Militarisation in East Asia. Considerations from the Works of Thucydides and Alfred Thayer Mahan
©2017
Textbook
68 Pages
Summary
“I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia. Simple as that.” Such were the words Admiral Harry Harris Commander U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) used to describe Chinese actions in East Asia. After two decades of effort towards modernization, it seems that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is in a position to challenge US primacy in East Asia. The PLAN has developed both in terms of capability and strategy through its emphasis on Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) and blue-water forces, embracing Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ideas on access and sea control. What we are witnessing in China is a shift in thinking: from a continental viewpoint to a maritime one.
After a decade of wars in the Middle East, the US has been taken by surprise. Today it looks at China’s naval build-up as threatening. The US has taken steps to refocus its attention on East Asia and meet the challenge of a contested sea. The dynamics of the Sino-American relation will also be examined through the lens of Thucydides and his ideas of great power.
This study discusses Mahan’s and Thucydides’ influence on Chinese and American ways of thinking and whether it will impact the future trajectory of the Sino-American relationship. The main developments in capability and strategy on both sides will also be examined.
After a decade of wars in the Middle East, the US has been taken by surprise. Today it looks at China’s naval build-up as threatening. The US has taken steps to refocus its attention on East Asia and meet the challenge of a contested sea. The dynamics of the Sino-American relation will also be examined through the lens of Thucydides and his ideas of great power.
This study discusses Mahan’s and Thucydides’ influence on Chinese and American ways of thinking and whether it will impact the future trajectory of the Sino-American relationship. The main developments in capability and strategy on both sides will also be examined.
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
iv
2.4. Anti-Access/Area Denial ... 21
2.5. China's Underwater Nuclear Deterrent ... 24
2.6. Taiwan ... 25
2.7. Thucydides and Uncertainty ... 26
Chapter 3
A New US Strategy ... 28
3.1. Between Engagement and Containment ... 29
3.2. Access ... 30
3.3. A New US Strategy ... 32
3.3.1. AirSea Battle ... 32
3.3.2. Distributive Lethality ... 33
3.4. Fiscal Considerations ... 35
Conclusion ... 37
Mahan and Thucydides ... 38
Conclusion ... 40
Appendix A ... 41
Bibliography ... 50
v
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Major trade routes and straits in the Asia-Pacific ... 42
Figure 2: The First and Second Island Chains ... 43
Figure 3: Major PLAN naval activities within the first and second island chains. ... 44
Figure 4: Major US Bases in East Asia ... 45
Figure 5: Range of Chinese Missiles ... 46
Figure 6: SAM installations on Chinese occupied Woody Island ... 47
Figure 7: Chinese claims in the East and South China Seas ... 48
Figure 8: Claims in the South China Sea ... 49
Introduction
1
Aims, Objective and Background
East Asiawhich according to the US State Department includes all the countries on the
Western Pacific rim (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs)is currently one of the world's
most dynamic regions. It is a region on the rise, with the world's most promising
economies, about 30% of the world's population (World Population Data Sheet, 2015) and
home to a rising power i.e. China. The United States (US) has a long history of involvement
in East Asia, which it considers vital to its economic interests. The emergence of China in
recent years has again shifted US focus to this important region.
US wars in the Middle East and the Global War on Terror have created a vacuum in East
Asia, used by Beijing to modernise its armed forces and assert its claims in the East and
South China Seas, referred to as its `near seas'. The main beneficiary of this modernisation
is the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) which has enjoyed significant attention in the
last 20 years, benefiting both from an increase in budget and the addition of new
capabilities. This study looks at the PLAN's modernisation both in terms of the
equipment it is acquiring and in terms of the strategic thought it is employing to achieve
this `turn to the sea'. The study looks at Alfred Thayer Mahan, looked upon by the
Chinese as the inspiration for their naval build-up, with his emphasis on sea control and
access. Thucydides is also consulted as a guide to great power politics. His History of the
Peloponnesian War with its great hegemonic struggle between Athens and Sparta can be
seen as a historical predecessor to what is happening between the US and China in the
Western Pacific.
This study will not focus solely on China but will also look at the steps taken by the US to
confront the challenge a rising China poses; a China which is more aggressive in territorial
issues and influential on the world stage. Changes in doctrine, equipment and strategy will
also be delved into. As both the PLAN and the US Navy (USN) adopt strategies to negate
one another, the Western Pacific looks primed to become a region to watch.
Research Outline
The study is divided in five chapters. The first chapter is more theoretical in nature,
it looks at Thucydides and Mahan and their writings. In the case of Thucydides, elements
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of his work will be discussed and applied to the Sino-American relation. The Thucydides
Trap will also be examined, as will the likelihood of war and the historical record of the
Thucydides Trap. The chapter will also look at Mahan and his ideas on sea power, access
and sea control. Emphasis will be placed on Mahan's two tridents and his idea that sea
power and sea control are not something undertaken solely in times of war but also in
times of peace. Finally, historic examples of other rising powers which looked at the sea
will be discussed vis-à-vis China.
The second chapter will focus on Chinese strategy and the PLAN's naval build-up. What are
the short and long term goals of the PLAN's modernisation? The concept of island chains
and the importance of Taiwan will be discussed. The emphasis on Anti-Access/Area-Denial
(A2/AD), the equipment and the capabilities acquired by the Chinese will also be explored.
The chapter will furthermore demonstrate that the PLAN is thinking along Mahanian lines,
both in its strategy and build-up. The uncertainty that this build-up creates will similarly be
examined.
The third chapter will adopt an American viewpoint and explore the dilemma between
engaging and containing China. The chapter will look at the USN as a power that has taken
sea control and access for granted since the end of the Cold War, perhaps even abandoning
some of Mahan's ideas, resulting in an unfavourable position to engage in high seas
confrontation. The US has mainly been focusing on developing strategies to counter
A2/AD, emphasising once again surface warfare as a task that its major surface combatants
will have to undertake. The concepts of Distributive Lethality, AirSea Battle and access will
be examined. The fact that the USN also faces a fiscal challenge will likewise be discussed.
The final chapter will summarise and draw conclusions on the situation in East Asia and the
merit of Mahan and Thucydides in Sino-American ties. The conclusion will also debate to
what extent these two strategic thinkers impact on both the Chinese and the Americans.
Limitations
Throughout the research the best effort has been made to present the most accurate
information at the time of publishing. However, the nature of the topic makes it such that
certain information is not readily available. For instance, in the case of China's nuclear
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submarine fleet, information is very scarce, due to tight security and secrecy surrounding
the building and deployment of these boats. Similarly, information on the US AirSea Battle
concept is still mostly classified. In these cases a certain amount of postulation had to be
undertaken.
4
Chapter 1
Thucydides and Mahan
5
1.1.
Thucydides
Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between 431-404 BC is still a very relevant
text in international relations. Different parts of the book have different relevance in the
study of foreign policy. The first book is held as a realist account of the causes of the war.
The Melian Dialogue is held by realists as the brutal, unsentimental view of politics whilst
the failed expedition to Sicily is seen as a warning against foreign intervention (Farley,
2011). Many have also stated that Thucydides encompasses everything needed to teach
international relations.
Thucydides offers perspective on what is currently going on in East Asia. In Thucydides'
time an established power (Sparta) was challenged by a rising power (Athens). Today, the
US (the established power) is challenged by China (the rising power). Similarly, the
Peloponnesian War also involved a predominantly land-based power against a sea-based
one. At the risk of sounding cliché, Mark Twain was right: "History doesn't repeat itself but
it often rhymes." Thucydides is thus still valid in international relations today and in Sino-
US relations.
1.1.1. Pride, Fear and Greed
In a speech, the Athenian delegation in Sparta justify their actions as neither unsurprising
nor against the laws of man, but rather driven by three important motivations; "prestige,
fear, and self-interest" (Hammond, 2009:38) referring to pride, fear and greed respectively.
Today this still holds true: most conflict is motivated by these three sentiments and this
certainly holds applies to Sino-US relation.
According to Thucydides, the War was simply a hegemonic struggle. Despite the fact that
there were immediate issues and offences (a full account can be found in Thucydides Book
1), what made the war inevitable "was the growth of Athenian power and Spartan fear of
it" (Ibid.13). Today, fear still plays a role in international affairs. Briefly, the US and China's
neighbours fear that a rising China will ultimately aim to change the status-quo, turning it
into one which is more favourable to China or into a world system with China as a hegemon.
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Pride is also a huge motivator on both sides of the Pacific. American pride at being the sole
superpower and Chinese Nationalism are huge motivators. Whilst the US has prided itself
in maintaining the current liberal order, the Chinese have their own ambitions, chief
amongst which is restoring China as the great power it historically was (Wang, 2013) before
the arrival of the European powers who gradually imposed their will upon China. This
culminated in the century of humiliation and the signing of unequal treaties between the
West and Qing China (Hayton, 2014: 48). Both the Chinese government and the Chinese
people are determined to never let this happen again, taking pride in their long history and
their ability to survive hardships. Today Nationalism is especially evident in China when it
comes to issues concerning Japan and territorial disputes (Upton-McLaughlin, 2013).
Reluctance to compromise and find common solutions can lead to rash actions and war.
Greed, economic interest and natural resources can lead to war. In Athens' case, it was the
desire for tribute from other Greek city states (Hammond, 2009: xii) and the fact that the
Athenian alliance against the Persians (The Delian League) gradually turned from an
alliance into an Athenian empire (Ibid. xiii). During this period, Athenians also acquired
overseas possessions. The situation in East Asia can also be attributed to economic gain.
Both the US and China have a vested interest in trade in East Asia and the flow of resources
through the vital straits and waterways of East Asia (AMTI Atlas).
With Chinese exports on the rise and China being the second largest economy in the world,
(OBC, 2016) it is only natural to aspire to take a more leading role in world affairs in an
attempt to shape the system to suit its own needs. Likewise, the US's own interest is in
preserving the current economic system and its economic edge, something which it aims
to achieve with the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).
1.1.2. The Thucydides Trap
Tensions between an established power and a rising one are not new; in his book
Thucydides attributes war to the rise of Athens and the fear it instilled in Sparta. This is the
essence of the Thucydides Trap, a phrase coined up by Graham Allison (Allison, 2015).
When considering the above three factors, a rising power and an established power may
result in a course towards war. This phenomenon is nothing new, although it is realist in
nature. Historic cases are abundant. In recent years, the Thucydides Trap has been applied
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to the Sino-US relationship. Thus, with Thucydides being still relevant and the analogy
being so similar, does this mean that conflict between the US and China is inevitable?
Allison intriguingly laid out his ideas about the Thucydides Trap in an essay for the Atlantic.
As part of the Thucydides Trap Project, a team under Allison's direction examined sixteen
cases where a rising power challenged an established one and determined the outcome of
such challenges (Thucydides Trap Project, 2015). The results are disturbing. Fourteen out
of sixteen cases resulted in war. The worrying factor, according to Allison, is the fact that
normal events or `standard crises' that can otherwise be resolved, nevertheless trigger war.
In the case of Athens and Sparta, it was the actions of smaller allies that drew them closer
to war. This can easily happen in East Asia. Both Taiwan and Japan have the potential to
draw the US closer to war with China. Arguably, the US's allies might play a bigger role in
the Thucydides Trap than fear of a rising power. This results in a situation where a great
deal of effort is required to escape the Thucydides Trap.
According to both Allison and Thucydides, no single power is responsible for the Trap. In
Thucydides, Athens' position is understandable; as its power grew, Athens became more
conscious of the injustices and disrespect it suffered. Sparta's interpretation of this was
that Athens was being unreasonable, ungrateful and threatening the established system as
a whole. This can again be applied to the US and Chinese relations. There is also an
interesting paradox here, in that China is trying to change the same status-quo that has
allowed it to economically prosper and grow. It is only natural that the US sees this as
threatening and confusing.
Allison is not the only one to recognise the dangers of the Thucydides Trap. In a speech in
Seattle, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated: "There is no such thing as the so-called
Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the
mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves." (Gracie,
2015). Despite dismissing the existence of such a trap between the US and China, Xi Jinping
has warned against rash actions that might make it a reality. Indeed, Xi Jinping is not the
only Chinese President to recognise the Thucydides Trap. Hu Jintao, during his presidency,
also commissioned a study about it in an attempt to avoid it (Yoshihara and Merighi, 2015).
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Despite all this we must also recognise the fact that we cannot accurately assess how far
the US and China are into their Thucydides Trap. On one hand, there is competition
between the two but there are also instances of collaboration. An interesting perspective
on this is an interview with Professor Toshi Yoshihara of the Naval War College (Ibid.). While
the historical outlook strongly favours war, with the most famous example perhaps being
the First World War, the counter argument is that it does not always lead to war. This can
be seen in the transfer of power between the British Empire and the US. Sino-US relations
could end in a similar way.
Similarly, China's actions can be interpreted in different ways. The PLAN's newly acquired
capabilities can be interpreted as aimed at denying US access to the global commons in
Maritime Asia. On the other hand, it can also be taken as aimed solely at maintaining the
global commons open, the same as the US has done in the last 70 years. China has been
active in the horn of Africa (Erickson, 2015) and it depends heavily on its overseas trade. It
is only natural that China will develop these naval capabilities. Looking solely at capabilities
does not mean that one can understand intentions. This makes the situation more difficult,
because while China develops capabilities to flex its muscles in the near sea, at the same
time these capabilities can be used to protect the global commons, something which the
US would gladly welcome.
Ultimately it might simply be too early to tell whether The Thucydides Trap is a forgone
conclusion in Sino-US ties. While the potential for conflict is certainly present,
opportunities for greater cooperation also exist. Both sides have vested interest in
maintaining peace.
1.1.3. The Elephant and the Whale
There are other parallels and lessons that can be learned from Thucydides History of the
Peloponnesian War.
The clash between a land power (the elephant) and a sea power (the whale) has already
been mentioned. This is evident when comparing the US and China; in terms of naval power
and power projection the Chinese are at a disadvantage. However, there are also other
implications to consider when it comes to sea and land power. For instance, the
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coordination between different branches of a military; can the navy coordinate with land
and air assets? The US has demonstrated this capability during recent conflicts. It is
doubtful whether China can manage the same (Kazianis, 2015). In any potential conflict in
East Asia, a large amount of cooperation between all branches of the military will be
required. A further warning is not to over extend oneself. This is especially true in the case
of the US which has to maintain a worldwide presence, together with the fact that
operations in East Asia are taking place so far away from home.
The Sicilian Expedition in Thucydides is a perfect example of this. An account of this is given
in Books six and seven. This also serves as a warning against foreign intervention. Although
for Athens it made sense to deny Sparta a powerful ally in Sicily, the whole venture became
a quagmire with Athens putting more and more resources into an expedition which
ultimately failed. In the end, it was a major blow for Athens: the men and ships lost in the
venture proved too great to replace and resulted in Athens losing the war.
1.2. Alfred Thayer Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was a US Admiral and naval theorist. His writings have
been incredibly influential at the turn of the century in shaping US, German, British and
Japanese naval strategy through his concept of sea power. His most famous and influential
book was The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 16601783 published in 1890 where
he outlines his conviction that a country that can project naval power will have a greater
impact on the world. His writings were published at a time when the US was still largely a
continental power and his work served to push the US to sea, both as a source of commerce
and as a way to guarantee safety. Today there can be no dispute that the US navy is
Mahanian in nature.
While being relatively unknown except in specific naval circles, he is still taught at the Naval
War College, and is experiencing a revival in China. Indeed, many have described China's
interest in maritime projection as `China's turn to Mahan'. Mahan has become wildly read
in China, his writings have been published and republished and interpreted. Chinese
officials have quoted him and held him as their champion when discussing Chinese naval
strategy.
10
1.2.1. Sea Power
Mahan describes the sea as a great highway through which trade, communications and
people flow (Mahan, 1898: 25). These well-known paths of travel are referred to as trade
routes which carry most of the world's shipping. The extended nature of these routes is
such that, in many instances, they make use of ocean territory that is not owned by any
specific power. Today this concept is referred to as the Global Commons, i.e. areas that lie
outside of the political reach of any one nation State (United Nations Environment
Programme). In the case of the sea these areas are also referred to as the high seas.
According to Mahan, the chief objective and purpose of the navy is to protect national
shipping passing through these areas, guaranteeing that commerce travels between point
A and B safely both in times of war and peace (Mahan, 1898: 25-27).
Indeed, it is the need to protect trade on the High Seas that pushes nations to consider
what Mahan calls `armed shipping' and it is only nations aggressive in nature that pursue
and maintain a navy outside this purpose (Ibid. 26). In 1890, when Mahan first published
his book, he refers to the US as not having the need for such a big naval force as most of
the trade reaching the shores of the US was foreign owned and the US economy did not
depend on it (Ibid.). In short, sea power does not comprise solely the navy's warships but
also the commercial fleet of a country, whose protection is the navy's raison d'être.
One of the phrases cited from Mahan's works perfectly sums up his definition of sea power.
He describes sea power as being "that overbearing power on the sea which drives the
enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the
great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's
shores" (Ibid. 138). This definition contrasts to that of other strategists of the time, like Sir
Julian Corbett a contemporary British Naval Strategist. Corbett placed less emphasis on
fleet battle and regarded a contested sea as being a normal state of affairs with command
of the seas meaning only command of communications (Corbett, 1911: 91-94).
Mahan acknowledges the fact that not all nations depend on seagoing trade for their
economic survival. At the time of publishing the US was not a maritime nation and his
writings where aimed primarily at pushing the US to become one. He also recognises that
certain nations are better positioned to become great naval powers. He narrows it down
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Details
- Pages
- Type of Edition
- Erstausgabe
- Year
- 2017
- ISBN (PDF)
- 9783960676218
- ISBN (Softcover)
- 9783960671213
- File size
- 3.2 MB
- Language
- English
- Institution / College
- University of Aberdeen
- Publication date
- 2017 (February)
- Grade
- A3
- Keywords
- South China Sea US China Naval Strategy Mahan Thucydides Strategy Sea Power A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial Deterrence Strategic Studies
