An Improved Lightweight Privacy Preserving Authentication Scheme for SIP-Based-VoIP Using Smart Card

Jan, Saeed Ullah

An Improved Lightweight Privacy Preserving Authentication Scheme for SIP-Based-VoIP Using Smart Card

Summary

In the past few years, secure information sharing became very popular in the area of immigration, military applications, healthcare, education, foreign affairs, etc. As secure communication utilizes both wireless and wired communication mechanizations for exchanging sensitive information, security and privacy of the information exchange cannot be easily compromised. To moderate the security, integrity, authenticity, and privacy issues related to information exchange, numerous authentication mechanisms have been recommended by different researchers in the literature in recent times, but these are vulnerable to prospective security flaws such as masquerade, insider, replay, impersonation, password guessing, server spoofing, denial-of-service attacks and, in addition, have failed to deliver mutual authentication.
In the past few years we have also witnessed a balanced growth in the acceptance of VoIP (Voice over IP) facilities because the numerous Web and VoIP applications depend on huge and extremely distributed infrastructures to process requests from millions of users in an appropriate manner. Due to their extraordinary desires, these large-scale internet applications have frequently surrendered security for other objectives such as performance, scalability and availability. As a result, these applications have characteristically favored weaker, but well-organized security mechanisms in their foundations. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application and presentation layers signaling protocol that initiates, modifies, and terminates IP-based multimedia sessions. Implementing SIP for secure communication has been a topic of study for the past decade, and several proposals are available in the research domain. However, security aspects are not addressed in most of these proposals, because SIP is exposed to several threats and faces security issues at these layers. Probes for SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) servers have been conveyed for many years.
To gather more details about these activities the author has designed a scheme for SIP servers in a network and composed data about some popular attacks. Furthermore, he explains his interpretations and guidance on how to prevent these attacks from being successful. Biometrics, a new field of research, has also been dealt with in this research by means of a “three-factor authentication scheme”, in which one factor is biometrics.

Excerpt

Abstract

In the past few years, secure information sharing became very popular in the area of

immigration, military applications, healthcare, education, foreign affairs, etc. As secure

communication utilizes both wireless and wired communication mechanizations for exchanging

sensitive information, so security and privacy of the information exchange cannot be easily

compromised. To moderate the security, integrity, authenticity, and privacy issues related to

information exchange, numerous authentication mechanisms have been recommended by

different researcher in the literature in recent times, but are vulnerable to prospective security

flaws such as masquerade, insider, replay, impersonation, password guessing, server spoofing,

denial-of-service attacks and in addition failed to deliver mutual authentication.

In the past few years we have also seen a balanced growth in the acceptance of VoIP (Voice over

IP) facilities, because the numerous Web and VoIP applications depend on huge and extremely

distributed infrastructures to process requests from millions of users in an appropriate manner.

Due to their extraordinary desires, these large-scale Internet applications have frequently

surrendered security for other objectives such as performance, scalability and availability. As a

result, these applications have characteristically favored weaker, but well-organized security

mechanisms in their foundations. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application and

presentation layers signaling protocol that initiates, modifies, and terminates IP-based

multimedia sessions. Implementing SIP for secure communication has been a topic of study for

the past decade, and several proposals are available in the research domain. However, security

aspects are not addressed in most of these proposals, because SIP is exposed to several threats

and faces security issue at these layers. Probes for SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) servers have

been conveyed for many years, and to gather more details about these activities we simply design

a scheme for SIP servers in a network and composed data about some popular attacks. What will

follow is an explanation of our interpretations and guidance on how to prevent these attacks from

being successful.

Biometrics a new field of research has also been materialized in this research, entitled "a three-

factor authentication scheme" in which one factor is biometrics. In biometric cryptosystems the

benefits of biometric confirmation are presented to basic cryptographic key supervisory systems

to enhance security. Anyhow, this research delivers a general outline of the basics, permitting to

biometrics as well as cryptography. This work also gives biometric cryptosystems based on iris

biometrics and using smart card as well as a password for authentication.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ... 1

1.1 Overview ... 1

1.1.1 One-Factor Authentication Scheme ... 1

1.1.2 Two-Factor Authentication Scheme ... 1

1.1.3 Three-Factor Authentication Scheme ... 2

1.2 Cryptology ... 2

1.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography ... 3

1.2.2 Key Generation Technique ... 3

1.2.3 Symmetric Encryption and Decryption ... 4

1.2.4 One-Way Digital Hash-Function ... 4

1.2.5 Asymmetric Cryptography ... 5

1.3 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) ... 7

1.3.1 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) ... 8

1.3.2 H.323 ... 11

1.4 Smart Card ... 11

1.4.1 Background of Smart Card ... 11

1.4.2 Standard Selection for Smart Card ... 13

1.4.3 Application of Smart-Card ... 14

1.4.4 Types of Smart Card ... 14

1.5 ProVerif an Automated Software Toolkit ... 15

1.6 BioHashing Technique ... 15

1.7 Common Adversary Model (CAM) ... 17

1.8 XOR (

) Bitwise-Operations ... 18

1.9 BAN-Logic ... 19

1.10 Chapter Summary ... 19

2. Literature Review ... 21

2.1 Overview ... 21

2.2 Kim and Kue Scheme ... 21

2.2.1 Registration Phase ... 22

2.2.2 Login Phase ... 22

2.2.3 Cryptanalysis of Kim and Kue Scheme ... 23

2.3 He et al.'s Scheme ... 23

2.3.1 Registration Phase ... 23

2.3.2 Login Phase ... 24

2.3.3 Authentication Phase ... 24

2.3.4 Password Change Phase ... 24

2.3.5 Cryptanalysis of He et al.'s Scheme ... 25

2.4 Das et al.'s Scheme ... 25

2.4.1 Registration Phase ... 25

2.4.2 Login Phase ... 25

2.4.3 Verification Phase ... 26

2.4.4 Password Change Phase ... 26

2.4.5 Cryptanalysis of Das et al.'s Scheme ... 26

2.5 An's Scheme ... 26

2.5.1 Registration Phase ... 27

2.5.2 Login Phase ... 27

2.5.3 Authentication Phase ... 28

2.5.4 Cryptanalysis of An's Scheme ... 29

2.6 Park et al.'s Scheme ... 29

2.6.1 Registration Phase ... 29

2.6.2 Login Phase ... 30

2.6.3 Authentication Phase ... 30

2.6.4 Cryptanalysis of Park et al.'s Scheme ... 31

2.7 Zhu-Xu-Feng's Scheme ... 31

2.7.1 Initial Phase ... 31

2.7.2 Registration Phase ... 31

2.7.3 Login Phase ... 31

2.7.4 Authentication Phase ... 32

2.7.5 Cryptanalysis of Zhu-Xu-Feng's Scheme ... 32

2.8 Song's Scheme ... 33

2.8.1 Initialization Phase ... 33

2.8.2 Registration Phase ... 34

2.8.3 Login Phase ... 34

2.8.4 Authentication Phase ... 34

2.8.5 Cryptanalysis of Song's Scheme ... 35

2.9 Wu et al.'s Scheme [19] ... 35

2.9.1 Initialization Phase ... 35

2.9.2 Registration Phase ... 35

2.9.3 Login & Authentication Phases ... 36

2.9.4 Password or Biometrics Change Phase ... 37

2.9.5 Cryptanalysis of Wu et al.'s Scheme ... 37

2.10 Lee et al.'s Scheme ... 37

2.10.1 Registration Phase ... 38

2.10.2 Login & Authentication Phases ... 39

2.10.3 Password Change Phase ... 40

2.10.4 Cryptanalysis of Lee et al.'s Scheme... 40

2.11 Lue et al.'s Scheme ... 40

2.11.1 Registration Phase ... 41

2.11.2 Login & Verification Phases ... 42

2.11.3 Password Change Phase ... 43

2.11.4 Cryptanalysis of Lue et al Scheme ... 43

2.12 Tsai et al.'s Scheme [25] ... 43

2.12.1 Working of Tsai et al. scheme ... 43

2.12.2 The Server Registration Phase ... 44

2.12.3 The User Registration Phase ... 44

2.12.4 The Login and Authentication Phase... 45

2.12.5 Cryptanalysis of Tsai et al. Scheme... 45

2.13 Wu-Xu-Xiong Scheme ... 47

2.13.1 Registration Phase ... 48

2.13.2 Login and Authentication Phases ... 48

2.13.3 Password Change Phase ... 50

2.13.4 Card Revocation Phase ... 50

2.13.5 Cryptanalysis of Wu-Xu-Xiang Scheme ... 50

2.14 Lipping Zhang et al.'s Scheme ... 50

2.14.1 Initialization Phase ... 51

2.14.2 Registration Phase ... 51

2.14.3 Login Phase ... 52

2.14.4 Authentication Phase ... 52

2.14.5 Password or Biometric Updating Phase ... 53

2.14.6 Cryptanalysis of Lipping Zhang et al.'s Scheme ... 54

2.15 Zhang et al.'s Scheme ... 54

2.15.1 Registration Phase ... 55

2.15.2 Login and Authentication Phases ... 56

2.15.3 Password Change Phase ... 58

2.16 Zhang et al.'s Protocol Analysis ... 58

2.16.1 Working Procedure of the Scheme ... 58

2.16.2 Biometric Extraction and Password Guessing Attacks ... 59

2.16.3 User Anonymity Violation ... 59

2.16.4 Replay Attack and Denial-of-Service Attack ... 60

2.17 Chapter Summary ... 60

3. Proposed Solution ... 61

3.1 Overview ... 61

3.2 Proposed Scheme ... 61

3.2.1 Registration Phase ... 64

3.2.2 Login and Authentication Phases ... 65

3.2.3 Password Change Phase ... 67

3.3 Chapter Summary ... 68

4. Security Analysis ... 69

4.1 Overview ... 69

4.2 Formal Security Analysis ... 69

4.2.1 BAN Logic ... 70

4.2.2 Rules of BAN Logic ... 70

4.2.3 BAN Method for Protocol Analysis ... 72

4.2.4 BAN-Logic Postulates ... 72

4.2.5 BAN Idealized Form ... 75

4.3 Proposed Protocol Analysis ... 75

4.3.1 BAN Goals for the Proposed Scheme ... 76

4.3.2 BAN Idealized form for the Proposed Scheme ... 76

4.3.3 BAN Assumptions for the Proposed Scheme ... 76

4.4 ProVerif Implementation ... 78

4.4.1 Proposed Protocol Verification Using ProVerif ... 78

4.5 Informal Security Analysis... 83

4.5.1 Denning-Sacco Attack ... 83

4.5.2 Stolen-Verifier Attack ... 84

4.5.3 Insider Attack ... 84

4.5.4 Password Disclosure Attack ... 84

4.5.5 Certified-Key Guarantee ... 84

4.5.6 Man-in-the-Middle Attack ... 84

4.5.7 Mutual Authentication ... 85

4.5.8 Online Password Guessing Attack ... 85

4.5.9 Offline Password Guessing Attack ... 85

4.5.10 Biometrics Security ... 85

4.5.11 Resist Replay Attack ... 86

4.5.12 Strong User Anonymity ... 86

4.5.13 Resist Denial-of-Service Attack ... 86

4.6 Chapter Summary ... 87

5. Performance Analysis ... 88

5.1 Overview ... 88

5.1.1 Attack Resistance and Functionality Analysis ... 88

5.1.2 Storage Overhead Analysis ... 89

5.1.3 Computation Cost Analysis ... 90

5.1.4 Communication Cost Analysis ... 91

5.2 Chapter Summary ... 92

6. Conclusion and Future Work ... 93

Bibliography ... 95

List of Figures

Figure- 1: Symmetric Cryptography ... 3

Figure- 2: Symmetric Encryption/Decryption ... 4

Figure- 3: A Diagrammatic Representation of Single-Way Hash Function ... 4

Figure- 4: Asymmetric Cryptography ... 5

Figure- 5: Public Key Infrastructure ... 6

Figure- 6: Conventional Public Key Infrastructure ... 6

Figure- 7: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [25] ... 7

Figure- 8: VoIP Application Scenarios ... 8

Figure- 9: SIP's Messages Structure ... 8

Figure- 10: Flow Chart Representation for SIP Callee ... 10

Figure- 11: Participants using H.323 ... 11

Figure- 12: A Typical Smart Card ... 12

Figure- 13: A Ring-Shaped Smart Card ... 12

Figure- 14: The Chip, Dimension and Standards Selection for Smart Card ... 13

Figure- 15: Smart Cards Types ... 14

Figure- 16: ProVerif Model ... 15

Figure- 17: Insecure Bio-Metric Extraction ... 16

Figure- 18: Biometric data with hashing ... 16

Figure- 19: Adversary Control over Distributed System [80] ... 17

Figure- 20: XOR-Logic Circuit ... 18

Figure- 21: XOR Technique for Error Correction ... 18

Figure- 22: The Registration ... 51

Figure- 23: Login and Authentication Phases ... 53

Figure- 24: Iris BioHashing Technique ... 62

Figure- 25: Biometric Template Storing Stages ... 63

List of Tables

Table- 1: Notations Used for Kim and Kue Scheme ... 21

Table- 2: Notations Used for the Scheme ... 23

Table- 3: Notations Used for the Scheme ... 25

Table- 4: Notations Used for An's Scheme ... 27

Table- 5: Notations Used for Park et al.'s Scheme ... 29

Table- 6: Notations Used for Zhu-Xu-Feng's Scheme ... 31

Table- 7: Notation Used for Song's Scheme ... 33

Table- 8: Notations used by Wu et al.'s Protocol ... 35

Table- 9: Notations Used for Lee et al.'s Scheme ... 38

Table- 10: Notations Used for Lue et al.'s Scheme ... 41

Table- 11: Notation used for Tsai et al.'s Scheme ... 44

Table- 12: Notations used in Wu-Xu-Xiong Scheme ... 47

Table- 13: Notations used Lipping Zhang et al.'s Scheme ... 51

Table- 14: Notation Used for Zhang et al.'s Scheme ... 55

Table- 15: Notation used for the Proposed Scheme ... 64

Table- 16: Notations used by Burrows, Abadi and Needham ... 70

Table- 17: Protocol steps and its descriptions ... 75

Table- 18: The Functionality Comparison ... 89

Table- 19: Storage Overhead ... 89

Table- 20: Computational Coast Analysis of Different Schemes ... 91

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

In this era of computing and the globalization [1], people depend more and more on computer

networks (Internet) compared to traditional communication. In both commercial and private

sector information sharing is an essential task. So information authentication is vital for each

participant. Since data authentication depends on complex cryptographic functions and

algorithms for initiating the session, it is useful to discuss the authenticity of information

among the participants and strongly appropriate to have a secure and robust mutual

authentication scheme which can guarantee both content and correctness of the message.

Authenticity of data refers to the protection of sensitive personal information from un-

authorized user or changes made by an attacker, intercept and modifying the content of the

message, capture and disturb the flow of data. Therefore, many authentication schemes have

been proposed by different researchers at different times for the security of data.

In network communication (Internet), a major issue is the exchange of information

confirmation of indigenous and foreigner consumer in the insecure distributed environment.

Categorically, authentic users are extra controlling over the attackers [2]; subsequently they

retain information in the internal system that is not obtainable to the impostor. Therefore,

several inaccessible consumer authentication schemes are proposed for the exchange

information. These protocols claimed that they are more powerful against different attacks,

but these schemes still pose weakness. The authentication schemes presented so for, to

preserve the security of the exchanged information, are classified as under:

1.1.1 One-Factor Authentication Scheme

The user has a secure PIN code for authenticity. The encryption and decryption of PIN code

are done by some complex cryptographic algorithms. One-factor authentication scheme was

introduced by Lamport in 1981 [1] to preserve the security of information. Later on, different

password based authentication schemes were presented by different researchers for various

applications.

1.1.2 Two-Factor Authentication Scheme

Soon it was understood that a single-factor authentication scheme can easily be broken and

therefore fails to survive fully against different attacks. The main idea for two factor

authentication schemes was put forward from password-based authentication scheme.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Therefore, scholars [3] introduced two factor methods for authentication to achieve more

security of information exchange. In different schemes, smart card is used as a second factor

together with the password for the authentication of exchanging information.

1.1.3 Three-Factor Authentication Scheme

Though, two factor authentication schemes provide enough security yet many issues are still

there. Thus, researchers [3] expressed three factors authentication schemes in which

biometrics in addition to password and smart card used to ensure the communication among

the users to become more secure.

However, multi-factor authentication schemes are also introduced by some researchers for

authenticity. But these schemes cannot be implemented due to lack of resources, counterfeit

utilization of available resources and maximum communication and computational cost. The

systems of today encourage lightweight operations for security, in which random numbers

and a simple hash function are used.

As already discussed, keeping in view the importance of network security for the exchange of

sensitive personal information over the communication line, more efforts are necessary to

protect data from unauthorized user so that the legitimate users can easily access all

information in open networks. As available resources in network environment are limited, it

is necessary to design such cryptographic functions and mechanisms that can exactly

communicate and authenticate the legal users. Some of the cryptographic mechanisms are as

under:

1.2 Cryptology

Crypto is a Latin word meaning secrete [5], it is a branch of mathematics which deals with

the study of secrete writing. Cryptology is mainly divided into two sub-areas:

· Cryptography: It is the study of information security engineering linked with

mathematics. Cryptography provides us the way to trigger the most recent security

schemes for information exchange over internet. It allows us to protect the distributed

environment but this is very difficult field.

· Cryptanalysis: The concept of investigating information security system is subject to

learning about the hidden facts of the infrastructure used for information sharing. The

term cryptanalysis is used to break cryptographic algorithms and get access to secretes

Chapter 1

Introduction

of cipher text, even though the key is not known. The cryptography has the following

main types:

1.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography

In private key cryptography, encryption or decryption is a common technique to confirm

message privacy, approval, integrity and authenticity. The encryption procedure converts a

quantity or some stream of bits to cipher text subject to private secrete common key [5].

However, the decryption procedures use the same private common key and the cipher text

and decipherment of plain text as shown in figure-1.

Figure- 1: Symmetric Cryptography [5]

1.2.2 Key Generation Technique

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) of the National Institute of Standard and

Technology (NIST) has sanctioned Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) requiring

cryptographic procedures that accepted for the Federal Government for USA use [7]. Further,

NIST Specialized Proclamations (SPs) provide and suggest some proceedings that contribute

the central government departments to put cryptographic algorithms in secure controlling the

cryptographic important key generation which is efficiently cryptographic components which

include cryptographic procedures is worn for marketable security assistance. So the key

generation methodology is a step for showing proof of cryptographic algorithms.

The creation of a key is by means of several methods: RBG "Random Bit Generator" [7] is a

method through which one key might be derived from another. For example, sometime a key

can be generated from password and password is itself a key used for security of information.

Second, private key cryptography is a common key also used for the protection of

information and validation of data protection.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

· CANCEL-Pending work cancellation, no termination of already accepted the call

· REGISTER-Record-keeping in the header of SIP Server.

The VoIP is used to refer to audio, video and multimedia communication. This

communication commence over IP networks. It is due to the fact that VoIP can easily be

implemented and it is cost effective for the end user. To sustain quick evolution and usage

flexibility VoIP system need efficient, flexible and secure communicating and indicating

scheme. For transmitting audio, video and multimedia streams over IP networks; a real time

protocol is much needed. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [75] was designed for the

purpose mentioned above. SIP establishes, modifies and terminates sessions among the peers.

SIP provides real time between participants to set-up, modify and terminate sessions among

two or more computers for the exchange of data. SIP mainly developed for five specific

elements. These supported facts are: session establishment, user availability, user capabilities,

location of the user and manage, control, modify, transfer of data and session termination etc.

as shown in figure-9 above.

1.3.1.1 SIP Architecture

SIP is working on the application-layer [75]. Typically SIP-based signaling protocol involves

the following elements:

· User Agent: This portion is designed for creating request and response processing.

· Registrar: It is a database portion of the SIP comprising localities as well as client

preferences.

· Proxy: It receives requests and precedes it to the existing locality in the

communication.

· Redirect: The server catches request and acknowledges the client about the incoming

node.

Security of messages transmitted in SIP-based-VoIP is a challenging technique, especially

whenever the session between two peers are established. The SIP-based-VoIP [76] networks

need a security mechanism for the protection of information; that no one could modify, listen,

and session disturbance and so forth. These kinds of vulnerabilities can exist either at

signaling phase or in the communication of data (voice) phase. Therefore, both the phases use

special cryptographic mechanism for protection. The architecture for understanding calling

using SIP is shown using flow chart by the following figure-10

Chapter

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.4.2 Standard Selection for Smart Card

The "International Organization for Standardization" (ISO) agrees the physical features,

dimension, interaction location, electrical signals, lengthwise low-level passage and high-

level presentation communication protocols [78]. Part 4 of ISO 7816 is specific attention as it

identifies the typical communication-protocol statistics elements and "Application Protocol

Data Units" (APDU). Furthermore, ISO 7816-4 pronounces that where the data storage part

will be on a smart card and where can be planned for a file system. It also demonstrated the

addressing assigning to smart cards parts such as number systems and registering techniques

for smart-card requests, identifier length-value, data configurations, improves smart-card

instructions, mutual authentication, SQL Query Access, encryption/decryption and many

more which are shown in figure-14.

Figure- 14: The Chip, Dimension and Standards Selection for Smart Card [78]

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.4.3 Application of Smart-Card

Smart Card is responsible for performing multiple tasks, the operator incomes only one card

for certain requirements. There are many applications of a single smart card; some of these

are healthcare, ATM cards for banking money transaction, network usage, calling cards,

Identification of a specific location, mobile phone SIM subscriber, ticketing and ringing,

passports, voting system and information security etc.

1.4.4 Types of Smart Card

The smart cards can be categorized into four types:

1.4.4.1 Contact Smart Cards:

This type of smart card required physical contact with the chip e.g. money exchange cards

and intelligently access sanative location for different purposes.

1.4.4.2 Contactless Smart Cards:

Contactless smart cards don't require physical contact with a device or chip however can run

or empowers via radio repetition, e.g. access control, nearby open transportation system, ski

passes, tickets and stuff recognizable proof.

1.4.4.3 Hybrid Smart Cards:

Hybrid smart card is a type of smart card having two chips associated with each other, one

support contact interface and other contactless interface.

1.4.4.4 Dual-interface smart cards:

Double interface card is a type of smart card that contains a self-contained chip that supports

both contact and contactless interfaces.

Figure- 15: Smart Cards Types [78]

Chapter

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Chapter 1

Introduction

retina-imaging, skin and facial structure. In case, someone negotiates the aforementioned

characteristics of another one, a BioHashing Technique [79] is adopted. It is simple and

pseudo-random sketching technique that is irreversible and can be generated using the private

key. For example... figure-17 and 18 best explains the phenomenon of Bio-Hashing

Figure- 17: Insecure Bio-Metric Extraction [79]

Figure- 18: Biometric Data with Hashing [79]

In other words, biometrics is a unique quantifiable characteristic to identify, designate or

recognize human being. Now-a-days numerous authentication schemes are being introduced

due to the explicit user codes are available like BioHashing codes. BioHashing confirmation

is proper and well-matched methods that can operate anyone using smart cards or smart cell

phone. In the proposed scheme biometrics is a third-factor for authentication. Before storing

Chapter

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expert or sho

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marized by

-13 below.

rovides a d

of scheme

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card, it sho

curity comp

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secret key

detailed ske

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CAM, avail

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[80]

Introduction

stage of

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copy and

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e rest of

Details

Pages
Type of Edition: Erstausgabe
Year: 2017
ISBN (PDF): 9783960676287
ISBN (Softcover): 9783960671282
File size: 6.1 MB
Language: English
Publication date: 2017 (March)
Grade: 3.23/4
Keywords: Secure communication VoIP Voice over IP SIP Session Initiation Protocol Biometrics three-factor authentication Smart Card BAN Logic ProVerif Security controls Password Cyber security IT security

Author

Saeed Ullah Jan (Author)

An Improved Lightweight Privacy Preserving Authentication Scheme for SIP-Based-VoIP Using Smart Card

Summary

Excerpt

Table Of Contents

Details

Author

Saeed Ullah Jan (Author)