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The Use of Strategic Bombing against Non-State Actors in the Middle East. Objectives and Limitations of Air Power in the Cases of Hezbollah, Houthis and ISIS

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Summary

In the last decades, states revealed a tendency for expanding their dependence on so-called strategic bombing in wars against other states, an approach that raised questions on whether it is possible to reduce the involvement of ground and naval forces in future military confrontations.
The successful employment of strategic bombing as the major pillar of military operations that took place within different geographical areas and terrains encouraged states to limit or altogether avoid resorting to campaigns that involve putting their “boots on the ground.” As a matter of fact, one can claim that improvements in the military aircraft industry – including persistent research on issues of technology, effectiveness and accuracy – have pushed for this result. Another set of reasons, however, that are indirectly connected to developments in aerial capabilities of militaries should not be ignored, including demands by governments for shorter, less costly wars, concerns about public opinion and electoral implications, as well as the fear of high rates of casualties.
Airmen, meanwhile, were also called to implement strategic bombing operations against non-state actors. Yet, the outcome is certainly an issue of debate. In general, launching air strikes on states differs on many levels from aerially attacking militant organizations, terrorist groups or local tribes. Armies are fundamentally trained to fight against other armies, in addition to the difficulties of differentiating between civilians and militants, the so-called principle of discrimination.
This study seeks to examine both the rationale and objectives of states in resorting to air power against non-state actors in the Middle East, focusing on the three cases of aerial operations on Hezbollah in Lebanon, ISIS in Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Excerpt

Table Of Contents


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fight against other armies, in addition to the difficulties of differentiating between
civilians and militants, the so-called principle of discrimination. This study seeks to
examine both the rationale and objectives of states in resorting to air power against
non-state actors in the Middle East, focusing on the three cases of aerial operations on
Hezbollah in Lebanon, ISIS in Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen .
Nature & Changing Nature of Warfare
Ahead of discussing the research questions and main assumptions of this research
project--which will be presented in the next chapter in addition to the conceptual
framework--it is crucial to examine the development of the theoretical literature on
war. Air power, as it has been stated, is just one way of using military force.
Therefore, it cannot be separated from broader academic debates on war. This part of
the introductory chapter will tackle some of the key traditional views on the so-called
nature of warfare and its dynamics, as well as showing the contemporary arguments
about a change in its nature, or "character" as some authors describe it.
As it will appear throughout the following part of the chapter, major military
concepts of air power--as well as the literature on war's nature--were created at a
time when targets were easily identified, states were fighting other states and
technology--especially in terms of weapons and means of communications--was still
at its early stages of development .The challenge for air power, in the meantime,
involves maintaining its efficiency and effectiveness when states are aerially attacking
non-state groups--accumulating knowledge of guerilla tactics throughout long years
of warfare--and technology of weapons and communication is developed to a higher
extent than any other previous, historical eras. Perhaps--when combining the
arguments in this section with the conceptual framework part--one can complete his
understanding of the ongoing challenges facing air power, especially when employed
in Middle Eastern war zones, for the latter is an example of all of such problems that
were tackled in many academic and military texts.

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Throughout history, states had largely counted on a series of mechanisms in
order to achieve their foreign and security policy goals, which ranged from diplomatic
and economic means to military ones. The decision of a state to choose the third
option, involving the use of military force, is related to seeing it as the best possible
channel through which a political outcome can be reached while assuming that other
channels are less effective. Such emphasis on the strong interrelation between war and
politics has been suggested in studies on the topic. (McMaster 2015, p. 7)
However, in the conceptualization of war, what exactly a favorable "political
outcome" entails and the definition itself of a "military victory" remain subject to a
substantial debate. One, as an example, can possibly highlight disagreements among
the diverse traditions of the International Relations (IR) theory, although they mostly
accept war as a "large-scale organized violence between political units." (Levy 1998,
p. 141) For the neo-realist school of thought, for instance, war is the end result of an
international system that is characterized by a state of anarchy, which results from the
absence of an international-central government to handle conflicts and settle disputes
among states. As Kenneth Waltz had put it, "war occurs because there is no automatic
adjustment of interests. In the absence of a supreme authority there is then the
constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force." (Fearon 1995, p. 384) This
argument rests on drawing a distinction between politics on the domestic level and
politics on the international level. Domestic governments are commonly authorized--
whether politically, legally, constitutionally or through means of using force--to
maintain order within all territorial areas of their states. The absence of a similar
condition in terms of inter-state relations leads eventually to a decrease in chances of
peace and increase in prospects of war. (Rosenberg 1990, p. 285-286)
Realists also argue that war is less likely to happen whenever a balance of
power--which is military-based by nature--takes place between states, a situation
that can partially explain, for instance, the non-occurrence of a direct confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War decades. Within
such context, one can understand the logic of Thucydides--one out of several
classical political thinkers and philosophers that realists claim that their assumptions
are historically rooted in their texts--in his so-called theory of hegemonic war. A
hegemonic war, for Thucydides, begins with an economic, technological and military

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transformation in the "hierarchy" of the international system, motivating some states
to get engaged in a war against the existing hegemon in a bid to create a new system.
Yet, the theory does not rule out the fact that some changes in the international system
can be too minimal to influence the superpower status of certain states. In that case,
war is less likely to happen. (Gilpin 1988, p. 592-594)
On the contrary, scholars of the Marxist tradition focus on the economic
benefits of war that motivate states to be involved in them, or at least play a role in the
eruption of conflicts. War, based on this perspective, offers an opportunity for states to
test new weapons produced by their domestic companies, open new markets for their
products, gain access for raw materials required for industrial purposes or even human
capital that comes on lower costs. As an example, it is most likely that Marxists will
argue that Nazi Germany adopted a military interventionist approach because of its
need for lebensraum (living space), a situation that can also be traced in the case of
Mussolini's Italy that described itself as a "proletarian nation." (Geier 1999)
There is no doubt that classical Marxists and neomarxists have some
disagreements. For example, the classical Marxist theory argues that capitalism is the
major cause of international conflicts, pointing out that "capitalist states battled each
other as a consequence of their incessant struggle for profits and battled socialist states
because they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction." For neomarxism, its
scholars are precisely concerned with the relationship between the developed,
capitalist countries and the developing ones, stressing that the former became richer
and economically stronger as they are supported by the ruling elites of the latter. (Walt
1998, p. 32-33)
Yet, both Marxists and neomarxists share a common ground in terms of their
conceptualization of war, which is generating wealth through the use of military force.
Moreover, they generally believe that a military action offers an opportunity to
enhance the economic interests of the ruling class and social and political elites--such
as the "monopoly capitalists" of Lenin or "military-feudal elites" of Schumpeter--
although this situation should not necessarily have the same positive impact on the
rest of the society. Instead, the presence of war implies that the society will pay its
price, which comes in the form of an increase in taxation, reduction of spending in

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healthcare, education and other domestic priorities for the people or--on a politico-
military level--extraordinary measures such as the imposition of conscription
policies. (Levy 1998, p. 156-157)
Such realist and Marxist arguments, nevertheless, pose such a long list of
questions on the nature of war that answering them might require examining further
academic literature that worked on surpassing the limited scope of the two camps.
Both realist and Marxist theories provide an explanation for international phenomena
within the boundaries of their basic assumptions and theoretical logic. The above-
mentioned ideas can most likely offer an explanation for the way through which states
can stay aside from the war option, or at least present a perspective on causes of war,
though offering little insight on the nature of warfare itself. One can hardly argue that
any of these theories did present a comprehensive, well-structured theory of war. The
same problem can also be seen in other IR traditions. For example, a feminist
perspective on war will show preoccupation with its implications on women and
children, as well as refer to the "gendered nature" of states, cultures and the
international system as the reason behind the continuation of wars on the international
arena.
There is no doubt that interpreting "nature of war" differs from one scholar to
the other. Scholars who use such term to label their work are normally preoccupied--
of course among several issues--with the objectives of war, definition of military
success and amount of force required for accomplishing the targets of a military
mission. Nonetheless, the US Marine Corps' basic doctrine manual, Fleet Marine
Force Manual 1, states that "the basic nature of war is constant." Moreover, it stresses
that such nature signifies "a violent clash between two hostile, independent, and
irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other." According to such
document, the "violent essence of war will never change. Any study of war that
neglects this characteristic is misleading and incomplete." (Meilinger 2010, p. 25)
Whether to critique their work or to give them credit for their contributions in
enhancing the academic understanding of war, scholars of war studies do rarely ignore
the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu when reviewing the evolution of the
literature on the topic. In The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Clausewitz, both

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authors had managed to develop their own theories on the nature of war, which
continues to be used in most--if not all--research projects in the meantime. Hence, it
is important to clarify the key aspects of the arguments provided by Clausewitz and
Sun Tzu, in addition to underlying the current, counterarguments about a
transformation in the nature of war as a second stage. For Clausewitz, he
conceptualized war as :
"Not only a genuine chameleon, since it alters its nature somewhat in each particular case, it is
also, in its overall manifestations, a wondrous trinity in with regard to its predominant
tendencies, which consist of the original violence of war's nature, namely hatred and hostility,
which can be viewed as a blind natural force; of the play of probability and of chance, which
make it into an unpredictable activity; and of the subordinating nature of a political
instrument, since it submits to reason itself." (Echevarria II 2003, p.321)
Clausewitz, who was a Prussian general in addition to being a military theorist,
asserted in his book that war is a violent clash of opposing wills, being "not waged
against an abstract enemy, but against a real one who must always be kept in mind."
On basis of such conceptualization, Clausewitz structured his so-called trinity, which
encompasses the government, the military commander and the army and the people.
Throughout his book, Clausewitz examines the relationship and the interactions
among those three elements, which some of its major aspects will be explained in the
coming paragraphs. Meanwhile, perhaps not included in the above-mentioned
definition, Clausewitz showed concern with two major dimensions of war. On the one
hand, although stressing that war "is merely the continuation of policy by other
means", Clausewitz portrayed fighting as one of the most--if not the most--
significant part of the war equation. (Waldman 2009, p. 19-23)
He believed that the political framework and objectives of war will never
remain the same, for they will always be in change, whereas "physical violence" is
unchangeable: a war means that fighting will inevitably occur. This argument should
not lead to a conclusion about a marginal importance for politics in war in
Clausewitz's theory--especially amid his emphasis about the need for establishing a
clear objective for war--but rather indicate that he believed that a political end result
of war is related to the anticipated impact of using force. (Waldman 2009, p. 19-23)
Clausewitz described fighting--or "combat" in accordance with the terminology he
used--as:

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"the only effective force in war... That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because
the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be
destroyed...All action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should
actually occur, the outcome would be favourable. The decision by arms is... in war what cash
payment is in commerce...regardless how rarely settlements occur, they can never be entirely
absent." (Waldman 2009, p. 26)
On the other hand, war is an action that is conducted by humans, a perception that
Clausewitz attempts to prove throughout his text by explaining and giving
recommendations on the way through which political and military leaders should act
in times of war. For example, although Clausewitz insisted that politicians are entitled
to lead the war, he admitted that this is not always an applicable process. It is worth
noting that, by the time Clausewitz was writing his incomplete text, a series of
logistical and technological problems hindered the presence of quick and effective
means of communication between the army leaders and politicians. Accordingly, he
stated the army commanders should, when forced to do so, have the right to take
decisions based on the conditions they are encountering. However, Clausewitz is often
criticized for not elaborating on the conditions under which the leadership rights
should be transferred to the military commanders, including the ability of the enemy
to impact the flow of events in a war through its military strategies and moves.
(Handel 1991, p.40-43)
Pertaining to Sun Tzu, he believed that a war should occupy the shortest
possible time span, with the lowest possible losses in terms of human casualties and
effort, a perception that Clausewitz would not disagree about to a great extent. Sun
Tzu, yet, had a firm belief in keeping resorting to war as the last option, or at least
combine it with other diplomatic and intelligence mechanisms in order to reduce
dependence on using force as much as possible. As the Chinese general and military
strategist puts it, "to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme
of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Since
"victory is the main object in war", the matter should be examined and investigated
carefully, a situation that might not necessarily suggest-- which Clausewitz had called
for--a need for an excessive use of force in all cases. Instead, the "supreme excellence
in war" requires "to attack the enemy's plan; next best to disrupt his alliances; next
best to attack his army; the worst is to attack his cities." (Kuo 2007, p. 7-9)

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In order to apply this strategic thinking in real-life wars, Sun Tzu focused on
resorting to diplomatic, economic and psychological tools--which Clausewitz ignored
despite his emphasis on morale-related elements such as the opposing wills of fighting
parties--ahead of getting involved in a war. Moreover, which Sun Tzu is highly
credited for discussing and Clausewitz is critiqued for underestimating their
importance, Sun Tzu tackles a number of concepts that are all related to intelligence
and deception such as "surprise", "speed" and "maneuver." Deception necessitates an
understanding of an enemy's ideas, plans and anticipations, a target that can be
achieved through competent intelligence skills and "penetration of the opponent's side
by one's own spies." Aside from its military aspect--which also includes spreading
false news about one's military and the approach of "when near, make it appear that
you are far away; when far away, that you are near"--deception can also occur on a
political level. Sun Tzu, at such point, focused on endeavoring to cause disagreements
and tensions between an enemy's military and its allies. (Critzer 2012, p. 8-12)
It is true that these techniques will possibly be considered as naïve and
outdated for wars in the meantime, But Sun Tzu--who wrote about war almost two
millennia before Clausewitz--gained prominence due to his concern with shaping the
surrounding conditions of a war in order to reach the highest possible degree of
guaranteeing a victory. Most of these techniques were to be perceived by Clausewitz
as useless and adopted only by the weaker parties in a war. But Sun Tzu--agreeing
with Clausewitz in most of his assumptions such as those related to the need for
leadership skills, quick victories and inevitability of putting competent and strong
commanders on top of the military--understood the need for examining the other side
of the story. Sun Tzu thought it is strongly important to "know your enemy and know
yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the
enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant of
both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril."
(Critzer 2012, p. 8-12)
In the last decades, a number of scholars developed a series of arguments in
order to highlight a change in the nature of warfare, while seeking to prove that the
classical perceptions on war can no longer serve as an appropriate analytical
framework for wars in the 20th and 21st century. One can simply argue that these

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arguments are problematic to a large extent, especially amid the absence of a coherent
theory on the matter, for they only represent a rising--though currently dominant--
trend in the literature on warfare. But, by all means, it is crucial to discuss their major
pillars for two reasons. The first reason involves the tripartite emphasis on issues of
technology, rise of non-state actors and the reduced tendency among states to launch
"great wars", issues that neither orthodox texts as that of Clausewitz nor IR theories
had sought to explain their impact on warfare. The second reason involves their
importance for this study, for presenting such arguments will pave the way for
tackling the relationship between air power and non-state actors, which will be
discussed in the coming chapters. Hence, this part of the chapter will present two key
features of the transformation in war nature .
Firstly--being generally described as the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA)-- the technological development in means of communications and weapons
raises many questions about their impact on warfare in the future, resulting in the
creation of a series of models on the issue, such as the so-called network-centric
warfare. Technology, which Clausewitz, aside from stating that "knowledge must
become capability, attempted to exclude from his theory in order to arguably make a
long-lasting theory on war, brought new realities to war, which even reached the
extent of expanding the scale of the concepts that lies under the term warfare. For
example, one can possibly argue that a major aspect of contemporary warfare might
include the "cyber-attacks" that intelligence agencies around the world conduct
against each other. This situation makes Sun Tzu's demand for hiding or sending
wrong information in times of war a much harder task to accomplish. It is worth
noting that such advanced weapons technological tools--such as smart devices,
broadcast stations and access to satellite-produced information--can be available to
states and their opponents, including other states, individuals, criminals and militant
groups. Moreover, pictures and videos of wars are provided to the public while a
conflict is ongoing, keeping little secrets to be hidden. (Cronin 2013, p.25-28)
According to John Arquilla, the worldwide advancements in technology has produced
a state of an "increased size of the operational battlefield, which is the result of both
the increasing accuracy and destructiveness of weaponry, and the emerging ability to

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coordinate and control complex maneuvers, along with logistical support, over great
distances." (Arquilla 1994, p.25)
Secondly, the emergence of violent non-state actors became an unavoidable
aspect of war. It is important at this stage to highlight the concept of "new wars" that
was developed by Mary Kaldor in the late 1990s. Kaldor defined a new war as:
"The new wars are `globalized' wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of
the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and
because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic
production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support.
Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring
factions is common. "(Kaldor 1999, p. 90)
Kaldor mentioned that militant groups have two major features. The first feature
entails depending on light weapons such as rifles, machine-guns, hand-grenades,
landmines and short-range missiles. Kaldor stated that conflicts--such as the Cold
War and wars in Afghanistan and South Africa--had increased the accessibility of
these groups to weapons, explaining the economic and political mechanisms used by
them to buy these weapons. The second feature involves winning the "hearts and
minds" of both local population and people within the ranks of their adversaries. She
noted that "revolutionary warfare" usually takes place in geographical areas that
central governments cannot guarantee high levels of control over them. These areas
"provide bases from which the military forces can engage in tactics which sap the
morale and efficiency of enemy forces." (Kaldor 1999, p. 93-95)
As General Sir Rupert Smith argued in his book "The Utility of Force: The Art
of War in the Modern World", wars always include non-state actors, which are
divided into two types. The first type of non-state actors--which Kaldor spoke about
in her book--involves those that can mostly be found in Western states, such as
military alliances, coalitions and even regional and international organizations. The
second type--which absorbed the attention of most academics--includes non-state
actors that emerge from within a domestic socio-political environment such as Al-
Qaeda. Some of these militant groups can manage to have an international influence,
though not all of them have succeeded in taking such step. Smith points out a military
victory, within such context should be based on "capturing the will of the people"
instead of defeating the enemy in the battlefield. The reason lies in the difficulty of

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applying the ideas of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, which originally targeted states, on
non-state actors, stressing that it is also impossible to determine the time span for a
conflict. (Gow 2006, p. 1162-1163)
Reviewing the Literature on Air Power
The above-mentioned section of the chapter provided the basic, classical perceptions
of the most prominent military thinkers about war. Although they might disagree on
some aspects of their arguments, one can hardly argue that any of these scholars is
arguing that a military action can exist without having well-defined objectives, a
preliminary estimation of the expected outcome, and clear plan about the needed
amount of firepower. As strategic bombing is normally one type of a military action, it
should necessarily be examined and analyzed in light of the same standards. As the
British Air and Space Power Doctrine mentions, strategic bombing represents "the
ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behavior of people or
the course of events", seeking to "achieve militarily and politically favorable
outcomes in complex crises by using all available levers of power in a cross-
governmental and inter-agency approach." (British Air and Space Power Doctrine
2009, p. 8)
However, this definition is not enough to shape a clear understanding on how
air power should be used, which embodies a key debate in studies of air power. While
some scholars--especially the early ones--believe that an air force can solely
accomplish goals set for a specific military campaign, others argue for the necessity of
combining it with ground and naval troops and limiting dependence on them for
objectives related to the tactical level of war. A major feature of the literature on air
power involves the firm connection between its empirical dynamics and theory, which
is reflected in most of the academic papers and books on the topic. The aircraft was
used for military purposes during the First World War for the first time, nearly a
decade after the Wright Brothers finalized their invention. (Biddle 2002, p. 3-4)
However, the influence of warplanes on the flow of events during the war was quite
limited due to a number of obstacles that all parties of the conflict had encountered.
Each of the states involved had no adequate information about the aerial capabilities

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of their enemies. Governments--in addition to militaries--had also suffered problems
of establishing a communication system between ground and air forces, creating a
production system of airplanes and accomplishing high levels of accuracy. Some of
such industrial and technical difficulties were arguably not resolved until the early
1990s. (Morgan 2013, p. 2-3)
The early theorists of air power started developing their assumptions during
the interwar phase, a period of time when air forces in all countries were still taking
their first steps. For them, strategic bombing is a "war-winning strategy; decisive
strategy; the bomber would always get through; and only an independent air force
commanded by airmen could implement the strategy." (William March 2009, p. 17)
With his prominent book on the topic titled "The Command of the Air", published in
1921, Giulio Douhet was the first scholar to start advocating for strategic bombing.
Douhet, a former officer in the Italian military, presented a number of ideas that were
considered both unprecedented and shocking at such point of time.
Firstly, Douhet argued that airpower is capable of replacing both ground and
naval military formulas, in addition to considering the combination of air, ground and
navy troops a waste of resources that can be avoided. Secondly, he believed that air
power is capable of achieving a "material, moral and psychological" devastation to the
enemies. (Haslam 2012, p. 754-755) Thirdly, Douhet, critiquing the traditional
military structures of the armies, had also called for the creation of independent air
force within each country's militaries, for he thought that army leaders have a higher
tendency to depend on ground forces. (Berkland 2011, p. 391-392)
There is no doubt that other early theorists--mainly Hugh Trenchard and Billy
Mitchell--had been influenced by the ideas of Douhet, despite the fact that they
rejected his seemingly excessive confidence in air power. Perhaps this can reveal one
reason behind the development of air power theory in a different direction than that of
Douhet. Describing air power as "one of many means" to achieving military successes
that basically seeks to "assist the army"--Trenchard and Mitchell criticized the
preoccupation of Douhet with strategic bombing. Trenchard and Mitchell favored
examining air power as part of a comprehensive strategy that includes ground and

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naval operations, stressing the need for concern with the effectiveness of the military
option rather than the type of military power. (Haslam 2012, p. 755)
In fact, Trenchard--ex-British Chief of the Air Staff who is regarded as the
"father of the Royal Air Force''--was the first in history to lead a strategic bombing
campaign against non-state actors, yet he did not contribute theoretically to the
development of the literature in that manner. British warplanes conducted the so-
called air policing campaigns against insurgencies within their colonies during the
interwar period. Although the support of ground, colonial forces cannot be denied, the
British government resorted chiefly to air power to regain order in states such as
Yemen, Iraq and Somaliland, a situation that was pushed by security and economic
problems and leaning towards reducing reliance on ground forces in the post-First
World War period. (Longoria 1992, p. 14-16) Not differently from Douhet, Trenchard
and Mitchell emphasized the importance of providing air forces with autonomy in
terms of funding, resource and organizational aspects, a suggestion that is related to
their belief that aerial roles in wars will expand as the technological problems of
warplanes are solved by virtue of time. (Berkland 2011, p. 391-392, Haslam 2012,
p. 755)
The subsequent versions of the air power theory had backed the calls of
Trenchard and Mitchell for the integration of air, ground and naval troops in military
confrontations. Yet, they revealed an interest in determining the limitations of
strategic bombing, critiquing and contrasting with earlier theorists who focused
exclusively on the benefits of air strikes. In general, the contemporary literature on air
power points out to two main issues, which can be considered as analytical framework
more than a strict set of theoretical arguments amid a dominating scholarly pattern of
case-by-case analysis. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the "neo" trend in air power
theory, to a large extent, had contributed to the development of the existing literature
on the relationship between air power and non-state actors, for it stressed the need for
expanding the scope of analysis beyond the narrow boundaries of military strategies
and tactics.

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Contemporary scholars--such as Daniel Lake--objected the generalizations
and high expectations of early scholars concerning the use of air power, providing
some explanations on why strategic bombing succeeded in some cases, while failed in
other ones. Early scholars assumed that the diverse strategies of coercion through air
power are generally expected to lead to the destruction of state's economic capacities,
military capabilities or eruption of a domestic uprising against the government of the
attacked country. As an example, the NATO strategic bombing operation against the
Serb military in Kosovo could mostly represent a successful case study for supporters
of such arguments. Under the Operation Allied Force in 1999, the NATO air strikes
targeted Serb military targets in Kosovo and Belgrade, in addition to communication
centers, power stations and other sites that negatively affected the economy of the
attacked party to the conflict. After roughly three months and thousands of air strikes,
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic capitulated, though he did not lose power.
(Lake 2009, p. 83-84)
Moreover, within such context, it is certainly difficult to analyze the outcomes
of other campaigns of strategic bombing, especially those that targeted militarily
stronger enemies. For instance, during the Second World War, air forces of the Axis
and the Allies launched air strikes against civilian areas. Although the aerial
campaigns caused a high degree of psychological harm on civilians--in addition to
massive destruction in many towns and cities--they did not produce calls for regime
change or put a quick end for a war that lasted for roughly six years. In addition,
arguing that the Allied troops had achieved military victory through strategic bombing
only is problematic by all means. Contemporary scholars, hence, continuously
stressing need for expanding research on determinants of outcomes of strategic
bombing operations, usually have a single answer for this issue: both the coerced and
the coercing parties can affect the path of the conflict. The attacked states can
sometimes start a "counter-coercion effort" before the attacking air force succeeds in
making the cost of tolerating the consequences of war higher than the cost of
surrendering for the former. Such effort can also involve resorting to the support of
third parties or re-distributing financial resources to survive the economic pressures of
war. (Horowitz & Reiter 2001, p. 151-153)

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Furthermore, some contemporary scholars believe that the psychological
impact of air strikes is not only determined by the act of war itself, but also with the
ability of civilians to express their demands for ceasefire. For instance, authors such as
Lambert and Hosmer argue that military soldiers tend to have higher willingness for
peace in some incidents than civilians, as they are the most likely side to lose their
lives amid an aerial attack. Other academics claim that autocratic leaders give little
room for freedom of expression, thus civilian populations might lack a political
opportunity to reveal their rejection for war. (Mueller 2010, p. 9-12) Thus, it is no
surprise that some dictators managed to stay in power after losing war, including the
case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Kuwait war, which involved a
US-led operation of both ground and aerial forces. (Mueller 2010, p. 9-12)
On the other hand, some analysts--such as Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman
and Daniel Lake--urged examining strategic bombing within the context of the
surrounding regional and international contexts, a situation that cannot be separated
from the "two-way" nature of coercion endeavors. States normally count on a series of
mechanisms in order to achieve their foreign and security policy goals, which range
from diplomatic and economic means to military ones. The decision of a state to
choose the third option, represented specifically in the use of strategic bombing, is not
an aim in itself. Instead, it is seen as the best possible channel through which a
political outcome can be reached on basis of assuming that other channels are less
effective. Hence, one cannot disregard or at least give little attention to the
interactions among states and their impact on an aerial attack before, during or after its
commencement. For instance, it can be argued that the NATO aerial campaign on
Kosovo could not have led Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to surrender if the
economic and diplomatic weight of the European Union (EU), the absence of Russian
support and the NATO threat to deploy ground forces had not existed. (Byman &
Waxman 2000, p. 11-12) .
There is no surprise, despite limited discussion on such aspect within the air
power theory, that a considerable part of the academic literature on case studies
involving air power focuses on the interactions among states within a particular region
as an independent variable. As a matter of fact, previous instances showed the same
complexities in relation to non-state actors, as such groups usually enjoy the support

18
of external parties amid facing air strikes, a situation that can sometimes restrict the
influence of the military action. A number of scholars argued that the US détente with
the Soviet and China--supporters of the Viet Cong--had served as a key catalyst in
increasing the effectiveness of US air strikes during the Vietnam war. As a result,
using air power without considering the political and strategic aspects of a military
campaign reduces chances of producing a positive outcome. (Lake 2009, p. 86,
Clodfelter 2015, p.115-116, Smith 2002, p. 21-22)

19
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
Conceptual Framework
The integration of air power--as well as naval power--in military doctrines tackling
the issue of fighting non-state actors has largely been avoided until the mid-2000s.
Despite the inclusion of air power in actual operations against militant groups, the best
way through which such process can take place remained unknown. This situation was
apparently related to a dominating trend of thought, which suggested that air power is
an "indiscriminate weapon" that causes collateral damage, mainly related to the killing
of civilians. In that sense, many academic publications on the topic usually circulate a
quote by a US battalion commander in Iraq who said that he had "rarely put air into
my plan--this was because we did not understand how it could assist in a counter
insurgency fight." (Baltrusaitis 2008, p. 90-91)
The aim, at such point, is not to argue that using air power against non-state
actors is a meaningless act, for--in the meantime--many of the military doctrines in
Western states had realized some important benefits for airmen in such type of
warfare, which some of them were mentioned in the previous parts of the study.
Instead, this matter reflects the absence of a single theoretical framework that covers
the diverse aspects of the topic. This study, as a result will synthesize a number of
approaches in order to provide a comprehensive theroetical framework that can allow
one to have clear conceptualization of the key ideas that will be tested within the next
chapters on the case studies. These approaches include the conceptualization of Ron
Tira on "asymmetrical wars" against non-state actors and the approach of Edward
Luttwak on avoiding casualties. The study will also depend on the understanding of
the US Air Force doctrine and the approach of Derek Read on the issue to examine the
roles of air power in war against non-state actors within urban enviroments, which
represent the majority of the cases in the meantime.

20
Pertaining to non-state actors, one can differentiate between two kinds of
them. Some groups endeavor to gain recognition as an actor within the established
international system, as it had been the case--for example--with the Viet Minh or the
communists in China. The end of a war against a conventional military, for them,
should eventually lead to their rise to power within their state. Hence, although they
are fighting asymmetrically--which will be defined in the next paragraphs--they have
no objections towards being involved in negotiations or a process of dialogue with
state officials they are fighting against their militaries or those who do not accept their
politico-military logic. On the contrary, other non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda
express rejection to the present international system, seeking to replace it with another
system that functions in consistency with their political or ideological beliefs. (Tira
2010, p. 70) Yet, in both cases, wars will carry a different nature than inter-state ones.
Wars among states--or "simple symmetrical wars"--are traditionally based on
measuring the "military effectiveness" of the parties to the conflict. These wars are
also identified by a relationship between tactical and strategic levels of wars, in which
the outcomes of the former will most probably have implications on the latter. This is
related to the clear military aim which both fighting militaries do have in mind:
destroying the assets and troops of the opponent. (Tira 2010, p. 31)Tira identifies
symmetrical wars as those in which:
"the force buildup of the two sides is similar, and both sides believe that the fate of the war
would be sealed at the operational center of gravity located in the operational space, and by
attacking it in the prime major battle. The intention of both sides was meeting of force-on
force in the field, and no attempt was made to act against strategic centers of gravity that did
no directly affect the fighting" (Tira 2010, p. 31-32)
For asymmetrical wars, the fact that non-state actors prefer to stay aside from adopting
the military reasoning of states--which is significantly related to their ideologies,
cultural beliefs or strategic decisions--produces unusal challenges. Non-state actors,
on the one hand, do not always have a crystal-clear administrative hierarchy thorugh
which the actual decisionmakers within their ranks can be determined. The
relationship, moreover, between its members or the ways through which they receive
orders from their leaders and distribute tasks can sometimes be unknown for their
opponents. These dilemmas do not only affect the accuracy of the information
collected on these groups, but also raise questions about their real intentions behind

21
engaging in a war against a conventional military. For example, some non-state
actors--especially those that are associated with jihadist ideologies--might not view
war in terms of calculations of costs and benefits, but rather in terms of abiding by a
religious obligation that is most likely unending. But--in light of the state of
ambiguity surrounding them--it is not always plausible to assume that all non-state
actors have such belief in mind. (Tira 2010, p. 71)
The sophistication of an asymmetrical war, on the other hand, increases by the
unwillingness of non-state actors to fight directly against conventional forces, for they
are aware of the extremely-limited chances they have in terms of defeating the latter in
a battlefield. Non-state actors will, hence, resort to alternative tactics such as targeting
the "civilian-strategic centers of gravity" of the regular forces they are combating.
They will also take advantage of locals and use them as "human shields", which--
aside from the legal and humantarian implications of this issue--will most likely lead
to expanding the time span of the conflict with no concrete victories for the
conventional forces, putting the war objectives of governments under domestic
criticism. (Tira 2010, p. 71) Perhaps this situation had taken place during the US war
against the Viet Cong in Vietnam. While the Viet Cong suffered massive casualties
among its ranks and many tactical losses, its frequent killing of US soldiers had
imposed domestic pressures on the US government to eventually withdraw its troops
from Vietnam. The United States could have managed to resume the war for longer
periods, but its inability to translate its tactical victories into political and strategic
gains left little support or even a strong rationale for the continuation of the war.(Tira
2010, p. 72)
Perhaps the difficulties of asymmetrical wars and uncertainty about the
expected outcome could have played an important role in pushing policymakers in
certain situations--such as the case with the Israeli aerial operations in Gaza--to act
cautiously when expanding the scope of their military campaigns. As mentioned
earlier, this study will depend on a post-heroic approach of Edward Luttwak as the
basis for addressing the research questions of the topic. Luttwak believed that restraint
in the use of military power had existed during the Cold War. Although the Cold War
had resulted in dozens of wars across the globe, the fact that each of the two
superpowers enjoyed control over their "allies and clients"helped them to produce

22
such outcome. Restraint, at this point in history, was related to concerns about the
eruption of a nuclear war in case escalation reached levels that are beyond the control
of the United States or the Soviet Union. The main argument of Luttwak suggests
that--although wars are "easily started and then fought without perceptible restraints"
in the post-Cold War era--the dominating norm in warfare should involve shifting
military strategies and plans in order to produce the most possible state of "casualty
avoidance." (Luttwak 1995, p. 109-110) Luttwak argues that:
"Given the performance of certain modern weapons, if military planning is appropriately
modified to fully exploit their technical potential, it may be possible to emulate the casualty-
avoidance methods of eighteenth-century warfare and thus conduct armed yet virtually-
bloodless interventions. To be sure, US aims would have to be correspondingly modest and
remain so, resisting all temptations to achieve more than partial, circumscribed, and often
slow results as firmly as any good eighteenth-century general." (Luttwak 1995, p. 114-115)
This type of argument involves achieving a common ground between the traditional
public dissatisfaction with human casualties as governments decide to go to war and
the continuous need for using military power. It is worth mentioning that the academic
literaure on post-heroic warfare mostly focuses on the so-called "low-intensity
conflicts."Low-intensity conflicts, unlike the so-called "high-intensisty conflicts", are
those which at least one of its parties is a non-state actor. (Kober 2015, p. 97-98) For
example, Robert E. Osgood pointed out that the "public's readiness to sacrifice" is
limited when wars will not expectedly be short and hard to end up as the victorious
side. Other scholars such as Hugh Smith and Martin Shaw argued that technological
developments--including those related to air power--should lead to a reduction in the
deployment of ground forces in war areas. (Kober 2015, p. 97-98)
Some scholars, such as Martin Van Creveld argued that the spread of an
arguably cautious military strategies can be rooted in empirical and statistical data,
which can show a reduction of defense budgets around the world in the aftermat of the
Cold War. (Creveld 2008, p. 6-9) This situation can be defended by--according to
figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute--the
occurrence of only three large-scale armed conflicts from 1998 to 2007, as opposed to
30 conflicts that were classified as civil wars. This development puts the orthodox
consideration of military power as a means of achieving policy objectives in question
due to an apparent keenness by states to keep war as a last resort. (Mello 2010, p. 2-3)

23
For Luttwak--who is addressing US policymakers through his text--believes
that both the United States and its allies are facing lesser security threats in the post-
Cold War era. Hence, as military power is a tool of policy, an adjustment to
combating rules and doctrines should take place in order to become consistent with
the foreign and defense policy objectives of the state. (Luttwak 1995, p. 113) Though
no discussing the issue in details, Luttwak pointed out that air power can serve as an
important pillar of a post-heroic military policy. He, yet, believed that airmen cannot
solely achieve military victories, for " any one precision air strike can easily fail
because the assigned targets are concealed by bad weather, are no longer where last
spotted or are successfully camouflaged." Air power, thus, cannot allow states to win
wars. But a sustained aerial operation can decrease the need for dependence on
artillery, especially when cities are involved in wars. (Luttwak 1995, p. 120-121)
It is possible to argue that Luttwak does not provide concrete policy
recommendations for military commanders and governmnet officials on the ways
through which they can reduce military involvement, satisfy the anti-war public and
maintian supremacy in wars. Yet, maintaing such balance in actual asymmetrical wars
does certainly surpass the analytical capacity of his renowned text.
For this reason, representing the third aspect of the conceptual framework, it is
important to determine the ideal conditions under which air power can reach its
utmost effectiveness in asymmetrical wars. Air strikes are generally challenged by the
urban nature of the cities that non-state actors are based in their territories, which
represents the majority of the cases in the meantime. The density of the population in
cities allows armed groups to spread among civilians, which makes the accuracy of
aerial strikes a tough task to achieve. Such problem is not linked to technological
problems in military aircrafts, but rather associated with challenges of collecting
intelligence information on the actual sites that members of non-state groups are
hiding in. (Read 2010, p. 142) Therefore, most--if not all--of the military documents
on asymmetrical warfare usually stress that the employment of air, ground and naval
power is the final within a war of such nature. Perhaps this situation can allow one to
grasp the difference between aerially attacking conventional militaries or civilians
areas and using strategic bombing against non-state actors that are adopting guerilla
tactics ana benfiting the connections they enjoy with local populations.

24
The focus, in symmetrical wars, always involves using air power by militaries
as a means of coercion to enemies that are conventional militaries, seeking to make
the latter accept a political end result that is favourable for other states that are
attacking them. On the contrary--as it will be explained in the coming paragraphs--
having deep understanding of the socio-political and geographical conditions of the
battlefied and separating it from non-state groups acting within its borders are the
major pillars of strategic bombing campaigns in asymmetrical wars. The phases that
both preceeds and follows the campaigns of strategic bombing within asymmetrical
wars. The so-called "shock and awe" concept--first adopted by Douhet--involved
launching an attack against an enemy without issuing a warning. The aim is destroy
the enemy's aerial capabilities--which is not normally possessed by non-state
groups--lead to the "command of the air" and make the enemy less capable of
defending its territories. The next stage will involve attacking civilian areas in order to
"break their [civilians] will to resist and their war capacity." Pushing the civilians on
the enemy's side to call for a halt of fighting and avoid a military escalation was the
main aim of Douhet. Thus, a military would stop a war--or surrender in clearer
terms--not because of its interest in peace, but rather in response to popular pressure,
leading wars to be finished within shorter time spans than usual. (Berkland 2011, p.
391-392) When further academic contributions--as it has been explained in the
literature review section in the first chapter--emerged to critique the work of Douhet,
they were not fully against his arguments. Instead, there have been high degrees of
faith in the ability of air power to achieve fruitful results, though whether or not the
integration of ground--as well as naval forces--operations are needed to accelerate
and support the strategic goals of the war was the issue of concern.
On the contrary, as a first step, asymmetrical wars--whether backed by
domestic troops or foreign ground troops--have to deal with the "core grievances"
that led local populations to support a non-state group. Although it is hard to find a
clear definition for "grievances" that needs to be addressed, especially that some of
them might take long years to be resolves, such as the nonexistence of social services
such as health and education. Under these circumstances, a military operation will be
challenged by the factor of time, which can allow non-state actors to strengthen their
social and political positions. The major focus, instead, entails attempting to gain the

25
support of the locals in order to eventually win their cooperation with military troops
fighting the non-state elements. (Air Force Doctrine Document 3-2 2013, 6)The
British Royal Air Force (RAF), as an example, were responsible for transporting
Afghan Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia for Hajj amid the inability of the Afghan
national airline company to perform such mission. One can argue that such move--
described in some of the literature as acts of counterinsurgency (COIN)--had
increased the legitimacy of the then newly-declared government in Afghanistan in
2002 and weakened the extent of support to the Taliban militants. (Read 2010, p. 142)
Local populations can sometimes offer their support to non-state actors, which
increases the hardships and challenges faced by specifically by air power and
generally by all forms of military forces. For example, it is widely argued that the
support of the Sunni tribes and clans to the militants of the ISIS in Iraq adds more
strength to the latter, while putting the US-led coalition and the Shiite government
forces in a tougher situation. Based on US pressures, some attempts were made to
include Sunni ministers in the government as an attempt to obtain their support against
ISIS. But the failure of such process immediately indicated the continuation of the
Sunni sects and their people to ISIS. (Blaydes & Crenshaw 2015)
The US Air Force doctrine document described gaining the backing of the
population as the "essential element; it represents the battleground and operational
terrain. Like physical terrain factors, planners should skillfully navigate social
structures, culture, religion, language and history." As these factors might differ from
any geographical area to another, it is important to put such consideration in mind
while attempting to create alliances with the population. It is important to highlight the
fact that the aim of creating local support to military operations against non-state
actors does not mean that civilians should have combating roles. Rather, the key goal
is to motivate them to provide information about the non-state actors, as well as giving
them lesser causes to protect or support the elements of the latter. The degree, if these
conditions are achieved, of using military power can reach higher levels of accuracy,
for a separation between civilians and armed groups will be in place. (Air Force
Doctrine Document 3-2 2013, 6)

26
Research Questions
It can be argued that the majority of conflicts in the Middle East were historically
taking place among states, which accordingly gives an impression that strategic
bombing is suffering from a weak, empirical connection when applied to non-state
groups in the region. This situation, nevertheless, has been considerably reversed in
the post-Arab Spring period, which was dominated by conflicts between conventional
militaries against non-state actors, or even non-state actors fighting each other.
Furthermore, aside from the three case studies that are included in this study--which
will reflect the importance of studying the issue of employing air power in the Middle
East against non-state groups--one can easily point out to several cases of wars of the
same nature in previous decades.
The United States, for example, has been continuously launching drone strikes
against militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen since the
early 2000s, aiming at "diminishing AQAP's presence in the region." These aerial
strikes managed to cause the death of several leading figures of Al-Qaeda in Yemen--
such as Anwar al-Awlaki and Nasser al-Wuhayshi--as well as arguably "degrade,
disrupt and destroy its [Al-Qaeda] remnants" in the country. (Helsel 2016) Other
examples include the air strikes of the Iraqi military against Kurdish groups and Shiite
Muslims during the early 1990s, which were stopped following a US-British no-fly
zones imposed as part of a then package of international sanctions against the ruling
regime of Saddam Hussein. (BBC 2006)
However, these examples show that strategic bombing has either been used for
extremely short periods of time or even employed on frequent basis without being
maintained throughout a prolonged period of time. It is difficult to build a coherent,
theoretical generalization in light of these instances, as air strikes were not tested to
the maximum limits, though they were--with no doubt--part of the military strategies
of the states using them. As the 21
st
century saw more states resorting to air power
against militant groups in the Middle East, it becomes more urgent to create an
analytical framework through which questions about why, how and under which
conditions air power becomes more effective within asymmetrical confrontations can
be answered. This can explain--as it will be mentioned in the methodology section--

27
the reason behind tackling three case studies within a roughly similar time span, which
involves producing conclusions that can be generally applied on future cases. Wars in
the Middle East, in the meantime, are highly based on air power, with a noticeable
reduction in levels of using other types of military power, mainly land power.
Accordingly, when studying cases that occurred in the same period of time, one can
possibly manage to ensure the validity of the observations that will be reached.
As it has been stated in the above-mentioned paragraph, the historical examples
of Iraq, Syria and Yemen cannot be considered as sustained military campaigns in
which air power was used for prolonged period of time. Yet--a debate that has
apparently emerged since the Vietnam war--the effectiveness of strategic bombing in
asymmetrical conflicts has been strongly put in question for long decades, especially in
regards to its ability to achieve the objectives of any given military campaign. During
the Vietnam war, the US military witnessed an internal debate between the Air Force
and Marine Corps--on one side--and General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, on
the other side over this issue in 1964. The former believed that air strikes "would
compel Hanoi to cease and desist in its efforts to take over South Vietnam", while the
latter shared a totally different view. As then US Air Force, General Curtis LeMay, had
put it, "my solution to the problem would be to tell them frankly that they've [Viet
Cong] got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression, or we're going to bomb
them back into the Stone Age." Yet, for Johnson--responding to arguments about
increasing dependence on air power--argued that the "Viet Cong insurgency
could
continue for a long time at its present or an increased intensity even if North Vietnam
were completely destroyed." (Global Security 2016) The outcome of using air power
against a non-state actor in this war was by all means negative, which implies that
Johnson had an accurate estimation of the military situation in Vietnam, especially in
light of the guerilla tactics of the Viet Cong and their knowledge about the terrain in
the country. As General John Paul McConnell--ex-Air Force Chief of Staff and vice
commander of the Strategic Air Command--said in 1965, employing air power may:
"seem futile in trying to combat extensive guerrilla activities, especially under conditions as
they exist in Viet-Nam. There are no well-defined fronts; virtually all of South Viet-Nam is
the battlefield and combat operations shift rapidly and unpredictably from one locale to the
other. Hiding in the jungle or mixing with the civilian population, the Viet Cong normally
strike in relatively small numbers and whenever they have the advantage of surprise." (Air
University 1965)

Details

Pages
Type of Edition
Erstausgabe
Year
2016
ISBN (PDF)
9783960676089
ISBN (Softcover)
9783960671084
File size
729 KB
Language
English
Institution / College
The American University in Cairo – Department of Political Science
Publication date
2016 (November)
Keywords
Middle East IS Hizbollah Hisbollah Israel Lebanon Saudi Arabia Yemen Huthi Asymmetrical conflict Terrorism
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Title: The Use of Strategic Bombing against Non-State Actors in the Middle East. Objectives and Limitations of Air Power in the Cases of Hezbollah, Houthis and ISIS
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