 2012; Goldstein and Western, 2013; Ajami, 2012).
Consequently, the main objective of this study is to examine the theoretical implications of
the UN's responsibility to protect and apply these to a practical case. Syria is particularly
interesting to investigate since the Syrian civil war has been persisting since 2011 and even
though there is evidence that the scale of violence and suffering in Syria is extreme, with
over 160,000 deaths up to this point, and millions of Syrians fleeing from mass atrocities to
neighbour countries (Human Rights Watch, 2014), the international community has been
unable to end it.
This dissertation firstly postulates that the humanitarian emergency in Syria indeed falls
within the scope of R2P, and secondly that the UN has not exhausted all of its available
instruments to prevent this conflict from escalating into a civil war with mass atrocities and
to react to the existing considerable human rights abuse. Thirdly, it asserts that the Syrian
case is an example of the practical ineffectiveness of R2P, and that state interests still prevail

12
over the responsibility to protect strangers.
It is beyond the scope of this study to give a comprehensive analysis of R2P, but rather this
work will attempt to contribute to a better understanding of R2P in practice by highlighting
the weaknesses and strengths of a norm in its implementation. In other words, this
dissertation will assess R2P in a new light and will thus bridge the deficit in R2P literature. It
is hoped that the value of this study will bring attention to the need to do more research on
how well the international community's commitment to certain norms fares when put to the
test, and to continue the search for an international consensus on how to effectively protect
human beings from mass atrocities.
1.1
Methods and Sources
In order to find out whether R2P practices what it promises, this dissertation will use
triangulation to compensate for the weaknesses of a single method by "counterbalancing it
with the strengths of another" (Jick, 1979: 604). Therefore, quantitative and qualitative
methods will be used in the following.
As a first step, Doctrinal Legal Research, which investigates the formulation of R2P as a legal
doctrine through the analysis of legal rules, will be undertaken. The purpose of this method
is to find out the legal status of a norm (Hart, 1961; Arthurs, 1983). In other words, it will be
investigated where and to what extent R2P, developed by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), has been implemented in International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), the UN Charter, the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) of
2005 and UNSC Resolutions. The result will be used for the derivation of R2P criteria, which
ultimately form a set of options and instruments to be applied by the UN. They are divided
into two sub-categories: R2P criteria for the non-use of force and R2P criteria for the
potential use of lethal force.

13
Furthermore, a critical discourse analysis of UNSC Resolutions, presidential statements of
the General Assembly (GA) and the UNSC, as well as reports from the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (henceforth it will be
referred to as Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria) will be conducted to find out
how UN institutions reacted towards the massive human rights abuse in Syria, and to
establish whether their approach to fulfil their responsibility towards the suffering
population is decisive. Furthermore it will used to analyse statements by the permanent five
UNSC members to find out their interests behind actions or inaction. Critical discourse
analyses is especially useful to discover the actors' motives because it "explores how texts
construct representations of the world, social relationships and social identities and there is
an emphasis on highlighting how such practices and texts are ideologically shaped by
relations of power" (Fairclough, 1992 quoted in: Taylor, 2010: 3).
The case study approach has been selected in order to investigate the phenomenon of R2P
within its contemporary context. Since there is only a limited number of cases where R2P
has been so far applied, given the fact that the concept itself is fairly new, it is necessary to
provide a short comparison between Libya and Syria. Firstly, because the civil wars in both
countries are similar in their emergence, development, and context, and secondly, because
the difference in the UN's reaction to the humanitarian catastrophe in both cases can give
insight on how R2P is practiced.
Consequently, empirical data for the case study on Syria will be gathered from several
sources, such as the Human Rights Council of the UN (HCR), the Independent Commission of
Inquiry on Syria, the European Commission, as well as from non-governmental organisations
(NGO's) such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch which will be used to gain
an understanding on the humanitarian situation in Syria. A cross-referencing of these data

14
will be carried out to increase the validity of the findings. However, the fact that the
unstable situation in Syria makes it difficult to get accurate death tolls and circumstances of
death will be kept in mind. Consequently, the numbers will be unlikely to be exact, even
though the quality of sources will indicate a trend which can be used to draw conclusions on
the current situation in Syria.
1.2
Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation will begin by elaborating the conceptual framework of R2P in Chapter Two,
as well as the legal implementation of R2P by the GA in 2005 and the UNSC in 2006. Chapter
Two will also lay out the aforementioned criteria for the analysis. Chapter Three will
commence with a presentation of the emergence of the Syrian conflict in 2011 and the
current situation, before subsequently investigating the measures already taken by the
international community. The attention will be on non-military measures, such as mediation
and sanctions, and the consensus finding process in the UN. Additionally, R2P criteria will be
applied in order to determine whether they are fulfilled in the Syrian case. Chapter Four will
go beyond current measures, and will examine whether the Syrian civil war is a case for the
use of lethal force authorised by the UNSC. It will thus focus on the scale of violence and
human rights abuse in Syria, classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes, and on its
implications on regional and global peace and security. In order to do this, the second
category of the aforementioned criteria from Chapter Two will be applied. Chapter Five will
look at the interests of the five permanent members of the UNSC to find the motives behind
their (in)action. Chapter Six will reflect on the implications of a military intervention under
R2P in Syria, and will offer an outlook on the future credibility of the UN in case of a failure
to end mass atrocities in Syria.

15
2
Conceptual Framework
2.1
From Sovereignty as Authority to Sovereignty as Responsibility
In order to prevent further humanitarian catastrophes, such as those experienced in the
Second World War, the UN was established with the aim "to form an international
community based on respect for the dignity of human beings" (Breau, 2005:221). To achieve
this goal, members of the UN passed a number of multinational treaties and created laws,
among them the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Convention and its
Additional Protocols, and IHL in general (Barry and Southwood, 2011), to ensure that
individual's human rights would be protected and peace preserved. However, these only
oblige states to respect the human rights of their own citizens: conversely they have no
obligation towards people outside of their borders (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1998).
Consequently, state sovereignty became an important principle in order to protect citizens
from external threats, based on the assumption that respect for the sovereignty of other
states increases international peace (ibid). However, the possibility that a state might not
protect its population, but might instead be the perpetrator, was overlooked. In such cases,
humanitarian intervention, defined as "an act of intervention in the internal affairs of
another country with the view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration
or the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a
viable structure of civil authority can emerge" (Parekh, 1997: 55), seems to be an option.
However, during its first forty-five years of existence, the UN stressed that it promotes the
non-use of force and non-intervention in a sovereign state's affairs without the sovereign's
consent, regardless of the severity of human rights violations (Roberts, 2006). This
understanding of the UN's role was challenged in the 1990s due to internal conflicts
beginning to outnumber conflicts among states and the humanitarian emergencies in

16
Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, during which hundreds of thousands of people were
slaughtered and suffered mass atrocities (Weiss and Thakur, 2010:76).
Therefore, the question arises of what the international community, represented by the UN,
should do when the shared ideal of a right to life and dignity is violated to an extreme
extent. The incidents in the 1990s clearly showed that the instruments of the UN, namely
peacekeeping and conflict management, could not provide relief in situations where the
state sovereign rejected external help or was itself the abuser. Although there were calls for
a legalisation of humanitarian intervention, no consensus was reached on when and how to
intervene, and how regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) or individual states should be authorised to enter an internal conflict with potential
lethal force in order to protect civilians (Breau, 2005). Ultimately, the UN's credibility as the
main human rights organisation was endangered through its inability to enforce its own laws
and principles.
On the one hand, most of the UN members states were shocked by the mass atrocities in the
1990s, and the GA as well as the UNSC demonstrated their commitment to human rights in
various resolutions (Weiss and Thakur, 2010). On the other hand, a lot of countries, most of
them developing countries, worried about any practice that would challenge state
sovereignty (Roberts, 2006). According to Jennifer Welsh (2004), the international
community faced a dilemma at the end of the 20
th
century: how should a compromise be
found between what is legally right and what is morally right? Consequently, the Canadian
government established the ICISS with the objective to provide a doctrine for the right to
intervene, responding to the call of Secretary-General Anan (2000) who declared that the
protection of human rights must take priority over state sovereignty.

T
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However, t
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9; ICISS; 200
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17
UN could
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R2P2001)
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01). The
R2P2001
to React

18
mostly deals with a duty to react to situation where the protection of human lives and
dignity from mass atrocities is not guaranteed, and stresses that this includes political,
economic and judicial measures (ICISS, 2001). In extreme cases, the last resort is a military
intervention, and R2P2001 presents a threshold of six principles which must be fulfilled
before a military intervention is justified (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002). These include: Just
Cause, Right Intention, Proportional Means, Right Authority and Reasonable Prospects (ICISS,
2001: 32). R2P2001's last core principle is the Responsibility to Rebuild. The ICISS's intention
was to make interveners commit to rebuild that which is destroyed during the intervention
with the objective that a solid post-conflict reconstruction would create conditions for a
long-lasting peace (ibid.).
R2P2001 was deemed revolutionary since it includes original ideas from Just War Theory,
further enhancing them by adapting them to the contemporary moral demand for a better
protection of human beings from mass atrocities (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002). Nevertheless,
even though the ICISS report fuelled the debates about humanitarian intervention, it was
still only a report from an independent commission, and was not endorsed by the
international community. Therefore, the ICISS and Kofi Annan decided to present the report
to the GA during the 2005 World Summit, hoping that it would be implemented quickly
(Annan, 2000). In October 2005, the GA of the United Nations unanimously accepted R2P in
its World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD). In April 2006, after six months of
negotiations, the UNSC affirmed the result of the WSOD in Resolution 1674 (henceforth the
R2P version passed by the GA and the UNSC will be referred to as R2P2006). But what do
these resolutions mean for R2P?

2.2
A
The app
impossi
the idea
a law, a
R2P200
section.
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2.2.1
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a treaty or
01, and will
.
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of the Doc
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(UN Charter
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s "R2P lite".
others that
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UN Charter,
the Implem
of R2P on c
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ISS without
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thus form t
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R2P2001 crit
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that R2P h
2P2001 is n
of internati
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It is true th
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whether the
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ICISS (see T
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Table 1 in A
most R2P
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explore the
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. For examp
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been system
or details). T
have indee
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ome of its
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today, is
uch as Weis
2001 and R
D, 2005: § 1
national pe
ial threats
Right Auth
19
ntly, it is
itself to
ed it into
tation of
n a later
extensive
olutions,
matically
The main
ed been
are thus
features
eria Last
nding for
not that
ss (2007:
R2P2006,
138), and
eace and
(WSOD,
hority for

20
the use of force implemented in UN documents is only the UNSC (WSOD, 2005: § 139; UN
Charter Chapter VII). Therefore, the ICISS's (2001) proposition to allow the GA to legitimately
intervene in cases where the UNSC fails to react to mass atrocities in a timely and decisive
manner has not been implemented. Moreover, the criteria Reasonable Prospects and Right
Intention cannot be found in any legal or political document.
However, the UN passed a Responsibility to Prevent by agreeing to "assist[ing] those which
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out" (WSOD, 2005: § 138, 139).
Additionally, the UN accepted its Responsibility to React to mass atrocities and only
restricted it to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (WSOD,
2005: §138, 139), which is also partly incorporated into the Genocide Convention (1948: §8).
Therefore, the UN gave R2P more focus instead of adopting the very general proposition of
the ICISS (2011: 12) to act in cases of "large scale loss of life (actual or apprehended) and [...]
large ethnic cleansing". Likewise, the UN agreed to use "appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means [...] to help protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (WSOD, 2005: §139). Moreover, the
UN passed the Responsibility to Rebuild by setting up the Peacebuilding Commission in order
to "[...] assist[ing] parties of conflicts to end hostilities and emerge towards recovery,
reconstruction and development and in mobilizing sustained international attention and
assistance" (UNSC Res. 1645, 2005: 1).
Nevertheless, the parts of R2P2001 which were adopted verbatim by the international
community were agreed upon in the WSOD and UNSC Resolutions which makes them legally
recommendatory for future decisions, despite not being legally binding (Stahn, 2007).
However, R2P advocates have to acknowledge that even though one cannot argue that R2P

21
is a law, the evidence presented above demonstrates the fact that it mirrors international
law.
Moreover, the comparison shows that most of R2P2001 principles have indeed been
implemented. This is supported by the fact that UNSC has referred to R2P2006 in twenty-
three of its resolutions since 2005, justifying its decisions to act in a certain way, mostly to
sanction, to send peacekeeping troops or to condemn mass atrocities, as a result of a state's
negligence to protect its citizens (see Table 2 in Appendix). In UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) it
even authorised the use of force against the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Additionally, the UN
has continued to incorporate R2P in UN practice, for example by founding the Mediation
Support Unit and creating the position of the Special Representative on the Prevention of
Genocide and Mass Atrocities (Breakey, 2012).
This leads to the conclusion that, even though R2P2006 cannot be called state practice yet, it
is part of Jug Cogens which is "a body of principles recognized by the international
community as being fundamental to the maintenance of international order [...] from which
no derogation is permitted" (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2008). These principles,
agreed upon by the UN, concern threats to international peace and security, the use of force
and humanitarian elements, such as genocide, slavery and nowadays also considerable
abuse of human rights. In other words, R2P might not be a law, but it is a legal norm to
which the UN has committed itself. Hence, the UN can be held to maintain its pledge to
prevent and react to mass atrocities, and to rebuild post conflict. Its failure to do so will thus
harm the foundation and credibility of the UN. Based on this conclusion, a set of criteria can
be derived.

22
2.3
Deriving Criteria for the Case Study
For the case study on Syria, the criteria, derived from R2P in its legal implementation
recently discussed, are divided into two main categories: the first deals with the
Responsibility to Prevent measures undertaken, while the second includes the Responsibility
to React criteria. The latter is subdivided into peaceful instruments, and the potential use of
force. As a result, the following research design emerges and will be applied to Syria:
1.
Responsibility to Prevent: Measures undertaken to prevent a humanitarian
emergency from escalating
2.
Responsibility to React:
a.
Peaceful instruments: The use of "appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and
other peaceful means [...] to help protect [...]" (WSOD, 2005: § 139) the Syrian
population
b.
Potential military Intervention: Is Syria a case for the permissible and legal
authorisation of force by the UN? The following criteria must be fulfilled:
i.
Just Cause: One of the following is applicable in the case
-
Genocide
-
War crimes
-
Crimes against humanity
-
Ethnic cleansing
ii.
Last Resort: All peaceful means have been exhausted and have no or
little prospect of being successful
iii.
Occurrence of a Threat to International Peace and security

Since th
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is an op
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in acco
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2.3.1
Turning
brief ov
prioritis
sovereig
In Febr
uprising
used ex
fire wa
demons
reports
soldiers
Rights W
countrie
countrie
he Syrian co
urthermore
perating pr
t a military
is exclude
x, especially
rdance with
se the use o
The Libyan
g now to th
verview of
sed the hu
gnty.
ruary 2011
gs (Anderso
xcessive for
as used,
strations w
bore witne
s by Gadda
Watch, 201
es within t
es which w
onflict is st
e, Proportion
inciple whi
interventio
ed because
y in its lega
h the UN C
of force.
Case: the F
e extent to
the Libyan
uman right
, anti-gove
on, 2011). W
rce against
hundreds
were arrest
ess to the s
afi forces (
12). This r
the first te
were themse
till ongoing,
nality and R
ch is applic
on, and the
a discussi
al implicatio
Charter, the
First Militar
o which R2P
n civil war
ts of a po
ernment pr
When the
the protest
of Libya
ed, and p
exual assau
Independen
esulted in
en days in
elves dealin
, the Respo
Right Autho
cable when
measures t
on on who
ons, that it i
e UNSC will
ry Intervent
P has been
in 2011. T
opulation o
rotests beg
protest spr
tors: accord
ns alleged
rotestors w
ult of men a
nt Commis
at least 1
order to e
ng with the
onsibility to
ority are also
the decisio
o be undert
o can auth
is beyond t
l be unders
tion under R
practiced,
This was th
over the r
gan in Liby
read across
ding to Hum
dly involve
were execu
and women
sion of Inq
70,000 Lib
escape the
e turmoil o
Rebuild wi
o excluded,
on has alre
taken are b
horise the
he scope o
stood as th
R2P
this section
he first case
ights of th
ya followin
s Libya, Gad
man Rights
ed in the
uted. Furth
n, the use o
quiry on Li
yans fleein
e violence
of regime ch
ill not be d
the first be
eady been m
being discus
use of for
f this study
e sole auth
n will short
e in which
he governm
g the Arab
ddafi's gove
Watch (20
e anti-gove
hermore, p
of torture, a
bya, 2011;
ng to neigh
(UNHCR, 2
hanges (Ku
23
iscussed
ecause it
made to
sed. The
ce is so
y. Hence,
hority to
ly give a
the UN
ment to
b spring
ernment
012), live
ernment
ublished
and child
Human
hbouring
2011: 3),
perman,

Details

Pages
Type of Edition
Erstausgabe
Publication Year
2015
ISBN (PDF)
9783954898572
ISBN (Softcover)
9783954893577
File size
5.7 MB
Language
English
Publication date
2016 (September)
Keywords
United Nations Responsibility to Protect R2P Syria Human Rights
Product Safety
Anchor Academic Publishing
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Title: Can R2P practice what it promises? A Case Study on the Syrian Civil War
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77 pages
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