R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations. United Nations Security Council decision-making on Libya and Syria

O'Shea, Nadine

R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations. United Nations Security Council decision-making on Libya and Syria

Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security

Summary

The responses to mass atrocity cases by the international community, in particular by the United Nations Security Council, have been vastly inconsistent since the UNs existence. This was especially apparent during the 1990s when various mass atrocities occurred in different countries. The international community was in disagreement on how to respond to these types of intra-state crises, since a response, based on coercive measures, would mean to violate a country’s sovereignty, even if it is meant to protect civilians. However, the concept of sovereignty is the bedrock of international law and the UN Charter.
To provide consistency and to overcome the long debate of sovereignty versus Human Rights, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) developed the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The third pillar of R2P was meant to guide the decision-making of the Security Council. The idea was that the Security Council would apply the criteria for military interventions set out by ICISS in order to have appropriate and consistent responses to mass atrocities.
With the beginning of the Arab Spring and the use of force against civilians by the governments of Libya and Syria, the Security Council expected to react to both crises in a similar pattern, since civilians needed protection. However, this was not the case. While the Security Council responded immediately after the outbreak of violence in Libya by implementing coercive measures, it hesitated to adopt any Resolution, which included these measures, in regards to Syria.
This study will analyze the discourse of the 5 Permanent Members (P5) of the Security Council and their decision-making process on Libya and Syria. It will give explanations to the different responses to both crises and will evaluate the potential of R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations.

Excerpt

O'Shea, Nadine: R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations. United Nations

Security Council decision-making on Libya and Syria, Hamburg, Anchor Academic

Publishing 2017

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Druck/Herstellung: Anchor Academic Publishing, Hamburg, 2017

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Acknowledgments

This thesis is the result of the "International Relations" Bachelor programme from

the Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences in Kleve, Germany. During my

studies, I had the opportunity to do an internship at the German Mission to the

United Nations in New York and to follow the procedure of the Security Council.

There, my interest in peace and security studies strengthened and by attending

Security Council meetings on various crisis issues, in particular the Syrian crisis, I

was inspired for my thesis. I am grateful for this experience.

I would first like to thank my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Alexander Brand who had

great interest in my research, motivated me with his comments on my ideas and

gave excellent advice. I would also like to thank Ms. Elisabeth Tan who

supported me throughout the writing process.

Lastly, I would like to express my great appreciation to my family and in particular

to my wonderful husband. With their support and patience, it was possible for me

to have a great writing experience.

Abstract

The responses to mass atrocity cases by the international community, in

particular by the United Nations Security Council, have been vastly inconsistent

since the UNs existence. This was especially apparent during the 1990s when

various mass atrocities occurred in different countries. The international

community was in disagreement on how to respond to these types of intra-state

crises since a response, based on coercive measures, would mean to violate a

country´s sovereignty, even if it is meant to protect civilians. However, the

concept of sovereignty is the bedrock of international law and the UN Charter.

To provide consistency and to overcome the long debate of sovereignty

versus Human Rights, the International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty (ICISS) developed the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The third pillar of R2P was meant to guide the decision-making of the Security

Council. The idea was that the Security Council would apply the criteria for

military interventions set out by ICISS in order to have appropriate and consistent

responses to mass atrocities.

With the beginning of the Arab Spring and the use of force against civilians

by the governments of Libya and Syria, the Security Council expected to react to

both crises in a similar pattern since civilians needed protection. However, this

was not the case. While the Security Council responded immediately after the

outbreak of violence in Libya by implementing coercive measures, it hesitated to

adopt any Resolution, which included these measures, in regards to Syria.

This thesis will analyze the discourse of the 5 Permanent Members (P5) of the

Security Council and their decision-making process on Libya and Syria. It will

give explanations to the different responses to both crises and will evaluate the

potential of R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations.

1. Introduction...1

1.1 Current debate...1

1.2 Methodology...4

1.2.1 Research

Question and Hypotheses...4

1.2.2 Research

Design

and Data Collection...5

1.2.3 Structure

the thesis and the methods applied...6

2. The development and theoretical framework of the Responsibility to

Protect...10

2.1

From the concept of state sovereignty to the importance of Human

Rights...10

2.2

The UN Charter on sovereignty and Human Rights...11

2.3

Humanitarian interventions in the 1990s and the role of the UN

Security

Council...14

2.4

The creation of R2P as a balance between sovereignty and

humanitarian intervention...16

2.4.1

The main purpose of R2P and its three phases...16

2.4.2

The strengths and weaknesses of the six criteria for

military interventions/coercive measures...18

2.4.3

The incorporation of R2P by the United Nations...21

3 The decision-making process of the UN Security Council Permanent

Members regarding the crises in Libya and Syria...24

3.1

Security Council (P5) Discourse on Libya...24

3.1.1

Briefing by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in

Libya (2011)...24

3.1.2

Discourse on Resolution 1970 (2011)...24

3.1.3

Discourse on Resolution 1973 (2011)...26

3.1.4

Discourse on Resolution 2009 (2011)...31

3.2

Security Council (P5) Discourse on Syria...32

3.2.1

Briefing by UN Under-Secretary-General for Political

Affairs (2011)...32

3.2.2

Discourse on Draft Resolution 612 (2011)...33

3.2.3

Discourse on Draft Resolution 77 (2012)...36

3.2.4

Discourse on Resolution 2042 (2012)...39

3.2.5

Discourse on Resolution 2043 (2012)...40

3.2.6

Discourse on Draft Resolution 538 (2012)...41

3.2.7

Discourse on Resolution 2118 (2013)...43

3.2.8

Discourse on Resolution 2139 (2014)...44

3.2.9

Discourse on Draft Resolution 349 (2014)...45

3.3

Libya and Syria in comparison...47

3.3.1

The P5s perception of the ICISS criteria for military

interventions/coercive measures

in regards to Libya and

Syria...47

3.3.2

The P5s focus on the concept of sovereignty and

Human Rights in regards to Libya and Syria...51

3.3.3 Summary: Why did the P5 members decide to implement

coercive measures in Libya but not in Syria?...53

4. R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations?...55

References...60

Annex...66

Table of Content

Abbreviation

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICISS

International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty

LoN

League of Nations

NGO

Non-Governmental

Organization

NTC National

Transitional Council of Libya

5 Permanent Members of the Security Council

R2P

Responsibility

Protect

UK United

Kingdom

UN United

Nations

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights

UNHCR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees

US United

States

WW I

World War I

WW II

World War II

Tables and Figures

Figure A1:

Brief summary of the methods

Figure A2:

R2P as an emerging norm?

Table A1:

Summary of the six criteria for coercive measures and their

weaknesses

Table A2:

The discourse on Libya before and during Resolution 1970 and

1973

(February 25

2011 March 17

2011)

Table A3:

The discourse on Libya directly after the implementation of

Resolution 1970 and 1973

(May

2011 September 16

2011)

Table A4:

The discourse on Syria (27

April 2011 May 22

2014)

Table A5:

The P5s focus on sovereignty related aspects and human

rights/civilian protection related aspects

Table A5.1:

Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record,

6491

meeting, 25

February 2011 (Adopted Resolution 1970)

Table A5.2:

Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record,

6498

meeting, 17

March 2011

(Adopted Resolution 1973, Russia and China abstained)

Table A5.3:

Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record,

6528

meeting, 4

May 2011

(ICC

Prosecutor,

no Draft Resolution)

Table A5.4:

Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record,

6620

meeting, 16

September 2011

(Adopted Resolution 2009)

Table A5.5:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6524

meeting, 27

April 2011 (Briefing by Pascoe)

Table A5.6:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6627

meeting, 4

Oct 2011

(On a Draft Resolution which was vetoed by Russia and China)

Table A5.7:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6710

meeting, 31

January 2012 (Briefing by LoS)

Table A5.8:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6711

meeting, 4

Feb 2012

(On a draft Resolution which was vetoed by Russia and China)

Table A5.9:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6751

meeting, 14

April 2012, on the adopted Resolution

Table A5.10:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6756

meeting, 21

April 2012 (On the adopted Resolution)

Table A5.11:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

6810

meeting, 19

July 2012

(On a draft Resolution which was vetoed by Russia and China)

Table A5.12:

Coding Schedule: Security Council Meeting Record, 7038

meeting,

Sept 2013 (on the adopted Resolution 2118)

Table A5.13:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

7116

meeting, 22

February 2014

(on the adopted Resolution 2139)

Table A5.14:

Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record,

7180

meeting, 22

May 2014

(Draft Resolution, vetoed by Russia and China)

Table 6:

Number of times P5 members used veto power on Draft

Resolutions dealing with the Syrian crisis

1. Introduction

1.1 Current debate

In the beginning of 2011, major changes occurred in the Arab world, also known

as the ´Arab Spring´. Populations were calling for democracy, the end of human

rights violations and corruption. People in Tunisia were the first who started

protesting against their regime and succeeded. Former Tunisian president Ben

Ali fled Tunisia. People in Egypt also started massive protests, calling for the

ousting of Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak who was then forced to resign (Rosza,

E.N., 2012).

The revolutionary movement inspired people in Libya, which was ruled for

about 40 years by the authoritarian leader Muammar Gadhafi. Gadhafi reacted by

oppressing demonstrators with the use of military force (Wilson, C., 2015).

During the same year, people in Syria also started protesting and the

Syrian Government responded with violence, just as the Libyan Government did.

The reactions of both the Libyan and the Syrian Government and their use

of indiscriminate violence seemed to be similar. Due to the similarities the

international community was expected to treat both cases on the basis of the

Responsibility to Protect. The concept of R2P was developed by the International

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 to overcome

the challenges humanitarian interventions faced during the 1990s. During that

time, mass atrocities occurred in various countries but the Security Council acted

inconsistently. Furthermore, R2P was created to overcome the long debate of

sovereignty versus Human Rights and was meant to guide the Security Council

regarding the actions it should undertake to prevent/halt mass atrocities.

However, in practice, responses to mass atrocities were vastly different even

after the development of R2P. For instance, the Security Council dealt with the

situation in Libya and Syria differently even though both Governments did not

protect their population, but instead used violence against their own citizens

(BBC Timeline, 2016). While the Security Council reacted immediately in the

Libyan case by first imposing sanctions and then intervening militarily to protect

civilians, the Security Council seemed rather inactive in the Syrian case, in which

even the threat of sanctions was blocked by Russia and China.

This inconsistency started a debate on the concept of R2P among scholars

and it is certain that R2P, and humanitarian interventions in general, is still highly

relevant in both the scholarly field as well as in International Relations since there

is no consensus on how the international community, in particular the Security

Council, should respond to mass atrocity cases.

The following scholarly perspectives were made after the military intervention

was implemented in Libya, and the Security Council found itself paralyzed

regarding the Syrian case. Hence, the scholars provide an insight on why these

differences occurred, whether R2P is an emerging norm and what should be

changed.

The renowned scholar of International Relations T.G. Weiss (2011) argues

that humanitarian interventions in the 1990s were inconsistently dealt with by the

international community because there were no guidelines on how to prevent or

stop mass atrocities. R2P would provide the needed guideline, enable the

international community to act consistently and therefore Weiss states that "R2P

breaks new ground in coming to the rescue" (Weiss, T.G., 2011, p.9). Weiss is

convinced that R2P "has the potential to evolve further in customary international

law" (ibid.) since it redefines sovereignty. Hence, states could not act as absolute

sovereigns but would have to act responsibly (ibid).

The distinguished scholar A. Williams (2011) has a similar perspective and

claims that "no concept has moved faster in the area of global norms than the

R2P" (Williams, A., 2011, p.31). He further argues that R2P could serve as a

framework in debates on halting mass atrocities if tough measures are carried out

(ibid.)

While some scholars are commending R2P and are convinced that it could

emerge as an international norm despite the different responses to the crises in

Libya and Syria, other scholars claim that R2P would have no chance of

emerging as a norm if it stays the way it is.

A. Hehir (2013), a scholar in the field of International Relations, argues that

the intervention in Libya would be an exception and not the norm. The Security

Council members had similar interests in dealing with the Libyan crisis but this

was not the case in Syria. Hence, national interests would still determine the

response by the Security Council as they did during the humanitarian

interventions in the 1990s. Hehir further claims that R2P was not explicitly

mentioned as a term in any of the Resolutions regarding Libya. The Resolutions

were based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which deals with coercive

measures. This would mean that responses to mass atrocities were dealt with

using the same procedure as during the humanitarian interventions and failed to

add anything new to it. Even though the ICISS Report provided criteria, they were

not incorporated by the UN and thus, the Security Council would continue to deal

with mass atrocity cases inconsistently even after the establishment of R2P.

Hehir states that the Libyan and Syrian case would emphasize this point. The

different responses by the Security Council to these cases would show that

national interest, and not the concept of R2P, would still shape responses to

mass atrocities. The veto power of the P5 members would contribute to this

challenge. Hence, as long as R2P does not constrain the veto power of the P5

and does not provide any criteria for a military intervention, the Security Council

would respond inconsistently to mass atrocities and R2P could therefore not

emerge as an international norm (Hehir, A., 2013).

The academic researcher A. Garwood-Gowers (2011) emphasizes that the

Security Council only seemed to agree on how to respond to the Libyan crisis. He

argues that the debate on the Libyan Resolutions show deep disagreements. The

main disagreements could be found by the arguments of Russia and China.

Garwood-Gowers claims that Russia and China were concerned with the limits of

the military operations and feared that the US, the UK and France would have

the intention to pursue a regime change. This disagreement would also

emphasize that R2P´s second pillar, which deals with the response of the

international community to halt mass atrocities, would be fragile. To overcome

these disagreements, criteria for military interventions would be necessary and

the only way to have consistent responses by the Security Council. Similar to the

perspective of Hehir, he claims that Libya was rather an exception. The response

by the Security Council was due to special circumstances and "should not be

viewed as evidence of a fundamental change in states´ attitudes towards

intervention for civilian protection purposes" (Garwood-Govers, A., 2011, p. 616).

If R2P stays the way it is, then it would have little impact on the decision-making

process of the Security Council. Therefore, R2P would provide nothing new and

the Security Council would act inconsistently as it already did during the

humanitarian interventions in the 1990s (ibid.).

The debate among scholars demonstrates that there are different

perspectives on whether R2P is relevant for the Security Council decision-making

process and whether it provides more consistency in dealing with mass atrocities

and could therefore emerge as a norm in International Relations.

With this thesis, I position myself among those scholars who do not

perceive that R2P has the capacity to emerge as an international norm. T.G.

Weiss stated that there were no guidelines for the humanitarian intervention in

the 1990s, which R2P would provide. However, I argue the contrary. The United

Nations did not adopt the entire ICISS Report and therefore excluded the criteria

dealing with military interventions. Hence, the international community still does

not have a guideline for those highly controversial interventions.

As all scholars claim, criteria for military interventions are necessary in order to

gain consensus and to have consistency. Yet, this thesis argues that criteria will

not only be needed for military interventions but generally for coercive measures.

Throughout my analysis I found out that there is a research gap in regards

to the ICISS Report. While all scholars state the importance of the criteria

recommended by ICISS, there is no research on how helpful these criteria are in

theory and practice. Hence, my goal was to close this gap by analyzing the

strengths and weaknesses of the criteria in theory and to then see whether these

weaknesses have a negative impact in regards to the crises in Libya and Syria.

Therefore, after having done the research, I argue that even with the criteria, R2P

could not emerge as a norm since some criteria need clarification in order to

provide consistency.

A further gap in research became visible once I started researching the

factors for the different outcomes in the Libyan and Syrian crises. Scholars

seemed to try to find their own reasons for why these differences exist without

paying attention to the perspectives of the P5. Only A. Garwood-Govers

demonstrated the viewpoint of the P5 as shown above. I perceive the

perspectives of the P5 members of high importance since they are the only

countries which could legally decide whether to implement coercive measures in

cases of mass atrocities. Therefore, I will focus my analysis on the perspectives

of the respective P5 members in regards to the Libyan and Syrian crises.

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 Research Question and Hypotheses

This thesis focuses on the development of R2P and its potential as an emerging

norm in International Relations. In order to determine whether R2P has this

potential, the following questions have to be answered:

Main Research Question: Is the concept of R2P an emerging norm in

International Relations? > Will be answered troughout the Chapters but explicitly

in Chapter 4

Hypothesis: R2P is only at the start of norm emergence but it does not have

the potential to develop as a norm in International Relations

Sub-Research Question 1: How does the UN Charter deal with the concept of

sovereignty and Human Rights? > Will be answered in Chapter 2.2

Hypothesis: There is a paradox between the two concepts in the UN Charter

Sub-Research Question 2: How did the Security Council deal with civilian

suffering before the development of R2P? > Will be answered in Chapter 2.3

Hypothesis: The Security Council reacted inconsistently; acted in some cases

and did not act in other cases

Sub-Research Question 3: After the development of R2P, do the P5

members focus more on sovereignty or Human Rights in regards to the

Libyan and Syrian crises? Were they in favour or against coercive measures?

> Will be answered in Chapter 3

Hypothesis:

· France, the UK and the US had similar perspectives during the Libyan

and Syrian crises; civilians were suffering, Human Rights were violated

by the Governments, coercive measures were necessary to halt mass

atrocities

· Russia and China had similar perspectives during the Libyan and

Syrian crises; the sovereignty of Libya and Syria sovereignty needed to

be respected, coercive measures were not perceived as efficient to

solve the crises, a political solution was needed

Sub-Research Question 4: Why were sanctions imposed and an intervention

authorized in Libya but not in Syria? > Will be answered in Chapter 3

Hypothesis:

· In regards to the Libyan crisis, France, the US and the UK requested to

implement coercive measures whereas Russia and China had concerns

but did not use their veto power because they felt that most of the

ICISS criteria for a military intervention/coercive measures were fulfilled

· In regards to the Syrian crisis, France, the US and the UK requested to

implement coercive measures but Russia and China used their veto

power repeatedly because they did not perceive some ICISS criteria as

fulfilled

1.2.2 Research Design and Data Collection

The research design of this thesis is based on a comparative case study and has

the framework of a qualitative analysis but also includes some quantitative

elements. The reactions of the Security Council, particular the P5 members as

the unit of analysis, will be analysed in regards to the Libyan and Syrian crises.

These two cases were chosen because of their similarities and the fact that both

crises occurred after R2P was developed. With these cases, one can determine

whether R2P had an impact on the decision-making of the Security Council and

whether it solved the issues the international community faced during the

humanitarian interventions in the 1990s. A comparative case study is suitable to

answer all of the above stated research and sub-research questions since they

are exploratory in nature.

The collected data is based mainly on primary sources since the thesis

analyses the decision-making of the Security Council. Therefore, relevant UN

Security Council Meeting Records, UN Security Council Resolutions as well as

Draft Resolutions will be analysed. It is important to mention that there are more

documents on the Syrian crisis than on the Libyan crisis. This is due to the fact

that the Security Council acted quickly to the Libyan crisis, but could not find

consensus on more coercive measures in regards to the Syrian crisis. Hence,

specific states brought the debate on Syria repeatedly back to the agenda of the

Security Council. The discourse on the Libyan crisis will start with the briefing of

the UN Secretary-General in February 2011 and will end with the adoption of

Resolution 2009 in September 2011, shortly before former Libyan leader Gadhafi

was killed. The discourse on Syria will start with the briefing by UN Under-

Secretary-General for Political Affairs in April 2011 and will end with the last Draft

Resolution submitted in May 2014, which was vetoed by Russia and China.

A further important document is the ICISS Report since this is essential for

the analysis of the P5s perspectives during the discourse. Furthermore, the Report

is crucial to answer whether R2P has the potential to emerge as a norm in

International Relations. The main reason for this is that ICISS was the commission

which developed the concept of R2P.

Secondary sources were mainly used to analyse how the Security Council

dealt with mass atrocity cases before R2P was created. These sources include

scholarly articles, books and in rare cases news agencies.

1.2.3 Structure of the thesis and the methods applied

After reading the Security Council Meeting Records on Libya and Syria for the

first time, I realized that there is still no consensus about which actions the

international community, and in particular the P5 members of the Security

Council, should take in order to respond appropriately to mass atrocity cases.

Some states argue in favour of Human Rights which have to be protected even if

this means to violate a country´s sovereignty. Other states argue that a country´s

sovereignty should not be violated even if Human Rights violations occur in that

country, meaning that some states reject the idea of implementing any kind of

coercive measures.

Due to these different arguments, my goal in Chapter 2.1 is to first

determine how the concepts of sovereignty and Human Rights developed and

how they present a dilemma. Since the UN Charter is the source, based on

international law, for the Security Council I will further analyse in Chapter 2.2 how

the UN Charter includes the concepts of sovereignty and Human Rights.

To determine whether R2P is an emerging norm in International Relations, I

will analyse the responses of the international community to mass atrocity cases

before R2P was developed. Hence, I will find out in Chapter 2.3 how the Security

Council dealt with mass atrocity cases in the 1990s, the decade in which various

humanitarian interventions took place. Figuring out the challenges these

humanitarian interventions faced will help me to determine throughout this

research whether R2P is able to solve these challenges and could therefore

emerge to a norm.

In Chapter 2.4 I then continue with the development of R2P. Since I am

interested in how the international community should react to mass atrocity cases

according to the ICISS Report, I pay particular attention to the second pillar of

R2P, the ´Responsibility to React´ and the six criteria for military interventions,

which would justify such interventions. However, I will adjust these criteria to the

six criteria for coercive measures

. This will be done because I quickly realized by

reading the Security Council Meeting Records that the P5 members were even in

disagreement about less coercive measures, such as sanctions. Hence, this

adjustment is needed for the later analysis of the Security Council discourse. In

Chapter 2.4.2 I will analyse the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of these

criteria which will be helpful to later determine whether these weaknesses could

lead to challenges in practice. Afterwards, the incorporation of the R2P concept

by the UN will be evaluated to see which aspects of the ICISS Report were

included.

In Chapter 3.1 and 3.2 the discourse of the P5 members on Libya and Syria will

be evaluated. This analysis will be based on the Security Council Meeting

Records which took place when either a Draft Resolution was adopted or

rejected, or if an agency of an international organization briefed the Security

Council on certain developments.

The two methods of analysis will be Content Analysis and Discourse Analysis.

The Content Analysis allows me to determine whether the long debated dilemma

of sovereignty versus Human Rights would be present among the P5 members

and I also aim to find out which P5 members focus on either sovereignty, Human

From this point on, I will refer to the six criteria for military intervention set out by ICISS

to the adjusted six criteria for coercive measures

Rights or both. I will do this by counting Human Rights and sovereignty related

arguments. For this, I will develop a coding schedule which will be applied to

each Security Council Meeting Record, as can be seen in Table A5.1 to A5.14 in

the Annex. Analysing each discourse of the P5 on Libya and Syria will enable me

to create a final table, Table A5 in the Annex, which will precisely demonstrate

which P5 member focuses more on either sovereignty or Human Rights. I will

further determine whom the P5 accuse of violating Human Rights. This will allow

me to detect certain disagreements which could lead to different expectations

among the P5 members regarding the appropriate response to both crises.

For the Discourse Analysis, I will put everything into context and therefore,

more documents, such as briefings, rejected Draft Resolutions and adopted Draft

Resolutions, will be considered. Putting it into context is important in order to

know what the P5 members were debating about. The main goal of the

Discourse Analysis is to figure out whether the P5 members perceive the six

criteria for coercive measures as fulfilled. This, and the change of the

perspectives will be shown in Table A2 to A4. I assumed that if the P5 members

would have different perspectives on the fulfilment of the criteria, then this would

explain why some Draft Resolutions were adopted while others were rejected.

The Discourse Analysis further allows me to determine the reasons for these

actions. A further aspect of this analysis was to find out whether the theoretical

weaknesses of the criteria could also be found in practice in regards to the

Libyan and Syrian crises. This is relevant because it will demonstrate the general

weaknesses of R2P which could lead to inconsistent decision-making by the

Security Council and therefore, hinder R2P from emerging into a norm. For this, I

will also pay attention to whether R2P was directly or only indirectly mentioned in

the Draft Resolutions, the adopted Resolutions and in the discourse. I assumed

that if R2P was not directly mentioned, then it would not have a high impact on

the decision-making of the Security Council.

Chapter 3.3.3 is of high importance since it puts the discourse on Libya and

Syria in comparison. This Chapter will show the change of the P5s perspectives

regarding the six criteria on coercive measures and their view on sovereignty and

Human Rights. Furthermore, it will give reasons for these changes. The Content

and Discourse Analysis as well as the direct comparison of Libya and Syria will

demonstrate why the Security Council acted in Libya but was rather inactive in

Syria.

The last Chapter will conclude whether R2P has the potential to emerge as

a norm in International Relations. For this, I will apply and modify the model

constructed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) who describe the

different stages a norm is going through in order to be successfully established. I

will conclude that R2P, the way it currently is, does not have the potential to

emerge as a norm.

Throughout the writing process, I will be aware of the limitations my thesis

faces. Since I am doing a Content and Discourse Analysis, there is a probability

of the thesis being biased because I will interpret results. In order to be as

scientific and objective as possible I will base the methods of Content and

Discourse Analysis on guidelines presented by scholars. Hence, the Content

Analysis will be done with the helpful guidance of the work of H. Brunner, D.

Knitel and P.J. Resinger (2011) who precisely explain how a coding schedule has

to be developed in order to have a scientific Content Analysis. For the Discourse

Analysis I will use the academic work of G. Brund and G. Hirsch Hadorn (2014)

who stated that one should ask specific questions to the text and do this

consistently in order to be as objective as possible.

Figure A1: Brief summary of the methods

Result

By applying both

methods it is possible

to answer the

Research Question

as well as the sub-

Research Questions

Content Anlaysis

- Do the P5 focus more on sovereignty or

Human Rights?

Discourse Analysis

- Do the P5 perceive the six criteria for

coercive measures as fulfilled?

- Do the theoretical weaknesses of the

criteria present a challenge in practice?

- How convincing are the P5s arguments?

- Is there a direct reference to R2P?

2. The development and theoretical framework of the Responsibility

to Protect

2.1 From the concept of state sovereignty to the importance of Human Rights

Scholars of the academic field of International Relations tend to trace the roots of

the concept of sovereignty back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This treaty

ended the 30 Years War in Central Europe and introduces the principle of

sovereignty as well as the beginning of the nation-state. This is due to the fact

that territories were not ruled by different authorities anymore but rather by one

authority, which could decide how it would like to rule its territory. This is the

principle of internal sovereignty and in particular the right to self-determination.

Furthermore, the Treaty of Westphalia introduced external sovereignty, which

means that states are prohibited to interfere with the internal affairs of another

state. The principle of this dual sovereignty developed over time and is still

anchored in the international legal system of today (Hehir, A., 2010).

One can see though that throughout history, state practice deviated from

the concept of sovereignty. Powerful states absorbed weaker ones and this was

specifically evident during the times of colonialism in the 18

and 19

century.

The principles of non-interference as well as self-determination were ignored by

powerful states (Andrews, E.E., 2009). Inter-state wars also occurred and after

the disastrous experience of WW I, states recognized the need for international

cooperation through an intergovernmental organization in order to maintain

global peace and security through negotiations and dialogue. The League of

Nations was therefore established in 1920 as the first intergovernmental

organisation concerned with matters of peace and security. However, with the

outbreak of WW II, the LoN showed that it was unable to prevent major wars

(Tomuschat, C., 1995).

In 1934, the debate about sovereignty started once again with the

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. The Convention is

seen as a milestone of today´s international legal system for several reasons. For

the first time a set of criteria for statehood is defined through which a state is

recognized as such if it has "a permanent population, a defined territory, a

government and capacity to enter into relations with the other states"

(Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of States, 1934).

Moreover, the

Convention directly refers to sovereign states, which have the right to self-

determination, integrity, independence and non-interference. It further declares

the equality of states, which means that a state is sovereign independent of its

power. Military interventions are explicitly referred to as prohibited (ibid.).

Although the international community tried to prevent the violation of rights

of sovereign states, the reality was different as states militarily intervened into

sovereign states, which led to inter-state wars in WW II. However, states realized

that an international organisation was still a necessity for the maintenance of

peace (Tomuschat, C., 1995). In 1945, the UN was established with 51 member

states including all major powers. Today, the UN has 193 member states and is

therefore seen as an international forum with the capacity of enforcing resolutions

(United Nations, 2016).

In contrast to the principle of sovereignty, the concept of human rights in

international law developed only gradually in the 20

century. Even though the

Geneva Convention can be traced back to 1864, this Convention was limited to

the treatment of military personnel and civilians during war time (The Geneva

Conventions, 1949). The Genocide Convention, on the other hand, was adopted

by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and is not limited to war time. It legally

defines genocide as a crime, which violates international law. It further clarifies

what constitutes to genocide and that it applies to "rulers, public officials or

private individuals" (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide, 1948). The Convention calls upon the parties to prevent and punish

genocide through domestic or international tribunals (ibid). While the Genocide

Convention was limited to this specific type of crime, the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights included Human Rights in general. The Declaration was

introduced by the UN General Assembly in 1948 to promote fundamental Human

Rights during all times and to everyone. While the Declaration spells out various

rights humans have, it does not have a binding nature and does not elucidate any

consequences for cases where a member state violates Human Rights.

Nonetheless, the Declaration is seen as a milestone since the international

community raised awareness for Human Rights for the first time (Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).

2.2 The UN Charter on sovereignty and Human Rights

With the experience of WW II, states were mostly concerned with the principle of

sovereignty in order to prevent inter-state wars. This is the reason why it was

important for states to include this principle into the Charter. Even though,

Human Rights are mentioned in the Charter, the principle of sovereignty is of

higher value for the maintenance of peace and security between states. This can

be seen by looking at the high frequency of articles stating the importance of

sovereignty in chapter I, which deals with the purpose of the UN as well as in

chapter II, which describes the principles of the UN. In Article 1(2) it is already

stated that inter-relations between the member states are based on "equal rights

and self-determination" (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). The next Article

1(3) then demonstrates that states are concerned with the promotion of Human

Rights. Chapter II, however, includes the concept of sovereignty but does not

mention Human Rights. Article 2(1) declares "sovereignty equality" (ibid.) for all

states and Article 2(4) further states that "all members shall refrain in their

international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity

or political independence of any states

" (ibid.). While these are the principles

for states, the Charter includes in Article 2(7) that the UN also has to respect the

sovereignty of states and should not interfere with the jurisdiction of a state.

When one analyses the UN Charter it is evident that states perceived the

declaration of sovereignty as more important than the promotion of Human

Rights. While Human Rights are mentioned once in the chapter on the purpose of

the UN, it is not mentioned at all in the chapter describing the principles of the UN

(ibid.). Since both concepts are mentioned though, there is a tension between

them in the UN Charter. Furthermore, the Charter does not explain how the

international community should act if a state violates Human Rights (Weiss, T.G

and Daws, S. 2007).

There are only two exceptions in which it is legal under the Charter to violate

other states´ sovereignty. These exceptions are expressed in Chapter VII, which

generally deals with the question what the international community could do if

there is a threat to international peace and security. The maintenance of peace

and security is the primary task of the Security Council as stated under Article 24.

Article 41 claims that the Security Council should decide whether certain

situations threaten international peace and security. Furthermore, it can give

recommendations and can determine which peaceful measures should be

implemented to restore peace. Peaceful measures involve all non-military

measures, such as economic sanctions, arms embargo, travel ban, partial or

complete disruption of diplomatic relations. If the Security Council perceives

these as inadequate, then it can authorize military force under Article 42. These

measures can be enforced against states as well as against groups and

individuals (UN Charter, 1945).

At this point it is necessary to clarify that the Security Council is composed

of 15 members from which 5 are permanent. These members are the UK, the

US, France, China and Russia. They have prerogative rights, such as the veto

power. Any of the P5 can veto a Draft Resolution which will then not be adopted.

The other 10 members are non-permanent ones, they are elected and represent

geographic regions. The P5, however, do not represent the world since entire

continents such as South America, Africa and Australia are not members of the

P5. The Security Council is the only international body which can enforce binding

resolutions in the matters of peace and security. This is a major difference to the

General Assembly in which every single member is represented. The General

Assembly can only make recommendations and refer issues, which are

perceived as a threat against international peace, to the Security Council. In

practice, regional organisations are crucial for the enforcement of Security

Council resolutions since the UN does not have armed forces. Furthermore,

regional organisations have a better understanding of the regional situations than

third parties although they can only enforce measures with the approval of the

Security Council (Weiss, T.G. and S. Daws, 2007). During the Cold War, the

Security Council was not able to work effectively because the 2 major powers,

the US and the Soviet Union, used their veto power repeatedly and global issues

could not be solved properly. With the Iron Curtain also dividing the Security

Council, there was a deadlock. The concept of sovereignty was still the bedrock

of the UN and the promotion of Human Rights was lacking since the Security

Council was mostly concerned with preventing each other from enforcing foreign

policy agendas due to a lack of trust. Therefore, states often had to act

unilaterally.

However, some success could be seen during the Cold War. The UN

established Peacekeeping Operations which were mandated to observe the

implementation of ceasefires in war torn countries. This was done with the

consent of the host state. The peace-keeping forces had to be neutral and used

no or limited military force. At a later stage, peace-enforcement was introduced

which did not demand the consent of the host state and the use of military force

was usually necessary. The similarities between peace-keeping and peace-

enforcement is that both operations were authorized when a war had already

occurred (Tomuschat, C., 1995).

2.3 Humanitarian interventions in the 1990s and the role of the UN Security

Council

With the end of the Cold War in 1990/1991, the Security Council was able to

adopt resolutions and to promote the importance of Human Rights. The P5 were

no longer bitterly concerned with power competition and instead focused on

cooperation. Human Rights were not seen as domestic matters anymore but as

global ones. Peacekeeping Operations increased and the Security Council

authorized various interventions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It seemed

as if Human Rights were implemented into international law since 1945 but the

international community only enforced actions regarding Human Rights after the

Cold War.

During this time the term ´humanitarian intervention´ became popular even

though various definitions exist (Hehir, A., 2010). Jennifer M. Welsh (2006), the

current UN Secretary-General´s Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect,

defines humanitarian intervention as the "coercive interference in the internal

affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of

addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human

suffering" (Welsh, J.M., 2006, p. 3). This means that the Peace-keeping and

Peace-enforcement Operations also fall all under the term humanitarian

intervention.

The increasing numbers of humanitarian interventions are also a result of

changing warfare. Whereas old wars were acts of aggression with the nature of

inter-state wars and under the complete authority of a state, scholars perceive

that the 1990s experienced new wars. These new wars are fought mostly by non-

state actors, have the character of intra-state wars and targets civilians, who

suffer from gross Human Rights violations. Old wars were fought to achieve

certain goals based on national interest whereas new wars are usually ethnic or

revolutionary wars. In some cases, the governments are the main cause of the

intra-state war, in other cases the governments cannot prevent the outbreak of a

civil war. These new wars mostly break out in failed empires. This was the case

after the collapse of the European colonies in Africa and with the breakup of the

Soviet Union. Hence, while there was a relaxation of inter-state relations, in

particular between the US and Russia in the 1990s, there was a dramatic

increase in the number of intra-state wars (Nye, Jr. and Welch, D., 2014).

There was also a normative change within the Security Council because it

broadened its perception of what accounts to a threat of international peace and

security under chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, a threat to peace would not

only include acts of aggression between states but also humanitarian

catastrophes within states. This means that an intervention based on peaceful

measures as well as military measures authorized by the Security Council would

be legal (Welsh, J.M., 2006).

With these changes in mind, one would expect the Security Council to

prevent or stop humanitarian suffering. The reality was that during the 1990s

humanitarian interventions took place, but they were either not effective or not

authorized by the Security Council. With the collapse of Yugoslavia an intra-state

war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Bosnian Serbs were

supported by the Serbian government in the ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb

population, in particular the Muslim population. The UN established so called

´safe areas´ for civilians. However, the Srebrenica massacre followed, in which

Serb forces entered these ´safe areas´ and murdered about 8000 Muslim

Bosniaks. UN Peace-Keepers stood by because their mandate was to ensure the

safe delivery of humanitarian assistance but not the direct protection of civilians.

The Peace-Keepers had no instruction on how to handle these attacks. The next

humanitarian catastrophe occurred in 1994 in Rwanda where the population was

ethnically divided into Tutsi and Hutu. The government of Rwanda was led by

Hutu and also the majority of the population was Hutu. Conflict broke out

between the two groups and the Security Council authorized the United Nations

Assistance Mission for Rwanda. However, the mission´s mandate was limited to

the observation of the implementation of a peace agreement. Violence increased

and the Security Council was not able to prevent a genocide in which 800,000

Tutsi were killed (Walker, P. and Maxwell, D., 2009). In 1999, the Security

Council had to prove itself once again. In Kosovo, a civil war occurred after

Serbian leader Milosevic removed the autonomy status of Kosovo. Kosovar

Albanians were opposed to this decision and this resulted in a separatist

movement. The war between the Serbian government and the separatists led,

once again, to humanitarian suffering. The Security Council failed to act which

led NATO to intervene. Aerial bombings by NATO were meant to force

Milosevic´s army to withdraw from Kosovo. The Security Council only stepped in

as the war ended and established the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

Its mandate was to observe the implementation of the peace agreement. While

the UN, and in particular the Security Council, was criticised for its inaction,

NATO on the other hand was criticised for the heavy use of its military. During

the Kosovo war, the term "humanitarian bombing" (Weiss, T.G., 2012, p.12)

occurred.

This shows that humanitarian interventions are highly debated because the

greater aim of these interventions is to protect and help civilians but since these

interventions include military force, civilians could also be killed. However,

complete inaction would shield brutal regimes (ibid). It was obvious for the

international community that humanitarian catastrophes have to be stopped, but

there was no consensus on how they can be stopped without violating a

countrys´ sovereignty and causing even more civilian causalities due to military

operations. Hence, the Security Council dealt with these crises inconsistently.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was aware of this dilemma and brought

the debate to the UN in his Millennium Report in 2000 with the following question

"If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,

how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic

violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"

(United Nations, General Assembly, 2000, p.48).

2.4 The creation of R2P as a balance between sovereignty and humanitarian

intervention

2.4.1 The main purpose of R2P and its three phases

In 2000, the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS)

was established under Canadian authority with the purpose of answering

Annan´s question. It was aware of the fact that the reality of International

Relations changed due to new actors, new warfare and new challenges and

threats. Therefore, the commission perceived that the UN has to adjust its

practices to meet these challenges and to broaden its spectrum of action (Loges,

B., 2013).

The Commission was eager to find out how the UN could prevent and stop

mass atrocities since civilian suffering is one major new challenge and a threat to

regional as well as global peace. ICISS represented various regions. It was

chaired by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and by the Special

Advisor to the UN Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun. The main task of

ICISS was to provide guidelines and criteria for the international community for

situations in which gross Human Rights violations occur. Furthermore, it was

engaging in the on-going debate about sovereignty and intervention for

humanitarian purposes. ICISS´ aim was to report the UN General Assembly on

its findings and to recommend appropriate actions within one year. The

Commission held consultations in various regions with participants from UN

agencies, national governments, NGOs, civil society and think tanks.

In 2001, ICISS finished its report called ´The Responsibility to Protect´. The

report claims that state sovereignty is still a core element in International

Relations because the state would be the most appropriate institution for

providing basic public goods and preventing its population from external threats.

However, sovereignty should not be perceived as absolute. ICISS receives

sovereignty as a responsibility and the main responsibility of a state would be to

protect its populations. The fundamental argument is that if a state is not willing

or not able to protect its own citizens then this responsibility is transferred to the

international community (Loges, B., 2013).

The concept of R2P has three phases. The first phase is the ´Responsibility

to Prevent´ during which the international community should assist a state to be

able to protect its population. The sources of the internal conflict have to be

addressed. If, however, a state fails to protect its own citizens, then the

international community has to take up its responsibility and enter the second

phase called ´Responsibility to React´. This could mean that sanctions are

imposed as non-military measures. General sanctions could, however, harm the

civilian population. Therefore, ICISS recommends the imposition of sanctions

against those individuals committing the Human Rights violations. Those

sanctions include for example travel bans, aviation ban, the expulsion of

membership in regional and international organisations, the freezing of foreign

assets, and arms embargoes. With these types of sanctions, the population is not

affected as much as with general sanctions. Whereas sanctions are broadly

accepted as a legitimate punishment, military interventions as more coercive

measures are still a controversial issue. The reason for this is that with sanctions

a state is disrupted in its relations with other states and the international

community as a whole but it can still govern domestically. Nonetheless, in

extreme cases a military intervention can be justified. In its report, ICISS argues

that a case has to satisfy certain criteria in order to be legitimate and legal. These

six criteria for military interventions will be analysed in detail in the section below.

The third phase is the ´Responsibility to Rebuild´ in which the international

community is responsible after the intervention to rebuild the political, judicial and

economic sectors in cooperation with national actors. The aim is to re-establish a

sovereign state which can fulfil its responsibilities.

Besides these phases, ICISS also includes ´Operational Principles´ as a

guideline for successful military interventions. In order to have a successful

intervention, the mandate has to be clear and precise. If this is not the case, then

an intervention could have unintended consequences (ICISS Report, 2001).

2.4.2 The strengths and weaknesses of the six criteria for military

interventions/coercive measures

ICISS recommends six criteria in its report which should serve as a guideline for

military interventions/coercive measures performed by the international

community. The aim was to clarify in which cases the international community

should use military force/coercive measures and how it should operate during

interventions.

The first criterion is the ´Just Cause` which means that such measures are

meant for exceptional cases only and are therefore justified if there is a "large

scale loss of life" and/or "large scale ethnic cleansing" (ICISS report, 2001, p. 33).

The Commission does not quantify the term "large scale". It argues that this

would be a situation which is "conscience-shocking" (ibid.). To determine whether

any of these situations occur within a state, ICISS explains that evidence is

crucial. Credible institutions like UN agencies and independent missions

established by the UN Secretary-General could undertake the task of fact finding.

The second criterion is called ´Right Intention´ which ensures that the

coercive measures, and especially military interventions, are performed primarily

for humanitarian purposes and not to achieve certain national interests. ICISS

argues that the intentional overthrow of a regime is not perceived as right

intention, but it might be necessary to protect the population. Support by regional

organizations would further strengthen the ´Right Intention´. The `Last Resort´

criterion explains that less coercive measures have to be considered before more

coercive ones. However, ICISS stated that where there is a situation in which

humans suffer dramatically, there might be no time for peaceful measures and

stronger ones, such as military interventions, might be more appropriate. The

fourth criterion named ´Proportional Means´ deals with the military operation

itself. It should ensure that no excessive operation occurs but rather one that is

proportionate to the aim of protecting civilians. Civilians could also be victims in

these operations, but the goal is to protect them. ICISS, therefore, recommends

to focus on specific targets rather than "all out warfighting" (ICISS report, 2001, p.

37). The ´Reasonable Prospects´ criterion deals with the cost-benefit analysis of

the measures. For example, if one expects the loss of lives to increase

dramatically due to an intervention or if it provokes a civil war, then a military

intervention is not an option. The last criterion ´Right authority´ is a crucial one

because throughout all humanitarian interventions in the past, the international

community struggled to decide which organisation could authorize an intervention

which would then result in a legal and legitimate intervention. ICISS clearly states

that the most appropriate institution is the UN and its Charter, and the Security

Council in particular (ibid.).

The UN Charter, however, entails a paradox between sovereignty and

interventions for humanitarian purposes. By including gross Human Rights

violations into the spectrum of perceived threats by the Security Council, it can

legally prevent or stop human suffering within a country if it has clear evidence.

Hence, ICISS established these criteria as a guideline which should help the

international community to act effectively and most importantly, to help to find

consensus among the P5 members (Mertus, J. and Helsing, J.W., 2006).

ICISS illustrates that one should not find an alternative to the Security

Council for these matters but rather make the Council work more effectively by

adjusting its decision-making practices in situations where there is evidence of

large scale killing and immediate action is necessary. ICISS suggests that the P5

should apply the ´Code of Conduct´ in cases where it is crucial to prevent or stop

massive humanitarian suffering, meaning that they should not use their veto

power if a majority supports the Draft Resolution. This would prevent the Security

Council from finding itself in a deadlock and it could work more efficiently (ICISS

report, 2001).

ICISS does not only attempt to find a balance between sovereignty and

interventions for humanitarian purposes but also a balance between inaction, as

it was the case in Rwanda, and doing too much by undertaking excessive

operations, as some argue was the case in Kosovo (Weiss, T.G., 2012, p.12).

However, some elements of the criteria are not clarified sufficiently which

could result in controversy among states and in particular among the P5. ICISS

explained that the intention of regime change would not account to the `Right

intention` criterion, but a regime change might be necessary to protect civilians.

This dilemma, however, could lead to further disagreements among the P5.

Whereas some might argue that regime change may be necessary, others could

argue that their initial intention was regime change and not civilian protection.

Many countries are concerned that the primary purpose of an intervention is not

humanitarian suffering, but national self-interest to which regime change may

count (Ramsboth, O., Woodhouse, T., Miall, H., 2011).

A further dilemma could occur in regards to the ´Last Resort´ criterion.

ICISS argues that peaceful measures should be explored first but they also claim

that sometimes there is no time for exploration but action would be needed.

Since this is parallel to the Articles 41 and 42 under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter, the Security Council can determine which actions are appropriate.

However, the P5 members might be divided on the measures and can therefore

not act effectively.

Additionally, the criteria ´Proportional Means` and ´Reasonable Prospects´

are also difficult to determine. One country could argue, for example, that aerial

bombing is necessary to protect civilians while another country could counter by

saying that this would lead to more civilian casualties. Hence, they would have

divergent perspectives regarding ´Proportional Means´. The same could be true

for ´Reasonable Prospects´. While one country perceives that sanctions would be

necessary to pressure a Government, for instance, another country could argue

that pressure would deteriorate the situation and sanctions could lead to a

humanitarian catastrophe.

Generally, the criteria are set out to guide the international community, and

in particular the Security Council, through the decision-making process regarding

coercive measures. However, some aspects of the criteria show weaknesses and

can therefore result in disagreement among the P5 and a potential deadlock due

to a lack of clarification (ICISS Report, 2001).

Table A1: Summary of the six criteria for coercive measures and their weaknesses

1. ´Just

Cause´

Large-scale killings occur

There is evidence gathered by UN agencies or other credible

institutions (ICC)

2. ´Right

Intention´

Humanitarian purpose as main intention, not regime change as

initial intention

Regime change may be needed to protect civilians

Problem: Difficult to determine

o States could be accused of attempting regime change even

though they could argue that regime change is needed to

protect civilians

Dilemma could occur among the P5

3. ´Last

Resort´

Peaceful measures have to be explored first, before more coercive

measures

Problem: Difficult to determine

o Some states may think that peaceful measures should be

implemented, while other states may be convinced that more

coercive measures are needed

Dilemma could occur among

the P5

4. ´Proportional

Means´

Military operations should focus on specific targets only, minimal

use of force

Problem: Difficult to determine

o Some states may perceive that the military means implemented

are proportional while other states disagree

Dilemma could occur among the P5

5. ´Reasonable

Prospects´

There is a chance of success that coercive measures can protect

civilians

If it would do more harm than good, then coercive measures

should not be implemented

Problem: Difficult to measure

o Different countries may have different perspectives on whether

coercive measures do more harm than good

Dilemma could occur among the P5

6. ´Right

Authority´

UN Security Council should authorize coercive measures

P5 should adopt ´Code of Conduct´ (Refrain from veto power if

majority supports a Draft Resolution)

Source: Data presented in table was taken from the ICISS Report (2001) and adjusted

accordingly

2.4.3 The incorporation of R2P by the United Nations

The terrorist attacks in New York on September 11

2001 triggered the ´War on

Terror´ as a response. The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were

among others justified as interventions for humanitarian reasons. This spread

concerns among many countries and as a result the concept of R2P was seen as

a further justification for arbitrary interventions. The Non-Aligned-Movement was

opposed to R2P and also the G77 had some reservations.

However, the co-chair of ICISS, Gareth Evans, former UN Secretary-

General Kofi Annan and the Canadian government brought R2P back to the

debate within the UN General Assembly (Loges, B., 2013). In 2004, Annan

introduced his report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" at the

High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Annan endorsed the

ICISS report on R2P and claimed that UN members had a shared responsibility,

meaning that if a state fails to protect its own people, then the international

community has to step in. In his report Annan included the necessity of criteria for

the guidance of military interventions. Although, the criteria Annan recommends

are slightly different than the ones in the ICISS report, the general meaning is the

same (United Nations General Assembly, 2004).

In 2005, Annan reaffirmed his support for R2P in his report "In Larger

Freedom" and stated that military interventions may be necessary in certain

situations. He also asked the Security Council to set up criteria for guidance

(United National General Assembly, 21 March 2005). In the same year, the

General Assembly adopted the World Summit Outcome, in which R2P was

explicitly mentioned under §138 and §139. Hence, UN members recognized that

the state has the primary responsibility to protect its own population, but if it fails

to do so, the international community has to act. Generally, it should always

assist the state in question so that there is a possibility that a crisis can be

prevented. If, however, the state fails to protect its population and peaceful

means are inadequate, then the Security Council can act under Chapter VII in a

"timely and decisive manner" (General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005, p. 30),

on a "case-by-case basis" (ibid.) and it can cooperate with regional organisations.

Furthermore, Human Rights violations, as mentioned in the ICISS Report, were

reduced to four crimes which are crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide

and ethnic cleansing. This was done to dispel some states´ concerns about

limitations on state sovereignty. They were suspicious of a military intervention

under R2P that could be justified in regards to any type of Human Rights

violations (ibid.).

Generally, scholars have different opinions about the incorporation of R2P

into the UN. Some scholars, such as Todd Lingberg (2005), perceive the

adoption of R2P into the General Assembly resolution as a milestone for R2P

since all members of the UN recognized that sovereignty is not absolute but

should rather be perceived as a responsibility. Furthermore, member states also

acknowledged their responsibility to act as an international community and

claimed that the Security Council would be the only body with the authority to

enforce military measures. Lingberg argues that this resolution shows the change

of the relationship between sovereignty and Human Rights (Lingberg, T., 2005).

However, other scholars argue that the adoption of the R2P concept by the

General Assembly deviated too much from the original ICISS Report and would

not answer general issues. For instance, the World Summit Outcome resolution

did not include any recommendation for actions in cases where the Security

Council is paralysed but immediate action is needed. Moreover, it did not restrict

the P5´s veto power in any way. Additionally, the resolution did not include any

criteria as suggested by ICISS or Kofi Annan. The three phases of prevention,

reaction and rebuilding introduced by ICISS were excluded in the resolution.

Therefore, the R2P incorporation into the resolution was called ´R2P lite´ by

some scholars. Furthermore, the resolution incorporated that the Security Council

should act on a case by case basis, which was always criticised during

interventions in the 1990s.

Hence, the question arose whether R2P would be a substantially new

concept for International Relations and relevant in the decision-making process

for the P5 members or if it would merely be a new term for humanitarian

interventions. The challenges the Security and therefore R2P could face would

then be the same the international community faced during humanitarian

interventions in the 1990s (Bellamy, J.A., 2009). The UN Secretary-General Ban

Ki-Moon was aware of the reality that the Security Council has been paralyzed in

the past and therefore failed to act many times. Thus, in 2009 he reminded the

member states of the recommendations by ICISS to restrict the veto power of the

P5 in situations where the four major crimes occur. However, so far, the member

states did not include this suggestion (United Nations General Assembly, 2009).

3. The decision-making process of the UN Security Council

Permanent Members regarding the crises in Libya and Syria

3.1 Security Council (P5) Discourse on Libya

3.1.1 Briefing by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Libya (2011

)

Due to the dramatic increase of violence in Libya, particularly against civilians,

the Security Council, the Secretary-General as well as the

Office of the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

dealt with the topic immediately.

On February 25

2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the

Security Council on the situation in Libya. He stated that 1,000 people have

already been killed since the uprising. Civilians would be in constant fear

because security forces were using indiscriminate force, arrested arbitrarily and

shot peaceful protestors. While the UN would not have evidence yet, Ban Ki-

moon perceived the reports, which were written by human rights groups, as

reliable. He reminded the Security Council that it has to step in if a state

manifestly fails to protect its civilians as it was agreed upon in the World Summit

Outcome in 2001. Moreover, he informed the Security Council that regional

organizations, such as the League of Arab States and the African Union, had

already condemned the violence in Libya and asked for an end to it. As the crisis

escalated, Ki-moon asked the Council to act promptly and effectively by

implementing financial, military and trade sanctions. While Ban Ki-moon did not

use the term R2P directly, he did state its content and reminded the Security

Council of its responsibility (United Nations Security Council Meeting Record

6490, 2011).

3.1.2 Discourse on Resolution 1970 (2011)

Only one day after the briefing by Ki-moon, France, the UK and the US as well as

eight non-permanent members submitted a Draft Resolution to the Council. In the

Draft, the Council members condemned the violence against civilians by the

Libyan government and welcomed that regional organizations, such as the

League of Arab States, the African Union and the Organization of the Islamic

Conference, also denounced these crimes. The Draft welcomed the decision of

the Human Rights Council to establish an independent international commission

of inquiry for investigation. Furthermore, the Council itself decided to refer the

Libyan case to the International Criminal Court for further investigation and fact

finding. While the Resolution does not explicitly refer to the concept of R2P, it

does remind the Libyan government that the primary responsibility lays within the

state. The Resolution authorizes peaceful measures, such as travel ban, asset

freeze and an arms embargo under Chapter VII Art. 41 of the UN Charter (UNSC

Resolution 1970, 2011).

These are targeted sanctions against Gadhafi, his family and other high-

ranking politicians in the Libyan regime, which the ICISS Report would support

since targeted sanctions are not meant to harm the general population but

pressure the regime´s leadership (ICISS Report, 2001).

The Council adopted the draft unanimously during its meeting. The

representative of the UK welcomed the unanimous adoption with the statement

that it would demand an end to the oppression supported by sanctions. France

took a similar stance by adding that the Resolution reminds the international

community to react if a state fails to protect its population, thus indirectly referring

to the R2P concept. The US representative went further by using strong language

to describe Gadhafi´s violent acts as "those who slaughter civilians will be held

accountable" (SC Meeting Record 6491, p.3), thereby supporting the reference to

the ICC. He argued that the international community took up its responsibility to

support the Libyan population in their calls for their rights. While the US did not

argue once in favour of the protection of Libya´s sovereignty, it did argue for the

protection of civilians and thereby accused the Libyan government five times of

committing Human Rights violations. The representative of Russia, on the other

hand, also focused on the protection of civilians but emphasized the importance

of sovereignty (ibid.).

Even though the P5 members do not focus on the same aspect, they all

perceive the `Just Cause´ criterion as fulfilled since they referred the Libyan crisis

to the ICC for investigation in order to gain further evidence. Furthermore, all

members denounced the large loss of lives and all, except China, made Gadhafi

responsible for the catastrophic humanitarian situation.

The P5 further argued that the Security Council would be the responsible

institution which would have to respond. While France, the UK and the US

argued that the international community would look at the Security Council to act,

Russia and China emphasized the importance of obeying Security Council

Resolutions.

These statements show that to all P5 members, the `Right Authority´

criterion is fulfilled. They all agree that the Security Council was the most

appropriate body to respond effectively to the crisis.

The Russian representative argued that the Resolution authorized peaceful

measures under Chapter VII Article 41, but the Resolution would not mention

Article 42, which would enforce a military intervention. Sanctions, however, would

be necessary to prevent further deterioration. Russia and China both emphasized

the importance of regional organizations and their demands to end violence in

Libya. Therefore, both perceived the ´Right intention´ criterion as fulfilled due to

regional support and thus voted in favour of the Resolution (ibid.).

3.1.3 Discourse on Resolution 1973 (2011)

Not even one month later, France, the UK, the US and non-permanent members

submitted a further Draft Resolution due to the lack of compliance by Gadhafi to

Resolution 1970. The resolution condemned the increasing violations of Human

Rights and reminded the UN members that the AU, the League of Arab States

and the Organization of the Islamic Conference did take a similar stance. While

the Resolution assures its compliance to the sovereignty of Libya, it did declare

that the situation would still be a threat to international peace and security.

Hence, it requested member states to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

and "to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated

areas under threat of attack

excluding a foreign occupation force of any form

on any part of Libyan territory" (UNSC, Resolution 1973, 2011, p.3). The

Resolution further imposed a No-Fly zone, which was requested by the Arab

League of States, and the Council asked member states to "take all necessary

measures" (ibid.) to enforce it. Furthermore, the asset freeze was expanded to

large entities under Gadhafi´s authority.

The resolution excluded a foreign occupation and set a limit to the military

operation as advocated by ICISS in order to have clear rules. However, the

request "to take up all necessary measures" (ibid.) seems to be vague. In order to

have a successful military intervention, the mandate has to be clear to all parties.

Vague guidelines could result in different military approaches and thus in

unintended consequences. Furthermore, this part of the resolution could

challenge the ICISS criteria ´Proportional means" since the means of the

intervention are not clarified in the Resolution (ibid.).

The Resolution was adopted on March 17

2011 with China, Russia, Brazil,

India and Germany abstaining and the other members in favour. In the meeting,

France welcomed the UN General Assembly´s request to suspend Libya´s

membership from the Human Rights Council due to the increasing indiscriminate

violence against civilians by the Libyan regime. Throughout the speech, the

representative of France reminded the Council five times of the suffering of

Libyans and accused Ghadafi directly by saying "the will of people has been

crushed by the murderous repression by Colonel Al-Gadhafi´s regime against his

own people" (UNSC Meeting Record 6498, p. 2). The UK, France and the US

emphasized that Resolution 1973 had to be evoked because Gadhafi ignored his

obligations under Resolution 1970, and pressure would be needed to protect

civilians.

This was already mentioned in Resolution 1973 itself but it clarifies that the

´Last resort` and ´Reasonable Prospect´ criteria are fulfilled to France, the UK

and the US (ibid.).

The representative of the UK mentioned NATO for the first time in this

context by announcing that NATO would be prepared to implement the

Resolution. The UK additionally stated that "the central purpose of the resolution

is clear: to end the violence, to protect civilians" (UNSC Meeting Record 6498,

p.4). The US and France took a similar position.

With this statement, the criteria ´Right intention´ of the ICISS Report would

be satisfied for the US, UK and France since the initial purpose of the intervention

would not be a regime change, but the protection of civilians which is a legitimate

justification for a military intervention under R2P.

While France, the US and the UK completely support Resolution 1973,

Russia and China had reservations. Russia claimed that they still had questions

regarding the No Fly zone as well as the use of force and its limits. Russia feared

that this intervention "could open the door to large-scale military intervention"

(UNSC Meeting Record 6498, p. 8) and that the "responsibility for the inevitable

humanitarian consequences of the excessive use of outside force in Libya will fall

fair and square on the shoulders of those who might undertake such action"

(ibid.).

This is a crucial statement because it demonstrates Russia´s concern that

the criterion ´Proportional Means´ as recommended by ICISS would not be

fulfilled and therefore, a military intervention under R2P could not completely be

justified in Russia´s perspective. The representative of Russia argued that it did

not use its veto power because civilians would need to be protected. Thus, this

strengthened the ´Right Intention´ criterion for Russia.

China made a similar statement, claiming that questions about the

implementation of the Resolution would not have been answered. The only

reason why China did not veto was because the League of Arab States and the

African Union demanded more coercive action from the Security Council, thus

giving great importance to the perspective of regional organizations.

Both Russia and China had in common that they preferred a peaceful

solution to the crisis, thus the criterion ´Last Resort´ would also not be fulfilled to

them. Furthermore, both argue that sanctions or a military intervention would

deteriorate the crisis, meaning that to Russia and China, the ´Reasonable

Prospect` criterion would not be satisfied (ibid).

On March 24

2011, Ki-Moon briefed the Council on the implementation of

the No Fly zone by European and US military forces. He reported that his Special

Envoy to Libya, which had the mandate to mediate between Libya, the opposition

and the international community, had a meeting with the Libyan Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister claimed that the regime had to act to counter terrorist

groups like Al-Qaeda and he demanded that the opposition should also commit to

a ceasefire. Ki-Moon informed the Council that violence against civilians would

continue even though Gadhafi claimed numerous times to implement a ceasefire.

The Libyan Foreign Minister would further announce that Ghadafi would comply

to Resolution 1970 and 1973 (UNSC, Meeting Record 6505, 2011).

The Special Envoy to the Secretary-General briefed the Council on April 4

2011 on the meetings he had with the Libyan authorities and the National

Transitional Council of Libya, an assembly established by the opposition. He

notified the Security Council that the Libyan government would be willing to agree

to a ceasefire if the opposition also agreed. However, Libyan media would have

broadcasted Gadhafi´s rejection of a ceasefire. The NTC informed the Special

Envoy that they would be willing to a ceasefire but Gadhafi would need to resign

in order to end the conflict since this would be the will of the people (ibid.).

This situation illustrates a dilemma. While Gadhafi gave contrasting

statements on his agreement to a ceasefire, the NTC stressed that peace would

only be achieved if Gadhafi stepped down. This implied a regime change which

challenged the Security Council. The UK, France and the US have already stated

that the purpose of a military intervention would be humanitarian. However,

knowing that Gadhafi refused to resign even though the opposition declared that

his resignation was the only path to achieving peace, raised the question whether

a regime change would be necessary to protect civilians. As stated in the ICISS

Report, a regime change may be legitimate if this was the only way to protect

civilians. However, this strategy may raise doubts regarding the ´Right intention`

of the military intervention of the P5 (UNSC Meeting Record 6509, 2011).

On May 3

2011, the Special Envoy to Libya informed the Security Council

that the violence increased between the Libyan government and the opposition.

He stated that the Libyan regime would only agree to a ceasefire if NATO

stopped its bombing, which killed some of Ghadhafi´s family members. The NTC

would not even negotiate a ceasefire if Ghadafi would not be willing to step down.

Therefore, the Libyan authority and the NTC found itself in a deadlock (UNSC

Meeting Record 6527, 2011). Shortly after this briefing, the ICC prosecutor

briefed the Council on the findings it had made. He confirmed that crimes against

humanity have been committed by the Libyan government and "500 to 700

persons died in February alone" (UNSC Meeting Record, 6528, p.3). Ghadafi´s

security forces would have killed peaceful demonstrators in various places in

Libya and the plans to oppress potential uprisings were made shortly after the

revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt occurred. The regime tried to cover its crimes

and "dead bodies were removed from streets and hospitals. Doctors were not

allowed to document the number of dead and injured admitted to hospitals after

the violent clashes began" (ibid). Furthermore, civilians who were perceived to be

unfaithful to the Libyan authorities would have been killed, arrested or tortured.

The ICC prosecutor stated that "the victims who were shot at by security forces

were unarmed civilians and there is no evidence of any attack against security

forces" (UNSC Meeting Record 6528, p. 4).

The briefing by the ICC prosecutor was crucial since it confirmed the

allegations the Council has made against Gadhafi in its Resolutions 1970 and

1973. With the increasing numbers of deaths, the violence against civilians and

the committing of crimes against humanity, there was sufficient evidence to

satisfy the ´Just Cause´ criterion of the ICISS Report. Surprisingly though, the

evidence was only confirmed after the military intervention started. However,

once could argue that the briefings by the UN Secretary-General, which was

based on reports from various human rights groups and UN agencies were proof

enough to start an intervention (UNSC Meeting Record 6490).

After listening to the briefing of the ICC prosecutor, the US, the UK and

France gave examples of the Human Rights violations committed by the Libyan

regime. While the representative of France did not mention the term R2P directly,

he argued that the Council stepped in by implementing Resolution 1973 to

protect civilians because the Libyan government would not only fail to protect

them but rather attack its own population. Along with this, Russia condemned the

use of force against civilians, but emphasized that a ceasefire and a political

solution is needed. Furthermore, Russia´s representative stated that the

bombings by NATO also led to casualties and that it should not go beyond the

UN mandate. China made a similar claim by adding "We are not in favour of any

arbitrary interpretation of the Security Council´s resolutions or of any actions

going beyond those mandated by the Security Council" (UNSC Meeting Record

6528, p.10).

The statements made by Russia and China clarified that Resolution 1973

did not give a clear mandate with its wordings "all necessary measures to protect

civilians" (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011) as recommended by the ICISS Report

in its operational principles for military interventions. Russia and China perceive

NATO´s action as going beyond the UN mandate while the US, France and the

UK did not critizise NATO once. This clearly demonstrates that Russia and China

did not see the criterion ´Proportional Means` as fulfilled. Moreover, the ´Last

Resort´ criterion would not be fulfilled either since both Russia and China still

preferred a solution through political means ( UNSC Meeting Record, 6528).

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs updated the Council

on several occasions in May, June and July 2011 on the humanitarian situation in

Libya. He stated that Human Rights violations and indiscriminate force against

civilians continued. Furthermore, the contrasting parties were still not able to

agree on a ceasefire. Gadhafi repeated that NATO bombings would have to stop

and the NTC reiterated that it would only negotiate if Ghadafi would step down as

demanded by the Libyan people. The Libyan Prime Minister, however, declared

that Gadhafi would not resign (UNSC Meeting Record 6595, 2011). The Under-

Secretary-General further informed the Council that the AU would demand an

end of the NATO bombing. Additionally, he stated that NATO would support the

opposition (UNSC Meeting Record 6566, 2011).

This new information could cause disagreement among the P5. Since

Russia and China position themselves against military force and already criticized

NATO´s action, they might feel even stronger about their position since the AU

demanded that NATO´s bombings should stop. As previously mentioned, Russia

and China did not veto Resolution 1973 because it had strong regional support.

But now, one regional organization took Russia´s and China´s initial stance of

opposing military interventions. Thus, the criterion ´Right Intention` may not be

seen as fulfilled anymore by Russia and China. (UNSC Meeting Record 6541,

2011).

3.1.4 Discourse on Resolution 2009 (2011)

After the Libyan opposition seized most parts of Libya, Ghadafi´s family fled to

Afghanistan and Ghadafi was hiding himself in Sirte, Libya. The African Union

and further numerous countries recognized the NTC as the only legitimate Libyan

authority (BBC, 2016). On September 16

2011, the UK, France, the US as well

as six non-permanent members submitted a Draft Resolution to the Security

Council. The Draft stressed the importance of Libya´s sovereignty and ownership

for the achievement of peace in the country. The UN would take up a leadership

role and should assist the new government throughout the transition process

towards a democratic and independent Libya. The Resolution supported the

NTC´s efforts to protect the population, rebuilding Libyan institutions, promote

Human Rights and prepare the electoral procedure. Furthermore, Resolution

2009 modified the arms embargo and asset freeze imposed on Libya under

Gadhafi´s authority. Additionally, it intended to keep the No-Fly zone imposed by

Resolution 1973 under review (UNSC Resolution 2009, 2011).

The Draft Resolution was unanimously adopted on the same day. The UK

welcomed the positive developments and assured its support to the NTC and its

plan to promote Human Rights and democracy. The US was grateful for the

General Assembly´s decision to recognize the NTC as the legitimate Libyan

authority with the ability to represent Libya in the UN and gave its "very best

wishes to the Libyan people, who suffered for many years under one of the

world´s most brutal dictatorships" (UNSC Meeting Record 6620, p.4). France

perceived the adoption of Resolution 2009 as a "historic step" (UNSC Meeting

Record 6620, p.3) and praised the Libyan people for protesting against

oppression and fighting for its rights. Moreover, the representative of France

stated that it would equip the new authority with the tools needed to establish a

democratic Libya. Russia reiterated that peace could only be achieved through

political means and requested the lifting of the No-Fly Zone as it contributed to

further civilian casualties "Unfortunately, the Security Council´s mandate for

conducting the operation in Libya was disregarded, resulting in air strikes that

also targeted civilian facilities and killed civilians" (ibid.).

While Russia and China already feared that a military intervention would

deteriorate the crisis, Russia now strengthened the assumption that the

´Reasonable Prospect´ criterion was not fulfilled since there were civilian

casualties due to the NATO bombings.

Even though all P5 members agreed on Resolution 2009, it is obvious that the

military intervention was perceived differently among them. The US, France and

the UK welcomed the developments and focused on Human Rights aspects in

their statements, whereas Russia repeatedly criticized the intervention. China, on

the other hand, did not mention anything regarding Human Rights or civilian

protection but rather focused on the adherence to Libya´s sovereignty (ibid).

3.2 Security Council (P5) Discourse on Syria

3.2.1 Briefing by UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (2011)

On April 27

2011, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Pascoe

briefed the Security Council on recent developments in Syria. He said that his

information would be based on reports by various human rights groups and UN

agencies, stating that the Syrian government would violently oppress

demonstrators and about 100 people would have been killed over one weekend.

Syrian president Assad claimed that he took the demands of the population

seriously and would implement reforms. However, according to reliable groups

and UN agencies, the government continued and even increased its violent

repression. People would not only demand the introduction of reforms but rather

wanted Assad to step down. Furthermore, UN Under-Secretary General Pascoe

informed the Council about reports on the indiscriminate use of force by the

government against unarmed civilians, arbitrary arrests and torture, children

would also be among the victims. Assad, however, claimed that civilians were

killed by the armed opposition, but he would have no evidence for this

accusation. Pascoe stated that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed the

necessity of an investigation into the killings of civilians as well as governmental

security forces. Furthermore, Ki-moon would have recalled Assad´s responsibility

to protect his population and demanded their right of peaceful demonstrations

(UNSC Meeting Record 6524, 2011).

The US, France and the UK all condemned the Human Rights violations

and the violent oppression of unarmed civilians by the Syrian government in their

speeches. Only the UK also called on protestors to demonstrate peacefully. The

representative of the US argued that Assad would no longer be a legitimate

leader due to his violent actions. Throughout his speech, he accused Assad

seven times of violating Human Rights. Furthermore, he stated that the Syrian

government would try to gain Iran´s support in oppressing protestors. The UK

reminded Assad of his responsibility to protect his own population and

emphasized the importance of an investigation into the killings, similar to the

written statement by Ki-moon. The UK, the US and France requested coercive

measures which have to be implemented to pressure Assad if he does not stop

the violence. Russia and China, on the other hand, emphasized the importance

of a political settlement through national dialogue (ibid).

The arguments demonstrate that the UK, France and the US perceive the

´Last Resort´ criterion as fulfilled since they would authorize those measures only

if Assad would not end the violence. Russia and China, however, would not

perceive this criterion as fulfilled since they prefer a political solution.

Unlike the US, France and the UK, neither Russia nor China focused on the

Human Rights violations occurring in Syria, but rather affirmed the necessity to

comply with the UN Charter and its principle of sovereignty. Russia and China

both praised the reforms introduced by Assad. Furthermore, the Russian

representative did not perceive the Syrian crisis as a threat to international peace

and security. He argued that a foreign intervention would constitute a threat to

the region. Moreover, he claimed that the armed opposition would hope for the

situation to deteriorate which would lead the international community to intervene

and support the opposition in the overthrow of the Assad regime. Russia argues

that this would result in a civil war with unforeseen consequences. Additionally,

Russia asserts that violent actions also stem from the opposition, who would kill

members of the police and security force (ibid.).

The statements of the P5 are contrasting and show that there is some kind

of coalition building of France, the US and the UK versus Russia and China.

While the former focused on civilian protection, accused Assad of being

responsible for the violence in Syria and demanded an investigation, Russia and

China preferred to stand back and fully commit to the principle of sovereignty and

non-interference. Since the Russian representative argued that the Syrian crisis

would not constitute a threat to international peace and security, Russia did not

see the necessity to act. Furthermore, while the US, France and the UK criticized

the increasing violence, Russia and China focused on the democratic reforms of

the Syrian government (ibid.)

3.2.2 Discourse on Draft Resolution 612 (2011)

On October 4

2011, France, the UK and two non-permanent members

submitted the first Draft Resolution addressing the Syrian crisis. It reminded the

Syrian government of its responsibility to protect civilians and it condemned the

massive Human Rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the

Syrian authorities. Additionally, it regretted the slow progress of the

implementation of reforms by Assad. Furthermore, the Draft demanded the

immediate end of violence by all parties and the rejection of extremism so that a

political process led by Syria could be undertaken. The Draft thanked the League

of Arab States for its efforts to solve the crisis in Syria. While the importance of

Syria´s sovereignty was stressed, the Draft Resolution did threaten to authorize

sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter if the Assad regime would not

implement the obligation within 30 days (UNSC Draft Resolution 612, 2011).

The Security Council voted on the Draft the same day during its meeting.

While four countries abstained, nine were in favour but the draft was rejected

because it was vetoed by Russia and China. The UK, France and the US had

similar arguments for their positive votes on the Draft. All three argued that the

Resolution attempted to gain consensus by considering the various demands.

The Draft would not authorize sanctions immediately but rather threaten

sanctions in case Assad would not comply with the obligations. They all

condemned the violence against civilians by the Syrian regime. France regretted

that the Security Council would be unable to act to these crimes due to the veto

and the UK emphasized that the threat of Art. 41 of the UN Charter would not

authorize a military intervention. The US was "outraged that this Council has

utterly failed to address the urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to

regional peace and security" (UNSC Meeting Record 6627, p. 8). Furthermore,

people in Syria would recognize which countries would support them in their

demand for fundamental rights and which ones would not. The US stated that

regional organizations, such as the Arab League of States and the Organization

of Islamic Cooperation, already demanded that Assad would stop violationing

Human Rights but Assad would have only increased violence.

This shows that to the US, the ´Right Intention´ criterion is fulfilled since

regional organizations already denounced the violence and actions by the Syrian

regime. Since the UK and France drafted the Resolution which emphasized the

regional support, to them the criterion would also be satisfied (ibid.).

The US representative recalled indirectly the responsibility to react by

saying that the international community has to implement coercive measures if

the Syrian regime continues to ignore its obligations. Russia´s and China´s

arguments were contrary to the ones given by the US, France and the UK. While

both focused on the reforms by Assad, the necessity of respecting Syria´s

sovereignty and achieving peace through political means, Russia argued that the

opposition would also be violent and kill civilians. The representative of Russia

claimed that wordings in the Draft Resolution could open Article 42 of the UN

Charter and the authorization of a foreign intervention. Furthermore, the draft

would not reject extremism. Russia feared that the NATO-led intervention into

Libya could be a model for Syria. While Russia and China did not only reject a

military intervention, they also argued that the mere threat of sanctions would

deteriorate the situation. Russia claimed that the Syrian population would also

prefer reforms to a foreign intervention.

It is obvious that the P5 members had very contrasting views on the Syrian

crisis. France, the US and the UK were focusing on Human Rights violations and

the protection of civilians while Russia and China emphasized the importance of

Syria´s sovereignty. China did not mention Human Rights violations at all while

Russia was mentioning it once but made the armed opposition responsible. This

is contrary to the statements by France, the US and the UK who all accused

Syria solely for the violence. Russia´s and China´s arguments demonstrate that

they do not perceive the ICISS criteria ´Last Resort´ and ´Reasonable Prospects´

as fulfilled and therefore, reject not only a military intervention but even the

authorization of sanctions. Both argue that sanctions or an intervention would

make matters worse and that it would take some time for the Syrian government

to implement reforms. The UK, France and the US, on the other hand, perceive

these criteria as satisfied since they only threatened measures short of a military

intervention. They argue that regional organizations would support actions by the

Security Council, the Assad regime failed to implement its reforms and halt

violence and therefore needed to be pressured. Furthermore, the alternative

would be waiting which would mean that more people would be killed. An

interesting point was addressed by the Russian representative directly referring

to the Libyan crisis and the excessive use of force by NATO. This shows how

much Russia feared that Libya was a precedent for Syria (ibid).

While these differences existed, the criterion of ´Right Authority´ was

perceived as fulfilled by all P5 members. They all stated the importance of the

Security Council in maintaining international peace and security and emphasized

that it should take a leading role in solving the Syrian crisis.

However, their differences led to the rejection of the Draft Resolution.

According to the ´Code of Coduct´, Russia and China should have refrained from

using their veto power since a majority supported the Draft (ibid.).

3.2.3 Discourse on Draft Resolution 77 (2012)

On January 31

2012, representatives of the League of Arab States briefed the

Security Council on its actions regarding the Syrian crisis. They said that they

would call for an immediate end of violence and were working on an Arab plan to

solve the crisis. This plan demanded that the Syrian regime had to protect its

population, it should withdraw its military equipment from towns and cities, and it

should grant access to UN and Arab League agencies for investigations. The aim

would be a political settlement led by Syria. However, they claimed that the

Syrian government would have first approved the plan but then not meet its

commitment. Hence, the Arab League was considering implementing sanctions.

It informed the Council that civilians would still be under attack and this would be

evidenced by UN agencies and human rights groups. The representatives

suggested to refer the Syrian case to the ICC for further investigation.

Furthermore, they stated that they respected Syria´s sovereignty, but Assad

would need to be pressured to halt violence. Hence, they requested the Security

Council to authorize sanctions. The representatives of the Arab League argued,

however, that they rejected a military intervention as well as a regime change

(UNSC Meeting Record 6710, 2011).

The US, France and the UK welcomed the plan by the Arab League and

accused Assad of committing Human Rights violations and using indiscriminate

force against civilians. France stated that according to UN agencies more than

5,000 people were killed since the beginning of the violent clashes.

This statement demonstrates that to France, the criterion ´Just Cause´ is

satisfied since there is evidence by UN agencies, as suggested by ICISS, that

there is a large-scale loss of life which may be a crime against humanity, as the

World Summit Outcome described.

The US argued that the discourse is not about Libya, but Syria and that

both cases had their own respective circumstances and the Security Council

would need to act accordingly. France reiterated that the Draft does not call for a

military intervention or regime change but for the protection of civilians. The UK

claimed that pressure, such as sanctions, would be needed because in the past,

Assad has failed to commit to his obligations and, contrary to the previous

Russian statement, the UK perceives the Syrian crisis as a threat to international

peace and security (ibid.).

The arguments of the US, France and the UK took a similar stance towards

the Syrian crisis. They argue that Assad would be responsible for the crisis and

since he would not demonstrate any effort to ease the crisis, pressure is

perceived as necessary. Furthermore, Assad would not protect his civilians,

which would be a justified reason for ICISS to militarily intervene, or at least

impose sanctions. It would also justify the ´Right Authority´ criterion set out by

ICISS and mentioned in the World Summit Outcome because the Syrian

government is ´manifestly failing´ to protect its population. In their

argumentations, the US, France and the UK additionally claimed that their aim

would be to protect civilians and not to overthrow the regime. Furthermore,

regional organization would demand the Security Council´s support. Hence, to

them the criterion ´Right intention´ is fulfilled because they would only impose

sanctions for humanitarian reasons and those measures would be supported by

regional organizations.

Russia and China, however, emphasized their rejection of any type of

sanctions, regime change or a military intervention. They would not change their

perspective but demand respect for Syria´s sovereignty and request a political

settlement through national dialogue.

Since Russia and China repeatedly argued against regime change or

military intervention, even though the UK, France, the US as well as the Arab

League were opposed to these actions, Russia and China might think that their

intention would be based on regime change only. Thus, to Russia and China, the

´Right Intention´ criterion would not be fulfilled. This may be plausible since the

previous Draft Resolution did state that actions would be authorized under Art. 41

of the UN Charter, but it did not explicitly exclude Art. 42, a military intervention.

The re-occurring pattern of argumentation can be seen in the statements in which

the US, France and the UK focused on Human Rights related aspects and

directly accused the Assad regime whereas Russia and China did not accuse

Assad once of committing any crime but rather focus on the principle of

sovereignty (ibid.)

On February 4

2012, France, the UK, the US as well as 16 more countries

submitted a Draft Resolution to vote upon in the Security Council. The Draft was

meant to support the Action plan by the League of Arab States the Council

discussed some days before. The Draft demanded an immediate end to the

violence, regretted that there is no progress in the implementation of reforms by

the Syrian regime, condemned the Human Rights violations committed by the

Syrian government and the violence by all sides. Additionally, the Draft

demanded the government to commit to its responsibility to protect its civilians, to

allow access for Arab League agencies and to respect the people´s right to

peaceful assembly. Furthermore, it explicitly ruled out any action under Art. 42 of

the UN Charter (UNSC Draft Resolution 77, 2012).

The Draft Resolution had no abstentions and thirteen countries were voting in

favour. However, Russia and China used their veto power and the Draft was

therefore not adopted. As in the meeting on the previous Draft Resolution, the

US, France and the UK condemned the Human Rights violations by Assad and

France said that within the 10 months about 6,000 people were killed. France

argued that the Human Rights Council, the General Assembly, the League of

Arab States and various individual countries condemned the violence, but

regrettably the Security Council would not have been able to do so even though

UN agencies reported about the massive Human Rights violations committed by

the Syrian regime. The representative of France reiterated that regime change

was not the aim of France´s intention. The US used harsh language and

indirectly referred to Russia and China by arguing that "The US is disgusted that

a couple of members of this Council continue to prevent us from fulfilling our sole

purpose here" (UNSC Meeting Record 6711, p. 5). Furthermore, the US

representative claimed that one of the vetoing countries was supplying weapons

to the Assad regime, without directly naming the country. Moreover, he stated

that the US would have preferred tougher sanctions under Art. 41, but the Draft

would not even impose these measures. The UK directly referred to Russia and

China saying that "the UK is appalled by the decision of Russia and China to veto

an otherwise consensus resolution" and further argued that "the reality is that

Russia and China have today made a choice to turn their backs on the Arab

world and to support tyranny rather than the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian

people" (UNSC Meeting Record 6711, pp. 6-7).

The voting behavior demonstrated that this veto would be a further case for

the ICISS guidelines, which suggested that the P5 should abstain from using its

veto power if the draft is otherwise supported by a majority. Since 13 Security

Council members voted in favour of the Draft and only Russia and China vetoed,

ICISS recommendations would have been applicable. Russia and China should

have abstained from its veto. This perspective is supported by the UK and the US

who both emphasized that the Draft was supported by a majority. Further

interesting aspects are that there is tension among the P5, the UK directly called

out the country´s names which vetoed, accusing them of supporting Assad.

Russia, on the other hand, claimed that the US, France and the UK would

not aim at a political settlement, but preferred a regime change.

This accusation shows that it is now obvious to Russia that the US, the UK and

France do not have the ´Right Intention´ but rather pursue a regime change.

However, this perspective seems to be unreasonable in so far that the Draft

Resolution, contrary to the previous one, explicitly excludes any action under Art.

42 of the UN Charter, meaning that a military intervention and regime change

would not be possible (ibid.).

The representative of Russia argued that he used its veto because the

Draft would not adequately address the violent actions by the opposition and did

not entail the issue of extremism. China reiterated that a political settlement

through national dialogue would still be the most appropriate solution and the

Security Council should only assist this process. China´s representative further

argued that pressure on the Syrian government would not solve the crisis and

"Like many Council members, China maintains that under current circumstances,

to put undue emphasis on pressuring the Syrian government for a prejudged

result of the dialogue or to impose any solution will not help resolve the Syrian

issue. Instead, that may further complicate the situation" (UNSC Meeting Record

6711, p. 9).

China´s argument does not seem to be plausible since it stands, together

with Russia, alone in its decision to reject the Draft Resolution. It rather seems as

if the majority would like to pressure Assad with sanctions as one can see in the

voting behavior of the Council members. Russia and China, however, continue to

demand respect for Syria´s sovereignty (ibid).

3.2.4 Discourse on Resolution 2042 (2012)

On April 14

2012 France, the UK, the US and 4 non-permanent members

submitted a further Draft Resolution to the Security Council. The Draft supported

the Six-Point Plan proposed by Kofi Annan, the Joint Special Envoy of the UN

and the League of Arab States. The Plan called on the Syrian government to

withdraw its heavy weaponry from cities and towns and it demanded that all sides

commit to the ceasefire. Furthermore, it requested, in particular the Syrian

government, to allow access to humanitarian personnel and unarmed observers

whose mission it was to monitor the ceasefire. All parties to the conflict in Syria

have already agreed to the Six-Point Plan earlier (UNSC Resolution 2042, 2012).

The Draft was unanimously adopted. The representative of the UK said that

this would be Assad´s last opportunity to end the violence in Syria. France

argued that the Security Council would need to implement other measures if the

Syrian government would not comply with its obligation. While the UK

emphasized that the opposition would also need to respect the ceasefire, the

representative of the US praised the opposition by saying "We commend the

opposition for the strength it has shown in observing the ceasefire after the

brutality it has endured. We demand that the Syrian Government at last honour

its commitment

the opportunity is there; the burden is now on the Syrian

Government to seize it" (UNSC Meeting Record 6751, 2012, p. 9). China clarified

the objective of this Resolution and explained that it voted in favour because in

order to continue with a political settlement led by Syria, an environment free

from violence would need to be established.

The US, France and the UK all emphasized that civilians are suffering by

Assad´s indiscriminate violence and that more than 10,000 Syrians were dead.

Russia and China did not mention any aspects related to Human Rights, but

focused on respecting Syria´s sovereignty and refrained from accusing Assad of

using violence. Furthermore, while the US, France and the UK stated that it

would be now Assad´s responsibility to show his commitment to the ceasefire,

Russia argued that the burden would lay on the opposition. Hence, even though

the Resolution was unanimously adopted, major differences between the US,

France and the UK on the one side, and Russia and China on the other side, can

be observed (ibid.).

3.2.5 Discourse on Resolution 2043 (2012)

Only seven days later, Russia, China, France and 4 non-permanent members

submitted a further Draft Resolution to the Security Council. The Draft requested

the Council to establish a UN Supervision Mission UNSMIS, with 300 unarmed

observers whose tasks would be to monitor the ceasefire and the implementation

of the Six-Point Plan. The Draft regretted that the ceasefire was not respected by

all sides and violence continued (UNSC Resolution 2043, 2012).

The representative of France argued that it would take a risk by voting in

favour of the Resolution because the Syrian Government continued its repression

and ignored its obligations in the past. It reiterated that this would be the last

chance for peace. France, the UK and the US stated that sanctions would need

to be imposed by the Security Council if the Syrian Government failed to comply.

The representative of the US argued that an observer mission would only be

effective if there was already peace in the country but "unarmed observers

cannot prevent Assad´s violence against civilians, only intensified pressure can

do that" (UNSC Meeting Record 6756, p. 19). The UK accused President Assad

of hindering the work of the UN advance team in order to hide his crimes. Russia

and China emphasized the importance of respecting Syria´s sovereignty, so that

a political settlement through national dialogue would be possible. China further

stated that the UN mission should also respect Syria´s sovereignty. Russia´s

representative claimed that any kind of external interference would deteriorate

the crisis and he further argued that "the Libyan model should remain forever in

the past" (UNSC Meeting Record 6756, p. 2).

By directly referring to the Libyan intervention, Russia clarified that any

violation of Syria´s sovereignty would be rejected by Russia. China and Russia

reiterated their persuasion that the crisis could only be solved by completely

respecting Syria´s sovereignty and that an observing mission was necessary to

achieve sustainable peace (ibid.).

3.2.6 Discourse on Draft Resolution 538 (2012)

On July 19

2012, France, the UK, the US and 2 non-permanent members

submitted a Draft Resolution, which condemned the ongoing violence as well as

acts of terror in Syria. In the Draft, the Security Council regretted the failure of the

Syrian Government to implement the agreed Six-Point Plan in its entirety.

However, it would be necessary to enlarge the UN Supervision Mission.

Furthermore, the crisis would constitute a threat to international peace and

security and the Council would need to impose sanctions under Art. 41 if the

Syrian Government failed to comply (UNSC Draft Resolution 538, 2012).

Eleven Security Council members voted in favour of the draft, two members

abstained and Russia and China used their veto leading to the rejection of the

Draft. France and the UK strongly argued in terms of Human Rights violations

and civilian suffering. The representative of the UK stated that "more than 14,000

innocent Syrians have been killed since Russia and China first vetoed our efforts

to stem the violence in October 2011" (UNSC Meeting Record 6810, p.2).

This statement demonstrates the tension between the opposing sides and it

implies that Russia and China would be, next to the Syrian Government,

responsible for the ongoing violence in Syria since they were the only ones

vetoing Draft Resolutions dealing with the Syrian crisis.

Furthermore, the UK explained that the threat of sanctions under Art. 41

would be necessary in order to have consequences in case of non-compliance.

The representative of the UK strengthened his argument by clarifying that Kofi

Annan and the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon asked for these consequences.

The US stated that Art. 41 was only included because the Syrian Government

would still use heavy weaponry. The US, France and the UK, reiterated that the

Draft would not authorize Art. 42, and thus a military intervention would not be

possible.

Regarding the veto by Russia and China, the representative of the UK

claimed that Russia and China would rely on Assad´s empty promises and that

they would not be responsible members of the Security Council. Both, the UK

and the US, argued that the Draft had a majority and also the Arab League would

have called for more coercive measures.

This argumentation clearly shows again that to the US, France and the UK,

the criterion of ´Right Intention´ would be fulfilled since coercive measures have

the support of a regional organization. Furthermore, according to the ICISS

Report, Russia and China should have refrained from using their veto power

since the majority favoured the Draft as the voting behavior as well as the

statements made by the UK and the US proved.

China condemned the terrorist attacks which killed civilians and stated that

it would still be in favour of a political settlement. The drafters would have known

that a consensus was not reached and that the Council still had time left for

debating. Russia gave a similar statement and said that it was obvious that the

Draft would not be adopted.

This argumentation, in particular China´s argument, does not seem to be

logical since there is evidence from UN agencies about the increasing number of

deaths and they urged the Council to take action since waiting would mean that

innocent civilians would get killed (UNSC Meeting Record 6524, 2011).

Furthermore, the World Summit Outcome stated that the Council should act in a

"timely and decisive manner" (General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005, p.30).

However, the crisis was at that time going on for over one year with much loss of

life. Hence, it does not seem logical to argue that there was more time for debate.

Russia and China both explained their veto by saying that the Draft entailed

the threat of sanctions under Art. 41 and this could lead to a military intervention.

This argument does not seem plausible since Art. 41 does not authorize a

military intervention but an imposition of sanctions. However, the drafters could

have explicitly ruled out Art. 42 in order to avoid confusion and to have a clear

mandate as recommended in the ICISS Report (UNSC Meeting Record 6524,

2011).

3.2.7 Discourse on Resolution 2118 (2013)

After one year of inaction of the Security Council regarding the Syrian crisis, UN

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief

Coordinator, Ms. Amos, briefed the Security Council on April 18

2013 on the

humanitarian situation in Syria. According to Ms. Amos, bombings and killings

would continue and UN agencies as well as NGOs were rejected access to

various locations in Syria and were hence unable to provide humanitarian

assistance. This would be because of the bureaucratic barriers set up by the

Syrian Government. Furthermore, even in areas where UN agencies had access

to, they were unable to work effectively due to the violence by the opposition and

the Syrian Government. Ms. Amos requested the Security Council to find a

solution in order to stop the violence and argued that consequences for non-

compliance would be needed (UNSC Meeting Record 6949, 2013).

This briefing demonstrates the ever deteriorating situation in Syria and

interestingly, Ms. Amos asked for pressuring measures implemented by the

Security Council. The UK, France and the US tried to push a Resolution which

would open coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for years,

but this has always been a reason for Russia and China to reject the Draft (ibid.).

On July 16

2013, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Mr.

Simonovic, informed the Security Council on the continued use of indiscriminate

violence against civilians by the Syrian Government as well as the armed

opposition. He further stated that "War crimes, crimes against humanity and

gross human rights violations must not go unpunished. To that end, the Office of

the High Commissioner for Human Rights urges the Security Council to refer the

Syrian crises to the International Criminal Court" (UNSC Meeting Record 7000,

2013, p. 5).

The request of the OHCHR is an important one because it shows that the

previous Draft Resolutions, requtested by the US, France and the UK but vetoed

by Russia and China, were supported by the OHCHR. As previously mentioned,

referring the case to the ICC would also be in accordance with the ICISS Report

which stated that evidence would be needed to fulfill the ´Just Cause` criterion

(ibid.).

On September 27

2013, the Security Council unanimously adopted

Resolution 2118 after chemical weapons were used in Damascus, Syria. The

Resolution demanded the destruction of Syria´s chemical weapon programme

and prohibited the use of chemical weapons. The destruction would be verified

by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Furthermore, it

stated that measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would be imposed in

case of non-compliance (UNSC Resolution 2118, 2013).

After the adoption of the Resolution, the representative of the US argued

that Assad would need to be held accountable for the use of chemical weapons

and France also stated that evidence shows that the Syrian Government used

these weapons even though Assad would have rejected the existence of a

chemical weapons programme before. Hence, the representative of UK accused

Assad of lying. The US thanked the Russian Foreign Minister for cooperating

throughout the process of negotiating the Draft Resolution. The Russian

representative commended the Syrian Government on the progress of the

humanitarian situation. He regretted, however, that the armed opposition would

still continue their violent attacks. Furthermore, Russia clarified that the

Resolution would not automatically authorize measures under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter. China condemned the violence against civilians and stated that the

Resolution was important to achieve a political settlement and it would be

necessary to respect Syria´s sovereignty (UNSC Meeting Record 2139, 2013).

While China tended to condemn the use of chemical weapons in general,

the US, France and the UK accused Assad of using these weapons. However,

the Resolution only prohibited the use of chemical weapons but did not mention

who was using them. Russia, however, talks only positively about the Syrian

Government but condemns the opposition´s actions. Hence, the P5 blame

different sides for the crimes and this may hinder them to find a solution to the

crisis. Furthermore, the UK, France and the US emphasized that it would be

necessary to pressure the Syrian Government under measures of Chapter VII of

the UN Charter. However, both Russia and China rejected this option (ibid.).

3.2.8 Discourse on Resolution 2139 (2014)

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 on February 22

2014. It condemned the increasing violence and terrorist attacks. It concluded

that over 100,000 people were killed which was reported by the UN Secretary-

General. The Resolution demanded that all parties end the use of force against

civilians, lift sieges and allow humanitarian assistance. In case of non-

compliance, further measures would have to be considered by the Council

(UNSC Resolution 2139, 2012).

Russia claimed that there would be essential progress regarding humanitarian

assistance due to the actions by the Syrian Government. The Russian

representative regretted the attacks by the opposition and clarified that this

Resolution would not automatically authorize any measures under Chapter VII of

the UN Charter. Both, Russia and China, condemned the violence in Syria and

argued in favour of a political settlement without violating Syria´s sovereignty.

China and Russia´s arguments demonstrate that they would perceive the

´Just Cause´ criterion as fulfilled. They both denounce the violence against

civilians and see the need to respond through political means. While Russia

mainly blamed Syria´s opposition for the crisis, China did not accuse any side in

particular.

France, the US and the UK all blamed the Syrian Government for the

increasing violence and accused it of hindering the delivery of humanitarian

assistance. The UK claimed that there would be no progress as Russia said,

violence would rather increase. Hence, to the US, France and the UK, the ´Just

Cause´ criterion would be fulfilled and pressure would be needed (UNSC Meeting

Record 7116, 2014).

3.2.9 Discourse on Draft Resolution 349 (2014)

On May 22

2014, the UK, France, the US as well as 61 other countries

submitted a Draft Resolution to the Security Council which requested to refer the

Syrian crisis to the ICC. The aim was to investigate Human Rights violations and

to hold those responsible for the crimes accountable. It furthermore condemned

the violation of international human rights law by both the Syrian Government

and the opposition. The Draft reminded the Council that UN Secretary-General

and the OHCHR frequently requested to refer the case to the ICC since crimes

against humanity and war crimes may have been committed (UNSC Draft

Resolution 348, 2014).

Before voting, France requested to take the floor and reminded the Council

that over 160,000 people were killed during the crises. Both, the Syrian

Government and the opposition, were to blame for this. The representative of

France explained how the argument that a referral to the ICC would hinder the

peace process would not be valid since there would be no peace process.

Furthermore, the Draft would be based on terms already used in past

Resolutions such as in Resolution 1970 during the Libyan crisis. This resolution

was supported by all P5 members. He further referred to the Rwandan genocide

and stated that the Council could not behave as they did in 1994 and stay silent.

He added that "A veto would cover up all crimes; it would be a veto against

justice. It would give new justification to the French proposal to limit the use of

the right of the veto in the case of mass atrocities" (UNSC Meeting Record 7180,

p.4).

However, the Draft Resolution was rejected. Thirteen countries voted in

favour, Russia and China used their veto. The representative of the US accused

Russia of supporting the Syrian Government no matter which crimes it committed

and called the Syrian Government a "Government killing machine" (ibid.). The

veto would prevent victims to speak about the crimes which would now be

unpunished. He reminded the Council that not only Assad´s crimes would be

unpunished but also the crimes committed by the opposition and terrorists. The

UK took a similar approach saying that the Draft was merely about fact finding

and argued that "It is to Russia and China´s shame that they have chosen to

block efforts to achieve justice for the Syrian people" (UNSC Meeting Record

7180, p. 7). Additionally, the UK representative reminded the Council that this

Draft was otherwise supported by a majority.

These statements demonstrate that tension among the P5 was heated and

the US, France and the UK directly named China and Russia when using harsh

language. Furthermore, they took a similar stance as the ICISS Report did

regarding the limited use of the veto when atrocities occur. This Draft would apply

to this exemption since only Russia and China used their veto and the rest

supported the Draft.

The Russian representative argued that the Draft would be a pretext for a

foreign military intervention. He referred to the US, France and the UK as the

"Western colleagues" (UNSC Meeting Record 7180, p. 12) who would supply

weapons to the opposition, including terrorists, and would not even condemn

terrorist attacks.

However, this argument does not seem plausible since the UK, France and

the US supported Resolution 2139, which condemned terrorist attacks.

Moreover, the three countries submitted a Draft on July 19

2012, which also

condemned terrorist attacks but the Draft was vetoed by Russia and China.

Russia argued that France, the UK and the US would only be interested in

a regime change and that the referral to the ICC could potentially lead to a

military intervention (ibid.).

Russia´s arguments demonstrated again that to Russia, the criterion ´Right

Intention´ of the ICISS Report is not fulfilled since France, the US and the UK

would not primarily be interested in halting violence against civilians but would

rather be interested in a regime change.

The Russian representative argued that the referral of Libya to the ICC in

Resolution 1970 deteriorated the crisis since NATOs bombing campaign resulted

in civilian casualties. He stated that "Our colleagues from NATO countries

arrogantly refused to address that issue altogether. They even refuse to

apologize" (UNSC Meeting Record 7180, p.13). Furthermore, the Russian

representative claimed that peace would be needed first and only then could the

crimes be punished. China had a similar perspective and argued that the

international community should be patient. The representative of China explained

that he used his veto because the crisis could only be solved through political

means and China would generally reject the referral to the ICC since it would not

be a member to the Rome Statute.

The arguments reaffirms that to Russia and China, the ICISS criterion "Last

Resort" is not fulfilled since sanctions or a military intervention were out of

question and only a political settlement could lead to sustainable peace (ibid.).

3.3 Libya and Syria in comparison

3.3.1 The P5s perception of the ICISS criteria for military interventions/coercive

measures in regards to Libya and Syria

Throughout the discourse on Libya before and during Resolution 1970 and 1973

in 2011, all P5 members agreed that that the `Just Cause´ criterion would be

fulfilled since they referred the Libyan case to the ICC for investigation and

condemned the large scale loss of lives. Furthermore, they agreed that the

Security Council would be the most appropriate body to respond effectively to the

crisis and thus perceived the Security Council as the ´Right Authority´ (UNSC

Meeting Record 6491).

To the US, France and the UK the criterion ´Right Intention´ would be

satisfied since the initial purpose of authorizing coercive measures was

humanitarian. They explicitly stated that they would not pursue regime change

(UNSC Meeting Record 6498). Russia and China also perceived that the Security

Council had the `Right Intention` because civilians needed protection and the

Council had the support of some regional organizations who requested the

Council to act (ibid.).

The P5 members, however, disagreed on whether coercive measures were

appropriate and the `Last Resort´. The US, France and the UK argued that

Gadhafi first ignored the legitimate demands of the Libyan population and then

he ignored the obligations set out in Resolution 1970. Hence, more coercive

measures were necessary to protect civilians. Russia and China, on the other

hand, argued that a sustainable solution would only be achieved through political

means and not by sanctions or authorizing military force and therefore, coercive

measures were not their `Last Resort´. However, Russia did mention in the

beginning of the Libyan crises that sanctions were needed but was always

opposed a military intervention (ibid).

Russia and China, furthermore, argued that coercive measures would

deteriorate the crisis in Libya and therefore, would not perceive the ´Reasonable

Prospect´ as fulfilled. The UK, France and the US emphasized that those

measures were needed to pressure Gadhafi and to protect civilians (UNSC

Meeting Record 6498).

Even though the criterion `Proportional Means´ was not applicable at this

point because the military intervention had not begun yet, Russia already

expressed its concern about the implementation of the No-Fly Zone under

Resolution 1973. Russia feared that the No-Fly Zone could expand into a large

military intervention. Furthermore, Russia and China both stated that their

questions regarding the limits and means of the intervention remained

unanswered.

The discourse on Libya before and during Resolution 1970 and 1973

demonstrated that Russia and China had serious concerns about the impact

these Resolutions may have. They did not use their veto power, however,

because regional organizations requested the implementation of coercive

measures by the Security Council (ibid.)

Table A1: The discourse on Libya before and during Resolution 1970 and 1973

(February 25

2011 March 17

2011)

UK, US, France

Russia, China

1. Just

Cause

2. Right

Intention

3. Last

Resort

4. Proportional

Means

5. Reasonable

Prospects

6. Right

Authority

= criterion fulfilled

X = criterion not fulfilled

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6491, 6498

With the implementation of Resolution 1970 and 1973, the discourse within the

Security Council changed. While all P5 members still perceived the `Just Cause´

and ´Right Authority´ criteria as fulfilled, their points of view deviated in all other

criteria.

As before, Russia and China had a different perception regarding the ´Last

Resort´ criterion than the UK, France and the US.

They also still had a different perception of the `Reasonable Prospect´

criterion. The discourse demonstrated that particularly Russia made the Security

Council aware of the civilians casualties by NATO bombings. Hence, China and

Russia´s perception that coercive measures would not lead to successful results

strengthened.

Furthermore, Russia and China may not see the `Right Intention´ criterion

satisfied anymore since the AU demanded an end to NATOs military intervention.

Russia and China only refrained from using their veto power on Resolution 1970

and 1973 due to the support by regional organizations. The AU, however, did not

support those elements of the Resolutions any longer. This may have led Russia

and China to the perception that the ´Right Intention´ would not exist anymore

due to the lack of regional support (UNSC Meeting Record 6541).

The ´Proportional Means´ criterion, which is now applicable because a

military intervention occurred in Libya, is not seen as fulfilled by Russia and

China either. Both emphasized that NATO was using excessive military force

leading to civilian casualties. Since the UK, France and the US are members of

NATO and did not criticize NATOs actions, it is to assume that they perceive this

criterion as satisfied (UNSC Meeting Record 6528).

Table A3: The discourse on Libya directly after the implementation of Resolution

1970 and 1973 (May 4

2011 September 16

2011)

UK, US, France

Russia, China

1. Just

Cause

2. Right

Intention

3. Last

Resort

4. Proportional

Means

5. Reasonable

Prospects

6. Right

Authority

Red = this criterion is perceived differently to the one in the previous table

= criterion fulfilled

X = criterion not fulfilled

o = criterion may not be fulfilled

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6528, 6620

The imposition of sanctions and the authorization of a military intervention in

Libya was perceived as a positive development by the UK, France and the US

(UNSC Meeting Record 6620). However, China and particularly Russia

condemned the military use of force against a sovereign country. Hence, to

Russia and China, coercive measures were out of questions when the P5

members had to deal with the Syrian crisis. They rather argued that Assad would

implement reforms to meet the demands of the people and this would take some

time. Thus, the `Reasonable Prospect´ criterion would not be fulfilled to Russia

and China since coercive measures would deteriorate the crisis. The UK, France

and the US, on the other hand, argued that pressuring the Syrian regime would

be necessary to protect civilians. This demonstrates that they expected success

if coercive measures would be implemented (UNSC Meeting Record 6627).

As during the Libyan crisis, Russia and China preferred a solution through

political means without pressuring the Syrian Government and therefore, the

´Last Resort´ criterion would not be satisfied. This is not true for the US, France

and the UK. They argued that they only threatened Assad with sanctions if he

would not comply with his obligations. Furthermore, they emphasized that they

would not authorize a military intervention. Additionally, they supported their

argument by referring to the statements of Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon who

both requested the Security Council to implement coercive measures for non-

compliance (UNSC Meeting Record 6810).

One of the most important changes since the discourse on Libya and Syria

started, is that Russia accused the UK, France and the US of attempting to

pursue a regime change in Syria. Even though regional organizations, such as

the League of Arab States requested coercive measures by the Security Council,

Russia and China did not perceive regional support as important as they did

during the Libyan crisis. They both repeatedly argued that regime change would

not be a solution. This means that they did not perceive the UK, France and the

US of having the ´Right Intention´ which would be the protection of civilians. This

conviction is more important to Russia and China than the support of regional

organizations. France, the UK and the US argued, however, that they would not

attempt to militarily intervene but would threaten sanctions since Assad would not

comply with any obligations (UNSC Meeting Record 6170).

Even though the `Proportional Means´ criterion is not applicable to the

Syrian case since the P5 did not impose sanctions or authorize a military

intervention, it is important to mention that Russia did point out again that NATO

used excessive force in Libya and that this was to be avoided in Syria (UNSC

Meeting Record 6627).

The P5 members only agreed that the criteria ´Right Authority´ and ´Just Cause´

would be fulfilled. They all argued that the Security Council would be responsible

for dealing with the Syrian crisis and they all condemned the large scale loss of

lives.

Due to the experience of the Libyan crisis and the different perceptions,

Russia and China did not refrain from using their veto power as they did

regarding Libya but vetoed against any Draft Resolution, which would pressure

the Syrian Government. It is important to see that neither of them were

completely satisfied with the Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya, but refrained

from vetoing them due to the regional support. The Draft Resolutions regarding

Syria also had regional support, but China and Russia chose to use their veto.

The reason for this was, among others, that they did not expect successful

results by imposing coercive measures (´Reasonable Prospects´), they preferred

to solve the crisis through political means and dialogue (´Last Resort´) and they

thought that the UK, France and the US had the initial intention of changing the

regime (´Right Intention´). Hence, Russia and China vetoed because these three

criteria were not fulfilled (ibid.).

Table A4: The discourse on Syria (27

April 2011 May 22

2014)

UK, US, France

Russia, China

1. Just

Cause

2. Right

Intention

3. Last

Resort

4. Proportional

Means

5. Reasonable

Prospects

6. Right

Authority

Red = this criterion is perceived differently to the one in the previous table

= criterion fulfilled

X = criterion not fulfilled

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6524, 6627, 6710, 6711, 6751,

6756, 6810, 7038, 7116, 7180

3.3.2 The P5s focus on the concept of sovereignty and Human Rights in regards

to Libya and Syria

As already seen in Chapter 2, the UN Charter entails a paradox in regards to the

protection of sovereignty and Human Rights. In practice, this paradox opened up

an international debate throughout the 1990s due to the humanitarian

interventions. It was still not clear if it would be legitimate and legal to violate a

state´s sovereignty if it would not protect its civilians or even harm them. ICISS

tried to answer this question by arguing that sovereignty would not be absolute.

Hence, if a state does not protect its civilians, then the international community

had to protect them. To determine if this dilemma would be solved through the

introduction of the R2P concept by ICISS, I undertook a Content Analysis and

counted the arguments made by the P5 members in regards to sovereignty and

Human Rights/civilian protection throughout the discourse on Libya and Syria.

During the discourse on Libya, it is evident that France, the UK and the US

had a common approach. They all expressed arguments based on civilian

protection numerous times and directly accused Gadhafi of violating Human

Rights. Generally, they argued that sanctions as well as a military intervention

would be needed to protect civilians. Hence, they did not mention any argument

which would defend Libya´s sovereignty. They rather stated that Ghadhafi had

lost legitimacy to rule due to his violent actions against civilians and therefore, the

international community would have to step in.

Russia and China emphasized the importance of respecting Libya´s

sovereignty. While China only expressed one argument which was related to

civilian protection throughout the discourse on Libya, Russia roughly expressed

civilian protection related arguments as many times as France, the UK and the

US did. However, Russia only accused the Libyan regime of violating Human

Rights once whereas France, the US and the UK did it numerous times.

Furthermore, Russia is the only P5 member which directly accused NATO of

killing civilians.

It is important to see that France, the UK and the US did not change their

approach in the Syrian discourse compared to the crisis in Libya. They were

expressing numerous arguments which were related to civilian protection and

accused the Syrian Government directly of violating Human Rights. This is the

same approach they used during the Libyan discourse. However, when talking

about the Syrian case, France and the US did mention that terrorists would also

kill innocent civilians. Comparing how many times they accused terrorists and the

Syrian Government of killing civilians though shows that they mainly blamed

Assad for the violence against civilians (UNSC Meeting Record 6490, 6505,

6509, 6527, 6810)

One major change is that Russia did not blame the Government of Syria at

all while it did blame the Libyan Government once. Russia rather claimed that

terrorists were killing civilians. Furthermore, Russia referred to the Libyan case

and casualties due to NATO bombings twice when talking about the Syrian crisis.

Both Russia and China focused on Syria´s sovereignty and expressed

many times that Syria´s sovereignty had to be respected and one can see that

sovereignty prevailed over civilian protection. France, the UK and the US did not

defend Syria´s sovereignty once but expressed numerous arguments related to

civilian protection. Hence, there were in favour of threatening sanctions against

the Syrian Government. This would pressure the Syrian Government for a

change of action and could protect civilians (UNSC Meeting Record 6711, 6751,

6756).

This analysis shows that the introduction of the R2P concept by ICISS

could not solve disagreements about whether sovereignty or civilian protection

would prevail. Countries still had different perspectives on this issue. Some

countries, such as the US, France and the UK, argue that civilian protection

would be more important than sovereignty which may have to be violated. Other

countries, such as China, are convinced that sovereignty has to be respected

even if this government was not able to protect its population. It is important to

mention that Russia generally also focused on sovereignty. However, in the

Libyan case Russia expressed Human Rights related arguments more often than

sovereignty related arguments whereas it did the opposite in the Syrian case.

This may be due to the fact that Russia perceived the outcome of the Libyan

intervention as negative and hence tried to prevent any violation of Syria´s

sovereignty in order to avoid another negative result.

Table A5: The P5s focus on sovereignty related aspects and human rights/civilian

protection related aspects

Libya

Syria

Human

Rights

aspects/civilian

protection

Sovereignty-

related aspects

Human Rights

aspects/civilian

protection

Sovereignty-

aspects

France

12 (10)

50 (37) (3)

9 (9)

32 (27)

USA

9 (11)

50 (81) (4)

Russia

8 (1) (1)

11 (4) (2)

China 1

5 (1)

Directly accusing Libyan/Syrian Government of killing/torturing innocent civilians

Directly accusing terrorists of killing/torturing innocent civilians

Directly accusing NATO of killing innocent civilians

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6491, 6498, 6528, 6620, 6524,

6627, 6710, 6711, 6751, 6756, 6810,7038, 7116, 7180

3.3.3 Summary: Why did the P5 members decide to implement coercive

measures in Libya but not in Syria?

The US, France and the UK had a consistent approach throughout the crisis in

Libya and Syria. They all focused on civilian protection and did not defend the

country´s sovereignty since the Libyan as well as the Syrian Government lost

their legitimacy due to its violent actions against civilians. Hence, they mainly

blamed the Governments for the increasing violence. Furthermore, they all

perceived the ICISS criteria for coercive measures as satisfied and that is why

the US, France and the UK requested the implementation of coercive measures

in order to pressure the Governments and protect civilians.

Russia and China had a rather inconsistent approach since they did not

use their veto power in the Libyan case but used it excessively in the Syrian

case. The main reason for this is that they perceived the result of the imposition

of sanctions and the authorization of a military intervention in Libya as negative.

Hence, they tried to prevent that outcome in Syria by vetoing any Draft

Resolution which would open Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning sanctions

or military interventions. Furthermore, in retrospect they thought that the US,

France and the UK would not have the ´Right Intention´ but would rather have

attempted to pursue a regime change in Syria. During the Libyan crisis, Russia

and China expressed that they had those concerns but did not veto the

Resolutions since they had regional support (UNSC Meeting Record 6498). In

the Syrian case, Draft Resolutions requesting coercive measures, sanctions but

not a military intervention, also had regional support but this was not important to

Russia and China anymore. After Resolution 1970 and 1973 were implemented

in Libya, they saw what could happen if they allow coercive measures to be

implemented. According to them, sanctions and the military intervention were

deteriorating the crisis and NATOs excessive bombings led to even more

casualties. Russia and China did not want this to happen in Syria and thus, they

blocked all Draft Resolutions which included coercive measures, even if they

were only threatened and not authorized automatically. With this, they focused on

defending Syria´s sovereignty in all circumstances.

It is crucial to acknowledge that even though Russia and China did not veto

any Resolution regarding the Libyan crisis, they were not completely agreeing to

them since they did not perceive the all six criteria as satisfied. Hence, they were

not convinced of the Resolutions and the result was that NATOs bombings were

leading them to think that France, the UK and the US did not focus on civilian

protection but on regime change. Both feared that this would also happen in

Syria if they only allowed the slightest violation of Syria´s sovereignty (UNSC

Meeting Record 6711, 6751, 6756, 6810).

4. R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations

In order to determine whether the concept of R2P is an emerging norm in

International Relations, it is necessary to know what norms are and how a norm

successfully emerges.

The University of Cambridge defines a norm as an "accepted standard or

way of behaving or doing things that most people agree with" (Cambridge

University, 2013). This is similar to how Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink

(1998), both scholars of International Relations, perceive norms. Finnemore and

Sikkink analyzed the emergence of international norms and also the steps a

norm has to go through in order to be widely accepted. The first stage is the

Norm Emergence in which so called Norm Entrepreneurs, these are often

scholars, feel the need to change or enhance certain matters. Once Norm

Entrepreneurs form their ideas, they will go to an organization to promote this

idea. They usually chose to promote it in long established international

organizations, depending on the matter they would like to raise awareness about.

If the norm developers convince a majority of states of their idea, the potential

norm reaches a ´tipping point´. According to Finnemore and Sakkink, it is crucial

which states adopt the norm. The second stage is called the Norm Cascade in

which more states adopt the new norm due to international pressure. Afterwards,

the norm enters the third stage of Internationalization in which the new norm is

internalized due to its wide acceptance and is rarely questioned anymore. For all

these stages, a norm would need to be applied consistently in order to be

established successfully (ibid.).

When one applies the R2P concept, developed by ICISS, to the description

made by Finnemore and Sikkink about successful norm emergence it becomes

obvious that R2P is still in the early stages of norm emergence. R2P´s Norm

Entrepreneur is ICISS since this Commission was established to answer Kofi

Annan´s question about what to do if a state does not protect its population.

According to ICISS, a sovereign state has responsibilities, such as the protection

of its population, and if it does not protect the population, then the international

community has to do so by imposing sanctions or authorizing a military

intervention. ICISS brought its idea to the UN General Assembly to gain support.

So far, these steps are precisely accurate with the ones explained by Finnemore

and Sikkink who stated that the Norm Entrepreneur would promote his idea in an

organizational platform. Hence, the concept of R2P seems to be successfully

emerging (ICISS Report, 2001).

However, the UN General Assembly only adopted the general idea of R2P,

meaning that the states acknowledged their responsibility to protect their

population and that if a state fails to do so, the international community would

have the responsibility to step in. The detailed recommendations and criteria set

out by ICISS on how the international community should act precisely though

were left out (UN General Assembly, 2005).

Hence, since the organizational platform, the UN General Assembly, did not

incorporate the entire ICISS Report, meaningful changes, which may have an

impact in practice, were not included. This meant that R2P could not reach the

´tipping point` and would face the same challenges as humanitarian interventions

did in the 1990s. Therefore mass atrocity cases were and are still evaluated

based on selectivity without any guideline besides the UN Charter. The thesis

shows that it is important to analyze each individual country and furthermore, it is

highly relevant to incorporate guidelines and criteria for not only military

interventions but also coercive measures in general. Otherwise there will always

be the problem that in some cases the international community tries to protect

the country´s population but uses excessive military force (Kosovo, Libya) while it

does not act at all in other cases even though the country is unable or unwilling to

protect the population (Rwanda, Syria). This inconsistency hinders R2P from

emerging as a norm in International Relations, incorporating the entire ICISS

Report with its guidelines and criteria may help R2P to emerge.

One could argue that even if the UN General Assembly had adopted the

ICISS Report in its entirety and expanded the criteria to not only military

interventions but to coercive measures in general, there were already

weaknesses in the Report, particularly in these six criteria. Due to these

weaknesses, it would be difficult for the R2P concept to emerge. This leads to

further inconsistent action by the P5 members as already experienced throughout

the humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.

The strengths and weaknesses of the six criteria were already mentioned in

theory in chapter 2.4.2. With the discourse of the P5 members regarding Libya

and Syria now analysed it is clear that these weaknesses do not only exist in

theory but also in practice. The ICISS Report claims that countries should have

the `Right Intention´ when they decide to intervene into a sovereign state. The

right intention would be to protect civilians and not to pursue regime change.

However, ICISS also argues that regime change may be necessary to protect

civilians. Throughout the discourse on Libya, one could see that this dilemma

was real. While the US, the UK and France argued that Gadhafi should step

down since this would be the only way to protect civilians, Russia argued during

the Syrian discourse that the US, the UK and France only wanted a regime

change and did not attempt to protect civilians.

Furthermore, ICISS said that the ´Last Resort´ criterion should be satisfied,

meaning that peaceful measures should be explored before more coercive

measures. However, ICISS also expressed that sometimes there would be no

time left and more coercive measures had to be implemented immediately. This

issue can also be seen especially during the discourse on the Syrian crisis. While

France, the US and the UK tried include the threat of sanctions in their Draft

Resolutions, Russia and China were permanently vetoing these Drafts arguing

that dialogue and negotiation would be the only way to solve the crisis.

Additionally, the criteria ´Proportional Means´ and ´Reasonable Prospect´ are

also troublesome since both criteria are difficult to determine. The ICISS Report

does not explicitly give a guideline to infer proportionality. In practice, this

problem is illustrated in the Libyan crisis. While the UK, France and the US were

silent on this issue and one has to assume that they agreed to NATOs action

since they were NATO members, Russia and China repeatedly criticized NATO

for its excessive bombings. In regards to the `Reasonable Prospect´ criterion,

ICISS explained that a cost-benefit analysis should be done and that more

coercive measures should not be undertaken if it would cause more harm. The

US, France and the UK claimed that a military intervention in Libya and the threat

of sanctions in Syria would protect civilians since it would pressure the

Government. However, Russia and China argued that it would do more harm

than good.

Figure A2: R2P as an emerging norm

Source: Figure was taken from Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) International norm dynamics,

International Organization, 52 (4), pp. 887 917; Figure was adjusted

ICISS Report was not incorporated by the UN General Assembly entirely,

hence R2P could not reach the "Tipping point"

Even if the entire Report was incorporated, too many criteria need further

clarification

R2P is still in the early stages of norm emergence but does not to have the

potential to emerge further

While one can see that the ICISS Report lacks some important detail, it

entails an enormously strong element which may solve all the problems

mentioned above: The Code of Conduct. ICISS explained that the P5 members

should refrain from using their veto power if the Draft Resolution would deal with

the protection of civilians and the prevention of large-scale loss of lives and if the

Draft is otherwise supported by a majority. During the discourse on the Syrian

crisis, Russia and China repeatedly vetoed Draft Resolutions, as shown in the

Table A6 below, even though the majority supported them. If the Code of

Conduct would have been followed, then all Draft Resolutions would have been

adopted since the majority supported the Draft Resolutions. Hence, the deadlock

among the P5 members may have been prevented. This could have changed the

discourse in the Security Council as well as its actions. However, it is unlikely that

the P5 would voluntarily give up their veto power.

Table A6: Number of times P5 members used veto power on Draft Resolutions

dealing with the Syrian crisis

1. Draft

Resolution

612,

October 4

2011

2. Draft

Resolution 77,

February

2012

3. Draft

Resolution 538

July 19

2012

4. Draft

Resolution 348

May 22

2014

Favour: 9

Favour: 13

Favour: 11

Favour: 13

Abstentions: 4

Abstentions: 0

Abstentions:2 Abstentions:

Against:

Russia, China (veto

power)

Against:

Russia, China

(veto power)

Against:

Russia, China (veto

power)

Against:

Russia, China (veto

power)

Rejected due to

Russia´s and China´s

negative vote

Rejected due to

Russia´s and

China´s negative

vote

Rejected due to

Russia´s and

China´s negative

vote

Rejected due to

Russia´s and

China´s negative

vote

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Source: Data presented was taken from Draft Resolution 612, 77, 538, 348

In conclusion, it is evident that the Resolutions adopted by the Security

Council were not based on the concept of R2P and therefore, it had little to no

impact on the decision-making of the P5. Even though France, the UK and the

US demanded to implement coercive measures in Libya and Syria, they were

rarely referring to the term R2P directly. This can also be seen in the adopted

Resolutions and Draft Resolutions. They only indirectly referred to R2P but

directly to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Hence, it seems as if R2P did not add

anything new when one compares the decision-making of the Security Council

before the development of R2P and after.

At this stage, R2P does not have the potential to emerge as a norm in

International Relations and one can only hope that an answer to Kofi Annan´s

question on how to respond to mass atrocity cases can be found. Unfortunately,

it is certain that mass atrocities will continue to occur but it is not certain that the

Security Council will always be able to protect civilians.

For future research, one could analyze the hidden motivations of the P5

members. This thesis analyzed the discourse of the P5 and what they explicitly

said. However, one could go beyond and analyze the P5 members´ relations to

the governments of Libya and Syria regarding geostrategic policy as well as

military and economic interests. This could give further insight on why the

Security Council responded differently to the crisis in Libya and Syria.

One could also put this topic into the theoretical context, in particular to

International Relations theories. It would be interesting to find out if the different

responses could be explained by these theories.

Since this thesis argues that R2P does not have the potential of emerging

into a norm in International Relations, because the ICISS Report was not entirely

incorporated by the UN and the second pillar of R2P lacked clarity, it would be

interesting to analyze the first and third pillar of R2P by applying it to different

cases. One could then evaluate if these pillars are sufficient or need more clarity,

as the second pillar does, in order to enable R2P to emerge.

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with World Affairs, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 311-28

Annex

Figure A1: Brief summary of the methods

Figure A2: R2P as an emerging norm

Source: Figure was taken from Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) International norm

dynamics, International Organization, 52 (4), pp. 887 917; Figure was adjusted

Result

By applying both

methods it is possible

to answer the

Research Question

as well as the sub-

Research Questions

Content Anlaysis

- Do the P5 focus more on sovereignty or

Human Rights?

Discourse Analysis

- Do the P5 perceive the six criteria for

coercive measures as fulfilled?

- Do the theoretical weaknesses of the

criteria present a challenge in practice?

- How convincing are the P5s arguments?

- Is there a direct reference to R2P?

ICISS Report was not incorporated by the UN General Assembly entirely,

hence R2P could not reach the "Tipping point"

Even if the entire Report was incorporated, too many criteria need further

clarification

R2P is still in the early stages of norm emergence but does not to have the

potential to emerge further

Table A1: Summary of the six criteria for coercive measures and their weaknesses

7. ´Just

Cause´

Large-scale killings occur

There is evidence gathered by UN agencies or other credible

institutions (ICC)

8. ´Right

Intention´

Humanitarian purpose as main intention, not regime change as

initial intention

Regime change may be needed to protect civilians

Problem: Difficult to determine

o States could be accused of attempting regime change even

though they could argue that regime change needed to protect

civilians

Dilemma could occur among the P5

9. ´Last

Resort´

Peaceful measures have to be explored first, before more coercive

measures

Problem: Difficult to determine

o Some states may think that peaceful measures should be

implemented, while other states may be convinced that more

coercive measures are needed

Dilemma could occur among

the P5

10. ´Proportional Means´

Military operations should focus on specific targets only, minimal

use of force

Sometimes, immediate action is needed, no time to explore less

coercive measures

Problem: Difficult to determine

o Some states may perceive that the military means implement

are proportional while other states disagree

Dilemma could occur among the P5

11. ´Reasonable Prospects´

There is a chance of success that coercive measures can protect

civilians

If it would do more harm than good, then coercive measures

should not be implemented

Problem: Difficult to measure

o Different countries may have different perspectives on whether

coercive measures do more harm than good

Dilemma could occur among the P5

12. ´Right Authority´

UN Security Council should authorize coercive measures

P5 should adopt ´Code of Conduct´ (Refrain from veto power if

majority supports a Draft Resolution)

Source: Data presented in table was taken from the ICISS Report (2001) and adjusted

accordingly

Table A2: The discourse on Libya before and during Resolution 1970 and 1973

(February 25

2011 March 17

2011)

UK, US, France

Russia, China

7. Just

Cause

8. Right

Intention

9. Last

Resort

10. Proportional Means

11. Reasonable

Prospects

12. Right Authority

= criterion fulfilled

X = criterion not fulfilled

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6491, 6498

Table A3: The discourse on Libya directly after the implementation of Resolution

1970 and 1973 (May 4

2011 September 16

2011)

UK, US, France

Russia, China

7. Just

Cause

8. Right

Intention

9. Last

Resort

10. Proportional Means

11. Reasonable

Prospects

12. Right Authority

Red = this criterion is perceived differently to the one in the previous table

= criterion fulfilled

X = criterion not fulfilled

o = criterion may not be fulfilled

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6528, 6620

Table A4: The discourse on Syria (27

April 2011 May 22

2014)

UK, US, France

Russia, China

7. Just

Cause

8. Right

Intention

9. Last

Resort

10. Proportional Means

11. Reasonable

Prospects

12. Right Authority

Red = this criterion is perceived differently to the one in the previous table

= criterion fulfilled

X = criterion not fulfilled

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6524, 6627, 6710, 6711, 6751,

6756, 6810, 7038, 7116, 7180

Table A5: The P5s focus on sovereignty related aspects and human rights/civilian

protection related aspects

Libya

Syria

Human

Rights

aspects/civilian

protection

Sovereignty-

related aspects

Human Rights

aspects/civilian

protection

Sovereignty-

aspects

France

12 (10)

50 (37) (3)

9 (9)

32 (27)

USA

9 (11)

50 (81) (4)

Russia

8 (1) (1)

11 (4) (2)

China 1

5 (1)

Directly accusing Libyan/Syrian Government of killing/torturing innocent civilians

Directly accusing terrorists of killing/torturing innocent civilians

Directly accusing NATO of killing innocent civilians

Source: Table is based on Security Council Meeting Records 6491, 6498, 6528, 6620, 6524,

6627, 6710, 6711, 6751, 6756, 6810,7038, 7116, 7180

Table A5.1: Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record, 6491

meeting, 25 February 2011 (Adopted Resolution 1970)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related

argument

France

3 (4)

o SC6491/5/1(1)

o SC6491/5/2(2)

o SC6491/5/3(1)

2 (1)

o SC6491/2/1(1)

o SC6491/2/2

USA

4 (5)

o SC6491/3/1(2)

o SC6491/3/2(2)

o SC6491/3/3

o SC6491/3/4(1)

Russia

3 (1)

o SC6491/4/1

o SC6491/4/2(1)

o SC6491/4/3

o SC6491/4/1,1

o SC6491/4/2,1

China 1

o SC6491/4/1,2

Directly condemning the Libyan Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6491, 2011

Table A5.2: Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record, 6498

meeting, 17 March 2011 (Adopted Resolution 1973, Russia and China abstained)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related

argument

France

5 (4)

o SC6498/2/1(1)

o SC6498/2/2(1)

o SC6498/2/3(1)

o SC6498/3/4(1)

o SC6498/3/5

3 (7)

o SC6498/4/1(4)

o SC6498/4/2(2)

o SC6498/4/3(1)

USA

2 (3)

o SC6498/5/1(2)

o SC6498/5/2(1)

Russia 2

o SC6498/8/1

o SC6498/8/2

o SC6498/8/1,1

China 0

o SC6498/10/1

Directly condemning the Libyan Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6498, 2011

Table A5.3: Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record, 6528

meeting, 4 May 2011 (ICC Prosecutor, no draft resolution)

P5 Members

Human Rights (violations)

related arguments

Sovereignty related

arguments

France

2 (2)

o SC6528/13/1(1)

o SC6528/13/2(1)

2 (1)

o SC6528/4/1(1)

o SC6528/5/2

2 (3)

o SC6528/12/1(1)

o SC6528/12/2(2)

Russia

3 (1)

o SC6528/9/2(1)

China 0

o SC6528/10/1

Directly condemning the Libyan Government

Directly condemning NATO

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6528, 2011

Table A5.4: Coding Schedule on Libya: Security Council Meeting Record, 6620

meeting, 16 September 2011 (Adopted Resolution 2009)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France 2

o SC6620/3/1,1

o SC6620/3/2,1

UK 2

o SC6620/2/1

o SC6620/2/2

USA 1

o SC6620/4/1

Russia 2

o SC6620/3/1

o SC6620/3/2

China 0

o SC6620/4/1,1

o SC6620/4/2

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6620, 2011

Table A5.5: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6524

meeting, 27

April 2011 (Briefing by Pascoe)

P5 Members

Human Rights (violations)

related arguments

Sovereignty related

arguments

France

3 (2)

o SC6524/5/1(2)

o SC6524/5/2

o SC6524/5/3

2 (1)

o SC6524/17/1(1)

o SC6524/1

7/2

USA

3 (7)

o SC6524/4/1(2)

o SC6524/4/2(1)

o SC6524/4/3(4)

Russia 1

o SC6524/7/1

o SC6524/7/1,1

China 0

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6524, 2011

Table A5.6: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6627

meeting, 4 Oct 2011 (On a draft Resolution which was vetoed by Russia and

China

P5 Members

Human Rights (violations)

related arguments

Sovereignty related

arguments

France

5 (4)

o SC6627/2/1

(1)

o SC6627/2/2

(1)

o SC6627/2/3

(1)

o SC6627/3/4

(1)

o SC6627/4/5

3 (5)

o SC6627/7/1

(1)

o SC6627/7/2

o SC6627/7/3

(4)

USA

8 (16)

o SC6627/8/1

(1)

o SC6627/8/2

(1)

o SC6627/8/3

(4)

o SC6627/8/4

(3)

o SC6627/8/5

(1)

o SC6627/9/6

(4)

o SC6627/9/7

(1)

o SC6627/9/8

(1)

Russia

1 (1)

o SC6627/4/1

(1)

o SC6627/3/1

o SC6627/3/2

o SC6627/4/3

o SC6627/4/4

o SC6627/4/5

o SC6627/4/6

o SC6627/4/7

o SC6627/4/8

China 0

o SC6627/5/1

o SC6627/5/2

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Directly condemning terrorists

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6627, 2011

Table A5.7: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6710

meeting 31

January 2012 (Briefing by LoS)

P5 Members

Human Rights (violations)

related arguments

Sovereignty related

arguments

France 4

o SC6710/14/1

o SC6710/15/2

o SC6170/15/3

UK 2

o SC6710/17/1

o SC6710/1

7/2

USA

2 (5)

o SC6710/13/1(3)

o SC6710/13/2(2)

Russia 1

o SC6710/17/1,1

o SC6710/24/1

o SC6710/24/2

China 1

o SC6710/25/1

o SC6710/25/1,1

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6710, 2012

Table A5.8: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6711

meeting, 4 Feb 2012 (On a draft Resolution which was vetoed by Russia and

China)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related

arguments

France

8 (5)

o SC6711/3/1

o SC6711/3/2

o SC6711/3/3

o SC6711/3/4

(1)

o SC6711/3/5

o SC6711/3/6

(2)

o SC6711/4/7

o SC6711/4/8

(2)

6 (7)

o SC6711/6/1

(1)

o SC6711/6/2

(3)

o SC6711/7/3

(2)

o SC6711/7/4

(1)

o SC6711/7/5

o SC6711/7/6

USA

6 (6)

o SC6711/5/1(2)

o SC6711/5/2(1)

o SC6711/5/3(1)

o SC6711/5/4(2)

o SC6711/5/5

o SC6711/5/6

Russia

2 (2)

o SC6711/9/1,1

(1)

o SC6711/9/2

(1)

o SC6711/9/1

China 0

o SC6711/9/1,2

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Directly condemning terrorists

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6711, 2012

Table A5.9: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6751

meeting, 14 April 2012, on the adopted Resolution

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France

4 (5)

o SC6751/6/1(2)

o SC6751/6/2(1)

o SC6751/6/3(2)

o SC6751/6/4

UK 1

o SC6751/2/1(1)

USA

4 (9)

o SC6751/9/1(3)

o SC6751/9/2(3)

o SC6751/9/3(2)

o SC6751/9/4(1)

Russia 0

o SC6751/3/1

China 0

o SC6751/4/1

o SC6751/4/2

o SC6751/4/3

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6751, 2012

Table A5.10: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6756

meeting, 21st April 2012, on the adopted Resolution

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France

5 (6)

o SC6756/3/1

o SC6756/3/2(3)

o SC6756/3/3(2)

o SC6756/3/4

o SC6756/3/5(1)

3 (4)

o SC6756/6/1(2)

o SC6756/6/2

o SC6756/6/2(2)

USA

5 (11)

o SC6756/10/1(1)

o SC6756/10/2(2)

o SC6756/10/3(4)

o SC6756/10/4(1)

o SC6756/10/5(3)

Russia 0

o SC6756/2/1

China 0

o SC6756/8/1

o SC6756/8/2

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6756, 2012

Table A5.11: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 6810

meeting, 19

July 2012 (On a draft Resolution which was vetoed by Russia and

China)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France

7 (4)

o SC6810/3/1

o SC6810/3/2

o SC6810/4/3(2)

o SC6810/4/4(2)

o SC6810/4/5

o SC6810/4/6

o SC6810/4/7

3 (3)

o SC6810/2/1(2)

o SC6810/2/2

o SC6810/3/3(1)

USA

5 (10)

o SC6810/10/1(1)

o SC6810/10/2(4)

o SC6810/10/3(3)

o SC6810/10/4(1)

o SC6810/11/5(1)

Russia 0

o SC6810/8/1

o SC6810/8/2

China

1 (1)

o SC6810/13/1(1)

o SC6810/13/1

o SC6810/14/2

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Directly condemning terrorists

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 6810, 2012

Table A5.12: Coding Schedule: Security Council Meeting Record, 7038

meeting,

27 Sept 2013 (on the adopted Resolution 2118)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France

3 (1)

o SC7038/7/1(1)

o SC7038/8/2

o SC7038/6/5

UK 5

o SC7038/5/1

o SC7038/6/2

o SC7038/6/3

o SC7038/6/4

o SC7038/6/5

USA

5 (3)

o SC7038/4/1

o SC7038/4/2(1)

o SC7038/5/3(1)

o SC7038/5/4(1)

o SC7038/5/5

Russia 0

o SC7038/3/1

o SC7038/4/2

China 1

o SC7038/9/1

o SC7038/1,1

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 7038, 2013

Table A5.13: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 7116

meeting, 22 February 2014 (on the adopted Resolution 2139)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France

4 (5)

o SC7116/5/1

o SC7116/5/2

o SC7116/5/3(1)

o SC7116/5/4(4)

4 (4)

o SC7116/8/1(1)

o SC7116/8/2

o SC7116/8/3(2)

o SC7116/9/4(1)

USA

4 (1) (1)

o SC7116/6/1

o SC7116/6/2 (1) (1)

o SC7116/6/3

o SC7116/6/4

Russia

4 (1)

o SC7116/7/1,1

o SC7116/7/2(1)

o SC7116/7/3

o SC7116/8/4

o SC7116/7/1

o SC7116/8/2

China 1

o SC7116/10/1

o SC7116/10/1,1

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Directly condemning terrorists

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 2139, 2014

Table A5.14: Coding Schedule on Syria: Security Council Meeting Record, 7180

meeting, 22 May 2014 (Draft Resolution, vetoed by Russia and China)

P5 Members

Human Rights related

arguments

Sovereignty related argument

France

7 (5) (3)

o SC7180/3/1 (3) (2)

o SC7180/3/2

o SC7180/3/3

o SC7180/3/4(1)

o SC7180/4/5(1)

(1)

o SC7180/4/6

o SC7180/15/7

3 (3)

o SC7180/7/1(1)

o SC7180/7/2(1)

o SC7180/7/3(1)

USA

8 (13) (3)

o SC7180/4/1

o SC7180/4/2(5)

o SC7180/4/3(3)

o SC7180/5/4(3)

(2)

o SC7180/5/5

o SC7180/5/6

o SC7180/5/7(2)

(1)

o SC7180/6/8

Russia

2 (2 Terr) (1 NATO)

o SC7180/12/1(2)

o SC7180/13/2(1)

o SC7180/12/1

o SC7180/13/2

o SC7180/13/3

China 1

o SC7180/13/1

o SC7180/13/1,1

Directly condemning the Syrian Government

Directly condemning terrorists

Source: Data presented in table was taken from UNSC Meeting Record 7180, 2014

Table A6: Number of times P5 members used veto power on Draft Resolutions

dealing with the Syrian crisis

5. Draft

Resolution

612,

October 4

2011

6. Draft

Resolution 77,

February

2012

7. Draft

Resolution 538

July 19

2012

8. Draft

Resolution 348

May 22

2014

Favour: 9

Favour: 13

Favour: 11

Favour: 13

Abstentions: 4

Abstentions: 0

Abstentions:2 Abstentions:

Against:

Russia, China (veto

Against:

Russia, China

Against:

Russia, China (veto

Against:

Russia, China (veto

power) (veto

power)

power) power)

Rejected due to

Russia´s and China´s

negative vote

Rejected due to

Russia´s and

China´s negative

vote

Rejected due to

Russia´s and

China´s negative

vote

Rejected due to

Russia´s and

China´s negative

vote

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Code of Conduct

would apply due to

support by the

majority

Source: Data presented was taken from Draft Resolution 612, 77, 538, 348

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Year: 2017
ISBN (PDF): 9783960676935
File size: 1.7 MB
Language: English
Institution / College: Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences
Publication date: 2017 (September)
Grade: 1.5
Keywords: Security Council International law Sovereignty UN Charter Arab spring Human rights Responsibility to Protect United Nations Military intervention P5

Author

Nadine O'Shea (Author)

R2P as an emerging norm in International Relations. United Nations Security Council decision-making on Libya and Syria

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Author

Nadine O'Shea (Author)